{ "id": 4304267, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. GLEN AYRE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Glendale Heights v. Glen Ayre Enterprises, Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20140791", "first_page": "205", "last_page": "213", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "404 Ill. App. 3d 205" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2425670 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407", "parenthetical": "relying on the idea that the Code of Civil Procedure's general limitations provisions were all qualified by the statement that they applied \" 'except when a different limitation is prescribed by statute' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/336/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614053 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149-50" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "150-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183283 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72", "parenthetical": "explaining the normal discovery rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967040 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351063 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5441133 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "citing older cases and applying the 1979 version of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499218 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "809-10" }, { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564663 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "\"It is a basic axiom of statutory construction that in determining the intent of the legislature, a court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also 'the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706356 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615076 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0217-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 21756, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.400479698708787e-08, "percentile": 0.27607883702872255 }, "sha256": "869da10cba82b06c609840f8e251c9171edc3a611ea512b979995deece50ca2d", "simhash": "1:f26f4db4ef4ff43b", "word_count": 3451 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:54.131587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. GLEN AYRE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants and counterplaintiffs, Glen Ayre Enterprises, Inc., and its president, Albert Schneider, appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of plaintiff and counterdefendant, the Village of Glendale Heights, on plaintiff\u2019s complaint seeking relief for zoning ordinance violations on defendants\u2019 property. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to consider their affirmative defense that the property should not be subject to plaintiff\u2019s ordinances, because the property was never validly annexed into the Village of Glendale Heights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nIn its January 2004 complaint, plaintiff alleged that Glen Ayre was the owner of a parcel of real estate that had been annexed into the Village of Glendale Heights via an October 2000 ordinance. The complaint further alleged that Glen Ayre violated plaintiffs zoning ordinances, and it thus sought injunctions restricting the use of the land.\nDefendants thereafter filed affirmative defenses, including the defense that the annexation was void because it was not accomplished in compliance with governing statutes. Plaintiff responded to this affirmative defense by arguing, inter alia, that defendants were seeking to overturn the annexation after the one-year statutory time limit.\nAt trial, plaintiff adduced evidence that the subject property had several ordinance violations, and defendants attempted to establish, largely through offers of proof, that the annexation ordinance was void. The trial court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to declarations that the annexation was valid and that defendants\u2019 property was subject to plaintiffs ordinances. After the trial court denied their post-judgment motion, defendants timely appealed.\nOn appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations barred their affirmative defense contesting the validity of the annexation. Defendants call upon us to interpret the reach of the limitations statute; such questions of statutory interpretation are issues of law to be reviewed de novo. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 220 (2008).\nIn construing a statute, a court\u2019s primary goal is to determine the intent of the legislature, and the best indicator of that intent is the plain language of the statute in question. In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill. 2d 107, 116 (2008). We thus begin with the language of the limitations statute upon which the trial court relied. That language appears, not among the many statutes of limitations in the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2004)), but in section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1\u201446 (West 2004)), near the end of a Municipal Code division pertaining to annexation of territory (see 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 2004)). Section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 provides as follows:\n\u201cNeither the People of the State of Illinois nor any person, firm or corporation, public or private, nor any association of persons shall commence an action contesting either directly or indirectly the annexation of any territory to a municipality unless initiated within one year after the date such annexation becomes final ***. *** The limitation set forth in this section shall apply to any annexation, even where the judge, body or officer annexing the territory did not at the time of such annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be defective or void, except that the limitation of this Section shall not apply to annexations of territory which was not contiguous at the time of annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest such annexation.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1\u201446 (West 2004).\nDefendants do not dispute that the current suit, and thus their affirmative defense based on the validity of the annexation, did not commence within a year of the date the annexation was finalized. Defendants also do not dispute the contiguity of the subject property, so they do not fall within the exception provided in the limitations statute. Instead, defendants argue that the limitations statute does not apply here.\nDefendants\u2019 former counsel based this argument on the statute\u2019s language providing that a party \u201cshall not commence an action\u201d \u201cunless initiated\u201d within the one-year limitations period. Counsel argued that this language, given its plain meaning, indicates the legislature\u2019s intent that the limitations period apply only to the commencement of actions, not to affirmative defenses. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 201 (West 2004) (\u201cEvery action *** shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint\u201d).\nThis argument, which defendants\u2019 former counsel appears to have been the first to conceive, espouses a very reasonable interpretation of the quoted statutory language. Indeed, it is quite true that the language can be read to imply that defenses should not be barred by the statute. However, plaintiff is correct when it responds that the remainder of section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 sets out a legislative purpose that, under the facts of this case, conflicts with defendants\u2019 reading. The overall language of the statute, which bars actions \u201ceither directly or indirectly\u201d contesting an annexation more than a year after the annexation has been finalized (65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1\u201446 (West 2004)), indicates the legislature\u2019s \u201cobvious intent of shielding the zoning provisions of annexation agreements from attack after the passage of the one-year limitation period\u201d (Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d 100, 109 (2001)). As plaintiff argues, to allow defendants to defend against plaintiff\u2019s assertion of zoning authority by arguing that the annexation was invalid would be to allow defendants to challenge the annexation agreement \u201cindirectly,\u201d despite the legislature\u2019s intent to forestall such challenges.\nFaced with this conflict, we must follow the portions of section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 more closely tied to the legislature\u2019s purpose; that is, we must follow the language indicating the legislature\u2019s intent that annexations be shielded from attack after the passage of the one-year limitations period, rather than the \u201ccommence an action\u201d language upon which defendants rely. This result follows from several principles. First, although defendants are correct that the language of the statute, read literally, extends the limitations period only to \u201ccommence[ment of] an action\u201d and not to assertion of a defense, the language also indicates that it should apply to a defense with the purpose of challenging a finalized annexation beyond the limitations period. Thus, the language of section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 yields more than one interpretation. Second, if the facts of this case force us to choose which of two aspects of the statute the legislature intended to have enforced, we think it far more likely that the common phrase, \u201ccommence an action,\u201d was included without full consideration than that the unique purpose of the statute was set forth without full consideration. Thus, the policy language is far more likely to reflect legislative intent than is the offhand \u201ccommence an action\u201d language. Third, as stated, our goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain legislative intent; the language of the statute is the most reliable means to that end, but not the end in itself. Where the two conflict, we must follow the purpose. Cf. American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d 230, 239 (1989) (\u201cIt is a basic axiom of statutory construction that in determining the intent of the legislature, a court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also \u2018the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved\u2019 \u201d), quoting Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (1987). Fourth, and relatedly, when a court seeks to determine the meaning of statutory language, it should not construe words and phrases in isolation, but instead should interpret the language in light of the statute as a whole. E.g., Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). While, in isolation, the phrase \u201ccommence an action\u201d can be read to limit section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 to only actions and thus exclude defenses, the section as a whole very strongly indicates that the legislature intended to insulate finalized annexations from all legal attacks, whether or not by commencement of actions. Under the facts of this case, based on these principles, we interpret section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 as applying to defendants\u2019 affirmative defense challenging the validity of the annexation just as it would apply to a claim challenging the annexation. Thus, we reject defendants\u2019 argument that the trial court erred in concluding that section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 barred their affirmative defense regarding the validity of the annexation.\nThe decision in People ex rel. City of Des Plaines v. Village of Mount Prospect, 29 Ill. App. 3d 807 (1975), does not change our result. In Des Plaines, the plaintiff municipality filed an action to declare invalid another annexation of the same property by the defendant municipality, on the basis that the property had already been annexed when the second municipality purported to annex it. Des Plaines, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 809. The defendant answered by challenging the validity of the plaintiffs annexation. Des Plaines, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 809. The plaintiff filed its action within one year of its own annexation, but the defendant\u2019s answer was filed one week after the one-year anniversary. Des Plaines, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10. On appeal, the court held that the defendant\u2019s answer bore \u201ca striking resemblance to a counterclaim,\u201d and it thus applied the rule that a counterclaim not barred by a statute of limitations at the commencement of an action will not be so barred if raised during the action. Des Plaines, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 812. Here, by contrast, defendants do not argue that their challenge to the annexation\u2019s validity raises a counterclaim, and, in any event, the action here commenced long after the one-year limitations period had run.\nAside from the above statutory-interpretation argument, defendants\u2019 former counsel also contended that the annexation was void ab initio and thus a nullity that could be attacked at any time, notwithstanding any statute of limitations. In their briefs, defendants cited several cases that state the proposition that an annexation that fails to comply with certain statutory requirements may be considered void and thus may be attacked at any time. However, the case law upon which defendants relied was based on a previous version of section 7 \u2014 1\u201446. E.g., In re Annexation to City of Prospect Heights, 111 Ill. App. 3d 541, 543 (1982) (citing older cases and applying the 1979 version of the statute). That previous version provided that \u201cthe limitation set forth in [the] section shall not apply to any annexation where the judge, body or officer annexing the territory did not at the time of such annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 1\u201446. Section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 was since amended (Pub. Act 82 \u2014 211, \u00a71, eff. August 14, 1981) to state precisely the opposite. The section now provides that its limitations period \u201cshall apply to any annexation, even where the judge, body or officer annexing the territory did not at the time of such annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be defective or void.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1\u201446 (West 2006). This amended language directly refutes defendants\u2019 voidness argument.\nIn their briefs, defendants\u2019 counsel next argued that, even if the statute of limitations contained in section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 might otherwise apply, it does not apply here, because defendants\u2019 challenge to the validity of the annexation falls within what counsel called the \u201csaving\u201d provision of section 13 \u2014 207 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 207 (West 2004)). That provision states as follows:\n\u201cA defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by the statute of limitation *** to any action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff *** before such set-off or counterclaim was so barred, and not otherwise.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 207 (West 2004).\nThe purpose of this section \u201cis to prevent plaintiffs from intentionally filing their claims as late as possible in order to preclude defendants from a reasonable opportunity to file their counterclaim within the original limitations period.\u201d Cameron General Corp. v. Hafnia Holdings, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 495, 506 (1997).\nOur threshold difficulty with this argument is that it presumes that defendants\u2019 challenge to the annexation is a counterclaim, despite counsel\u2019s insistence, in the statute of limitations argument, that defendants\u2019 challenge was a defense and not a claim. However, nomenclature aside, we do not agree that the \u201csaving\u201d provision of section 13 \u2014 207 saves defendants\u2019 claim here.\nThe particular statute of limitations at issue here, section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 of the Municipal Code, is no ordinary statute of limitations. The typical statute of limitations exists primarily \u201cto require the prosecution of a right of action within a reasonable time to prevent the loss or impairment of available evidence and to discourage delay in the bringing of claims.\u201d Tom Olesker\u2019s Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 61 Ill. 2d 129, 132 (1975). Section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 was enacted with an entirely different aim: \u201cshielding the zoning provisions of annexation agreements from attack after the passage of the one-year limitation period.\u201d Langendorf, 197 Ill. 2d at 109. The legislative preference for finality in annexation proceedings is so strong that, again unlike typical statutes of limitations, the annexation limitations statute is not tempered by any discovery rule pausing the start of the limitations period until the claimant knew of or should have discovered the cause of action. See, e.g., Lubin v. Jewish Children\u2019s Bureau, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171-72 (2002) (explaining the normal discovery rule). These two observations compel the conclusion that section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 represents a legislative policy, in favor of limiting annexation challenges, that is unusually strong among limitations statutes. To enforce the \u201csaving\u201d provision of section 13 \u2014 207 against section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 would be to allow a general limitations statute to vitiate the unusually strong, and very specific, policy embodied in section 7 \u2014 1\u201446.\nThis court has explained that section 13 \u2014 207\u2019s \u201csaving\u201d provision does not apply in similar situations, albeit at least partially for reasons rendered obsolete under our current constitution. In Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149 (1974), the defendant raised a counterclaim based on a federal statute containing a one-year limitations period, and the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the counterclaim as time-barred. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 149-50. On appeal, the court quoted the \u201csaving\u201d provision of a previous version of section 13 \u2014 207 (see King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 150, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 83, par. 18), but it then noted that the saving provision was qualified by the rule that it did not \u201csupplant fixed limitations expressed in statutes that create *** actions\u201d (King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 150). The court observed that several types of statutes creating causes of action not known to common law, and also containing their own limitations provisions, had \u201cbeen construed as creating the condition precedent that the action be filed within the time prescribed in the statute creating the right.\u201d King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The court explained that its rule, which would disregard a general statute of limitations where a more specific limitations period is embedded within the statute itself, was based on the idea that \u201ccompliance with fixed limitations within the statute is indispensable to the maintenance of a right thereunder\u201d because the time element of the statute \u201cis such an integral part of the enactment *** that it necessarily is a condition of the liability itself and not on the remedy alone.\u201d King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 150. However, the King court cautioned against a \u201cboilerplate application of the rationale that demands strict compliance with all prerequisites of the statutory created actions,\u201d and it cited precedent for the notion that a court considering whether to apply a general limitations statute should balance the purposes underlying that general statute and the particular statute at issue. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 151.\nWe say that the reasoning in King is at least partially obsolete because it is packaged in language implying that courts enjoy limited statutory jurisdiction or that the legislature may impose conditions precedent to courts\u2019 jurisdiction; our supreme court has explained that neither of those concepts is true under our current constitution. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002). However, questions of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the point still holds that the legislature may condition a party\u2019s ability to recover, and a court must enforce such restrictions even if its failure to do so would not create a jurisdictional defect. Thus, we can take from King the idea that, by embedding a particularized limitations period within a statute, the legislature might intend that the limitation be integral to the statute despite a contrary limitations period (or \u201csaving\u201d provision) contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure King suggests for determining whether the particularized limitations period is, in fact, integral, so that it should override the general provision (or \u201csaving\u201d provision) in the Code of Civil Procedure, is to determine whether the purpose for the particularized limitation outweighs the purpose for the general limitation. We undertake that analysis above, where we conclude that section 7 \u2014 1\u2014 46, the particularized limitations statute at issue here, embodies a legislative policy that is much stronger than the general policy animating the general limitations provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that the general \u201csaving\u201d provision contained in section 13 \u2014 207 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not supplant the particularized limitation contained in section 7 \u2014 1\u201446 of the Municipal Code, and we reject defendants\u2019 former counsel\u2019s argument that section 13 \u2014 207 saves their claim. Because we conclude that defendants may not now challenge the annexation of the subject property, we do not consider any arguments contesting the propriety of the annexation.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nJORGENSEN and HUDSON, JJ., concur.\nAfter the parties finished briefing, and after we held oral argument, defendants filed an \u201cemergency motion\u201d stating that they had discharged their appellate counsel. The motion asked that we strike their briefs and oral argument but that we nonetheless reverse the trial court\u2019s decision on the basis that the underlying annexation was invalid. We hereby grant the motion and thus disregard defendants\u2019 now-withdrawn claims unrelated to the validity of the annexation. However, defendants\u2019 motion offers no cogent legal argument as to why the purported invalidity of the annexation should affect plaintiffs action. Instead of summarily rejecting defendants\u2019 appeal on that basis, we consider the invalid-annexation issue in light of the legal arguments advanced by their former counsel.\ndefendants in their briefs protested that they were not challenging the annexation, but were \u201conly seekfing] a finding that [plaintiff] cannot prove its case because the underlying foundation of its power [i.e., the annexation] is fatally defective\u201d or \u201csimply *** defending a claim *** founded upon an ineffective and non-existent annexation.\u201d By defendants\u2019 own description, then, their argument depends on the idea that the annexation was invalid. Thus, the only way a court could accept their argument is by ruling that the annexation was invalid. Further, the effect of defendants\u2019 argument, if successful, would be that plaintiff could not enforce its zoning and related laws against defendants; this, for all practical purposes, is the same remedy defendants would receive if they successfully challenged the annexation. We therefore are not persuaded that defendants are not challenging the annexation.\nPlaintiff does not dispute defendants\u2019 counsel\u2019s assertion that plaintiffs cause of action accrued during the one-year limitations period for a claim challenging the annexation.\nWe further note that King relied on case law that came to the same rule by analyzing statutory language that no longer appears in the Code of Civil Procedure. See King, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 150-51, citing Wilson v. Tromly, 336 Ill. App. 403, 407 (1949) (relying on the idea that the Code of Civil Procedure\u2019s general limitations provisions were all qualified by the statement that they applied \u201c \u2018except when a different limitation is prescribed by statute\u2019 \u201d), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, ch. 83, par. 13.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Glenn R. Gaffney and Justin R. Gaffney, both of Gaffney & Gaffney, of Glendale Heights, for appellants.", "Andrew Y. Acker, of Storino, Ramello & Durkin, of Rosemont, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. GLEN AYRE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20140791\nOpinion filed August 31, 2010.\nRehearing denied October 15, 2010.\nGlenn R. Gaffney and Justin R. Gaffney, both of Gaffney & Gaffney, of Glendale Heights, for appellants.\nAndrew Y. Acker, of Storino, Ramello & Durkin, of Rosemont, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0205-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 229 }