{ "id": 4304251, "name": "LEODA KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VAN MATRE REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Knight v. Van Matre Rehabilitation Center, LLC", "decision_date": "2010-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20141127", "first_page": "214", "last_page": "218", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "404 Ill. App. 3d 214" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282233 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373", "parenthetical": "providing that \"good cause\" as used in another context, i.e., to extend the time to respond to a request to admit under supreme court rules, is fact-dependent and rests with the trial court's sound discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894556 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201319 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2680066 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629533 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "providing that the version of section 2 - 622(a)(2) in effect as of August 25, 2005, expressly prohibited additional extensions once the original 90-day extension to file the applicable affidavit and health care professional's report had passed" }, { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "noting that when a statute is declared unconstitutional, its language reverts to what it was prior to the amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79402 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352932 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0378-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 9813, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1448982160736012 }, "sha256": "375dcb741433d9a229de42124ed1e04e7336994919670ce04e51a8616edc8c5a", "simhash": "1:e9e84fb4f469c9e5", "word_count": 1618 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:54.131587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEODA KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VAN MATRE REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue raised in this appeal is whether the medical malpractice complaint of plaintiff, Leoda Knight, had to be dismissed when she failed to timely file a health care professional\u2019s report. Given a change in the applicable law, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint and remand this cause for further proceedings.\nThe facts relevant to resolving this appeal are as follows. Plaintiff was a resident of a health care facility operated by defendant Van Matre Rehabilitation Center, LLC. Defendant Dr. Skuli Agustsson was an employee of Van Matre. On or about June 12, 2007, plaintiff took a medication that Agustsson had prescribed for her. The medication adversely affected plaintiff, causing her to suffer, among other things, severe physical injuries, mental anguish, and various economic losses. On June 12, 2009, plaintiff sued Van Matre and Agustsson for their alleged negligent acts, noting in her complaint that \u201c[a]n Affidavit from a Health Care Professional, in accordance with 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622 will be filed within ninety (90) days.\u201d\nOn September 18, 2009, 98 days after plaintiff filed her complaint, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint (see 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619 (West 2008)), because plaintiff failed to file within 90 days after filing her complaint the report of a health care professional attesting to the merit of plaintiffs claims. A few days later, plaintiff moved for additional time to file the health care professional\u2019s report, claiming that the retained professional needed access to more documents in order to properly assess plaintiffs claims. On September 30, 2009, without leave of court, plaintiff filed the report. That same day, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss with prejudice, finding that section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West 2008)) allows only one 90-day extension for the filing of a health care professional\u2019s report. Also on that date, the court denied plaintiffs motion for additional time to file the report, and, pursuant to Van Matre\u2019s request, the court struck the report that plaintiff had filed.\nAt issue in this appeal is whether section 2 \u2014 622 of the Code mandated that plaintiff\u2019s malpractice complaint be dismissed with prejudice when she failed to file a report from a health care professional within 90 days after filing her complaint. Before addressing that issue, we determine what standard of review should apply. Although we typically review the dismissal of a complaint with prejudice (as opposed to without prejudice) under an abuse of discretion standard (see Ingold v. Irwin, 302 Ill. App. 3d 378, 383-84 (1998)), we determine that a de novo standard of review applies here, because the trial court\u2019s decision was based on whether plaintiff complied with section 2 \u2014 622, which involves statutory interpretation (Moyer v. Southern Illinois Hospital Service Corp., 327 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894 (2002)). The trial court found that a dismissal with prejudice was required because plaintiff did not file a written report within 90 days after filing her complaint and \u201cthe intention of the legislature in drafting the amendments to \u00a72 \u2014 622 was that only one 90 day extension should be granted.\u201d\nIn considering the substance of plaintiff\u2019s claim, we begin by examining the law in effect when plaintiff filed her complaint. Sections 2 \u2014 622(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Code provided that an affidavit from the plaintiffs counsel (or from the plaintiff if the plaintiff is proceeding pro se) and a report from a health care professional similar to the defendant must be filed with the plaintiffs medical malpractice complaint or within 90 days thereafter if the complaint is filed just prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 622(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008). When plaintiff filed her complaint, section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) of the Code also provided, in relevant part, that \u201c[n]o additional 90-day extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall be granted, except where there has been a withdrawal of the plaintiffs counsel.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West 2008). Section 2 \u2014 622(g) of the Code provided that \u201c[t]he failure of the plaintiff to file an affidavit and report in compliance with this Section shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 \u2014 619.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(g) (West 2008). These provisions of sections 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) and (g) were added by Public Act 94 \u2014 677 (Pub. Act 94 \u2014 677, \u00a7330, eff. August 25, 2005).\nGiven the specific language of sections 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) and (g), the trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs complaint. See Jackson v. Victory Memorial Hospital, 387 Ill. App. 3d 342, 349 (2008) (providing that the version of section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) in effect as of August 25, 2005, expressly prohibited additional extensions once the original 90-day extension to file the applicable affidavit and health care professional\u2019s report had passed). However, the law has been changed.\nOn February 4, 2010, our supreme court, in addressing the constitutionality of the statute limiting the recovery of noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice action, held Public Act 94 \u2014 677 \u201cinvalid and void in its entirety.\u201d Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 250 (2010). As a result, the parts of section 2 \u2014 622 that Public Act 94 \u2014 677 amended reverted to what they were prior to August 25, 2005. See Jackson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 346 (noting that when a statute is declared unconstitutional, its language reverts to what it was prior to the amendment).\nPrior to August 25, 2005, section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) provided that \u201c[i]f an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificate and written report required by paragraph 1 shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the complaint.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West 2004). However, section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) did not state that no additional 90-day extensions shall be granted. Section 2 \u2014 622(g) provided that \u201c[t]he failure to file a certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 \u2014 619.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(g) (West 2004).\nIn interpreting section 2 \u2014 622 as it existed before August 25, 2005, courts found that noncompliance with section 2 \u2014 622 did not mandate that the trial court dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Wasielewski v. Gilligan, 189 Ill. App. 3d 945, 950 (1989). For instance, if the plaintiff failed to file the affidavit and report within the 90-day statutory period, the trial court could grant the plaintiff another extension of time to file them if the plaintiff could establish good cause for not filing them within 90 days. Tucker v. St. James Hospital, 279 Ill. App. 3d 696, 704 (1996). The decision whether to grant another extension was within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion and was not disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. McCastle v. Sheinkop, 121 Ill. 2d 188, 194 (1987); Tucker, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 704.\nGiven the above, we are left with the question of what relief should be afforded plaintiff. Defendants suggest that this cause be remanded so that the trial court may consider (1) whether plaintiff had good cause for not filing the health care professional\u2019s report within 90 days after the complaint was filed and (2) whether striking plaintiffs health care professional\u2019s report was proper. Plaintiff proposes that, rather than remand this cause to the trial court, this court should consider, among other things, whether she had good cause for not procuring the health care professional\u2019s report within 90 days after the complaint was filed.\nWe find defendants\u2019 suggested course of action the better one. Although we might be tempted, in the interest of judicial economy and with a view toward minimizing the parties\u2019 expenses, to rule on whether plaintiff had good cause for not timely filing the professional\u2019s report, this court serves as a court of review, not a finder of fact. DeBilio v. Rodgers, 337 Ill. App. 3d 614, 618 (2002). A determination of whether a plaintiff has established good cause is heavily dependent on the facts. See In re Marriage of Holthaus, 387 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (2008) (providing that \u201cgood cause\u201d as used in another context, i.e., to extend the time to respond to a request to admit under supreme court rules, is fact-dependent and rests with the trial court\u2019s sound discretion). Thus, we determine that it is necessary to remand this cause so that the trial court may consider whether plaintiff should have extra time to file the health care professional\u2019s report and, also, as defendants suggest, whether striking plaintiff\u2019s health care professional\u2019s report was proper. In proceeding this way, we do not, of course, mean to express any opinion on the merits.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed, and we remand the cause for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nO\u2019MALLEY and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.\nPresumably, the term \u201ccertificate\u201d was used in error in the version of section 2 \u2014 622 in effect before August 25, 2005, as Public Act 94 \u2014 677 replaced the term \u201ccertificate\u201d with either \u201creport\u201d or \u201caffidavit,\u201d as applicable, throughout the statute.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Shayla L. Maatuka and Robert W Dodd, both of Dodd Ludwig Maatuka LLC, of Champaign, for appellant.", "Jeffry S. Spears, Timothy G. Shelton, and Kelly J. Varsho, all of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLR of Chicago, for appellee Van Matre Rehabilitation Center, LLC.", "Tom E. Rausch and Jamie R. Wombacher, both of Gummerson Rausch Wand Gray Wombacher, LLC, of Woodstock, for appellee Skuli Agustsson." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEODA KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VAN MATRE REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20141127\nOpinion filed September 29, 2010.\nShayla L. Maatuka and Robert W Dodd, both of Dodd Ludwig Maatuka LLC, of Champaign, for appellant.\nJeffry S. Spears, Timothy G. Shelton, and Kelly J. Varsho, all of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLR of Chicago, for appellee Van Matre Rehabilitation Center, LLC.\nTom E. Rausch and Jamie R. Wombacher, both of Gummerson Rausch Wand Gray Wombacher, LLC, of Woodstock, for appellee Skuli Agustsson." }, "file_name": "0214-01", "first_page_order": 230, "last_page_order": 234 }