{ "id": 4304205, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAQUITA CALHOUN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Calhoun", "decision_date": "2010-09-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20140266", "first_page": "362", "last_page": "391", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "404 Ill. App. 3d 362" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228419 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "holding that despite the \"seriousness of defendant's actions\" in committing the murder, defendant's sentence had to be reduced because \" 'defendant ha[d] led a relatively blameless life except for this one explosive episode' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073647 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "correcting the mittimus to reflect the proper conviction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258757 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "\"[rjemandment is unnecessary since this court has the authority to directly order the clerk of the circuit court to make the necessary corrections\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57329 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391312 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2849655 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5387392 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290247 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5256468 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "noting that it was proper for the trial court for sentencing purposes to consider whether defendant's character showed he was unlikely to commit future crimes and whether circumstances were unlikely to recur" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499766 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "noting that in imposing a sentence the defendant's motive for committing the offense is relevant to whether the defendant's conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to recur" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536926 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21", "parenthetical": "noting fact that defendant is not likely to repeat his failure is factor to be considered by trial court in imposing a sentence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.W. 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "father adequately provoked where he killed a close family friend after learning that his friend had coaxed the father's 15-year-old daughter into drinking whiskey so he could sexually abuse the child in a field near father's home" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Tenn. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8533540 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "father adequately provoked where he killed a close family friend after learning that his friend had coaxed the father's 15-year-old daughter into drinking whiskey so he could sexually abuse the child in a field near father's home" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/152/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723232 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction where he killed father-in-law after learning father-in-law sexually molested daughter" }, { "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction where he killed father-in-law after learning father-in-law sexually molested daughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "959 A.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8205328 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144-45", "parenthetical": "defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction where there was evidence that he stabbed to death his 11-year-old daughter's molester after the child told the defendant that the adult man had kissed and licked her" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/959/1141-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "J. Crim. L. & Criminology", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "noting that most parents would become enraged at anyone who harmed or sexually assaulted their child" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Cal. Rptr. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction for killing his brother's murderer after learning of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Cal. App. 3d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183791 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689-92", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction for killing his brother's murderer after learning of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/185/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 Pa. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 483734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "held that \"threatened or immediate infliction of serious injury upon a parent, spouse or child\" sufficient provocation to reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter" }, { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "held that \"threatened or immediate infliction of serious injury upon a parent, spouse or child\" sufficient provocation to reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/461/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5299117 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "evidence that victim slapped defendant's child supported conviction for manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/351/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3555252 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "\"the law acknowledges the mitigating effect of human weakness and intense passion *** where the person *** acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite the passion of a reasonable person\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796922 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5119433 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "\"strong provocation as a mitigating factor at sentencing encompasses a wider range of conduct than that defined as serious provocation under the second degree murder statute\"" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034060 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 1025", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474280 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/1025-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3439482 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477534 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292349 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564573 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" }, { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064", "parenthetical": "noting that the failure to make the requisite showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4298868 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "\"Because no error occurred, there can be no plain error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4299273 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "\"Since we find *** that no error occurred, we do not need to perform a plain-error analysis\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630639 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "\"Finding no error, our plain-error analysis ends here\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619347 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "\"without error, there can be no plain error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4304811 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/403/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4302434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "holding that where defendant failed to object to a general verdict form, \"Smith [was] inapplicable since Smith is limited to situations in which the trial court actually denied a request for separate verdict forms\"" }, { "page": "855-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/401/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4296091 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "\"we decline to extend Smith to situations where counsel did not request separate verdict forms\"" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288852 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201150 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780266 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4294102 ], "weight": 16, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "opinion of Coleman, J., joined by Quinn, J." }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "563-64" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "565-66" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "Theis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "Theis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "Theis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "Theis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259041 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462052 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621337 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273-74" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "272-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777541 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4288812 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621417 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "23, 28", "parenthetical": "\"specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion\" (emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2022, "char_count": 75791, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.232840265502546e-08, "percentile": 0.32984258927837107 }, "sha256": "ca6397059cccc3fffd41b6f5d71b08694f0a10f621286b72b1bb5a7965f48182", "simhash": "1:5b3c952e726054f5", "word_count": 12361 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:54.131587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAQUITA CALHOUN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County defendant, Laquita Calhoun, was found guilty of kidnaping and first degree murder and sentenced to 7 years\u2019 imprisonment for kidnaping and 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder, with the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, defendant first contends that the circuit court erred in failing to provide separate verdict forms for each theory of first degree murder (intentional, knowing or felony murder), or in the alternative, that she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to request such separate verdict forms. Defendant contends that if the conviction was in fact for felony murder, the underlying felony (kidnaping) would be a lesser included offense of murder and would have precluded the trial court from imposing a separate sentence on the underlying kidnaping. Secondly, defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing her because he did not adequately consider the relevant mitigating factor of provocation in that when she committed the crime she believed that the adult victim had molested her one-year-old daughter. Instead, the judge sentenced defendant to the maximum time permitted for first degree murder for acting as a vigilante to retaliate for the rape of her daughter, noting the brutal manner by which her revenge was carried out. Lastly, defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the mittimus must be corrected to reflect that defendant was convicted of one count of first degree murder and one count of kidnaping, rather than two counts of first degree murder (one being a conviction for intentional or knowing murder and the other a conviction for felony murder). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part and order the mittimus corrected.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe following facts are undisputed. On February 28, 2004, the 29-year-old victim, Alonzo Jones, was present in codefendant Jeanette Daniels\u2019 apartment at 7425 South Parnell, when he was accused by defendant of molesting her child. As a result of this accusation, Alonzo was attacked and beaten by defendant and codefendants Terrance Jones (hereinafter Terrance) and Katherine Calhoun (hereinafter Katherine), in the presence of Derrick Fleming (hereinafter Derrick), Lakesha Collins (hereinafter Lakesha) and Jeanette Daniels (hereinafter Jeanette). Alonzo was then dragged outside and placed in the trunk of Derrick Fleming\u2019s car. On the following morning, his body was found in an alley near 5630 South Michigan Avenue.\nOn April 13, 2004, after learning that there was a warrant for her arrest, defendant turned herself in, confessed to her participation in the crime, and gave a videotaped statement to police. Soon thereafter, defendant, together with five codefendants, was indicted on 28 charges including: (1) 11 counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 2002)); (2) four counts of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 2002)); (3) four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4) (West 2002)); (4) one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 13(a)(1) (West 2002)); (5) two counts of kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10\u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002)); (6) one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 103(a)(1) (West 2002)); (7) one count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2002)); and (8) five charges of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(a), (b)(8) (West 2002)).\nCodefendants Lakesha, Terrance, Katherine, Jeanette and Navon Foster (hereinafter Navon) were all charged with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 2002)); aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 2002)); kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10\u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002)) and aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 4(a), (b)(8) (West 2002)). Terrance was also charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4) (West 2002)). Navon was also charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 103(a)(1) (West 2002)) and burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2002)). Prior to defendant\u2019s trial in this case, Terrance proceeded with a bench trial and was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of 28 years\u2019 and 7 years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. Similarly, prior to defendant\u2019s trial, codefendants Lakesha and Katherine each pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for a 20-year sentence. Codefendant Jeanette was tried simultaneously with defendant, but in a bench, rather than a jury, trial. She was found guilty of aggravated kidnaping and sentenced to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Codefendants Lakesha, Katherine, and Derrick all testified at defendant\u2019s trial on behalf of the State. Defendant and each of the codefendants were sentenced by the same judge.\nA. Jury Trial\nOn October 11, 2006, defendant proceeded with a jury trial. As already noted above, defendant\u2019s jury trial was conducted simultaneously with codefendant Jeanette\u2019s bench trial. The transcript of the trial proceedings reveals the following pertinent evidence.\n1. State\u2019s Case in Chief\nAs part of its case in chief, the State presented defendant\u2019s videotaped statement to the jury. In that videotaped statement, defendant told police that at the time of the incident she was 23 years old and that she had five children, ages: seven, six, four, two and one. Navon was the father of the four older children and Derrell Short (hereinafter Derrell) was the father of the youngest girl, Denise, who was one year old at the time.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s videotaped statement, on the evening of February 28, 2004, she was bathing her youngest daughter, Denise, when she noticed that the girl\u2019s \u201cprivate part was open.\u201d Defendant explained that her daughter\u2019s vagina appeared to be abnormally large, as if it had been stretched. Because earlier that day her next-door neighbor Jeanette had babysat for Denise, defendant immediately went to Jeanette\u2019s house to find out what had occurred.\nDefendant told police that when she arrived at Jeanette\u2019s house, Jeanette, defendant\u2019s sister Katherine, Lakesha, and Alonzo were there. Defendant asked Alonzo whether he had \u201cdone something to her baby\u201d and Alonzo responded that he did not \u201cwant to say it in front of the others.\u201d Alonzo then told defendant privately that he \u201cdid it.\u201d Defendant was upset and informed everyone in the apartment. At that point Jeanette stated that Alonzo had \u201cdone that to [her] baby too.\u201d Defendant asked Jeanette why she continued to allow Alonzo to live in her house if he \u201cdid that\u201d to her children, and then she fell to her knees and started crying.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s videotaped confession, at that point Terrance walked into the apartment and asked her \u201cwhat was wrong.\u201d Defendant told him that Alonzo had hurt her child. Terrance then struck Alonzo with a broomstick and attempted to stick the broom in Alonzo\u2019s anus. Defendant told the police that while Terrance was attacking Alonzo, she unsuccessfully attempted to telephone Denise\u2019s father, Derrell. As defendant proceeded to the bathroom, Alonzo ran out of the apartment to the first-floor landing and out the back door. Defendant ran after him and pulled him back up the stairs to Jeanette\u2019s apartment. After defendant returned to the apartment with Alonzo, Lakesha suggested that they put Alonzo in the trunk of Lakesha\u2019s boyfriend\u2019s car and take him to Denise\u2019s father, Derrell. Defendant, together with Lakesha, Katherine and Jeanette, then dragged the screaming Alonzo to the car, put him inside the trunk and drove to 59th Street and Halsted to find Derrell.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s videotaped statement, as they were driving, Lakesha asked defendant to stop at a liquor store at 59th Street and State Street. Once there, Lakesha opened the car trunk and called over to a few men standing on the corner. Lakesha told the men what Alonzo had done. They approached the car and kicked Alonzo several times. After this, Lakesha took over driving the car and defendant sat in the front passenger seat. Defendant could hear Alonzo moaning in the back.\nDefendant next told police that at this point, one of the tires on their car went flat and they stopped at a gas station to fix it. Defendant stated that at this point she began imagining her \u201cbaby crying, [Alonzo] was hurting her and he didn\u2019t care,\u201d and she became angry. Defendant got out of the car and saw a broken bottle; she picked it up, and while Lakesha opened the trunk for her, she cut Alonzo, twice on his arm and once on his face. Defendant shut the trunk and got back into the car.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s videotaped statement, the women could not find Derrell at home and therefore continued to the home of defendant\u2019s aunt, where Lakesha fell asleep while defendant telephoned Navon, the father of her other children. Defendant, together with Katherine and Jeanette, then proceeded to 74th Street and Parnell Avenue, where they picked up Navon. Defendant told Navon that Alonzo had \u201churt her baby\u201d and that she did not want him to \u201cput his hands on [Alonzo]\u201d but that she just \u201cwanted to beat his butt.\u201d Navon agreed to help, and after dropping Katherine and Jeanette at their homes, he and defendant proceeded to a tire repair shop at 60th Street and State Street. Defendant told police that while the tire was being repaired, Alonzo asked twice to be let out of the trunk, but none of the mechanics heard him.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s videotaped statement, after the tire was fixed, she and Navon drove to an alley at 56th Street and Michigan Avenue. Defendant opened the trunk and told Alonzo to get out. Defendant took a stick from the alley and hit defendant about 10 times on his back and head. Alonzo fell to the ground and defendant continued to beat him. After a few minutes, she stopped and entered the car. According to defendant, at that point, Navon, who was in the driver\u2019s seat, was preparing to drive away when he accidentally put the car in the wrong gear and \u201cbacked up\u201d over Alonzo\u2019s body. Defendant told police that as they drove away, she saw Alonzo crawling toward the middle of the alley, so Navon circled around the block and drove back into the alley and ran him over again. Defendant told police that she and Navon then drove back to Jeanette\u2019s apartment, where she called her aunt and told her what happened. Soon thereafter, defendant turned herself in to police and confessed to her involvement in the crime.\nThe State next presented the testimony of three eyewitnesses, Derrick, Lakesha, and Katherine, who corroborated defendant\u2019s videotaped confession. First, Derrick testified that on the evening of February 28, 2004, he was inside Jeanette\u2019s apartment with his girlfriend Lakesha, Jeanette, defendant, defendant\u2019s sister Katherine, and Terrance, when he witnessed the attack on Alonzo. Derrick had never met Alonzo before, but testified that Alonzo appeared to be mentally challenged because he slurred his words. Derrick stated that the attack began after defendant, Lakesha and Katherine questioned Alonzo about defendant\u2019s baby, \u201cwhether he molested or touched her.\u201d\nDerrick averred that even though Alonzo denied the allegations, Terrance walked over to him and kicked him in the testicles, and then struck him with a metal broomstick. Defendant followed and hit Alonzo twice with her fists before walking to the back room. According to Derrick, at that point, Lakesha opened the front door and told Alonzo to run. Alonzo attempted to escape, but Terrance called to defendant, telling her that Alonzo was \u201ctrying to get away.\u201d According to Derrick, defendant ran to the front, grabbed Alonzo by the neck, brought him back inside and threw him down onto the floor.\nDerrick stated that, at this point, he, Lakesha and Lakesha\u2019s seven-year-old son left the house to go to Lakesha\u2019s apartment. Once at Lakesha\u2019s apartment, Lakesha told Derrick to stay with her son while she returned to defendant\u2019s house to \u201ccalm everything down.\u201d Derrick testified that he next saw Lakesha on the following afternoon, at 4 p.m., that she was crying and that she told him that \u201cthe boy was dead.\u201d\nDerrick observed that his car had blood on the inside and outside of the trunk, as well as on the antifreeze bottle. Derrick testified that he panicked and took the car to a car wash where he washed off the blood and threw everything from the trunk into a nearby trash can.\nDerrick further testified that soon after this incident, he spoke to police, told them what he had witnessed at defendant\u2019s house, and led them to the trash can and the car wash where he had attempted to clean out his car. Derrick averred that soon afterwards he spoke to the State\u2019s Attorney and gave a handwritten statement.\nOn cross-examination Derrick testified that when he first observed Alonzo walking into the living room, Alonzo had blood running down both of his wrists, which had been cut.\nOn cross-examination, Derrick was questioned about his testimony before the grand jury, in which he admitted that when he left the apartment with Lakesha, he did not call the police or anyone else for help because he thought \u201cthey were going to take [Alonzo] to the police station\u201d because they were \u201ctalking about taking him [there] and having him *** locked up.\u201d However, Derrick testified that he could not recall making these statements before the grand jury.\nLakesha next testified consistent with Derrick\u2019s testimony with respect to what transpired in Jeanette Daniels\u2019 apartment. She further added that after dropping Derrick and her son at home, she returned to Jeanette\u2019s apartment in Derrick\u2019s car in order to \u201ctake [Alonzo] to the police station and turn him over to the police.\u201d\nWhen questioned about the specifics of the crime, Lakesha averred that she could not recall what occurred that night. Although she admitted that she gave police a videotaped statement shortly after the crime, and acknowledged the answers that she then gave to police, she testified that those answers were coached and that she had given them because the police threatened to \u201clock her up,\u201d place her son in foster care, \u201cand bounce him from home to home,\u201d as well as \u201cput her boyfriend [Derrick Fleming] away for murder for a long time.\u201d\nBecause of Lakesha\u2019s recantations, her videotaped statement was introduced at defendant\u2019s trial. In that videotaped statement, Lakesha stated that on February 28, 2004, she was at Jeanette\u2019s home with defendant, Terrance, Derrick, Jeanette, and defendant\u2019s sister Katherine when defendant \u201caccused Alonzo of molesting her baby.\u201d According to Lakesha\u2019s videotaped statement, Terrance then asked Alonzo if he was \u201cdoing that stuff to [the] kid they say he was doing,\u201d and that if it was true he would \u201cdo it to him [Alonzo].\u201d Even though Alonzo denied having molested the baby, Terrance started beating Alonzo\u2019s legs and arms with a broom, and defendant kicked Alonzo in the face. Terrance also tried to sodomize Alonzo with the broomstick handle, asking him \u201cwhy he was messing with kids and do [sic] he want him to show him how it feels [sic].\u201d According to Lakesha\u2019s videotaped statement, at this point, Jeanette, who was sitting on the bed responded, \u201cHe [Alonzo] did it because he did it [sic] before to one of my babies.\u201d\nIn her videotaped confession, Lakesha further stated that soon thereafter defendant and Terrance went to the back of the apartment, and she opened the door for Alonzo to escape. Alonzo managed to get downstairs and reach the gangway before he was stopped by defendant and Terrance, who pushed him back upstairs.\nLakesha stated that she then left the apartment with her boyfriend, Derrick, and her seven-year-old son. Lakesha drove Derrick and her son home, but then proceeded to drive around the neighborhood looking for defendant\u2019s \u201cbaby daddy Derrell.\u201d Lakesha found Derrell and told him that \u201csomeone was fumbling his baby,\u201d but Derrell refused to go with her to Jeanette\u2019s apartment.\nWhen Lakesha returned to the apartment, defendant, Jeanette, Katherine and Terrance were upstairs in the hallway outside the apartment. Lakesha told defendant that Derrell was not coming, so they had to \u201ctake Alonzo somewhere else, and somebody else would have to do it.\u201d According to Lakesha\u2019s videotaped statement, \u201cto get down the stairs, everyone had a piece of Alonzo\u2019s body.\u201d Specifically, Lakesha told the police that she, defendant and Jeanette held Alonzo\u2019s arms, while Katherine and Terrance helped with Alonzo\u2019s legs. Lakesha popped the trunk open, and they put Alonzo in the trunk and closed it. Everyone got into the car, and the plan was to kill Alonzo and throw his body into the lake. They drove around for awhile until they stopped at a liquor store, and then defendant\u2019s aunt\u2019s house. Lakesha stayed at this house because she fell asleep. The next day, she heard Alonzo had been killed.\nDefendant\u2019s sister Katherine also testified on behalf of the State. Katherine initially refused to answer any of the prosecutor\u2019s questions on direct examination. In spite of the trial court\u2019s repeated admonitions, Katherine continued to be uncooperative and was found in contempt of court. Katherine was recalled later in the trial proceedings and questioned regarding her prior videotaped statement to police. Katherine ultimately admitted that she was in Jeanette\u2019s apartment at the time in issue but refused to give details about defendant\u2019s involvement in the crime.\nKatherine admitted that she gave a videotaped statement to police on March 2, 2004, but stated that she did so only because the police told her that if she made a statement she would be allowed to leave. Katherine averred that many of the statements she made in that videotaped statement were not true and that she made them up because she was \u201cscared\u201d and the police \u201cmade her say those things\u201d by \u201cyelling at her.\u201d\nFor example, on cross-examination, Katherine averred that there was never a plan to kill Alonzo or throw him in Lake Michigan and that she made that statement during her videotaped confession because the police \u201cmade her do it.\u201d Katherine further denied having told the police that: (1) while Alonzo was being dragged down the stairs into the trunk, she heard defendant telling Alonzo \u201cyou\u2019re going to die\u201d; and (2) that on the following morning, defendant told her that she \u201ccut the victim\u201d and that Navon \u201crolled over\u201d him four times.\nBecause Katherine\u2019s testimony was inconsistent with her earlier statements to police, her videotaped confession was introduced into evidence. In that videotaped statement, Katherine told police that on the date in question, she was in Jeanette\u2019s apartment with Jeanette, Lakesha, defendant, Terrance and Alonzo when defendant told her that Alonzo had admitted to molesting her child. According to Katherine, Terrance then began beating Alonzo with a broomstick and hit him approximately 20 to 30 times. As Alonzo was being beaten, defendant said, \u201cHe deserves this; he molested my child,\u201d and later \u201cI want him dead.\u201d Defendant then held Alonzo down on the floor as Terrance pulled his pants off and sodomized him with a broomstick.\nKatherine further told police that Alonzo attempted to escape from the apartment, but that defendant stopped him by kicking him in the face twice. Defendant and Terrance then brought Alonzo back to the apartment, and defendant tried to telephone her \u201cbaby daddy,\u201d so he could \u201cjump on\u201d Alonzo. However, when defendant was unable to reach her \u201cbaby daddy,\u201d she said, \u201cF-k it. I will do this myself,\u201d and proceeded to drag Alonzo down the stairs, all the while praying, and repeating, \u201cYou are going to die.\u201d\nAccording to Katherine\u2019s videotaped statement, defendant, together with Jeanette, Lakesha, and herself, put Alonzo inside the trunk of Derrick\u2019s car. Once the women all got inside the car, defendant said that she did not want Alonzo taken to the police station and that she wanted him dead. The women drove around the south side trying to locate defendant\u2019s \u201cbaby daddy\u201d so that Alonzo could be \u201cwhooped,\u201d but when they were unsuccessful, they drove to a liquor store at 59th Street and State Street instead, where Katherine bought herself a drink. While at the liquor store, Lakesha opened the trunk in front of two or three men that she knew from the neighborhood and told them that she needed help and that \u201cthis man molested a baby.\u201d When Lakesha opened the trunk, Alonzo was still alive and talking. Katherine heard what sounded like bottles hitting something.\nAccording to Katherine\u2019s videotaped statement, once they left the liquor store, Jeanette again told everyone that Alonzo had also molested her child. Jeanette then suggested, \u201cWe can go to Lake Michigan,\u201d but defendant responded that she did not want to take Alonzo there because she \u201cwanted him dead.\u201d According to Katherine, as they were driving around in the car, she could hear Alonzo pleading from the trunk, \u201cTake me to the hospital. Take me to the police station. Sorry [La]quita [defendant], Sorry Jeanette.\u201d Defendant responded to his pleas with, \u201cI\u2019m not trying to hear that. You going to die tonight,\u201d and Jeanette chimed in, \u201cYou shouldn\u2019t have did what you did.\u201d Lakesha then turned up the volume on the radio.\nAccording to Katherine\u2019s videotaped statement, soon thereafter they got a flat tire and could not proceed to Lake Michigan. Instead, they all went to defendant\u2019s aunt\u2019s house to obtain money to fix the tire. Once there, Lakesha fell asleep and did not return to the vehicle. Defendant then drove Jeanette and Katherine to a gas station at 55th Street and King Drive where they fixed the flat tire before proceeding to pick up Navon, defendant\u2019s other \u201cbaby daddy.\u201d Katherine told police that at this point she got into an argument with defendant and Jeanette because she \u201cdidn\u2019t want to be a part of this\u201d and instead wanted to go home. Katherine was dropped off at her home soon thereafter. According to Katherine\u2019s videotaped statement, on the following morning, she went to Jeanette\u2019s apartment, where Jeanette told her that Alonzo was dead, and defendant explained to her that \u201cNavon ran over Alonzo four times\u201d and that she \u201ccut him.\u201d\nThe State next called expert forensic pathologist and Cook County assistant chief medical examiner Dr. Mitra Kalelkar. Dr. Kalelkar testified that on March 1, 2004, she performed an autopsy on the victim, Alonzo Jones. According to Dr. Kalelkar, the external examination revealed numerous blunt and sharp force injuries on Alonzo\u2019s body, as well as gravel marks consistent with a body being run over by a vehicle and being dragged along the road. The internal examination showed extensive rib fractures, lacerations to the right lung, blood inside the victim\u2019s right chest cavity, and hemorrhages underneath the victim\u2019s scalp. Dr. Kalelkar concluded within a reasonable degree of scientific and medical certainty that the victim died as a result of multiple blunt and sharp force injuries to his body, including crushing injuries of the chest. In her opinion, the manner of death was homicide.\n2. Jury Instruction Conference\nAfter the State rested, and defense counsel\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was denied, the parties proceeded with a jury instruction conference. During that conference, the State proffered without objection a general murder verdict form, which permitted the jury to find defendant either guilty or not guilty of first degree murder without specifying whether that finding was made on the basis of intentional, knowing or felony murder. During that conference, the State also offered without objection a single jury instruction defining first degree murder in the following manner:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of first degree murder when he kills an individual if, in performing the acts which cause the death:\nhe intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual;\nor\nhe knows that such acts will cause death to that individual;\nor\nhe knew that such acts create a strong probability of death\nor great bodily harm to that individual; or\nhe is committing the offense of kidnaping.\u201d\nDuring the jury conference instruction, defense counsel requested instructions on second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, but both requests were denied by the circuit court. The court also denied defense counsel\u2019s request to show the jury a picture of defendant\u2019s daughter, Denise.\n3. Defendant\u2019s Case in Chief\nFollowing the jury instruction conference, the defense proceeded by way of stipulation. The defense stipulated that if Yhana Wilkinson were called to testify she would state that she is a licensed, certified official court reporter and that on May 3, 2006, she reported certain proceedings wherein the witness Derrick Fleming testified to the following. Derrick did not believe that it was the intention of the involved parties to kill Alonzo but rather that it was their intention to take him to the police. According to Derrick\u2019s testimony at these proceedings, defendant and the other involved parties discussed taking Alonzo to the police station in his presence.\n4. Closing Arguments and Jury Deliberations\nAfter the defense rested, both parties proceeded with closing argument. During closing argument, the State argued that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree murder under each of the following three theories: intentional, knowing and/or felony murder. Although the State argued all three theories, it focused on felony murder by arguing:\n\u201cThis is a perfect example of felony murder. The felony is kidnaping. And we\u2019ve seen how [defendant] is guilty of kidnaping. She helps commit that crime. She forces Alonzo down those stairs and helps put him in the trunk of that car. And because she\u2019s guilty of kidnaping, because she combined with those women and Navon to kidnap Alonzo *** and because Alonzo dies during the course of that crime, she\u2019s guilty of murder period. It doesn\u2019t matter if she never intended Alonzo *** to die. It doesn\u2019t matter. It doesn\u2019t matter if she foresaw it. It doesn\u2019t matter. It doesn\u2019t matter if she didn\u2019t want Navon to do it. It doesn\u2019t matter. All that matters is that she committed kidnaping with those other participants and Alonzo died.\u201d\nFollowing closing arguments, the jury returned general verdict forms finding defendant guilty of both first degree murder and kidnaping.\nB. Sentencing\nAfter the denial of defense counsel\u2019s motion for a new trial, on November 16, 2006, the case proceeded to sentencing. At sentencing, the State presented a victim impact statement from Alonzo\u2019s aunt. The State argued that the extent of Alonzo\u2019s injuries and the fact that defendant was the ringleader who incited others to exact revenge on Alonzo warranted the maximum sentence. In mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant had no prior history of violence and her record reflects only two minor offenses: (1) for drinking as a minor and (2) for possession of cannabis, for both of which she received supervision. More importantly, defense counsel urged the court to consider the intense emotions that Alonzo\u2019s admission to having sexually assaulted defendant\u2019s one-year-old daughter would have evoked in defendant. Counsel also asked the court to consider the impact that defendant\u2019s prolonged incarceration would have on the development of her five children.\nAfter hearing arguments in mitigation and aggravation, the trial judge sentenced defendant to the maximum sentence of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for first degree murder and to a consecutive 7-year sentence for kidnaping. In doing so, the judge rejected defense counsel\u2019s argument that defendant had been acting under deep and intense emotional provocation and concluded instead that this was a \u201cplanned\u201d and \u201ccalculated\u201d murder carried out in a \u201cdispassionate manner.\u201d The judge stated that defendant decided that she wanted Alonzo dead and that she and her accomplices drove around and brutally tortured Alonzo for three hours before killing him. The judge noted that he had \u201cnever seen a more horrendous, vicious crime than this one,\u201d and that defendant should \u201creceive the same mercy [she] gave Alonzo.\u201d The judge therefore concluded that by taking the law into her own hands and deciding who should live and die, defendant \u201cforfeited her right to live among a free society\u201d and stated that it was his intention that defendant \u201cnever see the street again.\u201d Defendant now appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. General Verdict Form\nOn appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to provide separate first degree murder verdict forms. The State charged defendant by indictment with first degree murder under three different theories: intentional, knowing and felony murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 2002). The State also charged defendant with kidnaping. See 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002). The trial court submitted the case to the jury with general verdict forms for kidnaping as well as first degree murder. The general verdict form for first degree murder allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree murder without specifying the theory upon which the jury relied. The jury returned general verdict forms of guilty for both murder and for kidnaping. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and to a consecutive 7-year sentence for kidnaping.\nDefendant contends that without special verdicts revealing the specific findings of the jury, it is impossible to discern under what murder theory she was convicted, whether under a theory of intentional, knowing or felony murder. Defendant maintains, and the State concedes, that if the jury found her guilty under the theory of felony murder, rather than intentional or knowing murder, such a finding would have precluded the trial court from sentencing her to a consecutive seven-year sentence for the underlying felony of kidnaping. This argument is based upon the undisputed principle that the underlying kidnaping felony is the predicate felony for the felony murder charge, and as such is a lesser included offense of felony murder that cannot support a separate conviction and sentence. See People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2009) (\u201c[according to Illinois law, the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder is a lesser-included offense of felony murder. Thus *** a defendant convicted of felony murder may not be convicted on the underlying felony. In such instances, the predicate offense will not support a separate conviction or sentence\u201d); see also People v. Battle, 393 Ill. App. 3d 302, 313-14 (2009), citing People v. Coady, 156 Ill. 2d 531, 537 (1993). Because defendant here did in fact receive consecutive sentences for her kidnaping and murder convictions, she maintains that the failure to provide the jury with specific verdict forms prejudiced the outcome of her case and requires this court to reverse her conviction and sentence.\nDefendant concedes that she did not request separate verdict forms and did not object to the use of a general verdict form during trial, but contends that this court should nevertheless review the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel or in the alternative as plain error. We will address each of her contentions in turn.\n1. Plain Error\nWe begin with plain error. The plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error if either the evidence is close, or if the error affects substantial rights. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). In either instance, defendant must preliminarily establish that there was error. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Once she does so, in the first instance, she must also prove \u201cprejudicial error,\u201d i.e., that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against her. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Alternatively, in the second instance, defendant must prove that the error was structural, or so serious that it affected the fairness of her proceeding and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. See People v. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244, 273-74 (2009); Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. In either instance, the burden of persuasion remains on the defendant. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, citing People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004).\nDefendant here maintains that it was error not to tender a specific verdict form to the jury sua sponte. Defendant\u2019s argument is premised on our supreme court\u2019s decision in Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1. In that consolidated case, defendants were each charged, among other things, with armed robbery and with intentional, knowing and felony murder. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 5. Each defendant requested that the jury be given special verdict forms for each of the separate murder theories, but that request was denied by the trial court. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 10. Instead, the trial court submitted to the jury a general verdict form for first degree murder with instruction to the jury to sign the verdict form if it found defendants guilty under any of the three murder theories. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 10. Each jury returned a general verdict of guilty for both the murder and the armed robbery charges, and defendants were sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for each crime. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 13.\nEach defendant in Smith contended that it was error for the trial court to deny their respective requests for separate verdict forms because each jury\u2019s specific findings could result in different sentencing consequences, in that if the convictions were for felony murder, defendants could not be subject to sentencing for the underlying felony of armed robbery for the reasons already discussed above, namely, that the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder is a lesser included offense of felony murder. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 13. The State in Smith urged that the two verdicts could stand under the so-called \u201cone-good-count rule,\u201d which permits a reviewing court to presume that where a defendant is charged and prosecuted under all three theories of murder, and the jury returns a general verdict of guilty without specifying the murder theory upon which it found defendant guilty, the jury found defendant guilty of the most culpable mental state, intentional murder. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 19-20.\nOur supreme court agreed with defendants and held that where \u201cspecific findings by the jury with regard to the offenses charged could result in different sentencing consequences, favorable to the defendant, specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion.\u201d Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23. Our supreme court further held that \u201cbecause the presumption that arises from application of the \u2018one-good-count rule\u2019 could work a prejudice against [defendants] at sentencing, the presumption cannot substitute for the jury\u2019s actual findings, at least where defendants have requested that the jury make specific findings with regard to the degree of the offense.\u201d Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23. Lastly, the court in Smith held that any such error arising from the trial courts\u2019 denial of requests for special verdict forms could not be disposed of under harmless error analysis because that would require the court to improperly invade the province of the juries and substitute its evaluation of the evidence for their findings of fact. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 25.\nWith respect to the appropriate remedy, our supreme court in Smith stated that the general verdict was valid to establish guilt and that the only issue was how to interpret the verdict for purposes of sentencing. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28. The court recognized that the presumption arising from the one-good-count rule could not be maintained because \u201cthe trial court refused the defendants\u2019 request for separate verdict forms, which would have made the basis of the juries\u2019 finding clear.\u201d Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28. Thus, our supreme court in Smith held that under those circumstances for purposes of sentencing it was compelled to consider the general verdict as a finding of guilty of felony murder. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28. The court then affirmed the murder convictions but vacated the convictions and sentences for the purported underlying felonies. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 29.\nIn the present case, the State argues that the holding in Smith is limited to instances where special verdict forms are requested and denied by the court and that consequently the trial court did not commit error in failing to tender special verdict forms to the jury sua sponte, since they were not requested by the defense. The State supports its position by citing to the aforementioned language of Smith itself, as well as by relying on the subsequent decision of our supreme court in Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244, which, the State purports, explicitly limited the holding in Smith to requests for special verdict forms. The State further argues that even if the court erred in its failure to tender the specific verdict forms, defendant has failed to establish that she was prejudiced under the first prong of the plain error analysis so as to be able to proceed with this issue on appeal. We agree with the State.\nThe State\u2019s position is consistent with our supreme court\u2019s subsequent decision in Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244. In Davis, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery and with intentional, knowing and felony murder. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 247. The felony murder charge was predicated on the underlying offense of aggravated battery. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 247. Upon the State\u2019s request, and without objection from defendant, the jury was instructed that it could find defendant guilty of murder under any of the three murder theories, intentional, knowing or felony murder. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 247. The defendant never requested a special verdict form, and the jury returned a general guilty verdict of first degree murder and a guilty verdict for aggravated battery. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 247. On appeal, the defendant challenged his murder conviction, contending that it was reversible error to instruct the jury that felony murder could be predicated upon aggravated battery because it is well settled that \u201c \u2018the predicate felony underlying the charge of felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose.\u2019 \u201d Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 264, quoting People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 458 (2001). Defendant argued that the conduct forming the basis of his aggravated battery charge, i.e., that he \u201cbeat the victim with his fists, feet and a board,\u201d was inherent in the murder itself, and had no independent felonious purpose, so that the jury should not have been instructed that it could find defendant guilty of felony murder solely on the basis of his commission of that underlying offense. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 264-65. Defendant argued that since he was convicted on a general verdict form it was impossible to determine whether the jury found him guilty under the erroneous felony murder instruction. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 265. He therefore urged the court not to apply the one-good-count rule, under which it is presumed that a defendant charged with all three theories of first degree murder, and convicted under a general verdict form, is guilty of intentional murder, so as to vitiate such an erroneous verdict. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 265.\nOur supreme court disagreed with defendant, upholding the one-good-count principle and finding that under its application defendant\u2019s verdict could stand. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273. In doing so, the court specifically addressed its decision in Smith and found that Smith did not intend to create a rule requiring the trial court to sua sponte give specific verdict forms. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273. As the court in Davis explained:\n\u201cThis court in Smith affirmed the murder conviction, but vacated the conviction and sentence for attempted armed robbery. In so doing, this court\u2019s holding was narrow: \u2018where, as here, specific findings by the jury with regard to the offenses charged could result in different sentencing consequences, favorable to the defendant, specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion.\u2019 *** [Citation.] This court was also careful to note that the defendant was not arguing that his convictions for murder should be set aside and was not repudiating the \u2018one-good-count rule.\u2019 [Citation.] This court concluded by finding that the error of refusing the defendant\u2019s request where it could ultimately be key to his receiving more severe sentencing was not subject to a harmless-error analysis. [Citation.]\nThe present case is a world away from Smith. Here, defendant did not object to the general verdict form and did not request a special verdict form. Again, the holding of Smith was conditioned on the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant such a request and did not establish a rule that the court must act sua sponte to give a specific verdict form. Additionally, defendant is challenging the validity of the one-good-count rule, something which was expressly not done in Smith.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 272-73.\nSince the decision in Davis, the merits of defendant\u2019s position in this case and her attempt to invoke Smith to require sua sponte submission of special verdict forms even without a request by the defendant have been comprehensively examined and rejected by the plurality in People v. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d 555 (2009) (opinion of Coleman, J., joined by Quinn, J.). In Moore, defendant was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery and the jury was instructed on intentional murder, knowing murder and felony murder. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 563. Just as here, in Moore, the defense did not object to this instruction, nor did it offer specific murder verdict forms for submission to the jury. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 563. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of both first degree murder and armed robbery, and defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years\u2019 and 6 years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 556. In that case, just as here, citing to Smith, defendant argued that for sentencing purposes, \u201cthe general murder verdict cannot be presumed [under the one-good-count rule] to represent a finding that [defendant] was guilty of either intentional or knowing murder, and that in the absence of such presumption, the jury\u2019s verdict must be considered a finding on the felony murder charge.\u201d Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 563-64. Accordingly, defendant in Moore argued that his conviction and sentence for armed robbery, a lesser included offense of murder, must be vacated. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 564.\nIn rejecting defendant\u2019s argument, the plurality in Moore first recognized the continued viability of the one-good-count rule. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 564, citing People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411-12 (1994), and People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455-56 (1988). Next, relying on the supreme court\u2019s decision in Davis, the plurality in Moore found that our supreme court had explicitly limited the holding in Smith to situations wherein a defendant requests a separate verdict form and his request is denied. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 565. Accordingly, the Moore plurality held that the Smith decision did not disturb the one-count principle, under which it could be presumed that the jury found defendant guilty of intentional murder, nor did it impose a sua sponte duty on the trial court to give specific verdict forms. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 566. As the plurality in Moore explained:\n\u201cAlthough portions of the Smith opinion suggest disapproval of the use of the one-good-count rule to subject a defendant to more severe sentencing, the court\u2019s discussion is clearly dependent on the case\u2019s procedural context: the trial court denied the defense request to submit separate verdict forms to the jury. The Smith court repeatedly noted this context: \u2018it is a violation of due process to deny a defendant the opportunity to have the jury decide his theory of defense\u2019 [citation]; \u2018because the presumption that arises from application of the \u201cone-good-count rule\u201d could work a prejudice against [defendants] at sentencing, the presumption cannot substitute for the jury\u2019s actual findings, at least where defendants have requested that the jury make specific findings with regard to the degree of the offense\u2019 (emphasis added) [citation]; \u2018the trial courts erred when they refused defendants\u2019 requests for separate verdict forms [citation].\nThe significance of this procedural context has been confirmed by the supreme court [in Davis].\u201d Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 565-66.\nThe plurality in Moore continued:\n\u201c[T]he one-good-count principle has long been employed to permit enhanced sentencing, including the imposition of consecutive sentences for additional felonies, by construing a general first degree murder verdict as a finding of guilt on an intentional murder charge. We believe that this use of the principle is among the corollary rules explicitly left undisturbed by Smith. The Davis court\u2019s discussion of Smith demonstrates that the distinguishing factor entitling the defendant to relief from the application of the one-good-count principle in Smith was the request for separate verdict forms at trial, not the mere possibility that the principle would subject him to increased punishment. Accordingly, we reject Moore\u2019s argument that he is entitled to the relief granted in Smith because he, like the defendant there, received consecutive sentences, while the defendant in Davis did not. Since Moore did not request separate verdict forms in the instant case, we hold that Smith offers no support for his assertion that the general murder verdict could not support his armed robbery conviction.\u201d Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 566.\nDefendant nevertheless urges that we should adopt the view of the dissent in Moore. The dissent posits that Davis does not purport to modify the finding in Smith that regardless of whether special verdicts are requested, a sentence is void where it was impossible to tell from the general verdict whether the jury convicted defendant of intentional murder. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 578 (Theis, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, Smith and Davis are mutually distinguishable because Davis did not involve a failure to give special verdict forms but, rather, focused on the propriety of giving a felony murder instruction, where such an instruction may not have been warranted. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 576 (Theis, J., dissenting). As already pointed out above, Davis addressed whether a trial court erred when it instructed the jury that felony murder could be predicated upon an underlying aggravated battery where the conduct underlying the battery and the murder were the same and had no separate felonious purpose. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 264. Unlike Davis, where defendant merely challenged the propriety of the instruction with respect to the theory upon which he was convicted for murder, in Smith, the defendants challenged the validity of their convictions and sentences for both the murder and the underlying offense, contending that the denial of special verdict forms resulted in the possibility that they were subjected to increased punishment based upon the application of the one-good-count rule. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23.\nThe dissent therefore posits that, unlike the issue in Davis, the issue in Smith was the failure to tender special verdict forms. The dissent urges that the error in failing to provide special verdict forms could result in increased punishment to a defendant and is therefore deserving of different treatment than the failure to give a proper felony murder instruction. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 578 (Theis, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent concludes that the error to give specific verdict forms is presumptively prejudicial under any plain error analysis while the failure to give an instruction is not. Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 578 (Theis, J., dissenting).\nWhile we cannot disagree with the factual distinction between Davis and Smith as pointed out by the thoughtful dissent, we are nevertheless persuaded by our supreme court\u2019s specific interpretation in Davis of its own prior holding in Smith in which it unqualifiedly stated that \u201cthe holding of Smith was conditioned on the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant such a request and did not establish a rule that the court must act sua sponte to give a specific verdict form.\u201d Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273. Nor can we overlook the express language in Smith, which, in the very least, raised the question as to whether its holding extended beyond the failure of a trial court to grant defendant\u2019s request for special verdict forms. See Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23, 28 (\u201cspecific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion\u201d (emphasis added); \u201cbecause the presumption that arises from application of the \u2018one good count rule\u2019 could work a prejudice against [defendants] at sentencing, the presumption cannot substitute for the jury\u2019s actual findings, at least where defendants have requested that the jury make specific findings with regard to the degree of the offense\u201d (emphasis added); further noting that the presumption arising from the \u201cone good count rule\u201d could not be maintained because \u201cthe trial courts refused the defendants\u2019 request for separate verdict forms, which would have made the basis for the juries\u2019 finding clear\u201d (emphasis added)).\nOur view and the view of the plurality in Moore are supported by several other more recent decisions of this appellate court, which have similarly rejected extending Smith to situations wherein defendant did not request special verdict forms. See People v. Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d 100, 108 (2009) (\u201cThe Smith case as it stands today is limited to situations in which the trial court actually denied a request for separate verdict forms. [Citations.] If our supreme court wishes to expand this to a mandatory requirement that knowing, intentional, and felony murder always have separate verdict forms due to the different sentencing consequences, then it can do so. It is not our place to expand the holding of Smith\u201d); People v. Mabry, 398 Ill. App. 3d 745, 755 (2010) (\u201cwe decline to extend Smith to situations where counsel did not request separate verdict forms\u201d); see also People v. Allen, 401 Ill. App. 3d 840, 865 (2010) (holding that where defendant failed to object to a general verdict form, \u201cSmith [was] inapplicable since Smith is limited to situations in which the trial court actually denied a request for separate verdict forms\u201d).\nAccordingly, applying the holding of the Moore plurality and its progeny to the case at bar, we find that defendant here cannot establish that the trial court was required to sua sponte tender separate verdict forms to the jury and that failure to do so amounted to error. Since there was no error, there can be no plain error. People v. Sims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 9, 20 (2010), citing People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008) (\u201cwithout error, there can be no plain error\u201d); see also People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 115 (2010) (\u201cFinding no error, our plain-error analysis ends here\u201d); see also People v. Hommerson, 399 Ill. App. 3d 405, 412 (2010) (\u201cSince we find *** that no error occurred, we do not need to perform a plain-error analysis\u201d); People v. Strickland, 399 Ill. App. 3d 590, 604 (2010) (\u201cBecause no error occurred, there can be no plain error\u201d). Therefore, under the one-good-count rule, defendant is presumed guilty of the most serious offense of intentional murder and the trial court\u2019s judgment and sentence were proper. See Moore, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 566; Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 108; People v. Mabry, 398 Ill. App. 3d 745, 755 (2010); see also Allen, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 855-56.\n2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant contends in the alternative that we should find that counsel\u2019s failure to object to the general verdict form or to request a specific verdict form constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is evaluated in accordance with the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Under Strickland, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must show both that (1) counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance so prejudiced the defense as to deny defendant a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; see also People v. Bloomingburg, 346 Ill. App. 3d 308, 316-17 (2004). The failure to make the requisite showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nAs to the first prong, defendant must overcome a strong presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action or inaction of counsel was a valid trial strategy. Bloomingburg, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 317; 3 W LaFave, Criminal Procedure \u00a711.10(c), at 715 (2d ed. 1999). The reasonableness of counsel\u2019s actions must be evaluated from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time of the alleged error, and without hindsight, in light of the totality of circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts. People v. Kelley, 304 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634 (1999). Because effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation (People v. Odie, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 (1992)), mistakes in trial strategy or judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent (People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994)).\nSince the decisions in Smith and Davis, our appellate courts have repeatedly held that \u201ccounsel\u2019s decision to proceed with a general verdict form\u201d in lieu of specific verdict forms, falls within the realm of trial strategy and will be considered objectively reasonable \u201cwhere the law did not and does not place a mandatory burden on counsel to request separate verdict forms.\u201d Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 108; see also Mabry, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nDefendant here has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel\u2019s failure to request special verdict forms was part of a reasonable trial strategy. Defense counsel\u2019s decision to proceed with a general verdict form could have been premised on the fear that giving the jury special verdict forms would make it easier for them to find defendant guilty of murder under the theory of felony murder, since, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s participation in the underlying kidnaping, and since such a special verdict form would permit the jury to focus on felony murder separately from the intentional and knowing murder theories.\nIt would have been reasonable for defense counsel to conclude that his client had a better chance of prevailing on intentional murder since the focus on the element of intent would provide the jury with more latitude to reach a more lenient verdict. Counsel could have tactically concluded that it was better to present the jury with a general verdict form, which simply asks the jury whether defendant is \u201ca murderess,\u201d rather than a special verdict form, which specifically itemizes the elements of felony murder asking the jury to determine whether she is \u201ca kidnapper,\u201d and then permitting them to find her guilty of murder strictly on the mechanical basis of her involvement in the kidnaping. This is particularly true where tactically defense counsel could have felt that his client had an opportunity to get some degree of sympathy from the jury because of the provocation under which she committed the crime, namely, her discovery and belief that Alonzo had raped her infant daughter. Consequently, we find that defense counsel\u2019s decision to proceed with a general verdict form could very well have been the product of a sensible trial strategy. Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 108; see also Mabry, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nBecause defendant has failed to make the requisite showing of counsel\u2019s deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland analysis, we need not proceed to the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (noting that the failure to make the requisite showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the claim). For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 108; see also Mabry, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nB. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing\nDefendant next contends that the court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing the maximum 60-year sentence for first degree murder. She specifically maintains that the trial judge failed to consider several mitigating factors demonstrating her rehabilitative potential, including her age at sentencing (25 years old), her lack of significant criminal history (only two minor convictions for possession of cannabis and drinking as a minor), and the steps that she took to take responsibility for her actions (turning herself into police voluntarily and confessing to the crime). More importantly, defendant contends that the trial court refused to consider the fact that she had learned that Alonzo had sexually assaulted her one-year-old daughter as a mitigating factor on her behalf. Rather, defendant maintains, the trial judge used this fact as an aggravating factor to find that defendant deserved the maximum sentence because she \u201cunilaterally decided to take the law into her own hands\u201d to punish Alonzo. For the reasons that follow, we agree.\nGenerally, where, as here, a sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory limits permitted for the felony of which defendant was convicted (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 2000)), we will not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the court. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1995). The reasoning is, of course, that the trial court is in a better position to consider, among other things, the credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits and age of the defendant. People v. O\u2019Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 298 (1988). \u201cHowever, the mere fact that the trial court has a superior opportunity to make a determination concerning final disposition and punishment of a defendant does not imply that a particular sentence imposed is always just and equitable.\u201d O\u2019Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 298. Accordingly, an abuse of discretion will be found \u201ceven where the sentence is within the statutory limitations, *** if that sentence is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law.\u201d People v. Steffens, 131 Ill. App. 3d 141, 151 (1985).\nThe Illinois Constitution requires that penalties be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711; People v. Center, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1032-33 (1990). \u201cThis constitutional mandate calls for the balancing of the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment.\u201d People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). In determining the appropriate sentence, the trial court must carefully consider all of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, including, inter alia, the defendant\u2019s age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well as the nature and circumstances of the crime and of defendant\u2019s conduct in the commission of it. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 109.\nIn the present case, the comments of the trial judge in imposing the sentence reflect failure by the trial judge to recognize the full nature and extent of the provocation experienced by defendant upon her determination that Alonzo had apparently raped her infant daughter. While the trial judge may have questioned whether such molestation had occurred, he never questioned or attempted to negate the fact that defendant was sincere in her belief that such molestation did occur. Nor did that trial judge appear to fully recognize that the factual basis for this provocation was corroborated by the disclosure of codefendant Jeanette at the scene, that the same act had been committed by Alonzo against her daughter, and that consequently the belief of defendant in this provocation was enhanced.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections mandates that in imposing a sentence the trial judge consider as a mitigating factor whether defendant acted under \u201cstrong provocation,\u201d or whether there were circumstances which would \u201cexcuse or justify the defendant\u2019s criminal conduct\u201d even if those circumstances would have been \u201cinsufficient to establish a defense,\u201d or reduce the charge from first degree to second degree murder. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a) (West 2002); see also People v. Merritte, 242 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492 (1993) (\u201cstrong provocation as a mitigating factor at sentencing encompasses a wider range of conduct than that defined as serious provocation under the second degree murder statute\u201d). The language in section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections is \u201cmandatory, rather than directory,\u201d and the \u201csentencing authority may not refuse to consider relevant evidence presented in mitigation.\u201d People v. Heinz, 391 111. App. 3d 854, 865 (2009).\nWhile the term \u201cstrong provocation\u201d is not defined in the Unified Code of Corrections, the similar term \u201cserious provocation\u201d has a well-established meaning under Illinois law. Merritte, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 492. Serious provocation is defined as \u201c \u2018conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.\u2019 \u201d People v. Banks, 227 Ill. App. 3d 462, 473 (1992), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2(b); see also People v. Wilks, 175 Ill. App. 3d 68, 75 (1988) (\u201cthe law acknowledges the mitigating effect of human weakness and intense passion *** where the person *** acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite the passion of a reasonable person\u201d). When considering whether an individual has acted under serious provocation sufficient to reduce the offense of first degree murder to second degree murder, the categories of serious provocation recognized by our courts are: substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest and spousal adultery. Merritte, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 492. Serious provocation arising from substantial physical injury or assault extends to injuries to family members, including children. See, e.g., People v. Rice, 351 Ill. 604, 609 (1933) (evidence that victim slapped defendant\u2019s child supported conviction for manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Berry, 461 Pa. 233, 238, 336 A.2d 262, 264 (1975) (held that \u201cthreatened or immediate infliction of serious injury upon a parent, spouse or child\u201d sufficient provocation to reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter); Paz v. State, Ill So. 2d 983 (Fla. App. 2000) (reducing murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter where defendant killed the victim after defendant\u2019s wife indicated that the victim had sexually assaulted her); People v. Brooks, 185 Cal. App. 3d 687, 689-92, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1986) (holding that defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction for killing his brother\u2019s murderer after learning of the murder); see also 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a715.2(b)(7), at 502 (2d ed. 2003) (\u201cjust as a reasonable man may be provoked by some sorts of conduct which inflict injury upon himself, so too he may be provoked by the same sorts of conduct which causes injury to his close relatives\u201d).\nIn the present case, contrary to the State\u2019s assertion, the record effectively demonstrates that instead of focusing on the undeniably egregious nature of the provocation, the trial judge chose to focus on the defendant\u2019s actions responding to that provocation as vigilantism, thereby warranting higher punishment. Obviously, vigilante justice renders the perpetrator culpable and subject to legal penalties imposed. But, in imposing these penalties the trial judge is nevertheless under a duty to consider the fact that the vigilante justice taken was neither casual nor random but rather committed in response to provocation that objectively would be as extreme as any mother of any child could sustain. See, e.g., S. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 34 (1984) (noting that most parents would become enraged at anyone who harmed or sexually assaulted their child); see also Lee v. United States, 959 A.2d 1141, 1144-45 (D.C. App. 2008) (defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction where there was evidence that he stabbed to death his 11-year-old daughter\u2019s molester after the child told the defendant that the adult man had kissed and licked her); State v. Munoz, 113 N.M. 489, 827 P.2d 1303 (App. 1992) (defendant entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction where he killed father-in-law after learning father-in-law sexually molested daughter); Toler v. State, 152 Tenn. 1, 260 S.W. 134 (1924) (father adequately provoked where he killed a close family friend after learning that his friend had coaxed the father\u2019s 15-year-old daughter into drinking whiskey so he could sexually abuse the child in a field near father\u2019s home).\nMoreover, in failing to give due recognition to the provocation, the trial judge failed to recognize that in light of such provocation, there was very little, if any, likelihood that defendant would be a recidivist offender, so as to permit the full breadth of her rehabilitative potential. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711 (\u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20142 (West 2002) (\u201c[t]he purpose of the [Unified] Code of Corrections is to, [inter alia,] *** permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders *** and restore offenders to useful citizenship\u201d (emphases added)); see also People v. Lewis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 15, 21 (1980) (noting fact that defendant is not likely to repeat his failure is factor to be considered by trial court in imposing a sentence); see also People v. Glass, 98 Ill. App. 3d 641, 644 (1981) (noting that in imposing a sentence the defendant\u2019s motive for committing the offense is relevant to whether the defendant\u2019s conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to recur); see also People v. Black, 223 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634 (1992) (noting that it was proper for the trial court for sentencing purposes to consider whether defendant\u2019s character showed he was unlikely to commit future crimes and whether circumstances were unlikely to recur).\nThe State nevertheless contends that the trial court properly sentenced defendant to the maximum sentence permitted by statute simply on the basis of the brutality of the crime. While we acknowledge that \u201cthe seriousness of the crime\u201d has been held to be \u201cthe most important factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence\u201d (People v. Weatherspoon, 394 Ill. App. 3d 839, 862 (2009)), this does not relieve the sentencing judge from considering the requisite mitigating factors as articulated under the Unified Code of Corrections (see People v. Markiewicz, 246 Ill. App. 3d 31, 55 (1993)). We do not approve or purport in any way to sanction the conduct of this defendant in the murder of Alonzo nor do we condone the brutal manner by which it was committed. However, it would seem that accountability for that conduct can be reflected in a sentence that would nevertheless still recognize the impact of the vengeful pain and anger experienced by a mother upon discovering the sexual assault perpetrated by the adult victim on her infant daughter, as well as the fact that defendant, acting solely out of such egregious provocation, was unlikely to repeat the offense in the future. Rather, in sentencing defendant, the trial judge left no room for either of these factors, maximizing the sentence to the full extent permitted by statute, and on top of that adding a seven-year sentence for the underlying offense to be served consecutively. Our courts have never been reluctant to reduce a sentence on appeal, despite the serious nature of the underlying crime, where a trial court has neglected its duty to consider the relevant mitigating factors. See, e.g., People v. Crews, 42 Ill. 2d 60, 66 (1969) (holding that even though society was rightly outraged by the nature of the offense, in that case the murder of a child, the defendant\u2019s sentence for murder had to be reduced in light of the fact that she had no prior criminal background; noting that \u201cin determining punishment for the crime, care must be taken to insure that the punishment is appropriate and just,\u201d and that this must \u201cinclude a consideration of background and circumstances which affect punishment\u201d); see also People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 355 (2001) (holding that 10-year prison sentence on residential burglary conviction was manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense, despite the \u201cappalling and harmful nature\u201d of defendant\u2019s alleged sexual conduct toward the victim sleeping on sofa, and sentence would be reduced on appeal to 5 years); People v. Merritt, 53 Ill. App. 3d 929, 930-32 (1977) (holding that although defendant had committed \u201crepeated violent criminal acts,\u201d \u201cin the interest of his rehabilitation and so that the appearance of vengeance may be avoided\u201d four concurrent sentences of 40 to 65 years imposed on conviction of two counts of rape and two counts of aggravated kidnaping would be reduced to concurrent terms of 15 to 45 years where defendant was only 20 years old and his only prior conviction was misdemeanor); see also People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338, 364 (1996), quoting People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 282 (1989) (holding that despite the \u201cseriousness of defendant\u2019s actions\u201d in committing the murder, defendant\u2019s sentence had to be reduced because \u201c \u2018defendant ha[d] led a relatively blameless life except for this one explosive episode\u2019 \u201d).\nAccordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we remand to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing with instructions to the trial judge to give due reflection and implementation of the relevant mitigating factors. Based upon these mitigating factors, which include defendant\u2019s undeniably strong provocation, her lack of any venial criminal record, and the manifest unlikelihood of any repetition of this crime, we strongly believe that a proper sentence for this defendant would be at the minimal sentencing level for first degree murder, to which we would recommend that the present sentence be reduced.\nC. Mittimus\nDefendant finally contends, and the State concedes, that the mittimus must be corrected to reflect that she was convicted of one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) and one count of kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) rather than two counts of first degree murder, pursuant to sections 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) and 9 \u2014 1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(3) (West 2002)). The parties agree that the mittimus was made in error and does not properly reflect the jury\u2019s verdict or the sentence imposed by the court.\nThe mittimus currently reflects that defendant was convicted of one count of first degree murder pursuant to section 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (intentional murder), and sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. It further reflects that defendant was also convicted of one count of first degree murder pursuant to section 9 \u2014 1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code (felony murder), and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. The parties agree that this is incorrect and that defendant was convicted of only one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) and that the second conviction and seven-year sentence were for kidnaping under section 10 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1 (West 2002)).\nAccordingly, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(1), we order the clerk of the circuit court to make the necessary corrections as far as eliminating the conviction for felony murder, and replacing it with a conviction for kidnaping. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(1) (\u201c[o]n appeal the reviewing court may *** modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken\u201d); see also People v. McCray, 273 Ill. App. 3d 396, 403 (1995) (\u201c[rjemandment is unnecessary since this court has the authority to directly order the clerk of the circuit court to make the necessary corrections\u201d); People v. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d 4, 13 (1998) (correcting the mittimus to reflect the proper conviction). We, however, remand for a new sentencing hearing with respect to the conviction of first degree murder.\nAffirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part; mittimus corrected.\nMcBRIDE and ROBERT GORDON, JJ., concur.\nThat conviction was reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial on the basis of the trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of Jeanette\u2019s videotaped confession into evidence.\nAs already noted above, prior to defendant\u2019s trial Lakesha pleaded guilty to her involvement in the murder of Alonzo, and at the time of her trial testimony, she was serving a 20-year sentence.\nAt the time of her trial testimony, Katherine was serving a 20-year sentence for her involvement in the murder of Alonzo.\nIn the present case, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, which mandates a sentence between 20 and 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 2000).\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a) states in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe following grounds shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment:\n* * *\n(3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation.\n(4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant\u2019s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a) (West 2002).\nThis attitude may well be discernable in comparing the sentences that the same judge gave to the other codefendants in this case. While defendant was sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment on her first degree murder charge, codefendants Katherine and Lakesha each received 20-year sentences in exchange for guilty pleas to first degree murder. Similarly, Terrance, who was convicted of felony murder received a 28-year sentence. Although we recognize that sentences given to codefendants are not dispositive of discretionary abuse, nevertheless they can serve as an indication of the trial judge\u2019s evaluation of the relative offenses.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Lauren M. Bauser, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, and Mikah Soliunas, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAQUITA CALHOUN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20140266\nOpinion filed September 10, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Lauren M. Bauser, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, and Mikah Soliunas, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0362-01", "first_page_order": 378, "last_page_order": 407 }