{ "id": 4304445, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORDELLO FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Freeman", "decision_date": "2010-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201408\u20141536", "first_page": "978", "last_page": "997", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "404 Ill. App. 3d 978" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610710 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "waiver is the \"intentional relinquishment of a known right\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115686 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291993 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542613 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "66-67" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67-68" }, { "page": "67-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450979 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "11-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173780 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360433 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400-01" }, { "page": "400-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625059 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-88" }, { "page": "487-88" }, { "page": "487-88" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706478 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "the other paramount function is to determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096295 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619347 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629573 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545, 549" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629512 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "7, 15", "parenthetical": "although applying a \"blanket policy\" to defer ruling on a motion in limine is an abuse of discretion, it is ultimately unreviewable where the defendant does not testify at trial" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626929 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268979 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621356 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" }, { "page": "74-75" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "a circuit court's discrete decision to defer ruling on a motion in limine is not preserved for review where the defendant does not testify at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 A.2d 1326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.H. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4451913 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/121/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 F.2d 268", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 849561 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/584/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.W.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 Mich. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1967446 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/421/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6226656 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "construing section 115 - 13" }, { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "construing section 115 - 13" }, { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "construing section 115 - 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2954091 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3363292 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5350970 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" }, { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "quoting Senator Washington in a floor debate as stating, \" T find just impossible to understand how past sexual conduct is relevant at all to the case' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450836 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3597890 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible to demonstrate a propensity to commit another crime; however, other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove intent, modus operandi, identity, motive, or absence of mistake" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894483 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594646 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "medical hearsay testimony has historically been regarded as highly reliable because a patient's desire for proper diagnosis and treatment outweighs any motive to lie" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147614 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "223, 229" }, { "page": "222-23" }, { "page": "228-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256443 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "167-68" }, { "page": "167-68" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "177-78" }, { "page": "184-87" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451575 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401-02" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "405-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 38", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958370 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0038-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1742, "char_count": 51510, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1449074830231415 }, "sha256": "17b6445e8e7640b9cc4fd1a4635a9dfdfc000b2947ac3982e7cf9fd4766c62b4", "simhash": "1:f23ed78b5e3c54f1", "word_count": 8504 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:54.131587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORDELLO FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Cordello Freeman was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 2004)) and was sentenced to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in admitting testimony in violation of the rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7 (West 2004)); (2) the circuit court erred in failing to make a timely ruling on his motion in limine to preclude admission of his prior convictions; and (3) the circuit court impermissibly enhanced his sentence based on the victim\u2019s age when that was an element of the crime for which he was convicted. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\nThe following facts were adduced from the trial testimony of the victim, B.A.; her sister, Adrea; her mother, Renee Ballard-Ross; and Carey Kato, a forensic interviewer with the Chicago Children\u2019s Advocacy Center, who interviewed B.A. after the assault. The victim, B.A., is the younger sister of Tiffany Ballard, defendant\u2019s former girlfriend and the mother of his son. In the summer of 2006, B.A. was 12 years old and had just completed sixth grade. On July 18, 2006, defendant was at the home in which B.A. lived with Tiffany and the rest of their family to visit his son. At approximately 11:30 p.m. that evening, B.A. was lying on the bed in Tiffany\u2019s basement bedroom watching television. Tiffany went to the store but defendant stayed at the house and watched television with B.A. During a commercial break, B.A. attempted to leave the room. Defendant grabbed her by the arm and pulled her down onto the bed. He then used his legs to force her legs apart, slid her underwear to the side, and vaginally penetrated her. She testified that his penis was fully inside of her and that the assault lasted for about five minutes. During the assault, defendant covered B.A.\u2019s mouth with one hand and used his other hand to hold her arm over her head. B.A.\u2019s younger sister, Adrea, walked past Tiffany\u2019s bedroom at that time and saw B.A. crying while defendant was on top of her. Adrea entered the room and interrupted the assault. Defendant then stood up and Adrea went upstairs to tell her mother what had happened. Defendant left the house and B.A. went upstairs. B.A.\u2019s mother called the police, who took B.A. to the hospital.\nBefore calling the emergency room doctor, Dr. Nagui Hanna, to testify at trial, the State requested a sidebar, during which the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cMS. EGAN [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: During my prep of [Dr. Hanna], there is indication [sic] in his notes that he asked the victim if she ever engaged in sexual behavior before. I understand from rape shield laws that is not admissible, but the victim told the [d]octor she had never had sex before.\nTHE COURT: He didn\u2019t have to ask that, does he?\nMS. EGAN: In this particular case, this knowledge helped him form his opinion. In other words, the *** size of the tear to the hymen, location of the tear, the fact that she had never had sex before became relevant in his determination *** [that] he believes the combination of the *** injury to the outside of the vagina and hymen tear is consistent with sexual penetration. Because she had never had sex before, he said that was a relevant fact in his making that determination.\nTHE COURT: What do you say, Mr. Gallagher [defense counsel]? If that\u2019s part of the diagnosis, I can see if she never had sex before. It\u2019s a 12-year-old girl.\nMR. GALLAGHER: It is and she already testified. There is no way we can cross examine her. *** There is no way for us to question her about that topic at this time since it\u2019s now being brought up and she already testified. I suppose if we had known that it was part of the diagnosis [and that the State intended to use that information] beforehand, the Court might have found that *** we would be allowed to ask her about that topic.\nTHE COURT: Do you want me to call her hack and ask her that? It\u2019s part of the [d]octor\u2019s diagnosis based on the fact she is a 12-year-old girl. There is injury to the girl\u2019s vaginal area. He said he considered that fact in determining there was sexual abuse[,] the fact there was no prior sexual conduct of the 12-year-old girl.\nMR. GALLAGHER: I understand.\nTHE COURT: You can bring it out. Don\u2019t emphasize.\nMS. EGAN: I will.\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s a violation of the rape shield act. As part of the diagnosis you can bring it out, but don\u2019t dwell on it.\u201d\nDr. Hanna then testified that he treated B.A. upon her arrival to the hospital emergency room. B.A. indicated that she was 12 years old and described her injury as a sexual assault with penetration. He asked her about her previous sexual history and she told him that she had \u201cnever had sex before.\u201d He collected evidence as part of a criminal sexual assault kit and performed a genital exam on B.A. He observed bruising and tenderness in the external areas of the vagina, indicating that force had been used.\nHe then began an examination of the internal areas of the vagina. He explained that when a person has not had any prior sexual contact, he would expect the hymen, a membrane that separates the inner and outer parts of the vagina, to be \u201cintact, meaning there are no tears.\u201d It would not be \u201cbroken and [would] still [be] in its native shape and form[,] meaning that there\u2019s been no penetration through it into the vagina.\u201d When asked whether B.A.\u2019s lack of prior sexual contact was relevant to his diagnosis, he replied:\n\u201cYes. When I examined her, I was expecting to see a hymen that was intact and had not been broken before. *** [Instead,] I saw [a] one millimeter tear[,] which is a very small tear[,] in the lower part of the hymen indicating there was an attempt to break it. *** [The tear] was recent, meaning it happened in the last few days.\u201d\nHe also explained that, generally, when examining a sexual assault victim, he inserts a speculum into the vagina to conduct an examination inside of the vagina. However, he does not perform that test when the victim has not had previously had sex because it is likely to rupture the hymen.\nDr. Hanna concluded that the combination of the bruises on the outside of the vagina, the tenderness and pain B.A. described, and the tear in the hymen indicated that \u201cthere was some force or attempt at penetrating the vagina. Usually it\u2019s assumed from intercourse or attempt at intercourse.\u201d He further testified that this combination of injuries is consistent with a sexual assault allegation.\nAs part of his cross-examination, defense counsel explored Dr. Hanna\u2019s observations about B.A.\u2019s hymen. Defense counsel acknowledged that B.A. had not previously had sex before and prompted Dr. Hanna to again testify that B.A.\u2019s hymen was \u201cintact,\u201d except for what he described as a \u201cminute tear\u201d of about one millimeter. Defense counsel then prompted Dr. Hanna to testify that if an erect penis fully penetrated the vagina for five minutes, the hymen would have ruptured or the tear in the hymen would have been larger than one millimeter. Dr. Hanna agreed that the injury to B.A.\u2019s hymen was consistent with the tip of the penis entering the vagina. Additionally, Dr. Hanna testified that he did not observe any bleeding around the tear in B.A.\u2019s hymen. Defense counsel also elicited testimony that Dr. Hanna documented no other signs of trauma or bruising on B.A.\u2019s body.\nFollowing Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony and the dismissal of the jury, the court informed defendant that he would have to decide whether he would testify on his own behalf. Defense counsel then requested a ruling on his motion in limine to bar the State from introducing evidence of defendant\u2019s two prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes. The court determined that it would not rule on the motion at that time because it was \u201cpremature,\u201d citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 448, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463 (1984). The court further stated:\n\u201cIn order for me to make [an] intelligent ruling [on] whether or not the State can use any evidence for impeachment convictions [sic] which they wish to offer[,] which is the question to begin with, I cannot do that unless the [defendant does, in fact, testify. I will not speculate what he would say if he were to testify, to begin with. I am not making a ruling at this point on your motion because at this point[,] it\u2019s premature.\u201d\nThe State presented two more witnesses and entered two stipulations before resting its case. Defendant then unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict.\nDefendant\u2019s theory of the case was that Renee Ballard-Ross, the victim\u2019s mother, did not want defendant living in her home because she could not afford to support him along with her six children and her grandchild. In support of that theory, defendant called Janelle Allen-Holloway. She was defendant\u2019s caseworker at Kids\u2019 Hope United, a private agency affiliated with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). She testified that at the time of the offense, defendant was 18 years old and was still under the care of DCFS. She testified that defendant and Ballard-Ross sought to have defendant placed with Ballard-Ross as a foster child. She testified that if Ballard-Ross became defendant\u2019s foster parent, she would collect a stipend to defray the cost of supporting him. However, her efforts to place defendant in Ballard-Ross\u2019s home ultimately were unsuccessful. According to defendant\u2019s theory, when Ballard-Ross was unable to secure defendant\u2019s placement and collect the stipend, she had B.A. make a false claim of sexual assault against defendant to ensure that he would not return to the household.\nThe jury ultimately found defendant guilty. In his posttrial motion, he asserted 21 errors that he claimed should result in a new trial. The circuit court denied his motion.\nDefendant\u2019s presentence investigation report (PSI) disclosed that he was 18 years old at the time of the offense and 20 years old at the time of sentencing. The PSI revealed that defendant had been convicted of two prior felonies. In 2005, defendant pled guilty to unlawful restraint. He served 194 days in the Joliet Adult Detention Center and completed a 2-year probation sentence. Defendant was later convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and was serving a three-year probation sentence at the time he committed the present crime. The PSI also revealed that defendant entered DCFS custody at age three because of his mother\u2019s drug addiction. He lived with various family members throughout his life and experienced physical abuse at the hands of his cousin from ages three to six. However, he maintained positive relationships with his mother and siblings and has a \u201cwonderful\u201d relationship with his son.\nAt the sentencing hearing, defendant again called Allen-Holloway to testify in mitigation. She testified to his history in the DCFS system and his experience with neglect and physical abuse. She testified that he received his high school equivalency degree while he was incarcerated and later enrolled in a trade school to pursue a barber\u2019s license.\nIn allocution, defendant stated that he was \u201churt throughout this whole situation\u201d because he \u201clook[ed] at the victim as family.\u201d He said that the encounter between him and B.A. was a \u201cmisunderstanding.\u201d He said that he would \u201cjust look towards the future; and, hopefully, [he] will get a chance to be back out there with [his] son and continue to live [his] life.\u201d\nThe State then argued in aggravation that defendant showed no remorse for assaulting B.A. and was only upset about how the incident affected his life. The State highlighted his criminal history and argued that although he had a rough childhood, that did not justify sexually assaulting a young girl. The State also argued that the assault on B.A. was not a \u201cmisunderstanding,\u201d as defendant characterized it, but was \u201cforced, sexual penetration\u201d in which defendant held B.A. down and took advantage of her in her own home, where she felt safest.\nDefense counsel responded that defendant is entitled to the minimum sentence because he is intelligent, able to improve himself, and capable of being rehabilitated. He took the initiative to procure his high school equivalency degree and sought a barber\u2019s license. Additionally, he enrolled in sex abuse counseling and expressed his desire to continue his relationship with his son.\nThe court criticized defendant\u2019s characterization of the sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl as a \u201cmisunderstanding,\u201d finding it to be \u201can odd choice of words.\u201d It also criticized defendant\u2019s reference to B.A. as \u201cfamily\u201d and remarked that \u201chaving sex with a 12 year old is not exactly looking upon someone as being part of your family.\u201d Additionally, referring to the assault of B.A. as a misunderstanding was \u201cinsensitive on his part[;] looked upon her as family[,] again[,] insensitive to what the girl went through.\u201d The court remarked that in general, defendants end up in prison through their own actions and \u201cwhen you decide to have sex with a 12-year-old girl, that\u2019s what will get you there.\u201d The court also stated that sexual assault is the \u201ckind of a crime that a [victim] lives with for a long time.\u201d\nThe court commented further on defendant\u2019s prior criminal history, noting that he had two prior felony convictions and was on probation at the time of the current offense. The court further noted that defendant previously served 194 days in prison, which \u201capparently didn\u2019t phase [him] in the slightest.\u201d The court remarked that defendant was not a \u201cfirst timer in the system, which is other aggravation circumstances [sic] besides that girl was [12], besides the fact that she someone [sic] who probably looked at him for support being the father of *** her niece or nephew *** but he looked upon her as just another person he wanted to have sex with at the age of 12.\u201d\nThe court considered other disclosures in the PSI as well. It acknowledged that defendant had a difficult upbringing, but others who have similar childhoods \u201cdon\u2019t go around having sex with a 12 year old. They have to deal with the situation. And dealing with it is not having sex with a 12 year old.\u201d The court noted that there was no evidence that defendant was sexually abused himself, but that in any event, that would not mitigate the abuse perpetrated on B.A. Ultimately, the court noted that as a Class X offender, defendant was eligible for a sentence between 6 and 30 years, and sentenced him to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefense counsel then filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. In it, counsel argued, inter alia, that the court \u201cimproperly considered in aggravation matters that are implicit in the offense.\u201d The court denied the motion, stating that the sentence was \u201creasonable\u201d but \u201csignificant [because] the crime was significant and the prior record significant also.\u201d Defendant then filed this appeal from his conviction and sentence.\nDefendant first argues that the circuit court committed reversible error in admitting Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony that B.A. had \u201cnever had sex before\u201d in violation of section 115 \u2014 7(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7(a) (West 2004)), which limits the admissibility of evidence related to the prior sexual history or reputation of a sexual assault victim. In response, the State argues that Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony was admissible under section 115 \u2014 13 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2004)), which makes a sexual assault victim\u2019s out-of-court statements to a doctor made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis admissible as substantive evidence.\nDefendant concedes that he did not preserve this issue for appeal and that it is forfeited. Nevertheless, we may review this issue for plain error under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved errors where: (1) an error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone \u201cthreatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,\u201d regardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) an error occurs which is so serious that it affected the fairness of the trial and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007), citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005).\nDefendant argues that the court\u2019s error requires reversal under either prong of a plain error analysis. He argues that the evidence was closely balanced because there was no physical evidence to support B.A.\u2019s claim of sexual assault and the testimony provided was inconsistent. Thus, Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony \u201ctipped the scales\u201d against him because the State relied on that testimony as proof that B.A. had been assaulted. Defendant also argues that the court\u2019s admission of the testimony, in contravention of section 115 \u2014 7, was so serious that it denied him a fair trial.\nNevertheless, if there is no error, there can be no plain error. Thus, we must first determine whether admitting Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony was error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565.\nIn Illinois, we do not have a uniform system of codified evidentiary rules; rather, our rules of evidence generally derive from the common law. But see Ill. R. Evid. 101 et seq. (adopted Sept. 27, 2010, eff. Jan. 1, 2011). However, in certain circumstances, our legislature has created statutory rules of evidence. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5 et seq. (West 2008). The challenged evidence in this case is arguably governed by two statutory rules of evidence, sections 115 \u2014 7(a) and 115 \u2014 13 of the Code. Thus, we must examine the applicable statutes and determine which statute the legislature intended to apply to the admissibility of Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony.\nSection 115 \u2014 7(a) of the Code, commonly referred to as the \u201crape shield statute,\u201d was first enacted in Illinois in 1978 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7) and has since been amended several times. The statute in effect at the time of the offense in this case provided in relevant part:\n\u201cIn prosecutions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child [720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 2004)] *** the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim *** with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim *** consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 7(a) (West 2004).\nOur supreme court has on two occasions interpreted section 115\u2014 7(a) as \u201cabsolutely bar [ring] evidence of the alleged victim\u2019s prior sexual activity or reputation, subject to\u201d the two exceptions contained in the statute. People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395, 401-02 (2004); People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 170-71 (1990). The court concluded that the statute is \u201cneither vague nor ambiguous\u201d in preventing either party from introducing evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual history, specifically noting that it \u201cdoes not limit its proscription to a defendant\u2019s attempts to introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual encounters.\u201d Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 170. Furthermore, the statute makes \u201cno exception based on the purpose for which the evidence is offered.\u201d Santos, 211 Ill. 2d at 395. Thus, section 115 \u2014 7(a), as interpreted by our supreme court, is unambiguous in making evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual history inadmissible.\nThe General Assembly subsequently enacted section 115 \u2014 13 of the Code, which provides:\n\u201cIn a prosecution for violation of Section *** 12 \u2014 14.1 *** of the [Code], statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of the symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2004).\nSection 115 \u2014 13 is a \u201ccodification of the common law rule permitting the hearsay use of information revealed in medical treatment.\u201d People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 229 (1996), citing People v. Roy, 201 Ill. App. 3d 166, 179 (1990). The admission of such testimony is limited to those cases involving certain sex offenses, including the offense for which defendant was prosecuted. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2004).\nWe have previously observed that the plain language of section 115 \u2014 13 \u201cevinces a legislative intent to apply this provision broadly,\u201d encompassing testimony from nurses, treating doctors, evaluating doctors, or any other medical professional that is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment where it provides details of the sexual act committed, \u201cincluding how, when, and where the act occurred.\u201d Roy, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 178; see also People v. Davis, 337 Ill. App. 3d 977, 990 (2003). In In re T.T., we explained that a doctor\u2019s testimony regarding other circumstances of the attack, including \u201chow [the victim] was penetrated, the pain, and the offender\u2019s use of a lubricant,\u201d was admissible because it was relevant to the doctor\u2019s assessment that the victim sustained sexual abuse. In re T.T., 384 Ill. App. 3d 147, 164 (2007). Significantly, in Falaster, our supreme court further expanded the scope of admissible testimony to include statements regarding the victim\u2019s prior sexual history with the defendant. See Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 223, 229. In that case, the court admitted a nurse\u2019s testimony in which she recounted the victim\u2019s disclosure that she had begun engaging in oral and vaginal sex with the defendant, her father, approximately five years earlier. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 222-23. Thus, section 115 \u2014 13, as interpreted by our supreme court and appellate courts, is unambiguous in making a doctor\u2019s testimony recounting a victim\u2019s sexual history admissible, provided that it is relevant to the doctor\u2019s opinion that the victim was, in fact, sexually abused. See Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 228-29; In re T.T., 384 Ill. App. 3d at 164-65.\nThus, we are confronted with one statutory rule of evidence that would make Dr. Hanna\u2019s testimony that B.A. had \u201cnever had sex before\u201d inadmissible and one statutory rule of evidence that would make the statement admissible. Ordinarily, when two rules of evidence conflict, courts may consider whether the evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not for another. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 156 (2001) (evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible to demonstrate a propensity to commit another crime; however, other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove intent, modus operandi, identity, motive, or absence of mistake). In such cases, trial courts exercise their broad discretion to make those determinations in light of the parties\u2019 arguments for and against admissibility. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 156.\nHowever, in this case, we are presented with two unambiguous legislative enactments that make the same piece of evidence simultaneously admissible and inadmissible; thus, we must turn to the rules of statutory construction to resolve this conflict. See Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 479 (2006). Where the plain language of one statute appears to conflict with the plain language of another statute, we must look beyond the plain language of the statutes to determine the legislature\u2019s intent, which is of paramount importance. Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 479. The legislature is presumed to know of existing statutes at the time it enacts new statutes. People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005). Thus, we cannot presume that the legislature would enact a law that completely contradicts an existing law, thereby repealing the predecessor statute by implication. Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 479. Rather, we must attempt to construe the conflicting statutes together, in pari materia, where such an interpretation is reasonable. Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 479. Additionally, to resolve this conflict, we may ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent by considering the purposes of the statutes, the problems that they target, and the goals they seek to achieve. Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 479-80.\nAs Sandoval recounts, prior to the enactment of section 115 \u2014 7, evidence of a victim\u2019s sexual history was admissible at trial when the defendant asserted an affirmative defense of consent. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 167-68. However, consistent with traditional evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility of evidence of a witness\u2019s character and reputation, such evidence was limited to testimony regarding the victim\u2019s general reputation for immorality and unchastity and did not include specific acts of immorality or promiscuity. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 167-68, citing People v. Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 624 (1984); see also Fed. Rs. Evid. 404(a) (with limited exceptions, evidence of a person\u2019s character is inadmissible for proving conformity therewith), 608(b) (with limited exceptions, specific instances of a witness\u2019s conduct are inadmissible for demonstrating truthfulness). Because lack of consent was an element of the sexual assault offense, it was deemed permissible to allow a defendant to introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s general reputation for unchastity and immorality as it was more likely that \u201c \u2018an unchaste woman would assent to such an act than a virtuous woman.\u2019 \u201d Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 168, quoting People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 611 (1962).\nHowever, with the passage of section 115 \u2014 7, the legislature prohibited defendants from introducing any evidence of the victim\u2019s sexual history, except as between the defendant and the victim where it was pertinent to a consent defense. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7. In enacting the statute, the bill\u2019s sponsor declared that its purpose \u201cis to protect the rape victim from being harassed and abused as they have been in the past.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 11, 1977, at 65 (statements of Representative Jaffe). Speaking in favor of the bill, Representative Geo-Karis stated that the statute would prevent defense attorneys from \u201cdestroy[ing] and victimizing] a victim in a rape case.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 3, 1977, at 58 (statements of Representative Geo-Karis). Representative Cunningham added that the bill is a \u201ccompassionate\u201d one, \u201cdesigned to protect the dignity\u201d of sexual assault victims. 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 3, 1977, at 58 (statements of Representative Cunningham).\nRepresentative Jaffe also referred to a floor debate on an earlier, albeit unsuccessful, version of the bill in which he summarized the findings of the General Assembly\u2019s Rape Study Committee, which concluded:\n\u201cWe have the problem [that] many women never report rape because they fear the publicity and the rapistfs\u2019] threats and they fear the police and the court system. *** [A] woman who has claimed to be raped can be questioned about her past sexual behavior even [if] it has nothing to do with the case, which in effect turns her into the defendant. *** Whenever you have a rape case you have the victim really being turned into the defendant. The victim is constantly asked over and over and over again about here [sic] sex history. It happens on the trial level and it happens when the State\u2019s Attorney interrogates her. It happens when the police interrogate her. So as a result of that *** you\u2019ll find that women are very hesitant to come forward and report the crime of rape and they\u2019re very hesitant to go through the entire of [sic] rape because they felt that they are abused time and time and time again.\u201d 79th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 19, 1975, at 29-30 (statements of Representative Jaffe).\nThe evidentiary rationale for precluding a defendant from introducing evidence of the victim\u2019s sexual history with people other than the defendant is rooted in the fact that such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of whether the victim consented to sexual relations with the defendant. See Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 177-78; see also Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 624 (quoting Senator Washington in a floor debate as stating, \u201c T find just impossible to understand how past sexual conduct is relevant at all to the case\u2019 \u201d), quoting 80 Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 22, 1977, at 8-9 (statements of Senator Washington). We summarized this policy in People v. Summers by stating that section 115 \u2014 7 was intended to:\n\u201cprevent the defendant from harassing and humiliating the complaining witness with evidence of either her reputation for chastity or specific acts of sexual conduct with persons other than defendant, since such evidence has no bearing on whether she consented to sexual relations with the defendant.\u201d Summers, 353 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (2004), aff\u2019d, 214 Ill. 2d 548 (2005).\nMoreover, in Santos, the supreme court rejected the defendant\u2019s attempt to introduce two conflicting statements made by the victim involving a false allegation of rape as an improper attempt to introduce evidence that was collateral to any material issue in the case. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d at 405-06 (\u201c[w]hether [the victim] had, unbeknownst to defendant, engaged in sexual relations with someone else is wholly unrelated to the question of whether defendant reasonably believed that [the victim] was of age when the act of sexual penetration took place, which was the only controverted issue on this charge\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nHowever, the policies underlying section 115 \u2014 7 took shape long before the legislature had enacted section 115 \u2014 13 and in a different context. Section 115 \u2014 13 was enacted in 1998 as a codification of the holding in People v. Gant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 186 (1974), in an effort to prevent the inconsistent application of that legal rule in the trial courts. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1987, at 268 (statements of Representatives McCracken and Homer).\nIn Gant, the supreme court adopted the proposition:\n\u201c \u2018Statements of a presently existing bodily condition made by a patient to a doctor consulted for treatment are almost universally admitted as evidence of the facts stated ***. *** [T]heir reliability is assured by the likelihood that the patient believes that the effectiveness of the treatment he receives may depend largely upon the accuracy of the information he provides the physician. ***\n[ ]The exception [to the hearsay rule] might be taken one step further to encompass statements made to a physician concerning the cause or the external source of the condition to be treated.\u2019 \u201d Gant, 58 Ill. 2d at 186, quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7292, 690-91 (2d ed. 1972).\nThe legislature made clear that it only intended for the rule to apply in those cases involving certain sexual offenses. 85th 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1987, at 269 (statements of Representatives Homer and McCracken) (Representative Homer: \u201cYour bill codifies [Gant] with regard to sex offenses. *** [W]as it your intent to change the current rule with respect to the admissibility of such statements in the prosecution of other kinds of cases [?]\u201d Representative McCracken: \u201cNo. Not at all and it should not be interpreted as such\u201d); 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2004). Moreover, the sexual assault victim\u2019s statements must be admitted \u201cas evidence of the facts stated.\u201d 85th 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1987, at 268 (statement of Representative Homer).\nAs discussed above, section 115 \u2014 13 codified a common law rule of evidence. Historically, the evidentiary rationale for admitting such hearsay testimony as substantive evidence was rooted in the \u201csubstantial guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d and \u201cspecial guarantees of credibility\u201d inherent in such statements made by patients to medical personnel because patients know that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 859, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992) (construing section 115 \u2014 13); see also Roy, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 179 (medical hearsay testimony has historically been regarded as highly reliable because a patient\u2019s desire for proper diagnosis and treatment outweighs any motive to lie).\nIn light of the above, we can construe sections 115 \u2014 7(a) and 115 \u2014 13 together so as not to offend the purpose of either statute: their construction turns on relevance. The purpose of excluding evidence under section 115 \u2014 7(a) is to bar irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of the victim\u2019s sexual history that has no bearing on whether the victim consented to sex with the defendant but instead is used to harass the victim. The purpose of admitting evidence under section 115 \u2014 13 is to admit evidence that is otherwise relevant and reliable, but would be barred by the hearsay rule. Thus, a victim\u2019s sexual history, or lack thereof, taken by the examining doctor following a sexual assault examination comports with both statutes because it is relevant to a determination of whether the victim was sexually assaulted but does not have the effect of harassing the victim.\nWe find support for this conclusion in Sandoval. In examining Michigan\u2019s rape shield statute, Sandoval acknowledged the possibility that under certain \u201cextraordinary circumstances,\u201d a sexual assault victim\u2019s prior sexual history could be relevant and admissible to explain \u201c 1 \u201ca victim\u2019s physical condition indicating intercourse.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 184-87, quoting People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 355 n.4, 365 N.W.2d 120, 128 n.4 (1984), quoting United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978). Similarly, Sandoval recognized that a New Hampshire court permitted evidence of a victim\u2019s prior sexual history where it was relevant to explain physical injuries. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 187, citing State v. LaClair, 121 N.H. 743, 746, 433 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1981).\nHere, Dr. Hanna testified that the fact that B.A. had \u201cnever had sex before\u201d was relevant to his examination and ultimate conclusion that she had been sexually assaulted. Dr. Hanna testified that the lack of prior sexual contact was an important fact that explained the presence of the recent tear he observed in the hymen. Additionally, he altered the internal vaginal exam to avoid further damage to the hymen. Moreover, the combination of the hymen tear and the external vaginal bruising led Dr. Hanna to conclude that \u201cthere was some force or attempt at penetrating the vagina. Usually it\u2019s assumed from intercourse or attempt at intercourse.\u201d Thus, we conclude that Dr. Hanna\u2019s statement that B.A. had \u201cnever had sex before\u201d was admissible under section 115 \u2014 13 as relevant evidence of the fact that a sexual assault occurred, without offending the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting section 115 \u2014 7 to avoid undue harassment of B.A. Because there was no error in admitting the testimony, there can be no plain error and, thus, defendant\u2019s argument is procedurally defaulted.\nDefendant next argues that the circuit court erred in administering a \u201cblanket policy\u201d of reserving ruling on his motion in limine to exclude prior convictions for impeachment purposes until after the defendant has testified, despite that fact that he did not ultimately testify in this case. At the time that defendant filed his appellate brief, the supreme court had issued its opinion in People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 80 (2009), a consolidated case addressing our holdings in People v. Patrick, No. 1 \u2014 04\u20141895 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), and People v. Phillips, 371 Ill. App. 3d 948 (2007). The supreme court held that a circuit court abuses its discretion if it administers a \u201cblanket policy\u201d of refusing to rule on a pending motion in limine and that the error is reversible where the defendant testified notwithstanding the court\u2019s failure to rule. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 74-75. However, Patrick also held that if the defendant chose not to testify, then he had forfeited review of the circuit court\u2019s failure to rule on his motion. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77.\nThe supreme court had also granted petitions for leave to appeal in People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (2008), appeal allowed, 231 Ill. 2d 671 (2009), and People v. Tucker, No. 1 \u2014 06\u20142619 (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal allowed, 231 Ill. 2d 684 (2009), at that time. The court then issued a subsequent per curiam order clarifying that it allowed those appeals to consider the specific question of whether a defendant could seek review based on the circuit court\u2019s \u201cblanket policy\u201d of refusing to rule on his motion in limine, even if he ultimately chose not to testify. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (2010).\nIt appears that defendant\u2019s argument on appeal was premised on the possibility that the supreme court would find a circuit court\u2019s \u201cblanket policy\u201d of refusing to rule on pending motions in limine to be so egregious that it would overcome the forfeiture that resulted from a defendant\u2019s failure to testify. However, after reviewing the issue as a matter of structural error, constitutional error, and plain error, Averett reaffirmed the holding in Patrick, further concluding that a circuit court\u2019s application of a \u201cblanket policy\u201d of refusing to rule on a pending motion in limine is not reviewable on appeal where the defendant did not testify at trial. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 15-16.\nHere, as in the case of defendant Phillips, the circuit court did not, in fact, apply a \u201cblanket policy\u201d of refusing to rule on a motion in limine. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77. Rather, the court determined that it would be \u201cpremature\u201d to rule on the motion before defendant testified and that it would have to \u201cspeculate\u201d on defendant\u2019s testimony in order to determine whether the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions outweighed their probative value. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77; see also Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 15 (\u201cIn [defendant] Phillips\u2019 case [in Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77], the trial judge did not use a blanket policy\u201d). However, it is a distinction without a difference; defendant did not testify in this case. Thus, regardless of whether the court had a \u201cblanket policy\u201d to reserve ruling on motions in limine, we conclude that the issue is unreviewable under either Patrick or Averett. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77 (a circuit court\u2019s discrete decision to defer ruling on a motion in limine is not preserved for review where the defendant does not testify at trial); Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 7, 15 (although applying a \u201cblanket policy\u201d to defer ruling on a motion in limine is an abuse of discretion, it is ultimately unreviewable where the defendant does not testify at trial).\nAdditionally, contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, we cannot review this issue for plain error. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 12. As explained above, the plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and permits review of unpreserved errors in certain circumstances. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 11. However, defendant\u2019s decision not to testify \u201cgoes beyond normal forfeiture.\u201d Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 12. By not testifying, a reviewing court is deprived of an adequate record with which to evaluate the circuit court\u2019s decision on the admissibility of the prior convictions. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 12. The reviewing court would be forced to speculate on the substance of the defendant\u2019s testimony as well as the questions asked by the prosecution on cross-examination. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 12. Thus, we cannot apply the plain error doctrine to review an otherwise unpreserved error because there would be nothing to review.\nFinally, defendant argues that the circuit court impermissibly considered B.A.\u2019s age as an aggravating factor in sentencing where it was also an element of the crime for which he was convicted, resulting in a \u201cdouble enhancement.\u201d Although neither defendant nor the State addressed the issue, we must conclude that defendant has forfeited this argument as well. The supreme court recently reiterated the \u201cwell settled\u201d proposition that to preserve a claim of sentencing error, a defendant must object to the error at the sentencing hearing as well as raise the objection in a postsentencing motion. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010), citing People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 76 (2008); see also People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 352 (2000). Although defendant included the double enhancement argument in his postsentencing motion, he did not make a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing hearing. Thus, he has not preserved the issue for review.\nNevertheless, forfeited arguments related to sentencing issues may properly be reviewed for plain error. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. As with trial errors, a defendant must show either that: \u201c(1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.\u201d Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Under either prong of the plain error rule, defendant bears the burden of persuasion. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. We must \u201chold the defendant to his burden of demonstrating plain error\u201d and if he fails to meet that burden, we must honor the procedural default. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545, 549.\nThe supreme court continually expresses that one of the most important functions of this court is to determine whether an issue has been properly preserved for review. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106 (2008) (the other paramount function is to determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal). Thus, we must perform a proper forfeiture analysis to avoid the \u201cregrettable\u201d consequence that results when the supreme court \u201callows leave to appeal on an issue that it deems sufficiently important for [its] consideration and then must find the issue forfeited\u201d as a result of an appellate court\u2019s failure to first determine whether the issue had been properly preserved for review. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 549. Because defendant failed to recognize his forfeiture on this issue, he has not made any argument under either prong of the plain error doctrine. As such, he \u201cobviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.\u201d Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Thus, he has forfeited plain error review. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.\nHowever, the supreme court has recently clarified that the forfeiture rule may be relaxed and an issue substantively reviewed where \u201cthe basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge.\u201d People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485-88 (2009). Notwithstanding trial counsel\u2019s obligation to raise contemporaneous objections to allow for the immediate correction of trial errors, forfeiture may be relaxed in certain \u201cextraordinary circumstances\u201d under People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963). McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 487-88. Specifically, forfeiture may only be relaxed where: (1) counsel\u2019s objection to the court\u2019s inappropriate comments to the jury risk alienating the jury by appearing disrespectful of the court\u2019s authority; (2) defense counsel\u2019s objection to the court\u2019s conduct outside the presence of the jury \u201c \u2018would have fallen on deaf ears\u2019 \u201d; or (3) the court relies on social commentary, rather than evidence, in sentencing a defendant to death. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 487-88; People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963). Such a limited application of the Sprinkle principle \u201cunderscores the importance of uniform application of the forfeiture rule except in the most compelling of situations.\u201d McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488.\nArguably, only the second exception applies to defendant\u2019s double enhancement argument. McLaurin notes parenthetically that in People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 266 (1986), the supreme court held that counsel need not \u201cinterrupt the judge and point out that he was considering wrong factors in aggravation\u201d in order to preserve a sentencing issue for review because such an objection would \u201cfall on deaf ears.\u201d McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488. However, McLaurin also suggests that a defendant must specifically invoke the Sprinkle principle in order to take advantage of its leniency, which defendant did not do here. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 487 n.1 (\u201ca defendant who successfully invokes Sprinkle is not limited in the same ways as a defendant relying solely on plain-error review\u201d). Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, we apply the Sprinkle principle here and conduct a substantive review of the merits of defendant\u2019s argument as though the error were properly preserved.\nDefendant contends that the court improperly considered B.A.\u2019s age, which is an element of the crime for which he was convicted, as an aggravating factor in imposing his 12-year sentence. It is well settled that generally, a factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot also be used as an aggravating factor in determining his sentence. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2004). The rationale for this prohibition against \u201cdouble enhancement\u201d is based upon the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in designating the range of punishment. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12.\nDefendant relies on People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986), in support of his argument. In White, the supreme court held that because a victim\u2019s age is an element of the crime of aggravated battery of a child, age cannot also be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing a defendant for that offense. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66; see also Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12. Defendant argues that the same logic applies where, as here, defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under the age of 13. See 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 14.1(a) (West 2004).\nAt the sentencing hearing, the court referred to B.A. as the \u201c12-year-old\u201d girl more than a dozen times, rarely referring to her by name. In many instances, the court used B.A.\u2019s age to comment on the nature of the crime by underscoring defendant\u2019s abuse of a position of trust, refuting defendant\u2019s contention that B.A. was \u201clike family\u201d to him, and explaining that sex with a 12-year-old girl could not be a \u201cmisunderstanding,\u201d as defendant maintained. Nevertheless, at one point, the court noted that B.A.\u2019s age was one of many \u201caggravating] circumstances\u201d in this case. In light of that comment, and the frequency with which the court invoked her age, we must conclude that, under White, the circuit court improperly considered the victim\u2019s age as an aggravating factor in sentencing. See White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66.\nHowever, as White went on to explain, reliance on an improper factor in aggravation does not require that we remand for resentencing. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66-67. Improper double enhancement occurs only if consideration of that factor results in a \u201c \u2018harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.\u2019 \u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 11-12, quoting People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). Thus, if it appears from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered factor was so insignificant that it did not result in a greater sentence, then we need not remand for resentencing. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 67, citing People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1983).\nPredatory criminal sexual assault of a child is a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1) (West 2004). At the time of sentencing in this case, the offense was punishable by 6 to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment, with the possibility that a court could impose an extended term sentence of 30 to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1) (West 2004); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(c) (West 2004) (the court may impose an extended term sentence \u201cupon any offender who was convicted of *** predatory criminal sexual assault of a child *** where the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense\u201d); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(2) (West 2004) (\u201cfor a Class X felony, [an extended-]term [sentence] shall be not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years\u201d).\nDefendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the assault on B.A., had been convicted of three felony offenses in as many years. In fact, defendant was serving a three-year probation sentence at the time that he committed the instant offense. Both of these circumstances by themselves constitute statutory aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(3), (a)(12) (West 2004). Moreover, the court noted that defendant previously served 194 days in an adult prison on his first conviction, which \u201capparently didn\u2019t phase [him] in the slightest.\u201d Additionally, the court found that defendant displayed no remorse for his actions, calling him \u201cinsensitive\u201d for suggesting that the sexual assault of B.A. was a \u201cmisunderstanding.\u201d The court also noted that defendant, as the father of B.A.\u2019s nephew, was in a position of trust, and that he took advantage of that position with B.A. in her own home. Defense counsel did not argue that any statutory mitigating factors applied here, and the court cited none. The court recognized defendant\u2019s difficult upbringing, but found that that did not \u201ccondone\u201d the crime or minimize the effect that the assault would have on B.A. in the future.\nAs in White, the record in this case disclosed the presence of two statutory aggravating factors and the absence of any mitigating factors. See White, 114 Ill. 2d at 67-68. Additionally, the court here acknowledged the defendant\u2019s lack of remorse. As a result of these findings, the court sentenced defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment, rather than the 30 or 60 years for which he was eligible. Thus, we find that the weight placed on the improperly considered factor of the victim\u2019s age did not result in a \u201charsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.\u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 11-12. Therefore, as in White, we decline to remand the matter for resentencing. See White, 114 Ill. 2d at 67-68.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\nAffirmed.\nCUNNINGHAM and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.\nThe effect of the court\u2019s order, although poorly worded, was to admit the testimony with the limiting instruction that it may only be introduced for diagnostic purposes.\nThe State argued in passing that defendant waived the sentencing issue because defense counsel withdrew his argument in the postsentencing motion that defendant erroneously received an \u201cenhanced penalty.\u201d See Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 229 (2007) (waiver is the \u201cintentional relinquishment of a known right\u201d). However, defense counsel withdrew an argument based on an \u201cextended-term sentence,\u201d which rightly did not apply because defendant\u2019s sentence was within the statutory range.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Brian McNeil, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary R Needham, and Mikah Soliunas, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORDELLO FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20141536\nOpinion filed September 28, 2010.\nRehearing denied October 25, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Brian McNeil, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary R Needham, and Mikah Soliunas, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0978-01", "first_page_order": 994, "last_page_order": 1013 }