{ "id": 3716900, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WADE D. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Taylor", "decision_date": "2010-11-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20141100", "first_page": "421", "last_page": "424", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "405 Ill. App. 3d 421" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3502930 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "postconviction claim that juror was sleeping or otherwise inattentive was forfeited where the defendant failed to bring the juror's behavior to the trial court's attention during trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748973 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535-36", "parenthetical": "postconviction claim that a juror was sleeping was forfeited where the defendant failed to bring the issue to the trial court's attention during trial" }, { "page": "536" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "postconviction claim that a juror was sleeping was forfeited where the defendant failed to object at trial" }, { "page": "90-91", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's summary dismissal of the defendant's postconviction petition where his claim that a juror was sleeping during trial was forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623765 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263912 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0183-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 449, "char_count": 7767, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10863239517052925 }, "sha256": "6dcfb3accaa9c2e4d3126e5d6f7ce4353518b6ae32f1e5400ceacd93afc666ac", "simhash": "1:8eac7c3e736cc4f4", "word_count": 1258 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:02.087067+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WADE D. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 2005, after a jury trial, defendant, Wade D. Taylor, was found guilty of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (West 2004)) and was sentenced to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed. People v. Taylor, No. 2 \u2014 05\u20140953 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In June 2007, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2006)), and in July 2008, he filed a postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2008)). The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 1401 petition and summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit (725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)). Defendant\u2019s notice of appeal reflects that he was challenging the trial court\u2019s dismissal of both his section 2 \u2014 1401 petition and his postconviction petition. His brief on appeal, however, challenges only the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe Act provides a remedy to criminal defendants who have suffered substantial violations of their constitutional rights. People v. Barcik, 365 Ill. App. 3d 183, 190 (2006). When the death penalty is not involved, there are three stages to the proceedings. Barcik, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 190. During the first stage, the trial court determines whether the defendant\u2019s allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional violation that would necessitate relief. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998). The trial court may summarily dismiss the petition if it finds that the petition is \u201cfrivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2008). A petition is \u201cfrivolous or patently without merit\u201d if \u201cthe petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.\u201d People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). A petition lacking an arguable basis either in law or in fact is one \u201cbased on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.\u201d Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. \u201cWe review de nova the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition.\u201d Barcik, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 190.\nIn his postconviction petition, defendant alleged, among other things, that one of the jurors was crying during the victim\u2019s testimony. Defendant\u2019s affidavit, attached to his postconviction petition, stated:\n\u201cI, Wade D. Taylor, witnessed on my trial date (July 19, 2005), a young lady on my jury getting emotional (crying) during the testimony of the soul [szc] complaining witness against me, Megan E. Blunt. My public defender also noticed and motioned to the judge what was happening. The judge stopped the testimony of Ms. Blunt so that the jury could take a break. I believe the Court said that it would take a short recess because one of the jurors need[ed] to use the restroom.\u201d\nThe report of proceedings reflects that the following occurred during the victim\u2019s testimony.\n\u201cMS. PESHEK [Defense Attorney]: If I could have a moment please, Judge.\nTHE COURT: We are going to take a short recess at this time.\n(To the witness) Just wait there for a moment.\n(Jury leaves)\nTHE COURT: One of the jurors indicated they needed to [use] the restroom. That\u2019s why we took a short recess.\u201d\nDespite making other allegations in his postconviction petition, defendant, on appeal, claims only that his allegation that a juror was crying stated the gist of a constitutional claim. However, because defendant forfeited his claim that a juror was crying during the victim\u2019s testimony, the trial court did not err when it summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nPostconviction claims of juror misconduct, such as sleeping or inattentiveness, must be brought to the trial court\u2019s attention or they are forfeited. See People v. Escobedo, 377 Ill. App. 3d 82, 89 (2007) (postconviction claim that a juror was sleeping was forfeited where the defendant failed to object at trial); People v. Grenko, 356 Ill. App. 3d 532, 535-36 (2005) (postconviction claim that a juror was sleeping was forfeited where the defendant failed to bring the issue to the trial court\u2019s attention during trial); People v. Nix, 150 Ill. App. 3d 48, 50 (1986) (postconviction claim that juror was sleeping or otherwise inattentive was forfeited where the defendant failed to bring the juror\u2019s behavior to the trial court\u2019s attention during trial). The Fourth District stated in Grenko:\n\u201cIf we allow a defendant to ignore sleeping jurors during the trial, but then argue the ill effects of their sleeping after the jury returns a verdict against them in what the trial judge determined to be a fair trial, we open the door for any convicted defendant who will swear, and/or get a relative to swear, that the jurors were sleeping.\n*** Because of the trial judge\u2019s singular position in assessing courtroom conduct, atmosphere, and demeanor, a failure to bring such problems to the attention of the trial judge prevents their ever being addressed. Failure to object in these cases is not a mere technical violation, an interference with efficient administration, but an insurmountable barrier to evaluation of concerns that cannot be reproduced in the record. More than simple waiver was involved here.\u201d Grenko, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 536.\nHere, although defendant claims in his affidavit that his attorney \u201cmotioned to the judge what was happening,\u201d the record does not reflect that he made any objection or mistrial request based on the juror\u2019s behavior. Moreover, the record fails to reflect that any discussion occurred regarding a crying juror. Defendant makes no claim in his petition or affidavit that he registered an objection or requested a mistrial. Without either of these, the trial court was not given the opportunity to remedy any prejudice defendant now claims to have suffered as a result of the juror\u2019s emotional display. Moreover, as the State argues, even if defense counsel did motion to the trial court, nothing in the record or defendant\u2019s petition or affidavit indicates that the trial court was actually aware that a juror was crying. Rather, the record simply reflects that the trial court called a recess because it believed that a juror needed to use the restroom. By all accounts, then, it appears that defendant failed to effectively raise the issue in the trial court. Defendant\u2019s postconviction claim that he was prejudiced by a crying juror is, therefore, forfeited. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s petition failed to set forth a sufficient basis, either in law or in fact, to establish a constitutional violation for purposes of invoking the Act. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16.\nOn our review of the record, we hold that the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of defendant\u2019s postconviction petition was proper. See Escobedo, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 90-91 (affirming the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of the defendant\u2019s postconviction petition where his claim that a juror was sleeping during trial was forfeited); Grenko, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 537 (same).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.\nAffirmed.\nMcLaren and JORGENSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien and Jaime L. Montgomery, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E Bruscato, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Stephen E. Norris and David T. Murrell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WADE D. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20141100\nOpinion filed November 16, 2010.\nThomas A. Lilien and Jaime L. Montgomery, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E Bruscato, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Stephen E. Norris and David T. Murrell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0421-01", "first_page_order": 437, "last_page_order": 440 }