{ "id": 3716635, "name": "MEDINA BAILEY, Executive Director of Nurturing Development and Learning Center, Inc., Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bailey v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission", "decision_date": "2010-11-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20143375", "first_page": "550", "last_page": "563", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "405 Ill. App. 3d 550" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073721 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902-03" }, { "page": "903" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276869 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577987 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777124 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5020236 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/335/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594848 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345178 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590716 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383541 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4300177 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 1041", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2573616 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1046", "parenthetical": "interpreting \"any school\" in the statute prohibiting delivery of a controlled substance on school property to mean \" 'any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university' \" (emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Fla. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1985588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding without analysis that a kindergarten was not a school for purposes of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol within a certain distance of schools" }, { "parenthetical": "finding without analysis that a kindergarten was not a school for purposes of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol within a certain distance of schools" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/159/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 A.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7930391 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "private preschool was not considered \"public or parochial school\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/519/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a712", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 P2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Colo. App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo. App.", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Pa. Commw. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1426533 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/145/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. Reg. 19383", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "church kindergarten is a \"school\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ga. 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1183697 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "church kindergarten is a \"school\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/248/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.Y.S.2d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "preschool can be considered a \"school\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Misc. 2d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 900527 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "preschool can be considered a \"school\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/152/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 So. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7512919 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Montessori kindergarten was a school for purposes of liquor permit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/573/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2646124 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "defining \"school\" for purposes of city fire code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/93/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274350 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307272 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "defining \"private school\" for purposes of compulsory attendance law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544459 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383544 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" }, { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256344 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599258 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192512 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385223 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265344 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270158 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4261240 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0357-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1279, "char_count": 31865, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2944096354652337 }, "sha256": "a1e905311a33cabca2cd641837a8438c78b572e3e23ece01b09757ae978c3f2f", "simhash": "1:69fd79462269786d", "word_count": 5285 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:02.087067+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MEDINA BAILEY, Executive Director of Nurturing Development and Learning Center, Inc., Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Medina Bailey, executive director of Nurturing Development & Learning Center, Inc. (NDLC), appeals the decision of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (Commission) that the NDLC, a day care center that also operates a preschool, is not a \u201cschool\u201d under section 6 \u2014 11(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934, which prohibits the retail sale of alcohol within 100 feet of \u201cany *** school.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 11(a) (West 2006).\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn December 17, 2007, William Shaw, the local liquor commissioner for the Village of Dolton, issued a liquor license to Greenwood Liquor & Food, Inc., located at 825 East Sibley in Dolton, Illinois. NDLC is located at 835 East Sibley in South Holland, Illinois, next door to the liquor store. On January 4, 2008, petitioner, the executive director of NDLC, appealed Shaw\u2019s decision to the Commission, arguing that the issuance of the license violates section 6 \u2014 11 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 11 (West 2006)), which prohibits the retail sale of alcohol within 100 feet of \u201cany *** school.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 11(a) (West 2006).\nThe Commission conducted a de nova evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, petitioner testified that NDLC is a not-for-profit organization that participates in the Preschool for All program, a voluntary preschool program for three- to five-year-olds. She described the Preschool for All program as an equivalent to earlier Headstart or \u201cPre-K\u201d programs, which helped prepare children for kindergarten. Similarly, Preschool for All is an early intervention program that helps transition children to public or private school. The program is conducted five hours a day, and she requires children to arrive at the facility by 9 a.m.\nAs a participant in the Preschool for All program, NDLC is required to follow guidelines established by the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), including the requirement to have a state-certified teacher with a certification in early childhood education and to use an ISBE-approved curriculum. However, the Preschool for All program implementation manual provides that the \u201cIllinois State Board of Education does not endorse specific curricula for use in the Preschool for All.\u201d A nonprofit organization, Illinois Action for Children, monitors the program and visits the facility monthly, while the ISBE visits annually. Although the ISBE funds the program, Illinois Action for Children pays NDLC. Shaw presented a letter from the ISBE, dated April 16, 2008, which states that NDLC is not \u201cfunded directly by ISBE, and is not recognized or accredited as a school by the ISBE.\u201d\nPetitioner operates her business from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., five days a week. Children are dropped off at the building and picked up by their parents. NDLC accepts children from the ages of six weeks to six years of age. Forty children ages three to five years old are students in the program, which she characterized as a preschool.\nOn her business license application, petitioner indicated that NDLC\u2019s primary purpose is child care. Her 2007 corporate annual report states that the business NDLC conducts is child care. NDLC is listed as a day care center in the Yellow Pages. Included in the record are documents showing that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) monitors, visits, and evaluates the center.\nPetitioner testified that NDLC\u2019s and Greenwood Liquor & Food\u2019s property lines abut each other, and a fence separates the two properties; she measured the distance between the buildings to be 80 feet. She stated that she had a survey, but it was not submitted; instead, petitioner submitted an aerial map.\nOn May 6, 2008, the Commission entered an order affirming the decision of the Village\u2019s local liquor commissioner, finding that petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Village violated section 6 \u2014 11 by issuing a liquor license within 100 feet of a school.\nOn May 23, 2008, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing with the Commission alleging that she had new evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing. She attached a letter from the ISBE dated April 30, 2008. It stated that NDLC is registered with the ISBE as of April 29, 2008, and that it was associated with South Holland School District No. 150. According to petitioner\u2019s counsel\u2019s letter of May 5, 2008, petitioner applied for and received registration after the hearing with the Commission. The Commission denied the petition for rehearing on June 11, 2008.\nPetitioner filed a complaint for administrative review with the trial court. On July 22, 2009, the trial court found that the Commission\u2019s decision was not contrary to the law or clearly erroneous and that its decision to deny the petition for rehearing was not an abuse of discretion. This appeal follows.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, this court reviews the administrative agency\u2019s decision and not the trial court\u2019s determination. Village of Oak Park v. Village of Oak Park Firefighters Pension Board, 362 Ill. App. 3d 357, 365 (2005). The applicable standard of review depends on whether the question presented on appeal is one of fact, of law, or both. Daley v. Lakeview Billiard Caf\u00e9, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 377, 381 (2007). The factual findings of an administrative agency are considered prima facie true and correct (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006)), and a reviewing court will reverse only if the administrative decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Carlisle Investments Group, Ltd. v. White, 366 Ill. App. 3d 876, 883 (2006). However, this court exercises an independent review of an agency\u2019s conclusions of law. Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814, 818 (1993). An agency\u2019s determination of the legal effect of a given set of facts presents a mixed question of fact and law subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Lakeview Billiard Caf\u00e9, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 381. Such a decision is clearly erroneous only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Lakeview Billiard Caf\u00e9, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 381.\nPetitioner asserts that the Commission\u2019s decision should be reviewed de nova since the Commission did not make any specific findings of fact or provide any explanation of its decision. Respondents, the Commission, Shaw, and Greenwood Liquor & Food, argue that whether the NDLC is a school is a question of fact. However, because we are applying the definition of \u201cany *** school\u201d to the facts presented before the Commission, this case presents a mixed question of fact and law subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Lakeview Billiard Caf\u00e9, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 381.\nA. Section 6 \u2014 11(a) of the Liquor Control Act\nSection 6 \u2014 11(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 provides, in pertinent part, \u201cNo license shall be issued for the sale at retail of any alcoholic liquor within 100 feet of any church, school other than an institution of higher learning, hospital, home for aged or indigent persons or for veterans, their spouses or children or any military or naval station ***.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 11(a) (West 2006). The Act \u201cshall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 2 (West 2006). As the United States Supreme Court has found, \u201cschools and churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor.\u201d Larkin v. Grendel\u2019s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 121, 74 L. Ed. 2d 297, 303, 103 S. Ct. 505, 509 (1982).\nThe goal of a court when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent, \u201cand the surest indicator *** is the language in the statute.\u201d Department of Public Aid ex rel. Schmid v. Williams, 336 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556 (2003). \u201cTo this end, the court may consider the reason and necessity for the statute and the evils it was intended to remedy, and will assume that the legislature did not intend an *** unjust result.\u201d In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309 (2001). A court may not supply omissions, remedy defects, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law so as to depart from the plain meaning of the language employed in the statute. Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 309-\n10. \u201cIf the language of the statute is clear, its plain and ordinary meaning must be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction.\u201d Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 310.\nThe Liquor Control Act does not define \u201cschool,\u201d nor have Illinois courts interpreted the meaning of \u201cschool\u201d under the Act. In the absence of a statutory definition indicating a different legislative intent, words are to be given their ordinary and commonly understood meanings. Cojeunaze Nursing Center v. Lumpkin, 260 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1029 (1994). \u201cThe dictionary can be used as a resource to ascertain the ordinary and popular meaning of words.\u201d Cojeunaze Nursing Center, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary provides that a \u201cschool\u201d is an \u201cinstitution of learning and education, esp. for children.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1463 (9th ed. 2009). Merriam-Webster defines \u201cschool\u201d as \u201can organization that provides instruction.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1111 (11th ed. 2006).\nPetitioner relies primarily on Possekel v. O\u2019Donnell, 51 Ill. App. 3d 313 (1977), and Hilgendorf v. First Baptist Church of Danville, 157 Ill. App. 3d 428 (1987), in support of her argument that NDLC is a \u201cschool\u201d under the Liquor Control Act.\nIn Possekel, the plaintiff was injured while she was a student at the defendant\u2019s \u201cnursery and kindergarten,\u201d which was licensed as a day care center, but not as a nursery school or kindergarten. The defendant contended that she was immune from liability under section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 122, par. 24\u201424).\nThe court noted that the term \u201cschool\u201d is a place \u201cwhere instruction is given, generally to the young.\u201d Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The court refused to find, as a matter of law, that the defendant\u2019s establishment was a school as intended by section 24 \u2014 24. The court noted that the center was licensed as a day care center and that a day care center \u201ccan be with or without stated educational purposes.\u201d Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 317. However, in its motion for summary judgment, the defendant made no allegation that the center was engaged in instruction; instead, it relied on the fact that the establishment was called a nursery school and that the plaintiff was called a student. Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 317. \u201cBut merely calling an institution a school, a child a student, does not make either one.\u201d Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 317.\nThe court found that, regardless of whether the center was considered a \u201cschool\u201d at common law, it did not fall within the parameters of section 24 \u2014 24 because the School Code \u201cdoes not concern itself with nursery schools and kindergartens unless they are run by the school system.\u201d Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 318. Rather, section 24 \u2014 24 was meant to apply to schools \u201cgoverned or at least affected by the School Code\u201d and not to centers governed by the Child Care Act of 1969 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 23, par. 2214). Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 319. In addition, section 24 \u2014 24 applied to \u201c \u2018teachers and other certified educational employees,\u2019 \u201d but there was no indication that the defendant or any other employee of the center was certified. Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 319, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24. Accordingly, the court found that section 24 \u2014 24 did not apply. Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 319.\nIn Hilgendorf, the plaintiff was injured on the defendant church\u2019s playground while enrolled in the day care program of the church\u2019s school. The church asserted that it was immune from liability under section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code, while the plaintiff argued that immunity under section 24 \u2014 24 did not cover the operation of a day care facility operated by a private institution such as a church. The Fourth District noted that a \u201cschool\u201d has been defined as a place \u201c \u2018where instruction is given, generally to the young.\u2019 \u201d Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 430, quoting Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The court found that the day care program was affiliated with \u201ca private, parochial school system\u201d operated by the church, the employee who negligently supervised the plaintiff was an elementary school teacher certified by the state, and the plaintiff participated in a course of study in the day care program, \u201cwhich included instruction in the alphabet, reading, and art.\u201d Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 430. The court concluded that the day care program was a \u201cschool\u201d for purposes of section 24 \u2014 24 \u201ceven though the participating children were not of an age at which their participation was mandated by law and although the time they spent receiving instruction was not as long as that given to older children and involved more playtime.\u201d Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 430.\nHilgendorf distinguished Possekel on the basis that the day care program was part of a parochial school system, which enjoys immunity under section 24 \u2014 24; the program was not run for \u201cpecuniary profit\u201d; and the employee whose negligence was alleged was a teacher certified under the School Code. Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 432. See also People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 577 (1950) (defining \u201cprivate school\u201d for purposes of compulsory attendance law); Faith Builders Church, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1047 (2008); City of Chicago v. Bethlehem Healing Temple Church, 93 Ill. App. 2d 303, 308 (1968) (defining \u201cschool\u201d for purposes of city fire code).\nPetitioner claims that the definitions of \u201cschool\u201d described in Possekel and Hilgendorf apply to the instant case because NDLC is a place \u201cwhere instruction is given\u201d and its preschool program includes \u201cinstruction in the alphabet, reading, and art.\u201d Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 430. However, Possekel and Hilgendorf were decided under section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code, not the Liquor Control Act. But see Cole v. City of Ruston, 573 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1991) (Montessori kindergarten was a school for purposes of liquor permit); 111 East 22nd Management Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 152 Misc. 2d 842, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1991) (preschool can be considered a \u201cschool\u201d); Risser v. City of Thomasville, 248 Ga. 866, 286 S.E.2d 727 (1982) (church kindergarten is a \u201cschool\u201d). Furthermore, unlike the day care center in Hilgendorf, NDLC is not a part of a private, parochial school.\nRespondents argue that NDLC is a day care, which is omitted from the Illinois School Code. They point to evidence that NDLC provides services to children between six weeks and six years old; the Yellow Pages describes NDLC as a day care provider; and its annual report to the Secretary of State and its business license describe it as a \u201cchild care\u201d business. It is an \u201cearly intervention\u201d program that helps children prepare to attend public or private school. See 105 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 3.71 (West 2006) (the program includes a \u201cparent education component\u201d and gives financial priority to programs serving at-risk children). In addition, NDLC is licensed and regulated as a day care center and is monitored by DCFS. Day care facilities are governed by the Child Care Act of 1969 (225 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2006)), not the School Code. Section 2.09 of the Child Care Act of 1969 defines a \u201cday care center\u201d as a \u201cchild care facility [that] regularly provides day care for less than 24 hours per day for (1) more than 8 children in a family home, or (2) more than 3 children in a facility other than a family home, including senior citizen buildings.\u201d 225 ILCS 10/2.09 (West 2006).\nRespondents correctly point out that when the legislature has wanted to impose a distance restriction involving day care centers, it has explicitly done so. For example, section 11 \u2014 5\u20141.5 of the Illinois Municipal Code prohibits a municipality from locating an adult entertainment facility within 1,000 feet of \u201cany school, day care center, cemetery, public park.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 5\u20141.5 (West 2006). Section 11 \u2014 9.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 prohibits sex offenders from being present in a school building, on school property, or on a school bus, while section 11 \u2014 9.4(b\u20145) prohibits sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of a \u201cplayground, child care institution, day care center.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.3(b), 11 \u2014 9.4(b\u20145) (West 2006). The Missing Children Records Act distinguishes between enrollment in \u201ca school, preschool educational program, child care facility, or day care home.\u201d 325 ILCS 50/5(a) (West 2008). Therefore, the legislature could have specifically listed day care centers in section 6 \u2014 11(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 if it had so intended.\nRespondents contend that NDLC\u2019s participation in the Preschool for All program does not prove that it is a school. They cite Title 23, section 235.10(b) of the Illinois Administrative Code, which provides:\n\u201cEligible applicants for Early Childhood Block Grant programs include any public or private not-for-profit or for-profit entity with experience in providing educational, health, social and/or child development services to young children and their families. If the Early Childhood Block Grant program is operated in or by a child care center subject to the licensure requirements of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), then that child care center must hold the appropriate licensure in accordance with rules promulgated by DCFS ***.\u201d 23 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7235.10(b), amended at 30 Ill. Reg. 19383, eff. November 28, 2006.\nSee also 105 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 3.71 (West 2006) (implementing the Preschool for All Children grant program for \u201cpublic school districts and other eligible entities\u201d). Respondents argue that because a variety of entities, including day care centers, may participate in the program, participation is not tantamount to certification or recognition as a school.\nRespondents also cite two out-of-state cases in support of their argument: K&K Enterprises, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 145 Pa. Commw. 118, 602 A.2d 476 (1992), and Londer v. Friednash, 38 Colo. App. 350, 560 P2d 102 (1976). In K&K Enterprises, the liquor control board denied a restaurant\u2019s application for transfer of a liquor license on the basis that it was located within 300 feet of a day care center, in violation of a statute prohibiting the transfer of a liquor license if the property was within 300 feet of any school. On appeal, the court found that the day care center was not a \u201cschool.\u201d Although the director of the day care center testified that she taught during the course of the day and that she had a curriculum for the center, the curriculum was not issued to the day care center by the local school district or the state board of education. K&K Enterprises, 145 Pa. Commw. at 125, 602 A.2d at 480. \u201c \u2018School\u2019 is defined by Webster\u2019s as an institution that teaches children. Undoubtedly, this day care center teaches children; however, as shown by the definitions found in the Public Welfare Code, the primary role of a day care center is child care in the absence of a parent ***.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) K&K Enterprises, 145 Pa. Commw. at 125, 602 A.2d at 480. Therefore, the day care center was not a \u201cschool\u201d within the meaning of the statute. K&K Enterprises, 145 Pa. Commw. at 125, 602 A.2d at 480.\nIn Londer, a statute prohibited issuance of a liquor license where the building in which the liquor was to be sold was located within 500 feet \u201c \u2018of any public or parochial school.\u2019 \u201d Londer, 38 Colo. App. at 351, 560 P.2d at 103, quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a712 \u2014 47\u2014139(1)(d) (1973). The court found that a day care center located within 500 feet of the liquor store did not qualify as a \u201cpublic school,\u201d even though it included \u201ca program of pre-school instruction provided [to] certain children in accordance with a local school district.\u201d Londer, 38 Colo. App. at 353, 560 P.2d at 104. \u201c[T]here is no evidence in the record that the Center is a public school other than the fact of its voluntary participation in a cooperative pre-school program.\u201d Londer, 38 Colo. App. at 353, 560 P.2d at 104. See also Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. Pastare, 519 A.2d 592, 594 (R.I. 1987) (private preschool was not considered \u201cpublic or parochial school\u201d); Rivkind v. State ex rel. Gibson, 159 Fla. 553, 32 So. 2d 330 (1947) (finding without analysis that a kindergarten was not a school for purposes of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol within a certain distance of schools).\nLonder provides little assistance, since the issue in the instant case is not whether NDLC is a \u201cpublic or parochial school.\u201d However, K&K Enterprises is more applicable, as the day care center in that case involved at least some instruction. Further, the curriculum in K&K Enterprises was not issued to the center by the local school district or the state board of education. While petitioner testified that she uses an ISBE-approved curriculum, the Freschool for All program implementation manual provides that the \u201cIllinois State Board of Education does not endorse specific curricula for use in the Preschool for All.\u201d\nRespondents also cite 1979 debates as a way of ascertaining legislative intent. In the debates, which concerned an amendment regarding proximity to universities, Representative Johnson stated, \u201c[T]here\u2019s [a] 100 foot limitation with respect to churches and [a] 100 foot limitation with respect to elementary and secondary education facilities ***.\u201d 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 15, 1979, at 223 (statements of Representative Johnson). Respondents use this single statement to support their argument that \u201cschool\u201d as used in section 6 \u2014 11(a) refers to elementary and secondary schools, but not preschools. See also People v. Goldstein, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1046 (1990) (interpreting \u201cany school\u201d in the statute prohibiting delivery of a controlled substance on school property to mean \u201c \u2018any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university\u2019 \u201d (emphasis omitted) because other statutes in the same public law defined it that way), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702 \u2014 7(7)(a). However, legislative history is considered only if the statute is found to be ambiguous, an argument that the parties have not made. Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 399 Ill. App. 3d 51, 75 (2010). Furthermore, the debates are from 1979, involving an amendment regarding proximity to universities. That amendment had nothing to do with the original \u201cschool\u201d language. Therefore, we decline to interpret this statement from the 1979 debates as a way of ascertaining legislative intent. We also reject respondents\u2019 attempt to rely on a hearing transcript before the Illinois Racing Board, as it is not a written decision and it involves a different board.\nWe conclude that NDLC is not a \u201cschool\u201d under section 6 \u2014 11(a). Its principal function is that of a day care center: it is open 12 hours a day, 5 days a week, it serves children six weeks to six years old, it holds itself out as a day care center in its corporate filings and business license, and it is monitored by DCFS. While one component of its business is teaching preschool, at the time of the hearing, NDLC was not \u201cfunded directly by ISBE, and is not recognized or accredited as a school by the ISBE.\u201d Further, the Preschool for All program implementation manual provides that the \u201cIllinois State Board of Education does not endorse specific curricula for use in the Preschool for All.\u201d Illinois Action for Children monitors the program and visits the facility monthly.\nAnother subsection of the statute supports such an interpretation. Section 6 \u2014 ll(u)(ll) refers to \u201cthe principal of the school.\u201d Pub. Act 96 \u2014 1051, eff. July 14, 2010 (adding 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 ll(u)(ll)). Because a day care center does not have a principal, subsection 6 \u2014 ll(u)(ll) implies that the legislature did not intend for day care centers that include a preschool component to be considered \u201cschools.\u201d It should also be noted that children do not walk to NDLC; rather, they are dropped off and picked up by their parents. In Gorgees v. Daley, 256 Ill. App. 3d 143, 149 (1993), the court stated, regarding the constitutionality of section 6 \u2014 11, \u201cBecause the schools in Chicago are typically bigger and more children may walk past or congregate near clubs and food shops in the immediate area, the General Assembly could reasonably conclude that there is a greater likelihood of school children coming into contact with intoxicated individuals or alcohol.\u201d Children walking past a liquor store and, thus, being exposed to intoxicated people is a factor that the legislature and the courts are considering in the context of section 6 \u2014 11.\nFinally, section 6 \u2014 11(a) prohibits the retail sale of alcohol \u201cwithin 100 feet\u201d of a school. 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 11(a) (West 2006). While Greenwood Liquors claims that petitioner failed to present competent evidence as to the location of the property lines, the Commission could not have possibly found that the properties were more than 100 feet apart. Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the 100 feet must be measured from the lot line of the licensee\u2019s premises to the lot line of the school premises. Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 114 Ill. App. 3d 855, 859-60 (1983); Kaminski v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 20 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419 (1974); De Loian v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 109 Ill. App. 2d 71, 74 (1969); Smith v. Balias, 335 Ill. App. 418, 422 (1948). Although petitioner did not submit a survey, she testified that the buildings were about 80 feet from each other, and an aerial map showed that the properties abutted. It can hardly be disputed that Greenwood Liquors\u2019 property is within 100 feet of NDLC\u2019s when the properties obviously abut.\nB. Petition for Rehearing\nNext, petitioner argues that the Commission committed reversible error when it denied her petition for rehearing, which included \u201cnew evidence that was not available to NDLC at the time of the hearing,\u201d specifically, the April 30, 2008, letter from the ISBE. Petitioner fails to cite any authority in support of her argument in her opening brief, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)). Accordingly, we consider the argument waived. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7).\nWaiver notwithstanding, agencies have broad discretion in conducting administrative hearings. Wilson v. Department of Professional Regulation, 344 Ill. App. 3d 897, 907 (2003). Furthermore, \u201cnormally an administrative agency is not required to open up the record and consider new evidence.\u201d Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 158 Ill. App. 3d 275, 289 (1987).\nEvidence is considered \u201cnewly discovered\u201d only when it was not available at the prior hearing. Caywood v. Gossett, 382 Ill. App. 3d 124, 133 (2008). Here, the evidence was not available at the administrative hearing. The record shows that \u201cNDLC\u2019s registration with ISBE was applied for and received after the hearing with the Illinois Liquor Control Commission.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) However, NDLC was participating in the Preschool for All program well before the April 2008 administrative hearing, so its decision to register with the ISBE after the license was issued and after the evidentiary hearing, and after hearing the commissioners\u2019 comments, is suspicious. We will not permit petitioner to participate in a hearing and then create evidence after the fact. See Better Government Ass\u2019n v. Blagojevich, 386 Il. App. 3d 808, 819 (2008).\nFurthermore, the significance of petitioner\u2019s new evidence is unclear, as the letter says only that NDLC is now \u201cregistered\u201d with the ISBE, not that it is a school. Indeed, only two weeks before, the ISBE stated that NDLC is not \u201cfunded directly by ISBE, and is not recognized or accredited as a school by the ISBE.\u201d In addition, the April 30, 2008, ISBE letter states, \u201cWe hope we will work together for the excellence of K-12 education in Illinois,\u201d and section 2 \u2014 3.25o of the School Code allows for the \u201cvoluntary registration and recognition of non-public elementary and secondary schools.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/2\u2014 3.25o(a) (West 2006). NDLC, however, does not teach K-12; it participates in a preschool program for at-risk three- to five-year-olds. Accordingly, we find that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner\u2019s petition for rehearing.\nC. Remand to the Commission\nFinally, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to remand the case to the Commission for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 50(a) (West 2006) (a final decision of an administrative agency shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law); 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 111(a)(6) (West 2006) (circuit court has the power to remand the case and \u201cstate the questions requiring further hearing or proceedings\u201d). She argues that without such findings, the trial court was at a loss as to the appropriate standard of review and the basis of the Commission\u2019s decision.\nIn O\u2019Neill v. Rodriguez, 298 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902-03 (1998), this court noted that the purpose of an agency\u2019s findings in an administrative proceeding is to permit orderly and efficient judicial review. \u201cWhere such findings are sufficient to permit the reviewing court to make an intelligent decision, the standard is met.\u201d O\u2019Neill, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 903. Further, where the testimony before the administrative agency is preserved for review in the record, specific findings of fact by the agency are not necessary for judicial review. O\u2019Neill, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 903. The Commission concluded that petitioner failed to prove that Shaw violated section 6\u201411 of the Liquor Control Act by issuing a liquor license within 100 feet of a school, and the testimony before the Commission and the commissioners\u2019 comments are included in the hearing transcript. We conclude that the findings are sufficient to permit judicial review.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe note that this is a case of first impression in Illinois. The subjective feelings of justices are of no import. Courts do not make laws; the legislature does. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision finding that petitioner failed to prove that Shaw violated sectian 6 \u2014 11 of the Liquor Control Act by issuing a liquor license for the retail sale of alcohol within 100 feet of \u201cany *** school.\u201d\nAffirmed.\nNEVILLE and STEELE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lloyd Brooks, of Brooks Law Firm, of Homewood, for appellant.", "Irene F. Bahr, of Law Office of Irene F. Bahr, of Wheaton, for appellee Greenwood Liquors & Food, Inc.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael S. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Liquor Control Commission.", "Larry S. Kowalczyk and Christopher E Keleher, both of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Local Liquor Control Commissioner of Village of Dolton." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MEDINA BAILEY, Executive Director of Nurturing Development and Learning Center, Inc., Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20143375\nOpinion filed November 10, 2010.\nLloyd Brooks, of Brooks Law Firm, of Homewood, for appellant.\nIrene F. Bahr, of Law Office of Irene F. Bahr, of Wheaton, for appellee Greenwood Liquors & Food, Inc.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael S. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Liquor Control Commission.\nLarry S. Kowalczyk and Christopher E Keleher, both of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Local Liquor Control Commissioner of Village of Dolton." }, "file_name": "0550-01", "first_page_order": 566, "last_page_order": 579 }