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Ill. U. L. Rev. 559", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N. Ill. U. L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2627, "char_count": 93287, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.392380264786465e-08, "percentile": 0.3374660067054102 }, "sha256": "fce5a27ec2275406fadf556960448074c83d79217f4e8ea78c7233c8d35dcdac", "simhash": "1:ebfbbe2e7a4294f4", "word_count": 15067 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:02.087067+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STEVE SANDHOLM, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. RICHARD KUECKER et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants (Michael Venier, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Steve Sandholm, appeals the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his complaint, which alleged various counts of defamation, false light, and tortious interference, against defendants, Richard Kuecker, Ardis Kuecker, Glen Hughes, Michael Venier, A1 Knickrehm, Tim Oliver, Dan Burke, David Deets, Mary Mahan-Deatherage, NRG Media, LLC, Greg Deatherage, Robert Shomaker, and Neil Petersen. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint upon finding that the Citizen Participatian Act (Act) (735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2008)) provided defendants immunity from the claims alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the Act is unconstitutional and, alternatively, does not apply to the facts alleged in his complaint. Except Venier, defendants cross-appeal the attorney fee award, arguing that the trial court improperly limited the fees they could recover to those connected to the motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all points.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThis is a case of first impression involving interpretation of the Act, Illinois\u2019s anti-SLAPP (\u201cStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation\u201d) statute. The term \u201cSLAPP\u201d was developed by University of Denver professors George Pring and Penelope Canan, and the \u201cPublic Participation\u201d referred to involves concerned citizens acting primarily on matters relating to the public interest. See M. Sobczak, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 559, 563 (2008). In a typical SLAPP case, citizens oppose a developer\u2019s plan and petition their local government to stop the developer in some way. The developer then sues the citizens for intentional interference with prospective business and eventually the lawsuit is thrown out, but the citizens are financially strained in the process of defending the suit.\nWhile the Act\u2019s clear objective as an anti-SLAPP statute is to provide citizens with an immediate way to dispose of such lawsuits, the Act was written more broadly than such statutes in other states and more broadly than Pring and Canan had defined. SLAPP lawsuits were originally defined as involving a right to petition and a matter of public concern. M. Sobczak, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 559, 573 (2008). The Act exceeds that definition by including the rights to speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government, and it is not limited to matters of social or civic concern. The ramifications of the Act are presented before this court in the context of a defamation lawsuit. The facts below are derived from the record before us.\nOn April 25, 2008, plaintiff filed his initial complaint, which was later amended on May 9, 2008, June 27, 2008, and November 17, 2008. The third amended complaint alleged the following. Plaintiff was hired as a teacher and head basketball coach at Dixon High School for the 1999-2000 school year. For the 2003-04 school year, plaintiff was assigned the additional position of athletic director for Dixon High School. Plaintiff had always received positive performance evaluations during his time at Dixon High School. Beginning in February 2008, defendants started a campaign to have plaintiff removed as basketball coach and athletic director due to their disagreement with his coaching style. Defendants approached principal Michael Grady, superintendent James Brown, and members of the Dixon School District Board to complain about plaintiff\u2019s coaching style and performance. When the board and school administration did not remove plaintiff from those positions, defendants continued to campaign against him, forming a group known as the \u201cSave Dixon Sports Committee.\u201d\nCount I alleged defamation per se against Richard Kuecker. Richard published defamatory statements concerning plaintiffs abilities as a basketball coach and athletic director. Attached to the complaint was a February 28, 2008, letter that Richard authored and published on the \u201cSave Dixon Sports\u201d Web site. The letter made defamatory and false statements including that plaintiff only criticized athletes, badgered, humiliated, and bullied players, and was excessively abusive. Richard sent to the school board a petition making similar accusations, which was also posted on the Web site. On March 21, 2008, on WIXN radio, AM 1460, Richard, along with Michael Venier, Glen Hughes, and Al Knickrehm, discussed his dissatisfaction with the school board\u2019s failure to remove plaintiff as coach. Knickrehm was the general manager of the radio station, and he had requested that the others appear on the program. Richard stated on the program that plaintiff adversely performed his job, that his coaching philosophy was to verbally abuse, bully, discourage, and desecrate players, and that plaintiff needed to be fired. Richard, along with other members of the \u201cSave Dixon Sports Committee,\u201d posted the radio program on its Web site through April 10, 2008. Also posted on the Web site were additional statements from Richard and others criticizing plaintiffs coaching style and the school board\u2019s failure to remove him as coach and athletic director. Richard e-mailed to Matt Trowbridge, a reporter for the Rockford Register Star, defamatory statements, including that plaintiff was a bad coach and an embarrassment to the community and that his abusive behavior amounted to bullying.\nAn April 10, 2008, letter addressed to Doug Lee, the president of the Dixon school board, was signed by Richard and other members of the \u201cSave Dixon Sports Committee\u201d and published on the Web site. The letter described plaintiff as verbally abusive and unfit to hold the positions that he held. The letter further described defendants\u2019 complaints about the school board and the administration not conducting a full investigation and their failure to address the complaints at a March 19, 2008, school board meeting. On April 16, 2008, Richard told a reporter for the Rockford Register Star that the situation was not about plaintiffs coaching ability but about his verbal abuse.\nCount I alleged that Richard\u2019s defamatory statements: imputed to plaintiff an inability to perform his job and/or a lack of integrity in the discharge of his duties; prejudiced plaintiffs ability to perform his duties; and implied that he engaged in criminal activity.\nCount II alleged defamation per se against Glen Hughes and reiterated much of the same conduct alleged against Richard. Count III alleged defamation per se against Michael Venier and reiterated much of the same conduct alleged against Richard. An e-mail dated March 11, 2008, that Michael sent to a Dixon school board member was also attached. The e-mail criticized plaintiff for his \u201ccriticizing to the brink of abuse, demands bordering on slavery, [and] serious void of true citizenship.\u201d Count IV alleged defamation per se against Tim Oliver, alleging much of the same conduct alleged against Richard and the others. Counts V and VI alleged defamation per se against Dan Burke and Mary Mahan-Deatherage, respectively, alleging much of the same conduct alleged against Richard and the others. In addition, on April 24, 2008, Mary was quoted in the Dixon Gazette, \u201cWhy does there have be an instance of where someone is shoved or pushed? Why can\u2019t all these instances of abuse over 10 years...isn\u2019t that enough to fire him?\u201d Counts VII and VIII alleged defamation per se against David Deets and Greg Deatherage, respectively, and alleged much of the same conduct alleged against the others. Additionally, Greg was alleged to have published Richard\u2019s February 28 letter on the Northern Illinois Sports Beat Web site. On March 23, 2008, Greg published on that Web site statements that plaintiff was a \u201cpsyco [sic] nut [who] talks in circles and is only coaching for his glory\u201d and that he did not care about the players. On April 10, also on that site, Greg wrote about plaintiff, \u201cIt is his twisted pshyco [sic] babble and his abuse of power that we have had enough of\u2019 and that plaintiff was a tough, old school coach who tried to break the players down. Greg also allegedly wrote on the Web site saukvalleynews.com that plaintiff abused his power, that plaintiff claimed that girls\u2019 sports were not really sports, that plaintiff stated that the Dixon Boosters were a bunch of losers, that plaintiff thought that anyone who did not play basketball was not loyal, and that plaintiff stated that he did not owe the people of Dixon anything.\nCount IX alleged defamation per se against Ardis Kuecker, alleging much of the same conduct alleged against the others. In addition, a letter to the editor written by Ardis was attached. Ardis\u2019s letter was published on March 26, 2008, and stated that plaintiff utilized verbal and emotional abuse, bullying, and belittling in his coaching style. On March 12, 2008, Ardis stated to superintendent James Brown that during timeouts plaintiff yelled instead of prepared, that he would pick out a \u201cwhipping boy\u201d each year, that he was a negative person, and that she feared retaliation from him.\nCount X alleged defamation per se against Robert Shomaker and alleged that Shomaker wrote a letter to school board member Carolyn Brechon. In the April 10, 2008, letter, Shomaker stated that plaintiff had threatened Shomaker\u2019s son that his bad attitude would prevent him from making the varsity team, and he added that many other parents had similar stories about plaintiff\u2019s threatening behaviors. Shomaker also e-mailed Brechon on February 29, 2008, and stated that plaintiffs half-time speeches were profanity-laced, that he used profanity during practices as well, and that he called his players \u201cfucking morons.\u201d\nCount XI alleged defamation per se against A1 Knickrehm. Knickrehm was the general manager of NRG Media, which operated AM and FM radio stations in Dixon. The count alleged that Knickrehm made defamatory statements by participating in the petition to the school board to have plaintiff removed. Additionally, Knickrehm invited Michael Venier, Richard Kuecker, and Glen Hughes to appear on the program on his radio station on March 21, 2008. During the program, defamatory statements were made about plaintiff, as summarized in the description of the count against Richard. Knickrehm further allowed the \u201cSave Dixon Sports Committee\u201d to post the radio program on its Web site for repeated publication. On April 16, 2008, Knickrehm told reporter Trowbridge that plaintiff had \u201cabsolutely ripped the management of WIXN on its own radio station.\u201d Count XII alleged defamation per se against NRG Media, LLC, making the same allegations as count XI.\nPlaintiff alleged false light and invasion of privacy, alleging the same conduct described in the defamation counts, in the following counts: count XIII (Michael Venier); count XIV (Richard Kuecker); count XV (Glen Hughes); count XVI (Mary Mahan-Deatherage); count XVII (David Deets); count XVIII (Dan Burke); count XIX (Tim Oliver); count XX (Greg Deatherage); count XXI (A1 Knickrehm); count XXII (NRG Media, LLC); and count XXVI (Robert Shomaker).\nCount XXIII alleged interference with plaintiff\u2019s business expectancy, alleging the same conduct that supported the defamation per se and false light claims.\nCount XXIV alleged slander per se against Neil Petersen. Petersen was a school board member who stated in a March 21, 2008, letter to other school board members that the school board\u2019s proposed code-of-conduct response to the complaints about plaintiff was a \u201cslap in the face\u201d to parents and that the board\u2019s decision to retain plaintiff was jeopardizing funding from local business entities for extracurricular activities. Count XXV alleged against Petersen intentional interference with plaintiffs business expectancy, for the same statements supporting count XXIV\nOn April 23, 2008, the school board removed plaintiff as basketball coach, but he was retained as the school\u2019s athletic director.\nOn July 3, 2008, in response to plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint, NRG Media and Knickrehm filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2008)), arguing that the Act barred plaintiffs claims, that the alleged statements were protected opinions, that plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting that any statement was made with actual malice, which was a required element because plaintiff was a public figure, and that plaintiff failed to state all elements of each claim. On July 7, 2008, Michael Venier filed a similar motion to dismiss. Also on July 7, Glen Hughes, Tim Oliver, Dan Burke, David Deets, Mary Mahan-Deatherage, and Greg Deatherage filed a similar motion to dismiss. On July 8, Richard and Ardis Kuecker and Robert Shomaker and Neil Petersen filed similar motions to dismiss.\nOn August 26, 2008, the trial court heard the motions to dismiss. After the parties\u2019 arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On November 17, 2008, after a flurry of responses and replies, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which added count XXVI. In the meantime, on December 10, 2008, the trial court issued a detailed memorandum opinion and order on the matter. We summarize the trial court\u2019s order now, and we will further explore these issues in our analysis section.\nThe trial court acknowledged that defendants moved to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code, attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint. However, defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed for numerous reasons and that the Act provided the most well-founded reason. In reviewing the Act\u2019s history, public policy, intent, and broad-reaching language, the trial court determined that the Act barred plaintiff\u2019s complaint. The trial court stated that the Act applied to any claim based on, related to, or in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. In this case, defendants first sought action at a school board meeting but were unhappy with the result. Defendants sought to gain support for their position by publicizing their grievances against plaintiff, and their conduct did result in a reconsideration of the school board\u2019s initial decision.\nThe trial court acknowledged that section 15 of the Act appeared ambiguous in that it both excluded inquiry as to the subjective intent or purpose of the acts in furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights and then included inquiry as to the genuine aim of those acts. The trial court determined that the legislature\u2019s intent was to adopt the standard in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 113 L. Ed. 2d 382, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991), which adopted the Noerr-Pennington doctrine \u2014 derived from Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464, 81 S. Ct. 523 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626, 85 S. Ct. 1585 (1965). The gist of this doctrine is that even if a speaker was motivated by an illegal purpose in petitioning the government, as long as the actions constituted a genuine effort at petitioning for government action, they were immune from liability. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, Ill S. Ct. at 1354. The only exception, known as the \u201csham\u201d exception, applies when the speaker\u2019s actions were not genuinely aimed at procuring government action. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 1354. Thus, the trial court concluded that the ambiguity was to be resolved by determining whether the speaker\u2019s acts were genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action and that an inquiry into the subjective intent or malice is not allowed unless the objective test fails. Having determined that defendants here acted in furtherance of their desire that the school board remove plaintiff as coach and athletic director, the trial court held that the Act barred plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. It dismissed all 25 counts of plaintiffs second amended complaint.\nOn December 29, 2008, plaintiff moved for reconsideration. On January 2, 2009, defendants objected to plaintiffs motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. On March 30, 2009, defendants collectively moved for reasonable attorney fees under section 25 of the Act. On May 15, 2009, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider. It also addressed plaintiffs third amended complaint, stating that much of the complaint was identical to the second amended complaint. The only new allegations were contained in counts X and XXVI against Shomaker. Specifically, the amendments addressed alleged defamatory conduct in May or June 2008. The court allowed the third amended complaint to be filed as to counts X and XXVI. Shomaker moved to dismiss both counts on May 18, 2009. On July 23, 2009, the trial court granted Shomaker\u2019s motion to dismiss counts X and XXVI on grounds the Act barred plaintiffs action.\nOn May 18, 2009, Clark, Justen & Zucchi filed an affidavit in support of attorney fees totaling $15,991.28, for work performed on behalf of Venier. Dixon & Giesen filed an affidavit in support of attorney fees totaling $26,295.88, for work performed on behalf of Oliver, Burke, Deets, the Deatherages, Hughes, Shomaker, and Petersen. Pignatelli & Mertes filed an affidavit in support of attorney fees totaling $11,811, for work performed on behalf of the Kueckers. McGuireWoods filed an affidavit in support of attorney fees totaling $212,192.32, for work performed on behalf of NRG Media and Knickrehm. Plaintiff objected to the attorney fees claimed by McGuireWoods, arguing that such fees were unreasonable and unconscionable.\nOn July 15, 2009, the trial court rendered a decision on attorney fees. The court noted that it had advised the parties that requests for attorney fees should be limited to the portions of the case that dealt with the application of the Act. The parties had spent a substantial amount of time advocating other potential defenses besides the Act, and there was no provision for attorney fees for those defenses. The court further did not accept costs for travel time for attorneys who resided outside Lee County. The trial court noted the disparity in hourly fees, which ranged from $140 per hour to $508 per hour. The court determined that the reasonable hourly rate rested at $200 and that any fees charged in excess of $200 per hour would not be granted. The court further rejected McGuireWoods\u2019 charges for assistants, librarians, and WestLaw, as those were overhead costs; it also rejected McGuireWoods\u2019 charges for an attorney who was retained by an insurance company and was not an attorney with McGuireWoods. The court ordered the parties to revise their fee petitions accordingly.\nAs ordered, counsel for the various defendants filed revised petitions as follows: Pignatelli & Mertes, on behalf of the Kueckers, $1,560; Clark, Justen & Zucchi, on behalf of Venier, $11,229.28; Dixon & Giesen, on behalf of Oliver, Burke, Deets, the Deatherages, Hughes, Shomaker, and Petersen, $8,771.50; and McGuireWoods, on behalf of NRG Media and Knickrehm, $32,940. All attorneys filed motions for reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s decision to limit the fees to those incurred preparing the portions of the motions to dismiss based only on the Act.\nOn September 18, 2009, the trial court issued its final order, stating that it believed $200 per hour was the reasonable hourly rate charged by attorneys in Lee County for this type of legal work. It also believed that section 25 of the Act limited attorney fees to those incurred in connection with the motions based on the Act. Plaintiff did not respond to the revised fee petitions. The court granted the fees contained in the revised petitions.\nPlaintiff timely appealed, seeking reversal of the dismissal of his complaint and reversal of the award of attorney fees. Except Venier, defendants all timely filed notices of cross-appeal, seeking expansion of the attorney fee awards to include those fees associated with the entire defense.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the Act deprives him of his constitutional right to remedies for his injuries; (2) the Act is unconstitutional because it violates the due process and equal protection clauses; (3) defendants\u2019 conduct was not performed with the genuine aim of procuring favorable government action; and (4) the trial court failed to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits and the constitutional rights of persons to petition and participate in the government. Defendants counter that the Act is broad, applicable to the facts of the case at bar, and constitutional, both facially and as applied. Thus, the trial court did not err in applying the Act and dismissing plaintiffs complaint.\nAt oral argument, the parties acknowledged there was some confusion as to whether the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code or under the Act. Despite the parties\u2019 and the trial court\u2019s references to dismissal pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615, the dismissal was pursuant to the Act. The Act provides a procedure for dismissal similar to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2008)), since it does not attack the legal sufficiency of a claim but rather provides another method to defeat the claim. See 735 ILCS 110/20 (West 2008). A motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619 admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats the plaintiffs claims. River Plaza Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n v. Healey, 389 Ill. App. 3d 268, 275 (2009). Likewise, we would consider the facts legally sufficient when considering dismissal under the Act. The Code allows for a combined motion to dismiss with respect to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2008). \u201cA combined motion, however, shall be in parts. Each part shall be limited to and shall specify that it is made under one of Sections 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619, or 2 \u2014 1005.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2008). The Code further provides that each part shall clearly show the points or grounds relied upon under the section upon which it is based. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2008). Accordingly, it follows that a motion under section 2 \u2014 615 or 2 \u2014 619 combined with a motion under the Act would be allowed. Although \u201chybrid\u201d motions are improper, a reviewing court will review the dismissal if doing so would serve the interests of judicial economy and the nonmoving party was not prejudiced. Weatherman v. GaryWheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 286 Ill. App. 3d 48, 63 (1996). Here, although the grounds for defendants\u2019 motions were somewhat intertwined, it does not appear that plaintiff was prejudiced, as there was no objection to the manner in which defendants presented their motions and no party raises this issue on appeal. Further, the Act provides a new procedural method for dismissal, and defendants\u2019 arguments pertaining to the Act were separated sufficiently to be understood. Therefore, we will review the dismissal pursuant to the Act, using section 2 \u2014 619 principles as guidelines.\nThe purpose of a section 2 \u2014 619 motion is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact early in the litigation. Czarobski v. Lata, 227 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (2008). When ruling on a section 2 \u2014 619 motion, the court must construe the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Czarobski, 227 Ill. 2d at 369. The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiffs complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in the plaintiffs favor. Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 398 Ill. App. 3d 868, 878 (2010). In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court may consider pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on record. Barber, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 878. The reviewing court must consider whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent an issue of material fact, whether dismissal was proper as a matter of law. Czarobski, 227 Ill. 2d at 369. Even if the trial court dismissed on an improper ground, we may affirm the dismissal on any proper basis found in the record. Barber, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 878. Our review is de nova. Czarobski, 227 Ill. 2d at 369.\nThe Act, which became effective August 28, 2007, is relatively short. Section 5 declares the Act\u2019s public policy, which we quote in relevant part:\n\u201c[I]t is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged and safeguarded with great diligence. ***\nCivil actions for money damages have been filed against citizens and organizations of this State as a result of their valid exercise of their constitutional rights to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in and communicate with government. There has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits termed \u2018Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation\u2019 in government or \u2018SLAPPs\u2019 as they are popularly called.\nThe threat of SLAPPs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government ***. This abuse *** has been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens *** for involving themselves in public affairs.\nIt is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this Act to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government; to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law; to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs; and to provide for attorney\u2019s fees and costs to the prevailing movants.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008).\nSection 15 of the Act provides:\n\u201cApplicability. This Act applies to any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding on the grounds that the claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.\nActs in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008).\nSection 20 guides motion practice relating to the Act. Section 20(a) provides that upon the filing of any motion under section 15, \u201ca hearing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008). We note that plaintiff, in his motion for reconsideration, argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule upon the motion. That argument was rejected by the trial court because the expedition of the ruling was to benefit defendants, not plaintiff, and because some of the delays were due to plaintiffs filing amended complaints. The parties have not raised this issue on appeal.\nSection 20(a) further provides that the \u201cappellate court shall expedite any appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order denying that motion or from a trial court\u2019s failure to rule.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008). Here, the trial court granted the motion; therefore, we need not address this section. Cf Mund v. Brown, 393 Ill. App. 3d 994, 998-99 (2009) (holding this provision of section 20(a) in conflict with supreme court rules regarding interlocutory jurisdiction and unenforceable).\nSection 20(c) provides that the \u201ccourt shall grant the motion and dismiss the judicial claim unless the court finds that the responding party has produced clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability by this Act.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/20(c) (West 2008). Section 20(c), therefore, shifts the moving party\u2019s normal burden, to show that an affirmative defense bars the plaintiffs claims, to the nonmoving party, who must show that the Act does not apply. See Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993) (the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense in a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss). However, even when the defendant has the burden to prove that an affirmative defense applies, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is unfounded or requires the resolution of an issue of material fact before it is proven.\nA. Overview of Defamation Law\nBefore progressing, we briefly discuss the general principles of defamation law, as the Act changes the common-law rules of defamation by protecting otherwise defamatory speech when made while exercising one\u2019s right to petition government. A statement is defamatory if it tends to harm a person\u2019s reputation to the extent that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters others from associating with that person. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 501 (2006). Statements may be considered defamatory per se or per quad. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 501. A statement is defamatory per se if its defamatory character is obvious and apparent on its face and injury to the plaintiff\u2019s reputation may be presumed. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 501. Plaintiff here alleged only defamation per se. There are five categories of per se defamatory statements: (1) statements imputing the commission of a crime; (2) statements imputing infection with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) statements imputing an inability to perform or want of integrity in performing employment duties; (4) statements imputing a lack of ability or otherwise prejudicing a person in his or her profession or business; and (5) statements imputing adultery or fornication. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 501.\nSeveral situations may render otherwise per se defamatory statements not actionable. For instance, a defendant is not liable for a defamatory statement if the statement is true; only substantial truth is required for this defense to apply. J. Maki Construction Co. v. Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, 379 Ill. App. 3d 189, 203 (2008). A per se defamatory statement is not actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 580 (2006). Likewise, if the per se defamatory statement constitutes an expression of an opinion, it may enjoy constitutional protection under the first amendment. Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at 581. There are limitations, however, even when a statement implicates first amendment protection. Couching a factual assertion as an opinion will not free it from a defamation claim. J. Maki, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 200. Other limitations are also implicated when the first amendment is triggered in certain situations. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342-43, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 807, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1974) (public figures may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for truth or with \u201cactual malice,\u201d whereas private individuals do not need to show actual malice and are held to the less-stringent negligence standard (see also Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 194-98 (1976))).\nCertain privileges may also make per se defamatory statements not actionable. Two classes of privileges exist: absolute privilege and conditional or qualified privilege. Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at 585. The fair report privilege, which protects statements published about statements made in official court proceedings, is a qualified privilege. Solaia, 221 Ill. 2d at 588. Statements made by legislators or private citizens during legislative proceedings are absolutely privileged (Krueger v. Lewis, 359 Ill. App. 3d 515, 521-22 (2005)), as are statements made during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, when the statements are related to the proceedings (Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 291 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561-64 (1997)). An absolute privilege provides a complete bar to a defamation claim, regardless of the defendant\u2019s motive or the unreasonableness of the conduct. Naleway v. Agnich, 386 Ill. App. 3d 635, 639 (2008). \u201cA qualified privilege protects communications that would normally be defamatory and actionable, in order to effect the policy of protecting honest communications of misinformation in certain favored circumstances and thus facilitate the availability of correct information.\u201d Naleway, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 639. A qualified privilege, however, may be exceeded and the privilege is defeated in circumstances where the defendant makes false statements with an intent to injure or with reckless disregard for the truth. Naleway, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 639. Three types of situations in which a conditional or qualified privilege exists are: (1) situations that involve some interest of the person who publishes the defamatory matter; (2) situations that involve some interest of the person to whom the matter is published or of some third person; and (3) situations that involve a recognized interest of the public. Myers v. Levy, 348 Ill. App. 3d 906, 914 (2004).\nPlaintiff also alleged several false light claims. A false light claim must allege that: (1) the defendant\u2019s actions placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public; (2) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of the falsity of the statement or with a reckless disregard for whether the statement was true or false. Duncan v. Peterson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1047 (2005).\nWith this framework of defamation law in mind, the Act alters existing defamation law by providing a new, qualified privilege for any defamatory statements communicated in furtherance of one\u2019s right to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. The privilege is qualified because it may be exceeded if the statements are not made with the genuine aim of procuring a favorable government action. With this understanding of the Act, we proceed to consider plaintiff\u2019s claim that the Act is unconstitutional and, alternatively, that it does not apply to the facts of this case.\nB. Constitutionality of the Act\nPlaintiff first attacks the Act\u2019s constitutionality in two different ways: (1) it violates his right to a remedy for his injuries; and (2) it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions.\nArticle I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution provides:\n\u201cEvery person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a712.\nPlaintiff argues, albeit briefly and unsupported by case law, that the Act provides blanket immunity, allowing violations of his right to privacy and allowing persistent per se defamatory statements to be made about him with no remedy for the damage to his reputation. We reject plaintiff\u2019s argument. Article I, section 12, has been held to represent an expression of philosophy rather than a mandate for a certain remedy in any specific form. Defend v. Lascelles, 149 Ill. App. 3d 630, 642 (1986). The Defend court acknowledged that persons defamed in judicial proceedings have been left without redress because of the public policy favoring the free and open administration of justice, and it cited to Nolin v. Nolin, 68 Ill. App. 2d 54 (1966), for support that article I, section 12, has never been interpreted to abolish immunities extended for the protection of a recognized public interest. Defend, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 642-43. Other privileges or immunities have been determined not to violate section 12 of article I, as well. See Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 519-20 (2000) (holding Tort Immunity Act did not violate constitutional right to remedy); Steffa v. Stanley, 39 Ill. App. 3d 915 (1976) (finding spousal immunity did not violate constitutional right to remedy). The legislature has the inherent power to repeal or change the common law and may do away with all or part of it. Michigan Avenue, 191 Ill. 2d at 519. Here, the legislature specifically stated that the purpose of the Act was to protect the rights of citizens to participate freely in government and government processes. Contrary to plaintiff\u2019s characterization that the Act provides \u201cblanket immunity\u201d for persons to defame others, the Act provides protection for such statements only when made \u201cin furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). The Act provides a qualified privilege, granting more protection for speech than the common law provides, when the speech occurs in the exercise of the right to participate in government. Thus, the legislature\u2019s enactment of the Act cannot be said to violate section 12 of article I of the Illinois Constitution.\nNext, plaintiff argues that the Act deprived him of his due process and equal protection rights under both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. He argues that the Act creates a separate classification of persons \u2014 public employees \u2014 who, unlike others outside that class, are deprived of remedies for personal injuries. The guarantee of equal protection requires that the government treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). While the State is not precluded from enacting legislation that draws distinctions between different categories of people, the State is prohibited from according different treatment to persons who have been placed in different categories on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 322. In reviewing a claim that a statute violates equal protection, the court applies different levels of scrutiny, depending on the nature of the statutory classification involved. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 322-23. Classifications based on race or national origin or affecting fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323. Intermediate scrutiny applies to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323. In all other cases, the court employs only a rational basis review. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323.\nIn this case, plaintiff argues that the Act unequally affects public employees, which would trigger rational basis review. However, in reading the plain language of the statute, we cannot agree that the Act places public employees in a special category at all. The Act applies to any moving party whose alleged acts were in furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. Plaintiff himself, a government employee, may use the Act as a shield if he were facing a similar lawsuit for his participation in a government process. We reject plaintiffs allusion that Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 74 E3d 737, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (2003), somehow supports his position that antiSLAPP statutes are misused in protecting tortious misconduct. Jar-row merely held that a malicious prosecution claim, while covered by California\u2019s anti-SLAPP statute, was properly dismissed under the statute because the plaintiff failed to prove that it had a probability of prevailing on the claim. Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 742-44, 74 P.3d at 746-47, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 646-48. Further, California\u2019s statute is much less broad than the Act and thus its case law, while perhaps instructive, is not persuasive. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code \u00a7425.16 (West 2010). Therefore, we reject plaintiffs equal protection argument because the Act applies to all citizens meeting the criteria for its application. It is true that if plaintiff were employed by a private school, the Act likely would not apply because his removal would not involve a government process or achieving a government result, but that is because the intention of the statute is to protect citizens\u2019 constitutional rights to participate in government, not to get involved in privately operated businesses.\nAt oral argument and in his reply brief, plaintiff rejected defendants\u2019 claim that the Act is constitutional because remedies have been removed by other statutes that provide absolute or qualified privileges, such as judicial proceedings privileges or those provided by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)). Plaintiff raised Myers and McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 384, 105 S. Ct. 2787 (1985), in support. These cases raise an interesting issue that plaintiff failed to raise in his opening brief. The facts of Myers are strikingly similar to the facts of this case. In Myers, a parent made public statements against a high school football coach, seeking his removal. Myers, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 910. The coach filed a defamation lawsuit; the defendant moved for summary judgment; and the trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that the statements were privileged because they were directed toward the school, a governmental body. Myers, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 912. The trial court further concluded that the defendant did not act with actual malice, because he genuinely believed the veracity of his statements, including statements about the coach\u2019s performance. Myers, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 912-13. The plaintiff appealed, and the defendant argued that summary judgment was appropriate under the FI oerr-Pennington doctrine. This court disagreed, stating that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply in the context of defamation claims. Myers, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 918. Instead, this court applied McDonald and declined to elevate the right to petition to an absolute immunity for defamatory statements. Myers, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 919.\nIn McDonald, the plaintiff sued the defendant for sending libelous letters to President Reagan with the intention that he not hire the plaintiff for a United States Attorney position. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 480, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 387, 105 S. Ct. at 2789. The defendant moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the petition clause of the first amendment provided absolute immunity for his statements. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 481, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 387, 105 S. Ct. at 2789. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that it was not prepared to conclude that \u201cthe Framers of the First Amendment understood the right to petition to include an unqualified right to express damaging falsehoods in exercise of that right.\u201d McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 389, 105 S. Ct. at 2790. The Supreme Court further stated that \u201c[t]o accept petitioner\u2019s claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status,\u201d despite the fact that the petition clause was \u201cinspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble.\u201d McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 390, 105 S. Ct. at 2791. The Supreme Court found \u201cno sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition\u201d than other first amendment expressions, stating that \u201cthe right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit libel with impunity is not.\u201d McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 390, 105 S. Ct. at 2791.\nPrior to Myers, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was extended to civil claims outside the antitrust arena. King v. Levin, 184 Ill. App. 3d 557, 560 (1989). The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the extent to which acts petitioning a legislative body were privileged, in Arlington Heights National Bank v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 37 Ill. 2d 546 (1967), where, in the context of a zoning ordinance situation, it determined that the right to petition was not absolute and that wrongful conduct by a person who had \u201cactual malice\u201d was not protected by the privilege. Arlington Heights, 37 Ill. 2d at 551; King, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 560 (applying Arlington Heights standard in real estate development situation). However, the doctrine has not been applied in the context of defamation.\nAfter Myers, the legislature acted, intentionally or unintentionally, to extend the Noerr-Pennington doctrine beyond the arena of antitrust or zoning litigation. Under the Act, the right to petition government is guaranteed and in so petitioning, one also has the right to commit libel with impunity, as long as he does so with the genuine aim of procuring government action. As stated, the legislature has the inherent power to repeal or change the common law and provide privileges or immunities that affect a plaintiff\u2019s right to a remedy. Here, in protecting the rights of citizens to participate in government, the legislature provided a qualified privilege to speak even with actual malice. While this court may agree with plaintiff that the Act is broad, changing the landscape of defamation law, it is not this court\u2019s role to rewrite the statute. That is the duty of the legislature. See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006) (\u201cThis court may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation. If a statute, as enacted, seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and not to this court\u201d). Plaintiff has not provided us with a valid argument to strike down the Act on constitutional grounds. To the extent plaintiff alludes to grounds that the Act is unconstitutional other than those discussed here, we find those arguments forfeited for lack of development and citation to legal support. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7); Bohne v. La Salle National Bank, 399 Ill. App. 3d 485, 513 (2010). Having determined that plaintiffs constitutional attacks fail, we next consider the Act\u2019s applicability to plaintiffs complaint.\nC. Applicability of the Act\nPlaintiffs last two arguments involve the applicability of the Act to the facts of this case. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Act protected defendants\u2019 statements made outside the actual petition to the school board. Further, the trial court failed to strike a balance between plaintiffs right to file a lawsuit and defendants\u2019 right to participate in government. Defendants argue that the Act was written broadly enough that it applies to their statements made outside the petition and the school board meeting and that the trial court did not have the authority to give more weight to plaintiffs right to file a lawsuit. We agree with defendants.\nConsidering plaintiffs arguments in turn, we are required to interpret the Act, using general rules of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2008). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Abruzzo, 231 Ill. 2d at 332. When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied without resorting to aids of construction. Abruzzo, 231 Ill. 2d at 332. In determining intent, we consider the statute in its entirety, and words and phrases are not to be read in isolation. Abruzzo, 231 Ill. 2d at 332-33. A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-informed persons. Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369, 377 (2008). When a statute is ambiguous, the court may use tools of interpretation to ascertain the meaning of a provision. Ready, 232 Ill. 2d at 379-80.\nAccording to the plain language of the Act, the privilege will apply where: (1) the defendant\u2019s acts were in furtherance of his rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable government action; (2) the plaintiffs claim is based on, related to, or in response to the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts in furtherance\u201d; and (3) the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence that the defendant\u2019s acts were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action. As defendants argue, the plain language of the Act provides that the Act \u201cshall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/30(b) (West 2008). Section 5 of the Act sets forth its purpose and intent in significant depth.\nAs to the \u201cacts in furtherance\u201d portion of the Act, plaintiff argues that the Act should be read to cover only acts performed during a government proceeding. Acts or statements made during legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial proceedings are already protected by absolute or qualified privileges, including the protection of the right to petition the government as established by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See King, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 559 (identifying the qualified privilege outlined by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine for persons engaged in activities designed to influence government action). Considering the general statutoiy construction rules, and the Act\u2019s plain language, we cannot agree with plaintiff that the Act applies only to acts made during a government proceeding. The Act states that it applies to \u201cany act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party\u2019s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008).\nRegarding the latter portion of section 15, the trial court concluded that the language providing that \u201c[a]cts in furtherance *** are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome\u201d was ambiguous. It then concluded, based on the legislative history of the Act, that the legislature intended to adopt the NoerrPennington doctrine, which includes the \u201csham\u201d exception for acts performed without a genuine aim at procuring government action. We agree that this clause is ambiguous. While this section removes any consideration of intent or purpose, it then requires the court to consider intent as to whether the acts were made with the genuine aim of procuring government action. The directive on intent is unclear as to whether the court should consider the intent of the defendant\u2019s acts on a subjective or an objective basis. Because we deem this section ambiguous on its face, we resort to statutory construction aids to determine whether to use a subjective or an objective basis in deciding whether the acts were genuinely aimed at procuring government action.\nWe first look to the legislative history of the Act. There was not much discussion when the Act was passed, despite attempts at getting anti-SLAPP statutes passed in previous years (see E. Madiar & T. Sheahan, Illinois\u2019 New Anti-SLAPP Statute, 96 Ill. B.J. 620 (2008)). The Act was sponsored by Senator John Cullerton. Senator Cullerton stated the following about the Act before the Senate voted to pass the bill:\n\u201cThis bill is in response to a threat of what\u2019s called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Policy [sic] (Participation). It\u2019s referred to as a SLAPR legislation that a number of other states have \u2014 have passed. And what it\u2019s about is to \u2014 address the concern that certain lawsuits that could be filed that significantly would chill and diminish citizen participation in government or voluntary public service or the exercise of those constitutional rights. So, what the bill does is to first declare the public policy that we want to encourage, obviously, our citizens to \u2014 their constitutional rights \u2014 to exercise their constitutional rights of free speech and the right to petition and redress grievances. And then it provides for a procedural protection, if you will, when they are sued. And I\u2019ll give you an example, let\u2019s say a community organization makes recommendations to a local alderman concerning zoning changes. They just give advice, then the party that might not agree with the decision, the vote of the alderman, they \u2014 that person, that landowner would file a lawsuit, not just against the municipality, but also against the community organization that gave the advice. Even though all they were doing was giving advice to their elected officials. So, that\u2019s what the purpose of the bill is. We worked out on \u2014 an agreement with the \u2014 the trial lawyers so they are no \u2014 no longer in opposition. Municipal League is in favor.\u201d 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 20, 2007, at 15-16 (statements of Senator Cullerton).\nLikewise, in the House, there was little debate. Representative Jack Franks made the following comments before the bill passed in the House:\n\u201cThis Bill has been around for awhile. Now, Representative Feigenholtz worked on it awhile ago, Senator Obama had it as well had Senator Dillard. This year we were fortunate in that we got the parties together and there\u2019s no longer any opposition. The ACLU, the Illinois Municipal League and ITLA have...are all proponents. And what this Bill does is it codifies the standard in a 1991 U.S. Supreme Court case, the City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising when dealing with citizens participation lawsuits. And the reason why we\u2019re putting this Bill forward is that oftentimes folks who speak out whether they\u2019re running for office or are in office are sued by people to try to get them to shut up, to try to chill their ability to speak and it\u2019s wrong and it\u2019s not what we\u2019re about. And this Bill would take away many of those abuses that we\u2019d see. I can tell you in my county, it\u2019d be in the Village of Richmond, there was two (2) gentlemen running for trustees who were...who won but they were sued by a developer, threatened with bankruptcy, not being able to pay their legal fees, even though the...the developer\u2019s lawsuit was thrown out on three (3) separate occasions and that would stop the type of abuse. I\u2019d be glad to answer any questions.\n* * *\nBlack: Representative, Representative Sacia brought a Bill up a few days ago where a constituent had to pay seven thousand dollars ($7,000) to get out of being named a defendant in a lawsuit because he went to a hearing and signed in...\nFranks: Right.\nBlack: ...in as an opponent and I don\u2019t recall what the project or the issue was in Representative Sacia\u2019s district. But anyway, I mentioned at the time these slap [SLAPP] lawsuits are often used to inhibit our participation. So, the bottom line is this Bill would then make it easier for someone who is hit with one of those suits to seek immediate relief and there\u2019d be...not name the defendant and so not to chill public participation and expression when you want to speak out against something that\u2019s going on in your district, correct?\nFranks: Absolutely.\nBlack: All right. Great.\nFranks: *** It\u2019s an expedited hearing that they have to do within ninety (90) days and it also shifts the burden on the plaintiff and should the plaintiff lose, they\u2019d have to pay the defendant\u2019s attorneys fees.\n$ $ $\nFeigenholtz: I, too, rise in support of this legislation. It is a remedy to an issue that also occurred in my legislative district a few years ago. *** I believe that we really need to begin to put in these safeguards for people who speak out in pub...in public forums and are endangered by people who don\u2019t appreciate the First Amendment very much. ***\n* i$t *\nMathias: So, Representative Franks, I just want to make sure I got this right. You\u2019re trying to make sure that people are not shut up at...\nFranks: Right.\nMathias: ...at board meetings and places like that. Is that correct?\nFranks: Or whether they\u2019re running for office, as well.\nMathias: Right.\nFranks: Because what happened like in our area, in Richmond, these folks who were running for office were not included in the insurance that the village had and the mayor wouldn\u2019t include them.\nMathias: And so, you\u2019re doing it by shutting up the people who are trying to shut them up. Is that correct?\nFranks: I\u2019m not...I\u2019m not sure I understand the question. No, I\u2019m not saying...\nMathias: And you\u2019re trying to shut up the people who are doing the lawsuits, right?\nFranks: What I\u2019m trying...I\u2019m trying to bring some sanity to it...\nMathias: Okay.\nFranks: ...and if they want to fi...Anybody can file a lawsuit.\nMathias: Yes.\nFranks: Anybody with a pen can file a lawsuit.\nMathias: Representative, I\u2019m supporting your legislation.\nFranks: Good, good.\nSpeaker Hannig: Any further discussion? Representative Franks to close.\nFranks: I appreciate the folks who spoke on this. And let\u2019s join the twenty-two (22) other states that have this type of legislation, so we can keep the process going and not stifle public discussion and not put a chilling effect on people who want to speak their minds.\u201d 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 31, 2007, at 58-61 (statements of Representatives Franks, Black, and Mathias).\nBased on Representative Franks\u2019 reference to City of Columbia, we agree with the trial court that the legislature intended to adopt the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. However, that doctrine is more complicated than the legislative debates and the Act itself provide. The NoerrPennington doctrine originated in the antitrust arena, presenting a limit on antitrust liability by protecting companies\u2019 lobbying efforts, which stem from first amendment guarantees of free speech and freedom to petition the government. D. Davis, The Fraud Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Judicial and Administrative Proceed ings, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 325, 328 (2002). The Noerr case involved a group of truckers who sued several railroad companies, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by engaging in a negative publicity campaign against the trucking industry in an effort to damage the industry. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 466, 81 S. Ct. at 525. The railroads admitted conducting the campaign in an effort to influence the passage of certain state laws affecting truck weight limits and tax rates. The Supreme Court found in favor of the railroads, finding that the Sherman Act did not regulate political activity and would otherwise infringe on the railroads\u2019 right to petition government. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 475, 81 S. Ct. at 533. The Noerr Court limited its holding, stating that there may be situations where conduct is a \u201cmere sham\u201d to cover what is actually an attempt to interfere with business relationships of a competitor, implicating the Sherman Act. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 475, 81 S. Ct. at 533. Pennington upheld the same antitrust immunity doctrine where coal companies and unions persuaded the Labor Department to establish minimum wages for employees of contractors, which frustrated the non-unionized companies\u2019 efforts to compete. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 630-31, 85 S. Ct. at 1588. The antitrust immunity was expanded to protect administrative proceedings in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642, 646, 92 S. Ct. 609, 611-12 (1972), where a group of highway carriers alleged a conspiracy by other carriers to bring state and federal proceedings before courts or agencies to prevent them from receiving operating rights.\nThe \u201csham exception\u201d to the Noerr-Pennington protection was mentioned in Noerr and was discussed in greater detail in City of Columbia, which Representative Franks referenced during the legislative hearings. In City of Columbia, Omni, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Columbia Advertising, after Columbia had petitioned the government to enact billboard zoning limitations that hampered Omni\u2019s ability to compete with it. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 367-68, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 390, 111 S. Ct. at 1347. The Supreme Court stated that the sham exception encompassed situations in which \u201cpersons use the governmental process \u2014 as opposed to the outcome of the process \u2014 as an anticompetitive weapon.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 1354. The Court defined a sham situation as one involving a defendant whose activities are \u201c \u2018not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,\u2019 \u201d and not one who simply uses improper means to achieve the desired governmental result. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 1354, quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4, 100 L. Ed. 2d 497, 505 n.4, 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 n.4 (1988). The Court concluded that while Columbia had \u201cindisputably set out to disrupt Omni\u2019s business relationships, it sought to do so not through the very process of lobbying, or of causing the city council to consider zoning measures, but rather through the ultimate product of that lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning ordinances.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 381, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 1354.\nThe Supreme Court, however, further explained the sham exception approximately one year after City of Columbia, in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611, 623-24, 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (1993), in which it announced a two-part test for the exception to apply. In Professional Real Estate, Columbia Pictures sued Professional Real Estate Investors (PRE) for an alleged copyright infringement; PRE countersued, charging Columbia with antitrust violations and alleging that its copyright action was a mere sham that \u201ccloaked underlying acts of monopolization and conspiracy to restrain trade.\u201d Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 52, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 618, 113 S. Ct. at 1924. Columbia argued that filing the copyright lawsuit was immune under Noerr. The Supreme Court, after a discussion about the confusion in determining a sham, set forth the two-part test:\n\u201cFirst, [Columbia\u2019s] lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant\u2019s subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals \u2018an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor\u2019 [citation] through the \u2018use [of] the governmental process \u2014 as opposed to the outcome of that process \u2014 as an anticompetitive weapon.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60-61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 113 S. Ct. at 1928, quoting City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 380, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 1354.\nThus, the Court explained that this two-part test for the sham exception requires a plaintiff to disprove a challenged lawsuit\u2019s legal viability (objective motivation) before a court would entertain evidence of the economic viability (subjective motivation), and if that plaintiff succeeds, he still has to prove his antitrust claim. Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 113 S. Ct. at 1928. Proving a sham \u201cmerely deprives the defendant of immunity.\u201d Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 113 S. Ct. at 1928. The Court went on to explain that confusion over determining whether the sham exception applied stemmed from the Court\u2019s previous use of the word \u201cgenuine\u201d to denote the opposite of \u201csham.\u201d Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 113 S. Ct. at 1928. The Court stated that \u201cgenuine\u201d had both subjective and objective connotations, defining the word as meaning (1) \u201c \u2018actually having the reputed or apparent qualities or character\u2019; and (2) \u2018sincerely and honestly felt or experienced.\u2019 \u201d Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 113 S. Ct. at 1929, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 948 (1986). Thus, to be a sham, \u201clitigation must fail to be \u2018genuine\u2019 in both senses of the word.\u201d Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 61, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 624-25, 113 S. Ct. at 1929.\nTurning to the Act, if the legislature\u2019s intent was to adopt the standards set forth in City of Columbia, then the Act is adopting the two-part analysis employed to determine whether the party\u2019s acts in furtherance were \u201cgenuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.\u201d The words of the Act in section 15, although ambiguously written, correspond with the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis. Subjective intent is considered only when one\u2019s conduct is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action. Applying the doctrine and its sham exception to the facts of this case requires the court to first consider whether objective persons could have reasonably expected to procure a favorable government outcome (plaintiff\u2019s removal) through a public campaign like defendants\u2019 campaign against plaintiff. If the answer to that question is \u201cyes,\u201d then the court need not consider the subjective intent of defendants\u2019 conduct. If the answer is \u201cno,\u201d then the court would consider whether defendants\u2019 subjective intent was not to achieve a government outcome that may interfere with plaintiff but rather to interfere with plaintiff by using the governmental process itself.\nHere, defendants\u2019 acts did, in fact, lead to their desired outcome that the school board remove plaintiff as coach of the basketball team. Regardless of the actual outcome, even plaintiff admitted that defendants continued to seek his removal after the school board denied their petition. In plaintiff\u2019s own words in his complaint, the statements alleged all surrounded defendants\u2019 \u201ccampaign to have [plaintiff] removed as basketball coach and athletic director due [to] their disagreement with his coaching style.\u201d Defendants first complained to the Dixon High School principal, the superintendent, and members of the school board. After a school board meeting that did not end in a favorable result for defendants, defendants sought to gain more support through a Web site and speaking publicly. This is part of the process of influencing the government to make a decision in a petitioner\u2019s favor. Defendants had a right to participate in this process. The statements alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint criticized plaintiffs coaching style and related to the need for plaintiff to be removed from his positions. NRG and Knickrehm participated in this process by providing a forum for defendants to speak about their position. Some of the statements made were in the form of letters or comments posted on Web sites. Plaintiff argues that because the school board already heard defendants\u2019 complaints once, defendants\u2019 ensuing campaign was malicious and not intended at obtaining a favorable government outcome. Plaintiff ignores the possibility that the school board could hear defendants\u2019 complaints more than once and change its mind. Plaintiff also ignores the reality that oftentimes governmental bodies react to increasing numbers or public pressure. Here, the trial court determined on an objective basis, and we agree using the same objective standard, that reasonable persons could expect the school board to change its initial decision after the campaign placed public pressure on the board.\nWhether a school board decision is a \u201cgovernment process\u201d is answered by the plain language of the Act. That defendants sought the removal of plaintiff as athletic director and coach of the Dixon basketball team is undisputed. Dixon High School was a public school, and plaintiff was a public high school employee. The Act defines \u201cgovernment\u201d as \u201ca branch, department, agency, instrumentality, official, employee, agent, or other person acting under color of law of the United States, a state, a subdivision of a state, or another public authority including the electorate.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/10 (West 2008). Defendants sought action by the school board, and the school board acts under the authority granted to it by the laws of the state. See 105 ILCS 5/10 et seq. (West 2008). Further, a federal court has previously deemed a campaign to remove a school principal as \u201cclassic political speech,\u201d as \u201cit is direct involvement in governance.\u201d Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1988).\nTherefore, with regard to the first, objective test, plaintiff did not disprove that objective persons in defendants\u2019 position could reasonably believe that they could succeed in achieving their desired government outcome. Because the objective test was answered in the positive, we need not consider the defendants\u2019 subjective intent. As the Act states, defendants are \u201cimmune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). \u201cIntent or purpose\u201d is not considered unless a reasonable person could not expect a favorable government outcome. Thus, we agree with the trial court that defendants acted in furtherance of their rights to participate in government with the goal to obtain favorable government action.\nThe Act next requires that plaintiff\u2019s claim must be based on, related to, or in response to defendants\u2019 acts in furtherance of their rights to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. It is undisputed that plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit was based on or in response to defendants\u2019 \u201cacts in furtherance.\u201d\nFinally, the Act mandates dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint if plaintiff failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that the defendants\u2019 acts were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action. Plaintiff argues only that the Act should not apply because defendants\u2019 statements at issue were not made directly to the Dixon school board or during any hearing or governmental proceeding. As discussed, the statements did not need to be made within a petition or during a hearing, but needed only to be made within defendants\u2019 participation in the government process, which includes acts of gaining public support to influence favorable government action. Also, as we discussed, plaintiff failed to disprove the objective test \u2014 that reasonable persons could expect a favorable government outcome.\nPlaintiff briefly argues that there is nothing in the Act eliminating his common-law causes of action. A plain reading of the Act provides that it applies to any motion to dispose of a \u201cclaim in a judicial proceeding\u201d and that the Act defines \u201cjudicial claim\u201d or \u201cclaim\u201d to include \u201cany lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or other judicial pleading or filing alleging injury.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/10 (West 2008). Thus, the Act plainly applies to plaintiff\u2019s complaint, which set out causes of action that alleged injury.\nNext, plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to strike a balance, as section 5 of the Act requires, between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government. We disagree with plaintiff. The public policy in section 5 states that the purpose of the Act is to \u201cstrike a balance\u201d between these competing interests, but section 20 mandates dismissal when its requirements are met. The trial court struck the intended balance by properly applying the provisions of the Act. The legislature presumably struck the balance by passing the Act itself, and it is not the court\u2019s role to rewrite a statute that appears to lead to unjust results when interpreted as written. See DeSmet, 219 111. 2d at 510. As defendant Venier argues in his brief, the legislature often strikes balances between competing interests when enacting statutes, such as the Tort Immunity Act\u2019s balancing of the government\u2019s need to provide necessary services to the public and an injured citizen\u2019s need to seek redress for injuries sustained as a result of such services. The courts, however, are bound to interpret statutes as written and not to strike balances that the legislature already struck.\nD. Attorney Fees\nDefendants, with the exception of defendant Venier, cross-appealed the trial court\u2019s decision limiting the attorney fees awarded. As stated earlier, the trial court awarded attorney fees per section 25 of the Act (735 ILCS 110/25 (West 2008)), limiting the fees to those incurred preparing the portions of the motions to dismiss based on the Act. Defendants argue that they should have been able to collect fees associated with the defense of the case from the filing of the complaint through the dismissal. A party may be awarded attorney fees only when the fees are specifically allowed by statute or by a contract between the parties. Grate v. Grzetich, 373 Ill. App. 3d 228, 231 (2007). When a court with proper statutory authority to award attorney fees exercises that authority, we review its decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Grate, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 231. Whether a court has the authority to grant attorney fees is a question of law that we review de nova. Grate, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 231.\nSection 25 of the Act provides that the \u201ccourt shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/25 (West 2008). Because the parties\u2019 dispute involves the interpretation of this statutory provision, we review de nova whether the Act\u2019s language encompasses a broader range of attorney fees than the trial court awarded. We review the reasonableness of the amount of fees under an abuse-of-discretion standard.\nPlaintiff conceded during trial court proceedings that section 25 mandated that the trial court grant attorney fees for defendants. The parties dispute what fees are covered by section 25. NRG and Knickrehm argue that the unambiguous, plain language of the Act provides that fees for all of their attorneys\u2019 time spent in defending the lawsuit should be included as expenses incurred \u201cin connection with the motion.\u201d In the alternative, NRG and Knickrehm argue that if we find section 25 ambiguous, it should be interpreted broadly to avoid undermining the policy and purpose of the Act, which is to prevent defendants from bearing the costs of such suits. Further, NRG and Knickrehm argue that courts have held in other contexts that when awarding attorney fees, the fees are not to be \u201cchopped\u201d where the attorneys are dealing with a common core of facts and similar legal theories. Counsel for Hughes, Deets, the Deatherages, Petersen, and Shomaker makes the same arguments as counsel for NRG and Knickrehm. Additionally, counsel argues that much of the fees that the trial court excluded were caused by plaintiff\u2019s actions, including: (1) plaintiff amended his complaint three times, requiring defendants to analyze and respond to four pleadings; (2) plaintiff sought discovery while the motions to dismiss were pending, requiring defendants to file motions to quash subpoenas and objections to interrogatories; and (3) plaintiff objected to Shomaker\u2019s request to file an additional motion to dismiss in response to the new allegations pleaded in the third amended complaint, requiring additional time expended on the defense. The Kueckers\u2019 counsel argues that the trial court improperly relied upon an affidavit by attorney Douglas Lee in determining that $200 per hour was a reasonable rate for attorneys in Lee County. Lee\u2019s affidavit was submitted by plaintiff. Counsel for the Kueckers submits that its affidavit asserting the rate of $215 per hour was consistent and should have been accepted by the court.\nDefendants rely on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 426, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 46, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1935 (1983), to support their position that their fees may not be \u201cchopped\u201d by claim or legal theory and that they are entitled to fees for their entire defense. We reject that Hensley is applicable here, for two reasons: (1) the issue in Hensley involved different claims that were intertwined and factually and legally related and proceeded to trial; and (2) the statute in Hensley broadly stated that \u201c \u2018the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, *** a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee as part of the costs,\u2019 \u201d and the Court found that it could not separate the costs among the claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 46, 103 S. Ct. at 1935, quoting 42 U.S.C. \u00a71988 (1982). In Pietrzyk v. Oak Lawn Pavilion, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1051 (2002), the court distinguished Hensley when determining whether the plaintiff could recover attorney fees for her failed wrongful death claim under the fee provision of her successful Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1996)) claim. The court held that the plaintiff could not seek refuge under Hensley\u2019s \u201cclaim-chopping\u201d protection where there was no confusion as to what portion of fees went toward the Nursing Home Care Act claim (the plaintiffs counsel was to receive one-third of the award). Pietrzyk, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. The court stated that since common law prohibited a prevailing party from recovering attorney fees, statutes that allow such fees are to be strictly construed. Pietrzyk, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. The court further stated that while the Hensley \u201ccommon core of facts\u201d doctrine could be used as a shield to prevent the reduction of attorney fees by \u201cclaim-chopping\u201d based on the limited success of recovery, the doctrine may not be used as a sword to obtain fees that are not otherwise covered by the statute that authorizes such fees. Pietrzyk, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. In this case, the motions to dismiss and costs related to them may be separated from other costs, such as costs for filing other motions and drafting other arguments not based on the Act within the motion to dismiss. Therefore, we do not find that we are bound by Hensley to accept any and all fees submitted by defendants.\nWe use the same statutory interpretation rules stated earlier in this opinion. Section 25 contains the language \u201cin connection with the motion.\u201d The phrase \u201cin connection with\u201d has been deemed both ambiguous (Ness v. Ford Motor Co., 835 F. Supp. 453, 458 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (in context of insurance contract and construing ambiguity broadly and in favor of insured)) and unambiguous (Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1994) (in context of medical insurance provision, construed narrowly)). The phrase may be read broadly, as defendants argue, or narrowly, as the trial court did. Under defendants\u2019 interpretation, reasonable fees may be collected for work performed researching and preparing all parts of the motions to dismiss as well as other costs incurred while the motions were pending, including responding to plaintiffs discovery motions. The trial court interpreted section 25 narrowly to cover only the time it took defendants to research and draft their motions to dismiss under the Act, excluding all other costs related to other matters. We find the phrase \u201cin connection with\u201d as used in this statute to be ambiguous because it is capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-informed persons. Certain work tasks, defendants argue, overlap between the Act and other defenses and are impossible to separate because the attorneys were faced with a common core of facts and law. Because we find section 25 to be ambiguous, we may look beyond its plain language to determine its meaning.\nDefendants cite to Containment Technologies Group, Inc. v. American Society of Health System Pharmacists, No. 1:07 \u2014 CV\u20140997 (S.D. Ind. August 26, 2009), which rejected the plaintiffs argument that the fee award should be limited to time spent actually preparing the motion to dismiss under Indiana\u2019s anti-SLAPP statute. However, that case is distinguishable because the language of Indiana\u2019s fee provision states that the prevailing defendant \u201cis entitled to recover reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a734 \u2014 7\u20147\u20147 (Michie 2008). The Indiana fee-shifting provision is void of the potentially limiting language in our state\u2019s provision, and thus the defendant was entitled to recover for all time reasonably spent on the litigation, not just the motion itself.\nCalifornia\u2019s interpretation of its anti-SLAPP statute provides some limited guidance. California\u2019s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision, which does not contain the potentially limiting language \u201cin connection with,\u201d states that \u201ca prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney\u2019s fees and costs.\u201d Cal. Civ. Proc. Code \u00a7425.16 (Deering 2010). In Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (S.D. Cal. 2008), the court considered whether a defendant who succeeded in striking the plaintiffs state claims under the anti-SLAPP statute could recover fees for his motion to dismiss federal claims under different theories. The court held that the defendant could recover fees for the entirety of the motion to strike and fees for the portion of his motion to dismiss the federal claims that was based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine but no other fees for the remaining separate and distinct defenses. Kearney, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 1186-87. Therefore, even under California\u2019s broader fee-shifting provision, the court still limited recovery of fees to those associated directly with the anti-SLAPP motion.\nReading the entirety of the Act, we know that its purpose, in part, is to identify and adjudicate SLAPPs in an efficient manner and to provide for attorney fees and costs for prevailing movants. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). The Act also instructs that it \u201cshall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully.\u201d 735 ILCS 110/ 30(b) (West 2008). From the legislative debates on the Act, we know that the Act was intended to eliminate ongoing, costly litigation by providing a special, expedited means to dismiss such lawsuits. See 95th 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 31, 2007, at 59 (statements of Representative Franks (\u201cIt\u2019s an expedited hearing they have to do within ninety (90) days and it also shifts the burden on the plaintiff and should the plaintiff lose, they\u2019d have to pay the defendant\u2019s attorneys fees\u201d)). Based on this history and on the language of the Act, we conclude that the Act was intended to minimize attorney fees and litigation costs by providing defendants an avenue by which to easily and efficiently dispose of these types of lawsuits. We do not find that the language \u201cin connection with\u201d encompasses all costs of litigation, as defendants argue. Such a broad interpretation would defy logic where defendants pursue other defenses that are not connected to a motion under the Act. Considering the statute in its entirety, and the plain meaning of \u201cin connection with,\u201d read in context of the statute and its purposes and intent, we believe that defendants are limited to recovering only those fees associated with bringing the motion to dismiss on grounds based on the Act, as the trial court determined.\nThat being said, we next consider whether the trial court\u2019s determination of \u201creasonable\u201d fees was an abuse of discretion. In paragraph five of their joint motion for clarification of allowable attorney fees, defendants listed the following as \u201cactivities\u201d that did not \u201cfit comfortably\u201d in the court\u2019s order to amend their fee petitions to include only those efforts directed at the Act:\n\u201ca) Intake communications with clients\nb) Status communications with clients\nc) Fact investigation\nd) Witness and client interviews\ne) Responding to discovery requests\nf) Motion practice regarding staying discovery\ng) Gathering and reviewing documents\nh) Argument of the motion to dismiss, wherein numerous legal defenses are raised but not delineated\ni) Preparation for argument of the motion to dismiss, for which time spent on particular legal defenses is not delineated\nj) Attendance of status hearings and other hearings not specifically devoted to any particular legal defenses.\u201d\nThe trial court, in response to defendants\u2019 joint motion, issued its clarifying order. The clarifying order stated that defendants\u2019 motions raised various defenses, including the Act, the Illinois fair reporting privilege, opinion speech, and the need to show actual malice. The court granted defendants relief pursuant to the Act, and the Act allowed for fees associated with the motion. The court advised:\n\u201cThus, the only fees which the Court can allow are those which can specifically be allocated to the preparation and argument of the [Act] motion. Therefore, none of the activity set forth in paragraph 5 of the Defendants\u2019 joint motion should be included in the attorney\u2019s fees calculation unless it can be specifically identified as pertaining to the preparation and argument of the motion under the [Act]. The Court understands that this may mean that some general time which [is] incapable of being delineated may not be compensable to the Defendants. However, the statute limits attorney\u2019s fees compensation to that which can be specifically related to the motion under the [Act].\u201d\nWe do not find that the trial court\u2019s determination of fees and costs associated with the motions brought under the Act was an abuse of discretion. A defendant bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence from which the trial court can render a decision as to the reasonableness of his fees. Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill. App. 3d 21, 66 (2009). An appropriate fee consists of reasonable charges for reasonable services. Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 66. Justification of fees requires more than a mere compilation of hours multiplied by a fixed hourly rate or bills issued to clients, as this type of data does not provide the court with sufficient information as to the fees\u2019 reasonableness. Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 66. A petition for fees must specify the services performed, who performed them, the time expended, and the hourly rate charged. Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 66. \u201c[I]t is incumbent upon the petitioner to present detailed records maintained during the course of the litigation containing facts and computations upon which the charges are predicated.\u201d Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 66. The trial court\u2019s clarification order merely ordered defendants\u2019 attorneys to provide such details in their fee petitions. Defendants counter that it is impossible to separate the time spent on work related to the Act from that related to other defenses. However, the burden was on the attorneys to track their work in a detailed fashion.\nOnce a fee petition is submitted, the trial court considers factors including the skill and standing of the attorneys, the nature of the case, the novelty or difficulty of the issues involved, the importance of the matter, the degree of responsibility required, the usual and customary charges for comparable services, the benefit to the client, and the reasonable connection of the fees to the amount involved in the litigation. Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 66. The trial court considered these factors and the affidavits submitted by the various defense attorneys and by plaintiff and determined that the hourly rates ranged from $140 to over $500. It determined that most of the rates were close to $200 per hour, and it determined that this was a reasonable hourly rate. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the hourly rate at $200. The Kueckers argue that the trial court did not hear testimony from attorney Lee regarding the reasonableness of the $200 rate. However, the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of attorney fees. Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1058 (2006). A nonevidentiary proceeding is proper so long as the trial court can determine from the available evidence what amount would be reasonable and the opposing party has an opportunity to be heard. Aurora East School District, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1058. In this case, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it, and plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard, to determine the reasonable fees to be awarded. We, therefore, affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment that the Act allows a prevailing defendant recovery for only those attorney fees associated with a motion based upon the Act, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s selection of a reasonable hourly rate of $200 and its award of reasonable fees.\nWe further reject defendants\u2019 arguments that limiting fees would have a \u201cchilling effect\u201d on citizens who desire to participate in government, because they would risk having to pay a majority of their attorney fees. Dixon & Giesen argues that \u201cit is not reasonable to expect that an attorney could file a motion to dismiss under the [Act] without first having to take the steps necessary to determine the applicability of the [Act]. Under the trial court\u2019s narrow definition the fees generated to do intake communications with the client; investigate the facts; interview witnesses; attend general status or other court required appearances along with numerous other necessary steps in effective representation would not be included.\u201d This is not true under the trial court\u2019s or this court\u2019s order. If these tasks were performed in preparation of the motions to dismiss pursuant to the Act, the fees charged were recoverable. If those tasks overlapped issues, the attorneys were required to adjust the fees sought to reflect the time spent pursuing the motions based on the Act. While it may seem in defendants\u2019 view that the Act is impractical because it does not take into account that defense attorneys may litigate other defenses simultaneously, we remind defendants that it is not this court\u2019s place to rewrite the statute.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe conclude that the trial court properly applied the Act and therefore properly dismissed plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. We further agree that the trial court properly limited attorney fees to those associated with the motions brought under the Act and nothing more. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lee County.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.\nThe motion to dismiss was a combined motion under sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code, although the motion itself references only section 2 \u2014 615.\nPlaintiff argues at one point that NRG and Knickrehm have no protection because they are members of the media. However, the Act does not exclude media defendants from its protection.\nWe need not address plaintiffs argument that the trial court misapplied Scheidler v. Trombley, No. 07 \u2014 L\u2014513 (September 2, 2008), and Shoreline Towers Condominium Ass\u2019n v. Gassman, No. 07 \u2014 CH\u20146273 (March 25, 2008), as those circuit court orders were not binding on the trial court and are not binding on this court. Further, those cases are factually distinguishable: cause No. 07 \u2014 L\u2014513, Scheidler, did not involve statements other than a direct statement to a governmental body; and cause No. 07 \u2014 CH\u201406273, Shoreline, applied the Act except as to statements that were clearly unrelated to the defendant\u2019s government participation.\nThese defenses were contained in defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615, arguing that plaintiff failed to state a proper claim.\nThe remaining defendants do not take issue with the trial court\u2019s determination that $200 was a reasonable hourly rate.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen T. Fieweger, of Katz, Huntoon & Fieweger, P.C., of Moline, for appellant.", "Richard E. Lieberman, Michael R. Lieber, and Jacob P. Hildner, all of McGuireWoods LLP, of Chicago, for appellees Al Knickrehm and NRG Media, LLC.", "Magen J. Mertes, of Mertes & Mertes, P.C., of Sterling, for appellees Ardis Kuecker and Richard Kuecker.", "Jeffrey J. Zucchi, of Clark, Justen, Zucchi & Frost, Ltd., of Rockford, for appellee Michael Venier.", "Linda A. Giesen, of Dixon & Giesen Law Offices, of Dixon, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEVE SANDHOLM, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. RICHARD KUECKER et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants (Michael Venier, Defendant-Appellee).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20141015\nOpinion filed October 18, 2010.\nStephen T. Fieweger, of Katz, Huntoon & Fieweger, P.C., of Moline, for appellant.\nRichard E. Lieberman, Michael R. Lieber, and Jacob P. Hildner, all of McGuireWoods LLP, of Chicago, for appellees Al Knickrehm and NRG Media, LLC.\nMagen J. Mertes, of Mertes & Mertes, P.C., of Sterling, for appellees Ardis Kuecker and Richard Kuecker.\nJeffrey J. Zucchi, of Clark, Justen, Zucchi & Frost, Ltd., of Rockford, for appellee Michael Venier.\nLinda A. Giesen, of Dixon & Giesen Law Offices, of Dixon, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0835-01", "first_page_order": 851, "last_page_order": 888 }