{ "id": 3716405, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD Q. EVANS, Defendant-Appellant.-CHAD Q. EVANS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Evans", "decision_date": "2010-11-23", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201409\u20140159, 2\u201410\u20140153", "first_page": "1005", "last_page": "1010", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "405 Ill. App. 3d 1005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5480303 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-76", "parenthetical": "the defendant accomplice was eligible to receive an extended term based on the brutal and heinous nature of the principal's actions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092383 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264-65", "parenthetical": "the defendant, who was convicted on an accountability theory, was subject to consecutive sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615167 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94", "parenthetical": "the defendant accomplice was subject to firearm enhancement even though the principal was the one who was armed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2926808 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "where the State failed to prove that the principal committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the defendant accomplice could not be convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 916", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926-27", "parenthetical": "where the State failed to prove that the principal committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the defendant accomplice could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon" }, { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "\"a defendant cannot be found guilty of an offense under an accountability theory if the State has failed to establish the principal's guilt of the charged crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0916-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3627517 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/236/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625191 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625349 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706602 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629439 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0409-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 607, "char_count": 13066, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10860189146162576 }, "sha256": "a5549afc3c7993c4108c6612420d2833f051786c72525da204152db5f30a0f26", "simhash": "1:003ae654541cb536", "word_count": 2118 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:02.087067+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD Q. EVANS, Defendant-Appellant. \u2014 CHAD Q. EVANS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ZENOFF\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nChad Q. Evans (defendant) appeals from the denial of his request to file a successive postconviction petition and the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn May 1995, defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a)(2), (a)(3)) and one count of concealment of a homicidal death (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 3.1(a)). The evidence at trial demonstrated that, although defendant was not the shooter, he was accountable for the shooting death of Kevin Strauther. At the time of his death, Strauther was 17. Defendant was 18, and the shooter, Robert Garite, was 15. The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for first-degree murder and 5 years\u2019 imprisonment for concealment of a homicidal death, with the sentences to run consecutively.\nOn November 10, 2008, having already filed several postconviction petitions, defendant filed a petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. In the attached postconviction petition, defendant argued that he should not be required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Sex Offender Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2008)) or the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Violent Offender Act) (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. (West 2008)), because Garite, having been only 15 at the time of the murder, did not have to register. (Although defendant did not mention these acts by name in his proposed postconviction petition, the public act to which defendant referred deals only with these two registries.) The trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave on January 9, 2009, finding that defendant had failed to establish prejudice. Defendant appealed (No. 2 \u2014 09\u20140159).\nOn May 12, 2009, defendant instituted a new action by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus. In his petition, defendant again argued that the Sex Offender Act and the Violent Offender Act did not apply to him because Garite, for whose acts defendant was held accountable, was only 15 at the time of the murder, thus making him ineligible for registration. The respondents, the Department of State Police and the Lake County State\u2019s Attorney (LCSA), filed motions to dismiss. On September 15, 2009, defendant filed a motion, which, although unclear, appeared to request that his petition for writ of mandamus be recharacterized as a petition for declaratory relief. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the matter was not ripe for adjudication and granted the motions to dismiss. Although the trial court did not enter an order specifically granting or denying the request for recharacterization, in its order granting the motions to dismiss, it referred to defendant\u2019s petition as a petition for writ of mandamus or declaratory relief. Defendant appealed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his petition (No. 2 \u2014 10\u20140153).\nANALYSIS\nA. Postconviction Petition (No. 2 \u2014 09\u20140159)\nDefendant first appeals from the trial court\u2019s denial of his request to file a successive postconviction petition. A second or subsequent postconviction petition may be filed only with leave of the trial court upon a showing of both cause for failure to bring the claim in the initial petition and prejudice resulting from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(f) (West 2008). A petitioner shows cause \u201cby identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(f)(1) (West 2008). A petitioner shows prejudice \u201cby demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(f)(2) (West 2008).\nDefendant makes no argument on appeal that he established cause and prejudice. Accordingly, any contention that the trial court erred is forfeited. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (\u201cPoints not argued are waived ***\u201d). The trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s request to file a successive post-conviction petition is therefore affirmed.\nB. Petition for Writ of Mandamus (No. 2 \u2014 10\u20140153)\nDefendant also appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus (or declaratory relief), arguing that the trial court erred because (1) the issue is ripe for adjudication, and (2) he is not subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act when Garite, the principal, is not subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act. (Defendant makes no argument regarding the applicability of the Sex Offender Act.)\nWe need not decide the ripeness issue, however, because, even if the issue is ripe for adjudication, as defendant contends, defendant is subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act and, thus, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.\nPreliminarily, LCSA argues that the question of whether defendant is subject to the Violent Offender Act is not properly before us because the trial court did not enter a final order based on the merits of this issue. While it is true that the trial court did not grant the motions to dismiss based on a determination that defendant is subject to the Violent Offender Act, the trial court did enter a final order dismissing defendant\u2019s petition. Because we may affirm on any basis found in the record (Cwik v. Giannoulias, 237 Ill. 2d 409, 424 (2010)), we are not prevented from reaching the issue of whether defendant is subject to the Violent Offender Act.\nWhether, having been convicted on a theory of accountability, defendant is subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de nova. MD Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Abrams, 228 Ill. 2d 281, 286 (2008).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court recently reiterated the principles governing statutory interpretation:\n\u201cAs we have consistently held, our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009). The most reliable indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 29.\nIn determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Blum, 235 111. 2d at 29. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Blum, 235 111. 2d at 29.\nHowever, if a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways, the statute will be deemed ambiguous. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2009). If the statute is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic aids of construction in order to discern the legislative intent. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 11. We construe the statute to avoid rendering any part of it meaningless or superfluous. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 29. We do not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 29.\nWe may also consider the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 12. In doing so, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 12.\u201d Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass\u2019n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440-41 (2010).\nThe Violent Offender Act requires that a \u201c \u2018violent offender against youth\u2019 \u201d register with the appropriate agency within the required time frame. 730 ILCS 154/10(a) (West 2008). A \u201c \u2018violent offender against youth\u2019 \u201d includes one who is convicted of a \u201cviolent offense against youth.\u201d 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(l)(A) (West 2008). In turn, a \u201c \u2018violent offense against youth\u2019 \u201d includes first-degree murder \u201cwhen the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the defendant was at least 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.\u201d 730 ILCS 154/5(b)(2) (West 2008). The statute provides no exception for defendants convicted under an accountability theory.\nHere, it is undisputed that Strauther was under the age of 18 and that defendant was at least the age of 17 at the time of the murder. Accordingly, the plain language appears to apply precisely to defendant.\nDefendant argues, however, that because the principal Garite does not have to register under the Violent Offender Act, defendant does not have to register either. Whether Garite is required to register under the Violent Offender Act is disputed, but we need not decide the question, because even if Garite is not required to register under the Violent Offender Act, defendant has presented nothing that excuses him from registering simply because he was convicted on an accountability theory.\nDefendant does not contend that the language of the Violent Offender Act excludes him from registering, but instead argues that, because Illinois case law treats accomplices no differently than principals, he should not have to register if Garite does not. The two cases he primarily relies on, however, do not stand for the proposition that, where a principal is not subject to a registration law, the accomplice may not be required to register. Rather, they stand for the proposition that, where the State fails to prove that the principal committed an element of the charged offense, the accomplice may not be held accountable for that offense. See People v. Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d 916, 926-27 (2009) (where the State failed to prove that the principal committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the defendant accomplice could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon); People v. Griffin, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15 (1993) (where the State failed to prove that the principal committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the defendant accomplice could not be convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault). While a defendant\u2019s conviction may rise and fall with the principal\u2019s guilt of the charged offense (see Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 924 (\u201ca defendant cannot be found guilty of an offense under an accountability theory if the State has failed to establish the principal\u2019s guilt of the charged crime\u201d)), nothing provides that the defendant is subject to only those collateral ramifications to which the principal is also subject. For instance, if an alien defendant is convicted of a crime on an accountability theory and thus is subject to deportation, he would not avoid deportation simply because the principal is a United States citizen and not subject to deportation.\nThe remaining cases cited by defendant also do not stand for the proposition that defendant should be excused from registering because his principal is not required to register. Rather, they simply stand for the proposition that defendant, although only an accomplice, is punishable to the full extent of the law for the principal\u2019s actions. See People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill. 2d 285, 293-94 (2008) (the defendant accomplice was subject to firearm enhancement even though the principal was the one who was armed); People v. Sangster, 91 Ill. 2d 260, 264-65 (1982) (the defendant, who was convicted on an accountability theory, was subject to consecutive sentencing); People v. Tibbs, 103 Ill. App. 3d 73, 75-76 (1981) (the defendant accomplice was eligible to receive an extended term based on the brutal and heinous nature of the principal\u2019s actions).\nAs the plain language of the Violent Offender Act encompasses defendant and defendant has provided no basis on which he should be excluded, he is subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act, and thus the trial court properly dismissed defendant\u2019s petition.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ZENOFF" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Richard S. London, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and John E Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Department of State Police.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Carla N. Wyckoff, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Lake County State\u2019s Attorney." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD Q. EVANS, Defendant-Appellant. \u2014 CHAD Q. EVANS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201409\u20140159, 2\u201410\u20140153 cons.\nOpinion filed November 23, 2010.\nThomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Richard S. London, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and John E Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Department of State Police.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Carla N. Wyckoff, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Lake County State\u2019s Attorney." }, "file_name": "1005-01", "first_page_order": 1021, "last_page_order": 1026 }