{ "id": 4306217, "name": "TODD PATTON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS LEE, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Patton v. Lee", "decision_date": "2010-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20141092", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "203", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032" }, { "page": "1034" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273531 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963681 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597120 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24" }, { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2654624 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2608755 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "denying sanctions because false allegations were not the cornerstone of the lawsuit and when the dispute would have remained had those allegations not been made" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511437 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "1063-64" }, { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622472 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45703 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192371 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450872 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735900 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450836 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3616783 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0169-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 833, "char_count": 18565, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14500343456317338 }, "sha256": "97d89e679bb8872997d0ddce36e8c689180a59f398d03c44eaa4fb55e1783f3f", "simhash": "1:fd23f4e6e8025c63", "word_count": 3125 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:07.786999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TODD PATTON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS LEE, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThomas Lee appeals the trial court\u2019s order denying his posttrial motion for sanctions against his former son-in-law, Todd Patton, under section 226 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/ 226 (West 2008)) and Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). Lee argues that a petition for an order of protection that Patton filed against Lee contained false statements about Patton\u2019s divorce, arrest record, and previous orders of protection, entitling Lee to sanctions. Because the misstatements were inconsequential to the primary issue of whether an order of protection should have been issued, and because Lee did not specify any damages due to those misstatements, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThis appeal arises out of a disagreement between Patton and Lee on Thursday, March 26, 2009. Lee\u2019s daughter, Shawn, who was divorced from Patton, had full custody of three children fathered by Patton, and Patton had visitation on Wednesdays and alternate weekends. On March 26, 2009, Shawn was away from home and had denied a request from Patton that he care for the children. Instead, the children stayed with Lee and his wife.\nLater that day, Patton removed his daughter from her school bus and drove off with her in his truck. A while later, he arrived at the children\u2019s school and met Lee there, and an argument ensued. During the argument Patton touched or struck Lee on the chin.\nOn March 27, 2009, Patton filed a pro se emergency petition for an order of protection against Lee. Patton alleged that he felt threatened by Lee as a result of the argument. On the petition form filed with the court, Patton checked a box for \u201cno\u201d in response to the question, \u201c[i]s there or has there ever been an Order of Protection in any state and county naming you as the Petitioner or Respondent?\u201d He also checked the box for \u201cno\u201d to the question, \u201c[a]re there now, or have there ever been, any civil, criminal, or divorce proceedings involving you, one of the protected persons and/or the Respondent?\u201d The request for an emergency order was denied, and the case was set for a hearing.\nAt the hearing, Lee showed that Patton had been arrested on multiple occasions since 1989 for battery and traffic offenses and that two previous orders of protection had been entered against him. Patton testified, however, that he had been arrested only one time since 1989. Patton stated that he had another copy of the petition in which he provided different answers to the questions about arrests and previous orders of protection. That copy had been given to Patton\u2019s attorney, whom Patton hired after he filed the pro se petition, but it was not entered into evidence. The parties testified, and each gave a different account of the events of March 26, 2009. However, Patton admitted that he either touched or struck Lee during the confrontation.\nThe trial court denied the petition, stating that Patton lacked credibility and telling him, \u201cI have a gauge that I use for credibility. You don\u2019t want to know where you are.\u201d Lee\u2019s counsel then sought leave to file a motion for sanctions and asked for a finding that Patton made false statements in his petition. The following colloquy then occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I didn\u2019t find that he made false statements in the petition. I found that, somehow, there appeared to be different petitions. And I would like to have a copy of the petition that [Patton\u2019s counsel] has. Well, of course, that\u2019s not a court file. That\u2019s not part of a court file issue. So whatever he gave his attorney is attorney-client anyway.\nBut I am kind of taken aback. I don\u2019t think \u2014 you weren\u2019t served with that copy?\nMR. ROSE [Lee\u2019s counsel]: No.\nMR. LEE: No, I wasn\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: So \u2014 but I guess that [sic] the issue \u2014 if you are seeking 137 sanctions\u2014\nMR. ROSE: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I will give you 14 days for leave to file a petition.\u201d\nLee\u2019s counsel prepared an order for the court. The order stated that he had 14 days to file a motion for sanctions \u201cdue to the knowingly false and fraudulent statements contained in Todd Patton\u2019s Petition for an Order of Protection.\u201d Lee then filed a motion for sanctions under both section 226 and Rule 137, seeking sanctions based on fraudulent statements in Patton\u2019s petition. Attached to the petition were a transcript of portions of the testimony at the hearing on the petition, Patton\u2019s arrest record, copies of orders of protection entered against him, and an itemized list of Lee\u2019s legal expenses. That list did not specify the costs incurred as a result of any specific false statements and instead listed expenses generally related to the litigation as a whole.\nOn June 29, 2009, a hearing was held on the motion. The court asked Lee\u2019s attorney about the motion\u2019s allegation that the court had previously found that Patton made fraudulent statements. The court stated that the only order it had entered stated that Patton failed to meet his burden of proof. After some discussion about the written order\u2019s finding about fraudulent statements, the court stated that it did not recall making such a finding. The court ultimately set the matter for a hearing. After a dispute over whether the children would be allowed to testify at the hearing, the matter was set for arguments only, with no evidence permitted.\nOn September 15, 2009, the trial court judge recused himself after receiving a communication from a former client who had called him on behalf of one of the parties and attempted to influence the disposition of the case. The judge did not specifically name the party the caller referred to but stated that he was recusing himself as to any matters in regard to Patton, and the case was assigned to a new judge.\nThe parties appeared before the new judge, and Lee argued that Patton\u2019s petition contained fraudulent statements about Patton\u2019s arrest record, previous orders of protection, and whether he was previously divorced. The court questioned the effect those misstatements actually had on expenses in the case and also stated that it did not have a full transcript of the evidence from the hearing on the petition. Ultimately, the court stated that it could not determine whether the factual basis that Patton gave for seeking the order of protection was false. In regard to the arrests and previous orders of protection, the court found that they were inconsequential to the factual allegations required for an order of protection. As a result, the court denied the motion. Lee appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nLee argues that sanctions were appropriate under both section 226 and Rule 137. In regard to section 226, he argues that the plain language of the statute mandates the imposition of sanctions for any false statements. Patton contends that Lee failed to show that he actually incurred expenses from any misstatements about his divorce, arrest record, and previous orders of protection.\nSection 226 provides:\n\u201cUntrue statements. Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee, to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30 days of the judgment or dismissal, as provided in Supreme Court Rule 137. The Court may direct that a copy of an order entered under this Section be provided to the State\u2019s Attorney so that he or she may determine whether to prosecute for perjury.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/226 (West 2008).\nThe interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (2008). The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 292 (2006). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must give the language effect without resorting to further aids of construction. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). Where the language is clear, the statute may not be revised to include exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d 259, 265 (1988).\nThe trial court\u2019s decision on a question of sanctions is entitled to great weight and may not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Poland v. Davis, 295 Ill. App. 3d 652, 654 (1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Lindman, 356 Ill. App. 3d 462, 467 (2005).\nThe parties do not point to any precedent concerning sanctions under section 226, and we have been unable to find any. However, section 226 is the same as one of the predecessor statutes to Rule 137 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014611). Accordingly, cases that interpreted that section provide guidance.\nBecause former section 2\u2014611 is penal, it is strictly construed. See La Salle National Bank v. Union Oil Co. of California, 177 Ill. App. 3d 259, 262 (1988). Thus, \u201cthe complaining party may seek only those costs and fees which have a direct connection to the sanction-able pleadings or statements.\u201d Berkin v. Orland Park Plaza Bank, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1063 (1989); see Mari v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 179 Ill. App. 3d 321, 322 (1989). A party seeking an award under section 2 \u2014 611 has the burden of establishing that he or she actually incurred fees and expenses by reason of the untrue pleadings. Beno v. McNew, 186 Ill. App. 3d 359, 365 (1989). The petition for fees must specifically identify both the statements falsely made and the fees that resulted from those false statements. See Berkin, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1063-64. These principles are consistent with the plain language of the statute, which allows recovery of fees actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading. If untrue portions of the pleading would not actually affect the outcome of the case, recovery of fees unrelated to the specific untrue statements is not allowed. See, e.g., Berkin, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1063; Mari, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 323-24.\nThe general rule that the fees sought must be tied to specific untrue statements does not apply when those untrue statements are the cornerstone of an entire baseless lawsuit. Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 23-24 (1984). In Dayan the plaintiff sued McDonald\u2019s Corporation to enjoin the termination of his restaurant franchise. In both his original and his amended pleadings, the plaintiff maintained that he fully complied with McDonald\u2019s standards of quality, service, and cleanliness, a statement that became central to the issues in the case. The trial court later determined that the statement was false and made without reasonable cause and, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611, the court awarded McDonald\u2019s the entire cost of its defense. The appellate court sustained the award, stating that an isolated focus on each reimbursable component is not necessary when the false allegations made without reasonable cause are the cornerstone of an entire baseless lawsuit. Dayan, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 23-24.\nIn comparison, in Berkin, two deceased people were named as plaintiffs and were alleged to be located in Cook County. A defendant who was later dismissed from the suit sought fees under section 2 \u2014 611, based in part on the untrue statements about the location of the deceased plaintiffs. The court denied recovery of sanctions for the entire cost of the litigation, observing that the naming of the deceased plaintiffs was not the cornerstone of an entire baseless suit for which, without them as plaintiffs, the defendant would not have spent the same amount of time and effort in litigation. Berkin, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. However, the court allowed recovery of fees that were associated with investigating the deceased plaintiffs and that were documented in the record. Berkin, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1064; see also Mari, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 324 (denying sanctions because false allegations were not the cornerstone of the lawsuit and when the dispute would have remained had those allegations not been made).\nHere, the trial court reasonably found that the false statements Lee complained of were inconsequential to the overall determination of whether an order of protection should be issued. Had those items on the petition been correctly answered, the dispute would still have been present. Although Lee argues that, by answering the questions incorrectly, Patton increased his chances of success on the petition, that does not make those specific items the \u201ccornerstone of the litigation.\u201d Instead, the cornerstone of the litigation was the incident that occurred on March 26, 2009. Further, to the extent that Lee could recover expenses directly caused by the false statements, as the trial court noted, he did not provide evidence of what those expenses were. Instead, he provided a general itemization of costs, with no itemization of expenses due solely to the misrepresentations about Patton\u2019s arrest record, divorce, and past orders of protection. To the extent that Lee contends that Patton also made false statements in regard to the central events, he did not provide a full transcript of the hearing on the petition to allow the trial court to determine the matter, and the judge who oversaw that hearing did not make any such findings. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for sanctions under section 226.\nPatton next argues that he is entitled to sanctions under Rule 137. Rule 137 provides:\n\u201cEvery pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. *** The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nWhether to grant Rule 137 sanctions is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and we will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of discretion. Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 579 (2000). \u201c[U]nder Rule 137, sanctions may be granted under two different circumstances: (1) when a pleading, motion, or other paper is not \u2018well grounded in fact\u2019 or is not \u2018warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,\u2019 or (2) when it is interposed for purposes such as to \u2018harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u2019 \u201d People v. Stefanski, 377 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551 (2007), quoting 155 Ill. 2d R. 137; see Penn v. Gerig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 345, 354 (2002).\nThe standard for evaluating a party\u2019s conduct under Rule 137 is one of reasonableness under the circumstances existing at the time of the filing. Toland, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 656; Edward Yavitz Eye Center, Ltd. v. Mien, 241 Ill. App. 3d 562, 569 (1993). If a reasonable inquiry into the facts to support the filing has not been made to ensure that the facts stated are well grounded, the party, the party\u2019s attorney, or both are subject to an appropriate sanction that may include an order to pay the other party\u2019s attorney fees and costs. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson, 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 621 (1988). \u201cBecause of Rule 137\u2019s penal nature, courts must construe it strictly, must make sure the proposing party has proven each element of the alleged violation with specificity, and should reserve sanctions for the most egregious cases.\u201d Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1032 (2006). A court should not impose sanctions on a party for failing to conduct an investigation of facts and law when the party presents objectively reasonable arguments for his or her position, regardless of whether those arguments are unpersuasive or incorrect. Webber, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.\nHere, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 137 sanctions. As previously discussed, the court reasonably determined that the false statements, which were indicated by boxes checked on a form and were not the primary factual allegations in the petition, were inconsequential to the overall issue of whether an order of protection should be issued. The court also lacked a full transcript to determine whether the overall action was not well grounded in fact or law or was filed for the purpose of harassment. The court further did not have sufficient information to award sanctions for expenses incurred because of the false statements, because there was no itemization of expenses to show what amount related to that portion of the action. As a result, although Patton lacked credibility and his motives for filing the petition were questionable, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe court did not abuse its discretion when it denied sanctions under section 226 and Rule 137. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barry A. Rose, of Round Lake Park, for appellant.", "Joel Clark Runkle, of Hainesville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TODD PATTON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS LEE, Respondent-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20141092\nOpinion filed December 20, 2010.\nRehearing denied January 24, 2011.\nBarry A. Rose, of Round Lake Park, for appellant.\nJoel Clark Runkle, of Hainesville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 211, "last_page_order": 219 }