{ "id": 4305743, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL E. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Blankenship", "decision_date": "2010-11-15", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201408\u20141012", "first_page": "578", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 578" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "403 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4304094 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/403/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582632, 1582611 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "abstract of op." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0097-01", "/ill-app-2d/121/0097-02" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 1044", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3418900 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1051-52", "parenthetical": "defendant's silence when State announced that it was nol-prossing the burglary charge with the understanding that the burglary would be introduced in aggravation at sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950241 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "because \"the legislature intended for courts to impose the fine with some concrete evidentiary basis,\" the \"failure to support a street value fine with any evidentiary basis constitutes plain error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4136491 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298-99", "parenthetical": "\"As the appellant, defendant has the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error, and any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "no unique identifier; officer identified evidence package by other markings" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520940 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" }, { "page": "879" }, { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547722 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "declining to consider police reports not admitted at suppression hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2638889 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "747-48", "parenthetical": "no unique identifier; officers testified that, except for markings made by crime lab, package was in substantially the same condition as when they handled it" }, { "page": "747-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521973 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "\"the State was required to show, at the very least, that the condition of the narcotics delivered by [the police] matched the description of the narcotics examined by [the lab technician]\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258737 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283123 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1000" }, { "page": "998" }, { "page": "1001" }, { "page": "1006" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "1006" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2890561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467-68" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3364386 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4295211 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967", "parenthetical": "jurors asked if they had \" 'any problem' \" with the Zehr principles" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5769105 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "jurors asked if they would \" 'follow' \" the law as stated in the Zehr principles" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/402/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630758 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "where the defendant failed to present any evidence of a biased jury, he failed to meet his burden under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, and the court would not review the error" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473-74" }, { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362888 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238693 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209990 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 522013 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4296261 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706686 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79, 186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260218 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"in general both an objection at trial and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required to preserve that issue for review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152531 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0472-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1428, "char_count": 47783, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.005034850594305e-08, "percentile": 0.3727744358840998 }, "sha256": "802581db3d4d4466e85612a54b337c4f508aa20d4bf807553bf70e6176c9bd2c", "simhash": "1:ad3b5d74270ad571", "word_count": 8008 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:07.786999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL E. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Carl E. Blankenship, appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2008)). He argues that (1) the trial court\u2019s instructions and questions to prospective jurors did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007); (2) the State failed to prove a chain of custody for the substance he was charged with possessing; and (3) the court lacked an evidentiary basis for imposing a $10 \u201cstreet-value\u201d fine. We affirm.\nI. Rule 431(b)\nSupreme Court Rule 431(b) states:\n\u201cThe court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant\u2019s failure to testify when the defendant objects.\nThe court\u2019s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007).\nIn what follows, we often refer to the four principles as the \u201cZehr principles,\u201d after People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), the inspiration for Rule 431(b).\nDefendant concedes that he raised no Rule 431(b) issue in the court below. See People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 260 (1989) (\u201cin general both an objection at trial and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required to preserve that issue for review\u201d). Defendant asks us to review the Rule 431(b) issue under the plain-error rule, which \u201cbypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error\u201d when \u201cthe evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury\u2019s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence\u201d or when \u201cthe error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79, 186-87 (2005); see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Without error, of course, there is no \u201cplain\u201d error, so we first determine whether there was error at all in the trial court\u2019s application of Rule 431(b). See People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008).\nWe find no error. Here the trial court gave the same admonitions and put the same questions to each prospective juror. The trial court informed each juror of all four Zehr principles and asked whether the juror \u201cagree[d] with\u201d the principles. Each juror answered yes. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 431(b) in that it did not separately ask whether the jurors understood the Zehr principles. Defendant points to the conjunctive in Rule 431(b): the trial court is directed to ask each \u201cpotential juror *** whether that juror understands and accepts\u201d the Zehr principles (emphasis added) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)).\nThis court recently applied Rule 431(b) in a similar factual scenario. In People v. Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d 98 (2010), the defendant invoked the plain-error rule to preserve a Rule 431(b) chailenge. The trial court in Calabrese informed the jurors as a body of all four Zehr principles, and, as each juror was selected for the venire panels, asked the juror individually whether he or she \u201c \u2018accepted]\u2019 \u201d the principles the court had previously described. Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 100. Each juror answered \u201c \u2018yes.\u2019 \u201d Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 100.\nWe found no error in the court\u2019s administration of Rule 431(b):\n\u201cHere, the trial court asked each juror whether he or she accepted the principles that the court had described, and each juror had the opportunity to ask questions or state that he or she did not understand or accept the principles. Each juror, however, responded that he or she did understand and accept the principles.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 121.\nThe facts in Calabrese make no mention of any juror literally stating that he or she \u201cunderstood\u201d the Zehr principles. The jurors were, literally, asked only whether they \u201c \u2018accept[ed]\u2019 \u201d the principles, and each responded \u201c \u2018yes.\u2019 \u201d Nonetheless, we found that each juror \u201cresponded that he or she did understand and accept the principles\u201d (emphasis added) (Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 121). Tacit here was the premise that a rational juror (which we presume any juror to be (see People v. Wharton, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1080 (2002))) would not claim to accept the Zehr principles unless that juror believed he or she understood them. This premise was itself based on the notion that acceptance implies understanding, at least so far as Rule 431(b) is concerned. We expressly hold today what we implied in Calabrese.\nWe explain how our holding accords with the text of Rule 431(b). The canons of statutory interpretation apply to supreme court rules as well. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002). \u201cAs is the case with statutes, our primary task in construing a rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its drafters.\u201d Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 332. The most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which should be given its plain and ordinary (Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 332), or \u201cpopularly understood\u201d (Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 478 (1998)), meaning, unless this would defeat the intent of the drafters (People v. Scharlau, 141 Ill. 2d 180, 193 (1990)).\nIn Rule 431(b), \u201caccepts\u201d and \u201cunderstands\u201d are linked by \u201cand.\u201d \u201cAnd\u201d is generally interpreted as conjunctive rather than disjunctive. Byung Moo Soh v. Target Marketing Systems, Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131 (2004). \u201c \u2018As a general rule, the use of the conjunctive *** indicates that the legislature intended for all of the listed requirements to be met.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Byung Moo Soh, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 131, quoting Gilchrist v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602 (2000). Rule 431(b), however, prescribes no particular wording by which the trial court is to confirm that a juror \u201cunderstands and accepts\u201d the Zehr principles. We believe that, in common usage, to \u201cunderstand\u201d a proposition is to comprehend it, while to \u201caccept\u201d that proposition is both to comprehend it and to assent to it. \u201cAcceptance\u201d implies \u201cunderstanding,\u201d but \u201cunderstanding\u201d does not imply \u201cacceptance.\u201d We see nothing in Rule 431(b) to indicate that we should not apply this popular usage.\nThat \u201cunderstanding\u201d does not imply \u201cacceptance\u201d was the basis of our decision in People v. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d 465, 473-74 (2009), where the trial court, with respect to certain of the Zehr principles, asked the jurors if they \u201cunderstood\u201d the principles without also asking them if they accepted the principles. We found that these efforts did not satisfy Rule 431(b). Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 476-77. Similarly, in People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (2010), our supreme court held that it was error for the trial court to ask the jurors whether they understood a certain Zehr principle without also asking whether they accepted it.\nHere, by contrast, the trial court asked each juror if he or she \u201cagree[d] with\u201d all four Zehr principles. These words were sufficient to confirm whether the jurors (in the language of Rule 431(b)) \u201caccept[ed]\u201d the Zehr principles. See People v. Willis, 402 Ill. App. 3d 47, 52 (2010) (jurors asked if they would \u201c \u2018follow\u2019 \u201d the law as stated in the Zehr principles); People v. Schaefer, 398 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967 (2010) (jurors asked if they had \u201c \u2018any problem\u2019 \u201d with the Zehr principles). The words also sufficed to confirm whether the jurors comprehended or (in the words of the rule) understood the Zehr principles.\nEven if we were to find error, we would not find that it rose to the level of plain error. Defendant does not argue that the evidence was closely balanced. Rather, he contends that the error was so serious that it deprived him of his substantial right to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant has not, however, presented any evidence that the jury was biased. As defendant bears the burden of persuasion under the plain-error doctrine, his failure to present any evidence of a biased jury prevents the second prong of the plain-error doctrine from serving as a basis for excusing defendant\u2019s forfeiture of this issue. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613-14 (where the defendant failed to present any evidence of a biased jury, he failed to meet his burden under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, and the court would not review the error). As our supreme court recently stated, \u201c[w]e cannot presume the jury was biased simply because the trial court erred in conducting the Rule 431(b) questioning.\u201d Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 614.\nAs there was no error, much less plain error, in the trial court\u2019s application of Rule 431(b), defendant has not bypassed the forfeiture rule.\nII. Chain of Custody\nOn January 29, 2008, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Rockford police executed a search warrant at 1526 Broadway, apartment 3. The apartment was allegedly the site of narcotics activity. Detectives James Rossow and Robert Veruchi were among several officers who executed the warrant. Inside the apartment they found several occupants, including defendant.\nVeruchi testified that he was assigned to collect evidence recovered during the search. Veruchi said, \u201cWhen an item was located by any of the other officers that were executing the search warrant, they would notify me, and then I would go over and process the evidence.\u201d\nVeruchi testified that, when he and his fellow officers entered the apartment, they saw several occupants. At one point during the search, Veruchi was asked to approach Rossow. Veruchi went over to Rossow and saw defendant standing nearby. Veruchi saw another occupant sitting about four feet away from defendant and Rossow. This other occupant had been handcuffed. Veruchi was informed that Rossow had recovered money and \u201csuspected cocaine\u201d from defendant. Veruchi received the substance and weighed it on a portable scale. The substance weighed less than 15 grams. Veruchi then performed a field test on the substance, and the result was positive for the presence of cocaine. Shown State Exhibit 1, Veruchi said: \u201cThis is the package and appears to be the cocaine that I collected on that date.\u201d Veruchi testified further:\n\u201cQ. *** How do you know it would be that cocaine that you collected on that date?\nA. It\u2019s got my handwriting all over the bag with the case number, the time, the date, and all the particulars that were involved with\nthis piece of evidence.\n***\nQ. What are the changes to it that you\u2019re noting?\nA. It appears that the State Crime Lab opened the bottom of the package and then broke the cocaine into a couple different packages.\nQ. Okay. Other than the addition of the State Crime Lab\u2019s tags and seals, is that evidence in the same or substantially the same condition as when you tagged it into evidence on January 29, 2008?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nVeruchi did not describe any further handling by him of the evidence.\nRossow testified that, when he and the other officers entered the apartment on January 29, 2008, they handcuffed the occupants and secured the residence. Rossow \u201cfocused\u201d on defendant and asked for permission to search him. Defendant gave consent, and Rossow recovered from defendant\u2019s front pants pocket a \u201cclear, plastic baggy corner that contained an off-white, rock-like substance that resembled crack cocaine.\u201d Rossow handed the baggy to Veruchi, who was assigned to collect evidence at the scene. Rossow was then asked about State Exhibit 1:\n\u201cQ. *** Showing you [State Exhibit 1]. What is [it]?\nA. This is in a different form, except [for] the State Crime Lab\u2019s markings. This is the item located on [defendant] on [January 29, 2008].\nQ. And how do you recognize it to be that cocaine?\nA. Well, I gave this to Detective Veruchi at which time I observed him tag this into evidence, and it has Detective Veruchi\u2019s handwriting plus initials on the bag.\nQ. And other than the markings by the State Crime Lab which have been entered, is it in the same or substantially same condition as when you took it into evidence on that date?\nA. It appears to be, yes.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Rossow was asked whether \u201c[t]he last time [he] saw [State Exhibit 1] before today was when he handed it to Detective Veruchi.\u201d He answered: \u201c[W]hen we got back to the narcotics office, I observed Detective Veruchi tagging the item into evidence.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s third and final witness was Rhonda Shively-Earl, a chemist with the Illinois State Police crime lab (ISP lab). Shively-Earl testified that State Exhibit 1:\n\u201c[i]s a piece of evidence that was submitted to the laboratory for testing. I can identify it by an Illinois State Police case exhibit sticker on the evidence bag. That has my markings. I can also identify it by a seal at the bottom of the evidence bag that has my markings and by internal packaging that has my markings.\u201d\nAsked what she meant by \u201cmy markings,\u201d Shively-Earl replied: \u201cOn the sticker it\u2019s my initials and the date. On the other seals, it is my initials, the date, the case number and the Exhibit No.\u201d Shively-Earl testified that she received State Exhibit 1 on January 31, 2008, from Patty Bond, an evidence carrier for the Rockford police. Shively-Earl testified that, when the ISP lab receives evidence:\n\u201cWe put the Exhibit No. sticker on it, and we put our markings on that sticker and at that point inspect the seals and then store it in our vaults, or in this particular case I stored this in my vault until a later time.\u201d\nShively-Earl testified that State Exhibit 1 remained in the vault at the ISP lab until June 2008, when Shively-Earl conducted her analysis of the substance. Asked what \u201ccondition *** [State Exhibit 1 was] in, when [she] received it\u201d from the law enforcement agency, Shively-Earl answered, \u201c[T]here was a chunky substance in the knotted bag.\u201d Shively-Earl explained that, for purposes of testing and weighing, she \u201cremoved [the substance] from the knotted bag and packaged them separately and sealed them into a new plastic bag.\u201d\nShively-Earl testified that she weighed the substance from the knotted bag and saw that it weighed less than 15 grams. Shively-Earl then removed a portion of the substance and tested it for the presence of cocaine. The substance tested positive. After the test, Shively-Earl \u201cresealed [the substance] in the evidence bag *** and *** replaced it in [her] evidence vault until a later time when [she] could return it to the agency.\u201d\nThe State moved to admit State Exhibit 1, and defendant objected that the State had not proven a chain of custody for the exhibit:\n\u201cWe don\u2019t have any testimony, first of all, as to how long it took the item to get from Detective Veruchi to, well, what happened between Detective Veruchi and Patty Bond, how much time it took to get from Patty Bond to Mrs. Earl, as well as \u2014 Well, there was some testimony as to seals. There wasn\u2019t testimony \u2014 there was testimony as to the fact by both Detective[s] Veruchi and Rossow that the substance was different in the packaging now from when they packaged it.\nThere was no testimony from Mrs. Earl as to what condition, other than her saying that it was sealed, what it was in, what it looked like, anything of that nature that would be able to verify that the substance what we\u2019re talking about that was recovered by Detective Rossow and given to Detective Veruchi is the same substance that was tested by Mrs. Earl.\nIt[\u2019]s not something where this is a unique item. It\u2019s cocaine. Cocaine is cocaine, or even lookalikes of cocaine are all going to look similar, so I would argue that the chain of custody has not been properly shown to verify that what was recovered by Detective Rossow is the same thing that was tested by Mrs. Earl, and it\u2019s also what is here in court today.\u201d\nThe court admitted State Exhibit 1 without explanation.\nWhile this appeal was pending, defendant moved to supplement the record with several pages of reports from the Rockford police. The State did not object, and we granted the motion. The police reports detail items seized during \u201cthe execution of a search warrant at 1526 Broadway apartment number three on 1-29-08 at 1320 hours.\u201d The reports list the following items identified as suspected drugs:\nWe set forth the law governing chain-of-custody issues. Before the trial court may admit real or physical evidence of an offense, \u201cthe State must provide an adequate foundation either by way of live testimony or a stipulation that establishes that the item sought to be admitted is the actual item involved in the alleged offense and that the item\u2019s condition is substantially unchanged.\u201d People v. Garth, 353 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114 (2004). \u201c[W]here an item has readily identifiable and unique characteristics, and its composition is not easily subject to change, an adequate foundation is laid by testimony that the item sought to be admitted is the same item recovered and is in substantially the same condition as when it was recovered.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2005). \u201cHowever, in cases *** where a defendant is accused of a narcotics violation, the physical evidence is often not readily identifiable or may be susceptible to tampering, contamination[,] or exchange. In such instances, the State is required to establish a chain of custody.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 466-67.\n\u201cThe State bears the burden to establish a custody chain that is sufficiently complete to make it improbable that the evidence has been subject to tampering or accidental substitution.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467. \u201cUnless the defendant produces evidence of actual tampering, substitution[,] or contamination, a sufficiently complete chain of custody does not require that every person in the chain testify, nor must the State exclude every possibility of tampering or contamination; the State must demonstrate, however, that reasonable measures were employed to protect the evidence from the time it was seized and that it was unlikely that the evidence has been altered.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467. \u201c \u2018Once the State has established the probability that the evidence was not compromised, and unless the defendant shows actual evidence of tampering or substitution, deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the weight, not admissibility, of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467, quoting People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502, 510 (1994). The trial court\u2019s ruling on the sufficiency of a chain of custody will be reversed only if there was an abuse of discretion. People v. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1004 (2009).\nDefendant argues that the State failed to make a prima facie showing of a chain of custody for the cocaine, because the State did not account for the handling of the cocaine after it was processed by Veruchi and before it came into the possession of Bond. The State responds that the proper showing was made, because \u201c[g]enerally[,] identification by inventory number and a description of an item[ ] is sufficient to establish a proper chain of custody.\u201d The State notes that Veruchi and Shively-Earl \u201cidentified the specific item by description and by the numbers and identifying marks on the packaging.\u201d The State further argues that \u201cthe jury and the trial court saw [State Exhibit 1] in open court and would have seen the packaging at issue and could see whether it appeared as described by the witnesses.\u201d\nThere is no dispute that the State did not adduce the testimony of every custodian in the chain leading from the seizure of the drugs by Rossow to their receipt by Shively-Earl. Specifically, there was no evidence of how the drugs came into the possession of Bond after Veruchi weighed and tested them. Case law, however, shows that the State may remedy a gap in the chain of custody. One method is to show the existence of a \u201cunique identifier\u201d marked on the evidence. This court has described this method as follows:\n\u201c[W]hen no positive evidence of tampering or other contamination exists, the proponent of the evidence can replace a missing link, created when one or more custodians of the evidence do not testify, with evidence (1) that the evidence left the hands of one testifying custodian in a sealed envelope or other container and arrived in the hands of the next testifying custodian still in a sealed container, and (2) that the identifying number or code on the container sent out matches that on the container received.\u201d People v. Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d 430, 441-42 (2005).\nAs we later said in Howard:\n\u201cIllinois decisions endorse the use of one unique identifier to show that each person in a chain of custody is describing the same piece of evidence; the unique identifier is typically a police inventory number. [Citation.] Use of one unique identifier is the simplest, and so the most satisfactory, method of showing that each person was handling the same evidence.\u201d Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1004.\nHere Veruchi testified to a \u201ccase number\u201d on State Exhibit 1. Veruchi did not, however, describe what this number signified, and in the absence of such testimony we cannot ascertain whether the number was unique to defendant. There was evidence that defendant was not the only individual arrested during the search of apartment 3. The \u201ccase number\u201d might be a general designation for the warrant authorizing the search of apartment 3 or for the arrest(s) made during the search. We conclude that the State did not prove the existence of a unique identifier on the evidence.\nReference to a unique identifier is not, however, the only means by which the State may compensate for a gap in the custodial chain for drug evidence. In Woods, a drug case, the supreme court said:\n\u201cEven where the chain of custody has a missing link, \u2018trial courts have properly admitted evidence where there was testimony which sufficiently described the condition of the evidence when delivered which matched the description of the evidence when examined.\u2019 \u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467-68, quoting Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 510.\nSee also People v. Lundy, 334 Ill. App. 3d 819, 828 (2002) (\u201cthe State was required to show, at the very least, that the condition of the narcotics delivered by [the police] matched the description of the narcotics examined by [the lab technician]\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nFor instance, in People v. Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d 743 (1989), cited by Woods as authority for the \u201cmatching descriptions\u201d method of proof, police officers testified that they seized from the defendant a plastic baggy containing suspected drugs. The officers testified that, after testing and weighing the substance, they placed the baggy in an evidence bag, sealed it, and initialed it. The officers identified the State\u2019s exhibit as the evidence bag they had prepared, and they noted that it was in the same condition as when it left their custody, except for (1) openings made in the bag by the State lab and by defense counsel (for independent testing), and (2) certain markings. Similarly, the crime-lab chemist testified that, except for certain markings made by the police, the evidence bag and its contents were in the same condition as when the chemist received it. Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 747-48.\nThe defendant in Pettis argued that the State failed to establish the chain of custody, because it did not prove how the drugs were handled during the nine-day period between their delivery to the crime lab and their testing by the chemist. The appellate court held that, although there was a \u201cmissing link\u201d as the defendant described, \u201c[s]ince there [was] testimony describing the condition of the exhibit when delivered [by the police to the crime lab] which matche[d] the description of the exhibit when it was later examined by [the chemist], the evidence [was] sufficient to establish chain of custody.\u201d Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 754.\nHere, the State made a prima facie case through the \u201cmatching descriptions\u201d method. Veruchi testified that State Exhibit 1 was in the same or substantially the same condition as when he last saw it. Veruchi testified that State Exhibit 1 was different only in that the ISP lab had \u201copened the bottom of the package and then broke the cocaine into a couple different packages.\u201d Veruchi\u2019s description of how State Exhibit 1 differed from when he last saw it was consistent with Shively-Earl\u2019s testimony as to what she did with State Exhibit 1 as part of the testing and weighing process at the ISP lab.\nThus, the evidence of matching descriptions was sufficient to overcome the gap in the custodial chain and establish a prima facie case. Hence it was defendant\u2019s burden to produce \u201cevidence of actual tampering, substitution[,] or contamination\u201d (Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467). Defendant points to the police reports reflecting that the police seized suspected cocaine from at least one person aside from defendant during the search of apartment 3 on January 28, 2009. Though we allowed the appellate record to be supplemented with the police reports, the reports apparently were not admitted into evidence at trial. Therefore, we may not consider them. See People v. Long, 208 Ill. App. 3d 627, 638 (1990) (declining to consider police reports not admitted at suppression hearing). The evidence at trial did show, as defendant claims, that \u201cat least one other person in the apartment was under arrest and already handcuffed at the time the officers allegedly found cocaine on [defendant].\u201d There was, however, no testimony at trial that suspected drugs were seized from anyone besides defendant. Defendant, therefore, failed to rebut the State\u2019s prima facie case.\nDefendant cites two cases, People v. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 878 (1997), and Howard. In Gibson, the chain-of-custody evidence came in through the testimony of one officer, O\u2019Donnell, and a stipulation. O\u2019Donnell testified that he seized from the defendant a clear plastic packet, inside of which were 19 smaller packets containing a substance the officer believed to be cocaine. O\u2019Donnell testified that, when he arrived at the police station, he weighed the substance and derived a weight of two grams. O\u2019Donnell then assigned the evidence inventory number 1441897. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 879. The parties stipulated \u201c \u2018that Inventory 1441897 was tested at the Chicago Crime Lab by Francis Mannison; that the total items received were 20, the total estimated weight was 9.3 grams; that three items were tested and a total weight tested was 1.49 grams of cocaine, crack form.\u2019 \u201d Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 879.\nThe appellate court held that the State did not present a prima facie case for a chain of custody. The court first noted the \u201calmost *** five-fold increase\u201d in the total weight of the substance between O\u2019Donnell\u2019s testimony and the stipulation. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 882. The court then pointed to a significant \u201cbreak\u201d in the chain of custody:\n\u201cNot only was there no evidence regarding the handling and safekeeping of the evidence between the custody of Officer O\u2019Donnell and Mannison, there was also no evidence specifically detailing what procedures Officer O\u2019Donnell himself employed with regard to the safekeeping of the evidence. [Citation.] Indeed, other than testimony of Officer O\u2019Donnell that he inventoried the evidence under number 1441897, the only other evidence offered to prove the chain of custody was the stipulation, which merely established that Mannison tested the evidence assigned to inventory number 1441897 and found there to be 20 items weighing a total of 9.3 grams.\u201d Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 882.\nThe court concluded that, given the gap in the custodial chain and the \u201csubstantial discrepancies as to the weight of the evidence,\u201d the State failed to carry its initial burden. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 882.\nDefendant notes that, as in Gibson, there was a break in the chain of custody here since there was no evidence of how State Exhibit 1 passed between Veruchi and Bond. In Gibson, however, there was a vast disparity between the weight of the substance logged in by police and the weight of the substance tested by the crime lab. Given this evidence of \u201cactual tampering, substitution^] or contamination,\u201d the State had to adduce the testimony of every custodian in the alleged chain (Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467), but the State did not. Here, by contrast, there was no evidence of any such weight disparity, and hence the State did not have to \u201cexclude every possibility of tampering or contamination\u201d but had only to show that \u201cthe police took reasonable protective measures to ensure that the substance recovered from the defendant was the same substance tested by the forensic chemist.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467.\nIn Howard, there was testimony from the two police officers who originally packaged the suspected cocaine they seized from the defendant. The officers, Gately and Wellbank, were members of the State Line Area Narcotics Team (SLANT) when they conducted the operation that resulted in the defendant\u2019s arrest. Gately and Wellbank identified the State\u2019s exhibit as the package in which they had placed the suspected cocaine. Gately testified that the date, his initials, and his and Wellbank\u2019s badge numbers were on the package. Wellbank testified that the date and his and Gately\u2019s initials were on the package. Wellbank also testified that an \u201c T.D. number\u2019 \u201d was on the package but Wellbank did not explain the nature of this number. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1000. Gately and Wellbank also testified that the suspected cocaine weighed 53 grams on their portable scale (but they did not mention whether the weight was indicated on the package). Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 998. There was testimony that the package changed hands several times (with a certain period unaccounted for) until it was received by the lab chemist, who found that the substance inside the package weighed 51.2 grams. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1001.\nThis court reversed the trial court\u2019s ruling admitting the package. This court noted that there was no testimony that the package had a unique identifier, and we held that \u201cthe initials, badge numbers, date, and weight measurements fail[ed] *** as a matter of law\u201d to show the improbability of tampering or accidental substitution. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. This court explained that the information that was identified on the package:\n\u201cwould have shown that accidental substitution was improbable only if it showed that it was improbable that the same officers would have handled another bag of white powder of similar weight on that day. Narcotics enforcement is SLANT\u2019S function, so we are not prepared to assume that two SLANT officers would not make two or more similar drug purchases in one day.\u201d Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1005.\nDefendant notes that, where the court in Howard assumed from the nature of SLANT\u2019S duties that the officers handled drugs regularly, here there was specific evidence showing the possibility of accidental substitution, namely the police reports reflecting that the police seized suspected cocaine from at least one person aside from defendant during the search of apartment 3 on January 28, 2009. Again, as those reports were not admitted at trial, we may not consider them.\nDefendant also claims that the evidence is unclear as to when and where Veruchi processed and packaged the suspected drugs. Defendant notes that Rossow testified on direct examination that, upon seizing the drugs from defendant, Rossow passed them to Veruchi, \u201cat which time [Rossow] observed [Veruchi] tag [it] into evidence.\u201d On cross-examination, however, Rossow testified that, when he and Veruchi \u201cgot back to the narcotics office, [Rossow] observed Detective Veruchi tagging the item into evidence.\u201d Defendant argues that this discrepancy is important because Veruchi did not identify \u201cwhere he was when he processed the evidence.\u201d\nWe reject this line of argument. Describing his role during the search of apartment 3, Veruchi said, \u201cWhen an item was located by any of the other officers that were executing the search warrant, they would notify me, and then I would go over and process the evidence.\u201d We take this to mean that Veruchi processed the evidence at the scene, contemporaneously with receiving it. If defendant has in mind a difference between \u201cprocessing\u201d the evidence and \u201cpackaging\u201d it, he does not develop the distinction. As for the discrepancy in Rossow\u2019s testimony, it may well mean that Veruchi processed and packaged the evidence at the scene but inventoried it at the station.\nWe close with some concerns we have about Howard\u2019s approach to chain-of-custody issues. Howard noted the absence of a unique identifier on the evidence package and held that the police officers\u2019 \u201cinitials, badge numbers, and date\u201d on the package, and the similarity between the weights of the substance when processed by the police and tested by the lab chemist, failed \u201cas a matter of law\u201d to satisfy the State\u2019s initial burden. Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. The phrase \u201cas a matter of law\u201d suggests a general rule, as if the State\u2019s case will fail in all circumstances where a unique identifier is absent, or at least where the only information identified on the evidence package is the officer\u2019s initials and badge number and the date. If this were Howard\u2019s intent, we would take exception with such a rule because it would curb the flexibility that the case law consistently grants the State in establishing a prima facie case. See, e.g., People v. Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d 549, 560 (2004) (no unique identifier; officer identified evidence package by other markings); Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 747-48 (no unique identifier; officers testified that, except for markings made by crime lab, package was in substantially the same condition as when they handled it).\nEven if Howard did not intend so broad a pronouncement, its narrow holding is questionable because it disrupts the proof scheme that controls chain-of-custody issues. Here it is important to note where Howard believed the State\u2019s proof failed. Howard held that the officers\u2019 testimony did not show that \u201caccidental substitution was improbable.\u201d Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. What the court indicated was that it was not improbable that the officers, when asked to identify the evidence package, did not confuse the drugs seized from the defendant with other drugs. We question the court\u2019s path to this conclusion. The officers in Howard testified that they processed the drugs in the field after seizing them from the defendant. They identified the evidence package by certain markings, i.e., the date, the time, and their initials, and they noted the respects in which the package was different from when they had handled it, specifically that it had been opened by the crime lab, then sealed and marked with initials. We believe this testimony was sufficient under the case law to show that the police took proper protective measures by which they could differentiate the drugs seized from the defendant. See Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 560; Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 747-48. It therefore was incumbent upon the defendant to show evidence of actual tampering or substitution. The court in Howard pointed to no specific evidence of actual substitution. Instead, because \u201c[njarcotics enforcement [was] SLANT\u2019S function,\u201d the court was \u201cnot prepared to assume that two SLANT officers would not make two or more similar drug purchases in one day.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. Rephrased so as to delete the double negative, this was effectively a presumption that the police officers did make two or more similar drug purchases on the day the defendant was arrested. If the police officers in Howard were generally assigned to tasks having absolutely nothing to do with narcotics, would the court have made a different presumption and concluded that there was no probability of accidental substitution? Once the State has established that the police took \u201creasonable measures *** to protect the evidence from the time *** it was seized and that it [is] unlikely that the evidence has been altered\u201d (Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467), it is the defendant\u2019s burden to raise issues challenging the officers\u2019 testimony by, e.g., actually asking on cross-examination if the officers made \u201ctwo or more similar drug purchases in one day\u201d (Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1005). Engaging in speculative presumptions based on the officers\u2019 assigned duties is not the proper way to proceed. We have found no authority to suggest that, in a drug case, the State must establish as part of its prima facie case that no drugs were seized by the same officers that day from anyone other than the defendant. Pettis, which was relied on by the supreme court in Woods, is just one example of a case where no such showing was made (or, impliedly, was required). In Pettis, there was no evidence of what other law enforcement activities the officers were engaged in on the day they seized drugs from the defendant. Moreover, the officers\u2019 initials were the only markings of theirs that they identified on the State\u2019s exhibit. In Howard, not only were the officers\u2019 initials on the package but also the date the drugs were seized. The evidence in Pettis closed the universe of possible substitution to a far lesser degree than that in Howard, but the court in Pettis found the State\u2019s prima facie case established.\nWe believe that, in Howard, the burden shifted to the defendant when the officers differentiated the drugs by date, weight, and arresting officer, and it then became the defendant\u2019s burden to show by specific evidence that there were other drugs seized that day by the same officers. The defendant could not discharge that burden by relying on a presumption based on the nature of the officers\u2019 duties. There would be no meaning in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant if he could meet his burden through speculative presumptions. To the contrary, when the burden shifted to the defendant, the chain of custody was presumed to be established, and the defendant had to rebut it with specific evidence. As we said in Johnson:\n\u201c[A]bsent positive evidence of a compromising event, such an event\u2019s existence is nothing more than a reasonable hypothesis. The mere existence of a reasonable hypothesis consistent with a defendant\u2019s innocence is not enough to necessarily create a reasonable doubt of his or her guilt. [Citation.] Thus, to create a reasonable doubt, a flaw in a foundation based on chain of custody must do more than provide an opportunity for speculation about events in which the integrity of evidence could possibly have been compromised.\u201d Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 437.\nWe also question Howard\u2019s comments following its determination that the officers\u2019 testimony was too vague as to whether some additional markings on the evidence package included an identification number or other unique identifier. Howard noted that there was no source, other than the witnesses\u2019 testimony, as to the nature of the markings:\n\u201cWe are aware that, unlike us, the trial court most likely could actually see the information on the evidence bag when it made its ruling. The court may have known what Gately wrote on the bag but that possibility does not compel a finding of admissibility, because the court did not make a record of any observations that led it to conclude that admission was proper. Furthermore, the State could have supplemented the record on appeal to indicate the unexplained information on the evidence bag, but the State failed to do so. Absent a complete record of the trial court\u2019s observation or any other record of information on the bag, our review of the admissibility issue is limited to the witnesses\u2019 vague testimony in the transcript.\u201d Howard, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 1006.\nWe see two problems with this analysis. The first is the suggestion that this court is itself unable to procure and review physical evidence. In fact, in Johnson (cited by Howard), this court ordered one of the parties to supplement the record on appeal with the evidence envelopes in question. This court examined the exterior of the envelopes and verified what numbers were written on them. See Johnson, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 439. We see no reason why the Howard court could not have done the same.\nSecond, the court in Howard deemed the State responsible for the gap in the record as to the nature of the markings. In fact, it was the defendant, as the appellant, who had the duty of providing a record to support his allegations of error, and any record omissions were to be construed against him. People v. Bowman, 357 Ill. App. 3d 290, 298-99 (2005) (\u201cAs the appellant, defendant has the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error, and any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against defendant\u201d). The Howard court construed in the defendant\u2019s favor, not the State\u2019s, the vagueness about the additional markings on the package.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the State made a prima facie case for chain of custody and that defendant did not identify any evidence of actual tampering or substitution. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting State Exhibit 1.\nIII. $10 Street-Value Assessment\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a period of incarceration and then turned to the matter of fines:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** I\u2019m going to sentence you to a period of three years in the Department of Corrections. This is not as serious a case as the last one you went down for, that\u2019s why I\u2019m not giving you the extended term, but I\u2019ll sentence you to a period of three years [in the] Department of Corrections. There\u2019s a year of mandatory supervised release, $500 lab testing fee, $100 Trauma Fee.\nMR. MORRISON [Assistant Public Defender]: $100 drug assessment?\nTHE COURT: Lab fee $100. Thank you, Mr. Morrison. I got to tell you right offhand, I do not know what the street value is; point 83 grams.\nMS. QUADE [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Be [sic] $10.\nTHE COURT: $10 street value fine, court cost $273. Year of parole goes along with this, mandatory supervised release.\u201d\nThe court imposed the street-value fine according to section 5 \u2014 9\u2014 1.1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 (West 2006)).\nDefendant argues that the fine was improper because there was no evidence to support it. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review but urges us to review his argument under the plain-error doctrine. Where a street-value fine is based on insufficient evidence, there is both error and plain error because \u201cimposing the fine without any evidentiary support in contravention of the statute implicates the right to a fair sentencing hearing,\u201d and \u201cthe integrity of the judicial process is also affected when a decision is not based on applicable standards and evidence, but appears to be arbitrary.\u201d People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009); see also People v. Spencer, 347 Ill. App. 3d 483, 488 (2004) (because \u201cthe legislature intended for courts to impose the fine with some concrete evidentiary basis,\u201d the \u201cfailure to support a street value fine with any evidentiary basis constitutes plain error\u201d). We find no error, and so no plain error.\nSection 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(a) provides:\n\u201c(a) When a person has been adjudged guilty of a drug related offense involving possession or delivery of cannabis or possession or delivery of a controlled substance ***, in addition to any other penalty imposed, a fine shall be levied by the court at not less than the full street value of the cannabis or controlled substances seized.\n\u2018Street value\u2019 shall be determined by the court on the basis of testimony of law enforcement personnel and the defendant as to the amount seized and such testimony as may be required by the court as to the current street value of the cannabis or controlled substance seized.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(a) (West 2006).\nThe emphasized requirement was construed as follows in Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 46:\n\u201cWhile *** section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(a) only mandates \u2018such testimony as may be required by the court\u2019 on the current street value of the controlled substance, the statute also clearly requires the fine to be based on the substance\u2019s current value. There must be some evidentiary basis for street value in the record for the court to comply with the statutory mandate of imposing a fine at least equal to the street value of the controlled substance.\nThe evidentiary basis may be provided by testimony at sentencing, a stipulation to the current value, or reliable evidence presented at a previous stage of the proceedings. [Citation.] The legislature apparently acknowledged current street value may have already been established by providing only for \u2018testimony as may be required by the court\u2019 on the current value. Testimony on current street value may not be required by the court at sentencing if the value of the controlled substance has already been established. Nonetheless, an evidentiary basis for the street value of the controlled substance is required to comply with section 5 \u2014 9\u2014 l.l(a)\u2019s core requirement of imposing a fine \u2018at not less than the full street value.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe State notes Lewis\u2019s comment that street value may be set by \u201cstipulation\u201d and argues that defendant, by not disputing the assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s representation about street value, tacitly stipulated to the value. We agree. From the transcript, it appears that the court\u2019s inquiry about the street value of the drugs was a request to both parties for input. The State gave its opinion on street value. Defendant said nothing \u2014 neither proposing his own value nor even simply rejecting the State\u2019s opinion. Stipulations by silence have been found under comparable circumstances. See People v. Evans, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1051-52 (1978) (defendant\u2019s silence when State announced that it was nol-prossing the burglary charge with the understanding that the burglary would be introduced in aggravation at sentencing); People v. Johnson, 121 Ill. App. 2d 97 (1970) (abstract of op.) (defendant\u2019s silence when codefendant stipulated that victim\u2019s testimony would be the same at trial as at the preliminary hearing). We find no error in the imposition of the $10 street-value fine.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.\nAffirmed.\nJORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.\nWe recognize that our holding places us in conflict with People v. Rogers, 403 Ill. App. 3d 584 (2010), a decision in which this court assumed that a trial court\u2019s failure to question jurors \u201cabout their understanding (as opposed to acceptance) of the Zehr principles\u201d constituted error. Rogers, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 588. For the reasons above, we follow Calabrese and depart from Rogers.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary R. Peterson and Michael Delcomyn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Joseph P Bruscato, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Stephanie Hoit Lee, of Algonquin, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL E. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201408\u20141012\nOpinion filed November 15, 2010.\nGary R. Peterson and Michael Delcomyn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJoseph P Bruscato, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Stephanie Hoit Lee, of Algonquin, for the People." }, "file_name": "0578-01", "first_page_order": 594, "last_page_order": 614 }