{ "id": 4307035, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN L. GRAHAM, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Graham", "decision_date": "2010-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201409\u20140238", "first_page": "1183", "last_page": "1194", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 1183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676311 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962232 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527730 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544521 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"victim\" for restitution purposes can be \"a close relative\" of the named victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317111 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738895 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610746 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 1123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777659 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/1123-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527783 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a79", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009 Ark. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 7321520 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/318/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543208 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780265 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201150 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592505 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125562 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492979 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "noting that in Dace, the defendant \"was able to show that the witness had been involuntarily committed and adjudged dangerous to others\" and \"the record demonstrated that Dace's conviction was solely dependent on the evidence offered by the accomplice-witness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567297 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "noting that in Dace \"it was already established that the witness had been involuntarily committed, thus establishing some threshold basis for a belief that such records would be impeaching\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279671 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "noting, \"Unlike the testimony of the witness in Dace, [the witness's] testimony was not the only evidence against [the] defendant in the instant case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147317 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590192 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201402 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "348-49" }, { "page": "349-50, 359-60" }, { "page": "349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499390 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414-15, 418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3024424 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" }, { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515887 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531, 533-34", "parenthetical": "finding that the defendant had failed to sufficiently show that his sexual abuse victim's records were material and relevant where the defendant's \"sole evidence\" was that the victim \"had been to a medical doctor and a psychiatrist\" and \"was hyperactive and was taking Ritalin\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333148 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850135 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5148276 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283195 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573-74" }, { "page": "573-76" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0570-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1214, "char_count": 31158, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.46765605076141e-08, "percentile": 0.2800875649506979 }, "sha256": "7fcb025b5b8ba23f4f9bc20c60ec90340c71cd1d5e995dd2c54f9b56a74b8f41", "simhash": "1:e8aee71e575bd655", "word_count": 5028 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:07.786999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN L. GRAHAM, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Goldenhersh and Donovan concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nA Christian County jury found the defendant, John L. Graham, Jr., guilty on six counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 13(a)(3) (West 2006)). On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena the victim\u2019s mental health records for an in camera inspection and in awarding the victim\u2019s grandfather restitution for traveling expenses. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1992, the defendant\u2019s first wife, Rebecca, gave birth to their only child, S.G. In 1994, the defendant and Rebecca divorced, and Rebecca and S.G. moved to Arkansas. Rebecca subsequently remarried and gave birth to S.G.\u2019s half-sister, Lindsey, who was born a special-needs child (spina bifida). In December 2000, S.G. moved to Mattoon to live with the defendant and his second wife, Monica. Rebecca was apparently unable to \u201chandle\u201d both S.G. and Lindsey, and she sent the defendant a letter indicating that if he did not take custody of S.G., then she was going to give her up for adoption.\nIn 2004, the defendant and Monica separated, and the defendant began committing various acts of sexual penetration with S.G., who was 11 or 12 at the time. The abuse occurred frequently until March 2006, when S.G. reported it to her best friend, Elizabeth. After Elizabeth\u2019s mother spoke with S.G. about the allegations, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was contacted, and after a temporary stay at a foster home, S.G. moved back to Arkansas to live with her grandparents. The record indicates that S.G. has been in counseling ever since.\nIn May 2006, a Christian County grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple counts of criminal sexual assault. Thereafter, the defendant filed numerous pretrial motions, including a motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of S.G.\u2019s mental health records. The defendant\u2019s motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of S.G.\u2019s mental health records alleged that since 2003, S.G. had \u201cexhibited signs indicative of mental illness.\u201d The defendant\u2019s motion further alleged that he had recently learned that she had undergone \u201cintensive mental health treatment\u201d and was being \u201cmedicated for a mental illness.\u201d The motion alleged that S.G.\u2019s \u201cmental condition and current medication\u201d could possibly affect her \u201cability to accurately recollect matters at issue in this case.\u201d\nAt a subsequent hearing on the motion, the defendant argued that because S.G.\u2019s mental condition could possibly \u201caffect her testimony at trial,\u201d he was entitled to have the trial court conduct an in camera examination of her mental health records. Noting that S.G.\u2019s mental health records were privileged, the State countered that the defendant had failed to allege any connection between S.G.\u2019s mental health problems and her credibility as a witness. Explaining that after moving back to Arkansas, S.G. had been diagnosed as being bipolar and \u201csuffering from a post[ ]traumatic stress disorder\u201d (PTSD), the State indicated that S.G.\u2019s mental health problems were the result of the sexual abuse that she had endured while living with the defendant. Noting that there was \u201cno allegation that she was on any *** medications at the time that the offense[s] occurred,\u201d the State argued that the medications that S.G. was taking to stabilize her conditions actually worked to \u201cimprove her credibility rather than detract from it.\u201d The State further asserted that even if the court were inclined to grant the defendant\u2019s motion, S.G.\u2019s mental health records were in Arkansas, so they were unlikely to be obtainable with a \u201cmere subpoena.\u201d\nIn response to the State\u2019s arguments, defense counsel acknowledged that all he knew was that S.G. had \u201csought some intensive mental health treatment.\u201d Counsel maintained that his \u201cdilemma\u201d was that he needed the requested records to determine the potential relevancy of S.G.\u2019s conditions and medications.\nFinding that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of establishing that S.G.\u2019s mental health records were material and relevant, the trial court (the Honorable James Roberts) denied the defendant\u2019s motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of the records. Noting that child victims of sexual abuse commonly seek remedial counseling and treatment, the court ruled that the mere fact that S.G. was apparently receiving that treatment and the defendant\u2019s suggestion that \u201cthere might be something in [S.G.\u2019s] records that could be helpful\u201d were not enough to justify the disclosure of the records. The court further ruled, however, that if the defendant became aware that S.G. was suffering from \u201csevere mental health issues\u201d unrelated to the sexual abuse, the defendant could so allege and the court would reconsider his motion.\nThe defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of S.G.\u2019s mental health records. The motion to reconsider alleged, inter alia, that S.G. \u201chad exhibited signs indicative of mental illness before coming into contact with the [defendant\u201d and \u201c[t]hat due to the relationship between [S.G.] and the [d]efendant[,] he [was] entitled to inspect [her mental health] records.\u201d When the motion to reconsider was later argued, defense counsel again maintained that his \u201cdilemma\u201d was that he needed S.G.\u2019s mental health records to determine the potential relevancy of S.G.\u2019s conditions and medications. Indicating that one of the reasons why S.G. had moved to Illinois to live with the defendant was her \u201cmother\u2019s inability to control her,\u201d counsel suggested that S.G. might have been treated for \u201csome mental illness that stemmed from before she came into contact with [the defendant].\u201d Counsel also reasserted that the defendant was entitled to examine S.G.\u2019s mental health records because of his status as her father.\nAgain noting that S.G. had sought treatment for her psychiatric issues after moving back to Arkansas in 2006, the State again argued that the defendant had failed to establish a sufficient nexus between S.G.\u2019s mental health conditions and her credibility as a witness. The State contended that the disclosure of her privileged records was thus unwarranted under the circumstances.\nFinding no reason to disturb its prior ruling, the trial court (the Honorable Ronald D. Spears) denied the defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider. Noting that there was nothing to indicate that S.G. had undergone anything other than \u201cpost[ ]event psychological counseling,\u201d the court suggested that the defendant was essentially asking it to go on a \u201cfishing expedition.\u201d Indicating that the \u201crape counselor privilege\u201d would also apply to the requested records, the court stated that if the defendant knew where S.G.\u2019s mental health records were, he could possibly obtain them in his parental capacity, but the court would still have to review them in camera and \u201crule on them.\u201d\nIn November 2008, the State filed a six-count amended indictment charging the defendant with six specific acts of sexual penetration occurring between July 2004 and March 2006, and in February 2009, the cause proceeded to a jury trial. At the start of the trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence of S.G.\u2019s \u201cmental state before having any contact with the [defendant and at the time of [her] allegations.\u201d The motion argued that \u201cany testimony from [S.G.] regarding any treatment since these allegations arose should be prohibited as *** irrelevant.\u201d When arguing the motion, defense counsel maintained that because the defendant\u2019s requests to discover S.G.\u2019s mental health records had been denied, the State should not be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the treatment that she had received \u201csince the allegations.\u201d\nThe State responded by stating that \u201cby way of anticipatory cross,\u201d it was going to bring out that S.G. was on medication for bipolar disorder but that it did not intend to elicit that she had also been diagnosed with PTSD. The State advised that it did not have a psychiatrist or psychologist \u201clined up\u201d to discuss S.G.\u2019s conditions (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.2 (West 2008) (allowing for the introduction of evidence regarding a sexual abuse victim\u2019s PTSD if offered through the testimony of a qualified expert)) and that it was not going to use the evidence to \u201ctry to put on some pony show.\u201d\nAfter stating that \u201ccounseling that victims receive concerning sexual abuse\u201d are privileged communications, the trial court agreed to allow some \u201cleeway\u201d on the matter, and when the court inquired, defense counsel twice acknowledged that the defendant wanted the jury to hear that S.G. had been diagnosed as being bipolar. The court ultimately ruled that S.G. could testify about her counseling and treatment for her bipolar condition, but noting the absence of a mental health expert and the prejudicial nature of the condition\u2019s name, the court directed the State to avoid eliciting any testimony regarding S.G.\u2019s PTSD.\nWhen S.G. subsequently testified, she indicated that she had attempted suicide several times since March 2006 and had been diagnosed with \u201c[b]ipolar and depression.\u201d S.G. stated that she took Seroquel and Effexor XR for her conditions and that the medications helped her \u201cmood swings\u201d and \u201cthinking.\u201d\nWhen cross-examined, S.G. acknowledged that she had not been taking any medications for her bipolar disorder in March 2006. She further acknowledged that leaving her mother to live with the defendant was a \u201ctough transition\u201d and that she had tried to maintain contact with her mother after moving to Illinois. In March 2006, S.G. was optimistic about possibly spending Easter break with her mother, and she was admittedly upset when she learned that the defendant could not afford the cost of the visit. S.G. testified that she was aware that Monica had a daughter who had once \u201cmade some claims of sexual assault against a family member of hers.\u201d\nOn redirect, S.G. denied reporting the abuse because she was mad about not being able to visit her mother, and she indicated that she had no reason \u201cto continue to lie about something [that she had] allegedly started three years ago.\u201d S.G. stated that she had reported the abuse because she was \u201ctired\u201d of it, and she testified that she had not been taking medication in March 2006 because she had not been diagnosed with bipolar disorder until after she had moved back to Arkansas.\nS.G.\u2019s trial testimony regarding the sexual abuse was corroborated by medical testimony describing the condition of her genitalia when they were examined in April 2006 and evidence that S.G.\u2019s DNA was recovered from a sex toy and a condom found during a search of the apartment where she and the defendant had lived together. The jury also heard testimony that when DCFS interviewed the defendant regarding S.G.\u2019s allegations, he had stated that \u201cother than being a little mouthy,\u201d S.G. was \u201ca very good kid\u201d and was \u201cpretty much an honest child.\u201d The defendant told DCFS that S.G. was apparently making false accusations against him because she \u201cwas mad at him because she didn\u2019t get to go down to see her mom *** because he didn\u2019t have the finances.\u201d The defendant also told DCFS that S.G.\u2019s \u201cfamily down in Arkansas [had] put her up to saying this stuff.\u201d The defendant did not testify at the trial.\nRejecting defense counsel\u2019s claims that S.G. was a troubled child who had falsely accused the defendant so that she could move back to Arkansas, the jury convicted the defendant on all counts of the amended indictment. The trial court later imposed a 60-year aggregate sentence on the defendant\u2019s convictions, and the present appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\nS.G.\u2019s Mental Health Records\nContending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of S.G.\u2019s mental health records, the defendant first argues that the trial court \u201cshould have issued the subpoena, inspected the records in camera, and forwarded to defense counsel any items that were relevant to S.G.\u2019s credibility.\u201d The defendant suggests that by failing to do so, the trial court violated his rights under the sixth amendment\u2019s confrontation clause (U.S. Const., amend. VI). In response, the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant had failed to adequately demonstrate that the records he requested were material and relevant to S.G.\u2019s credibility.\n\u201cIllinois courts have held that evidence of a witness\u2019s mental condition is admissible to the extent that it bears on the credibility of the witness\u2019s testimony and is thus a permissible area of impeachment.\u201d People v. K.S., 387 Ill. App. 3d 570, 573 (2008). \u201cBefore such evidence may be introduced, however, its relevance to a witness\u2019 [sic] credibility must be established.\u201d People v. McMillan, 239 Ill. App. 3d 467, 487 (1993). \u201cA two-step procedure for discovery of mental health records has been established. First, the defendant must sufficiently show that the requested records are material and relevant to the witness\u2019s credibility.\u201d K.S., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 573-74. \u201cOnce this is done, the records are discoverable but must be examined by the trial court in camera if the witness claims or asserts his [or her] statutory privilege.\u201d People v. Harlacher, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (1994).\n\u201cThe trial court has broad discretion in ruling on issues of relevance and materiality and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d People v. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d 82, 87 (1994). \u201cA claim that the trial court erred in limiting discovery will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.\u201d People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 280 (2006).\nAt the outset, we emphasize that the record indicates that S.G.\u2019s psychiatric issues are an unfortunate yet unsurprising result of the years of sexual abuse that she suffered, and her need for what the trial court described as \u201cpost[ ]event psychological counseling\u201d stemmed from the defendant\u2019s criminal conduct. We thus agree with the trial court\u2019s observation that the \u201crape counselor privilege\u201d would seemingly apply to the records in question. See Harlacher, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 9. That said, as the State notes on appeal, with respect to the two-step procedure for the discovery of a witness\u2019s mental health records, \u201cthe bar for meeting the \u2018material and relevant\u2019 test has not been strictly defined.\u201d Additionally, a resolution of the inquiry must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis. See K.S., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 573-76 (holding that an in camera inspection of school records containing mental health information of three State eyewitnesses was warranted where the school that the witnesses attended \u201cenrolled students with behavioral and mental problems,\u201d one of the witnesses had been \u201cplaced into a psychiatric facility for three weeks\u201d following the incident in question, and the records apparently contained statements concerning the incident in question); Harlacher, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 9 (holding that the defendant had failed to sufficiently show that the requested records were material and relevant where the evidence before the court established nothing more than that his sex abuse victim had seen a clinical social worker \u201cfor some unknown reason\u201d six years before the abuse had allegedly occurred); People v. Monk, 174 Ill. App. 3d 528, 531, 533-34 (1988) (finding that the defendant had failed to sufficiently show that his sexual abuse victim\u2019s records were material and relevant where the defendant\u2019s \u201csole evidence\u201d was that the victim \u201chad been to a medical doctor and a psychiatrist\u201d and \u201cwas hyperactive and was taking Ritalin\u201d); People v. Walton, 107 Ill. App. 3d 698, 703-04 (1982) (holding that the defendant failed to establish that his robbery victim\u2019s mental health records were relevant where the evidence before the court was that the victim was \u201c \u2018under [the] medical supervision\u2019 \u201d of a county social services center and had \u201conce been a voluntary patient in a mental hospital[ ] but apparently had successfully completed his treatment there\u201d); People v. Phipps, 98 Ill. App. 3d 413, 414-15, 418 (1981) (holding that an in camera review of the witnesses\u2019 records was warranted where the witnesses were residents of a state mental health facility where the crimes allegedly occurred and the defendant specifically alleged that the requested records \u201ccontained mental evaluations, intelligent quotients, [and] statements concerning the truth and veracity of the witnesses\u201d). Nevertheless, in People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337, 350 (1988), the supreme court held that a defendant seeking the disclosure of privileged communications between a sexual assault victim and her counselor must offer a \u201creason to believe that the victim\u2019s counseling records would provide a source of impeaching material unavailable from other sources,\u201d and here, we conclude that the defendant has offered no such reason.\nAlleging that since 2003 S.G. had \u201cexhibited signs indicative of mental illness,\u201d the defendant sought an in camera inspection of S.G.\u2019s mental health records because he had recently learned that she had undergone \u201cintensive mental health treatment\u201d and was being \u201cmedicated for a mental illness.\u201d After the State explained that S.G.\u2019s need for psychiatric treatment and medication was a consequence of her victimization, the trial court gave the defendant the opportunity to allege that S.G. had mental health issues unrelated to the sexual abuse, but all that he subsequently pleaded was that S.G. \u201chad exhibited signs indicative of mental illness before coming into contact with [him].\u201d Other than stating that Rebecca had some problems controlling S.G., however, the defendant never specified what \u201csigns indicative of mental illness\u201d S.G. had exhibited, nor did he ever allege how they might affect her credibility. He never suggested that S.G. had ever experienced delusions, for instance, nor did he ever suggest that S.G. had ever suffered from a condition that might cause her to pathologically lie. In fact, he told DCFS that \u201cother than being a little mouthy,\u201d S.G. was \u201ca very good kid\u201d and was \u201cpretty much an honest child.\u201d\nHere, none of the information before the trial court gave it reason to believe that S.G.\u2019s mental health records would provide the defense with a source of impeaching information not available from other sources. The State disclosed the nature of S.G.\u2019s treatment and the specific disorders that she was diagnosed as having, and nothing indicates that S.G. has ever been treated for anything other than the trauma that resulted from the defendant\u2019s criminal conduct. It has also been observed that because a sexual assault counselor does not investigate a victim\u2019s complaint but rather \u201chelp[s] the victim understand and resolve her feelings about the event,\u201d an in camera review of a sex abuse victim\u2019s counseling records will \u201cnot likely result in the disclosure of any material useful to an accused.\u201d Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 348-49. We note that the defendant raised S.G. for several years, and he, himself, was thus a source of potentially impeaching information regarding her mental condition, beyond that which the State offered. We also note that Illinois law sets forth a procedure by which a parent can \u201cinspect and copy\u201d his or her child\u2019s mental health records. 740 ILCS 110/4(a) (West 2008). The defendant also had access to numerous unprivileged statements, concerning the sexual abuse, that S.G. made to other persons, which is also significant. See People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 93 (1990) (noting that the Foggy court held that disclosure was not required under the facts of that case \u201cbecause the defendant failed to show that he knew of specific information that would demonstrate bias or motive to fabricate and because the defendant had access, for purposes of cross-examination, to an array of unprivileged statements made by the complaining witness to other persons following the offense\u201d). Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily establish that the records he requested were material and relevant to S.G.\u2019s credibility. The information before the trial court lacked the substance and specificity needed to justify an in camera inspection of S.G.\u2019s mental health records. See Walton, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 703-04.\nEchoing the \u201cdilemma\u201d argument that he advanced in the trial court, the defendant suggests that his lack of specificity should be excused, because without access to the requested records, it was not possible for him to establish anything more than what is already known about them. The defendant cites People v. Dace, 114 Ill. App. 3d 908 (1983), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 104 Ill. 2d 96 (1984), in support of this contention. In Dace, in response to the State\u2019s claim that the defendant had failed to make the requisite showing that would entitle him to discover the mental health records of the State\u2019s key witness against him, the court stated the following:\n\u201cIn essence, the State urges us to require the defendant to demonstrate the relevance and materiality of information to which he has no access. The record here already indicates that [the State\u2019s key witness] was involuntarily committed because she was adjudged dangerous. There is no reasonable method for the defendant to establish any more than what is already known from court records. If the State\u2019s argument prevailed, a defendant would be unable to make the proposed showing unless, by some fortuity, the witness was either institutionalized at the time of the offense or trial or, even less likely, a witness voluntarily revealed his mental illness and treatment.\u201d Dace, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 915.\nWe note that Dace has repeatedly been limited to its facts (see People v. Plummer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 268, 280 (2000) (noting, \u201cUnlike the testimony of the witness in Dace, [the witness\u2019s] testimony was not the only evidence against [the] defendant in the instant case\u201d); People v. Knight, 139 Ill. App. 3d 188, 195 (1985) (noting that in Dace \u201cit was already established that the witness had been involuntarily committed, thus establishing some threshold basis for a belief that such records would be impeaching\u201d); People v. Friesland, 130 Ill. App. 3d 595, 596 (1985) (noting that in Dace, the defendant \u201cwas able to show that the witness had been involuntarily committed and adjudged dangerous to others\u201d and \u201cthe record demonstrated that Dace\u2019s conviction was solely dependent on the evidence offered by the accomplice-witness\u201d), aff\u2019d, 109 Ill. 2d 369 (1985)), but moreover, in Foggy, the supreme court rejected the dissenting justice\u2019s \u201cCatch-22\u201d argument, which the Dace court seemingly espoused (Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 349-50, 359-60). The Foggy court indicated that to require the disclosure of privileged records in the absence of a demonstrated need would effectively require disclosure \u201cin every case,\u201d and the court declined to adopt that rule. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 349-50. We therefore find that the defendant\u2019s reliance on Dace is misplaced. We also perceive a more fundamental obstacle that would ostensibly render the defendant\u2019s motion for the issuance of a subpoena for the production of S.G.\u2019s mental health records moot, i.e., the trial court\u2019s inability to subpoena the records in the first place.\nIt is undisputed that S.G.\u2019s mental health records are somewhere in Arkansas, and while the defendant asked the trial court to subpoena the records, he apparently failed to consider the logistics of his request. The trial court\u2019s subpoena power does not extend across state lines (see Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 312 (1991); People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 427 (1988)), so it would follow that any subpoena issued by the trial court to an Arkansas entity would be void for a lack of inherent power (see In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1994); People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987)). Thus, even if we were inclined to remand this cause to the trial court with directions that it subpoena S.G.\u2019s mental health records for an in camera inspection (see K.S., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 576), we would be asking the trial court to do something that it does not have the power to do. We also note that Arkansas law strictly prohibits the disclosure of a juvenile\u2019s mental health records, and its limited exceptions require a written request from the juvenile\u2019s parents or legal guardians. See Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, at 17, 318 S.W3d 70, 82; Ark. Code Ann. \u00a79 \u2014 27\u2014309(0(4) (West 2010). Ironically, it thus seems that while the trial court did not have the power to subpoena the records that the defendant wanted it to review, the defendant, himself, could have possibly obtained them.\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant had failed to sufficiently establish that S.G.\u2019s mental health records were material and relevant to her credibility as a witness. Nothing before the court gave it reason to believe that S.G.\u2019s mental health records related to anything other than the treatment she received for the psychiatric disorders that resulted from the sexual abuse to which she had been subjected or that the records would provide the defense with a source of impeaching information not available from other sources. Moreover, given that the requested records are in a location beyond the trial court\u2019s subpoena power, any subpoena issued by the trial court would have been void for a lack of authority.\nThe Trial Court\u2019s Restitution Order\nWhen imposing sentence, the trial court, at the State\u2019s request, ordered the defendant to pay S.G.\u2019s grandfather $894.60 in restitution as travel reimbursement (2,982 total miles at 30 cents per mile). The record indicates that S.G.\u2019s grandfather drove S.G. from Arkansas to Illinois and back numerous times during the pendency of the defendant\u2019s criminal proceedings and incurred additional expenses driving S.G. to and from an anger management support group that had met eight times at a location approximately 40 miles from their home in Arkansas. On appeal, correctly noting that a restitution order that is not authorized by statute is void and can be challenged as such at any time (see People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552 (2001)), the defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s restitution order is void because S.G.\u2019s grandfather is not a \u201cvictim\u201d for purposes of the statute that authorizes restitution (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West 2008)). The defendant alternatively suggests that the restitution order should be set aside because the trial court failed to consider his ability to pay restitution and failed to specify, inter alia, a payment schedule. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) (West 2008).\nA reviewing court \u201cshould reverse a trial court\u2019s restitution order only where the trial court has abused its discretion.\u201d People v. Stiles, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1125 (2003). However, \u201c[w]hether a judgment is void is a question of law which we review de novo.\u201d People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 72 (2007).\nA sentencing court is statutorily authorized to assess and order that a defendant pay restitution for \u201cthe actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries suffered by the victim named in the charge and any other victims who may also have suffered out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries proximately caused by the same criminal conduct of the defendant.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) (West 2008). For restitution purposes, the term \u201cvictim\u201d includes \u201ca single representative who may be *** the spouse, parent, child[,] or sibling\u201d of the named victim, \u201cexcept where the spouse, parent, child[,] or sibling is also the defendant.\u201d 725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 2008); 730 ILCS 5/3\u2014 1 \u2014 2(n) (West 2008). The defendant maintains that because this statutory definition of \u201cvictim\u201d does not include \u201cgrandparent,\u201d the trial court \u201clacked statutory authority to order the defendant to pay restitution to S.G.\u2019s grandfather.\u201d As the State notes, however, the statutory provision that defines \u201cvictim\u201d for purposes of the restitution statute provides that its terms are to be given their stated meanings \u201cunless the context clearly requires otherwise.\u201d 725 ILCS 120/3 (West 2008). The term \u201cvictim\u201d can thus be interpreted broadly, particularly where a literal, restrictive interpretation would lead to an absurd or unjust result. See People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 200-03 (1992). We also note that \u201c [legislative use of the word \u2018may\u2019 is generally regarded as indicating a permissive or directory reading, whereas use of the word \u2018shall\u2019 is generally considered to express a mandatory reading.\u201d People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997).\nWith these principles in mind, we agree with the State\u2019s contention that to hold that S.G.\u2019s grandfather is not entitled to receive restitution under the facts of this case would \u201cresult in absurdity.\u201d S.G.\u2019s mother, Rebecca, relinquished custody of S.G. in 2000, and S.G. has been living under her grandfather\u2019s care since her allegations against the defendant arose in 2006. S.G.\u2019s grandfather has thus assumed the role of a parent, and in this context, we believe that he was rightfully treated as the \u201csingle representative\u201d referred to in the statutory definition of \u201cvictim.\u201d 725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 2008); see also People v. Thornton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 624, 634 (1997) (noting that a \u201cvictim\u201d for restitution purposes can be \u201ca close relative\u201d of the named victim).\nUnder the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering the defendant to pay restitution to S.G.\u2019s grandfather. The restitution statute is meant \u201cto make defendants pay any costs incurred as a result of their actions\u201d (People v. Harris, 319 Ill. App. 3d 534, 536 (2001)), and its terms \u201cshould be construed broadly to effect [its] remedial purpose\u201d (People v. Fontana, 251 Ill. App. 3d 694, 707 (1993)). As for the defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s restitution order should be set aside because the court failed to consider his ability to pay restitution and failed to specify, inter alia, a payment schedule, these objections have been forfeited by the defendant\u2019s failure to raise them at his sentencing hearing. See People v. Fades, 123 Ill. App. 3d 113, 118-19 (1984).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant\u2019s convictions and sentence are hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Johannah B. Weber, and John H. Gleason, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Tom Finks, State\u2019s Attorney, of Taylorville (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris and Patrick D. Daly, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN L. GRAHAM, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201409\u20140238\nRule 23 order filed December 15, 2010.\nMotion to publish filed January 11, 2011.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Johannah B. Weber, and John H. Gleason, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nTom Finks, State\u2019s Attorney, of Taylorville (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris and Patrick D. Daly, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1183-01", "first_page_order": 1199, "last_page_order": 1210 }