{ "id": 4306988, "name": "UNITED AIRLINES, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Charlotte Graham, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "United Airlines v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission", "decision_date": "2011-01-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20142966WC", "first_page": "467", "last_page": "473", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "407 Ill. App. 3d 467" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 1289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1296" }, { "page": "1296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "844 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "423-24" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736090 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275" }, { "page": "1275" }, { "page": "1275" }, { "page": "1278" }, { "page": "1277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215443 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" }, { "page": "807-08" }, { "page": "808" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649095 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "909 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "822-23" }, { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621627 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370-71" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "917 N.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290363 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "856 N.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265162 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0938-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 689, "char_count": 15145, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14504725951204106 }, "sha256": "97bcf08c7c85c97f4999491560243349e16d1f51f90625b04b4ded620e5f0a47", "simhash": "1:fa00ada62d530190", "word_count": 2457 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:05.247121+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "UNITED AIRLINES, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Charlotte Graham, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Hoffman, Hudson, Holdridge and Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nOn March 31 and April 2, 2003, claimant, Charlotte Graham, filed applications for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)), seeking benefits from employer, United Airlines. At arbitration, the parties stipulated that claimant sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of her employment on May 9 and October 23, 2001. The only disputed issue was the nature and extent of her injuries. Following a consolidated hearing, the arbitrator awarded claimant wage differential benefits pursuant to section 8(d)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002)) of (1) $417.93 per week for 13 weeks from May 13, 2005, through August 11, 2005; (2) $407.93 per week for 95/7 weeks from August 12, 2005, through May 8, 2007; and (3) $407.93 from May 9, 2007 and \u201ccontinuing for the duration of the disability.\u201d\nThe Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed and adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision. On judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Commission. Employer appeals, arguing (1) the word \u201cdisability\u201d as used in section 8(d)(1) of the Act encompasses economic disability and (2) the Commission erred by sustaining claimant\u2019s objection to evidence offered by employer regarding claimant\u2019s work-life expectancy. We affirm.\nOn August 26, 1990, claimant began working for employer as a flight attendant. Employer agrees she sustained accidental injuries to her back that arose out of and in the course of her employment on both May 9, 2001, and October 23, 2001. Following her work-related accidents, claimant underwent extensive medical treatment, including two surgeries to her lower back. Ultimately, claimant\u2019s treating physician placed her under permanent restrictions of no lifting of greater than 30 pounds, no pushing or pulling of greater than 40 pounds, and no repetitive bending or twisting. Employer\u2019s medical department also determined long-term restrictions on claimant\u2019s physical activities to be appropriate.\nAt arbitration, claimant sought wage differential benefits pursuant to section 8(d)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002)). Employer attempted to introduce the testimony and a report of Dr. Arthur Eubanks, an economist, to provide an opinion on what age claimant was likely to leave the workforce. Claimant objected to Dr. Eubanks\u2019s testimony and report, arguing it was irrelevant in a section 8(d)(1) proceeding. Employer argued the word \u201cdisability\u201d in section 8(d)(1) referred to \u201ceconomic disability\u201d and evidence as to when claimant was likely to leave the workforce would be relevant to determining when her \u201ceconomic disability\u201d would end. The arbitrator disagreed with employer and sustained claimant\u2019s objection to the evidence.\nOn April 8, 2009, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision without further comment. On September 24, 2009, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Commission.\nThis appeal followed.\nOn appeal, employer argues the Commission erred by sustaining claimant\u2019s objection to the opinion evidence of its economist, Dr. Eu-banks, regarding the age at which claimant would retire from the workforce. It contends the clause \u201cduration of disability\u201d in section 8(d)(1) of the Act refers to the duration of a claimant\u2019s impaired earning capacity and Dr. Eubanks\u2019s opinions were relevant to a calculation of benefits under section 8(d)(1).\n\u201cEvidentiary rulings made during the course of a workers\u2019 compensation case will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Certified Testing v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 938, 947, 856 N.E.2d 602, 610 (2006). However, issues involving statutory construction are subject to de novo review. Washington District 50 Schools v. Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Comm\u2019n, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1090, 917 N.E.2d 586, 589 (2009).\n\u201cThe fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Comm\u2019n, 233 Ill. 2d 364, 370, 909 N.E.2d 818, 822 (2009). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill. 2d at 370-71, 909 N.E.2d at 822. Other considerations include \u201cthe reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought.\u201d Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill. 2d at 371, 909 N.E.2d at 822-23. \u201c[T]he *** Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and it is to be liberally construed to accomplish that objective.\u201d Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill. 2d at 371, 909 N.E.2d at 823.\nSection 8(d)(1) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201cIf, after the accidental injury has been sustained, the employee as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment, he shall *** receive compensation for the duration of his disability, subject to the limitations as to maximum amounts fixed in paragraph (b) of this Section, equal to 66\u2154% of the difference between the average amount which he would be able to earn in the full performance of his duties in the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002).\nHere the parties dispute the meaning of \u201cdisability\u201d as used in section 8(d)(1). Claimant contends \u201cdisability\u201d refers only to physical or mental disability, while employer maintains it also encompasses economic disability. The arbitrator and Commission rejected employer\u2019s interpretation, relying on Petrie v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 160 Ill. App. 3d 165, 513 N.E.2d 104 (1987).\nIn Petrie, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 513 N.E.2d at 108, this court considered \u201cwhether an increase in economic disability alone [was] a proper basis for modification of an award pursuant to section 19(h) of the Act.\u201d We concluded \u201cthat a change in physical or mental condition is a prerequisite for a section 19(h) petition.\u201d Petrie, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 172, 513 N.E.2d at 109. A review of the Act showed \u201cthat when the legislature used the term \u2018disability\u2019 in section 19(h) it was referring to physical and mental disability and not economic disability.\u201d Petrie, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 513 N.E.2d at 108.\n\u201cThis intent is evident by reference to the following sections: section 1(b)(3) refers to an employee\u2019s \u2018cause of action by reason of any injury, disablement or death\u2019; section 8(d)(1) states that an injured employee who \u2018becomes partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment *** shall *** receive compensation for the duration of his disability\u2019; section 8(d)(2) refers to injuries which \u2018disable [the employee] from pursuing other suitable occupations\u2019; and section 12 provides that an injured employee must submit to a physical examination on request of the employer for the purpose of determining the nature, extent, and duration of the injury and for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation due \u2018for disability.\u2019 [Citation.] On the other hand, when the legislature intended to refer to something other than physical and mental disability, it used different or additional language: sections 6(c)(1) and 8(h\u20141) refer to \u2018legal disability\u2019; and section 8(d)(2) refers to \u2018impairment of earning capacity.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Petrie, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 171-72, 513 N.E.2d at 108-09.\nThis court relied on Petrie in Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm\u2019n, 354 Ill. App. 3d 807, 821 N.E.2d 1274 (2005), when specifically addressing whether \u201cdisability\u201d as used in section 8(d)(1) meant economic disability. In that case, the employer filed a motion to suspend wage differential benefits that were previously awarded to the claimant, asserting the claimant \u201chad failed to respond to requests to provide income tax returns to determine whether a wage loss still existed.\u201d Cassens, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 821 N.E.2d at 1275. The Commission denied the motion, finding section 8(d)(1) did not refer to economic disability, only physical and mental disability. Cassens, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 807-08, 821 N.E.2d at 1275. \u201cAs there was no allegation that there was a change in [the] claimant\u2019s physical condition, the Commission found there was no basis for suspending payments.\u201d Cassens, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 808, 821 N.E.2d at 1275.\nOn review, we determined that neither the Commission nor this court had jurisdiction in the case, stating section 8(d)(1) was not one of the select provisions of the Act that permitted the Commission to reopen or modify a final decision. Cassens, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 821 N.E.2d at 1278. However, we also stated there was \u201cno reason to limit the interpretation of \u2018disability\u2019 in Petrie to section 19(h)\u201d and found the word had \u201cthe same definition for purposes of review of wage differential benefits under section 8(d)(1).\u201d Cassens, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 810, 821 N.E.2d at 1277.\nIn Cassens, the supreme court granted the employer\u2019s petition for leave to appeal and affirmed this court\u2019s ultimate decision in the case. Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 533, 844 N.E.2d 414, 423 (2006). It agreed that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to modify the claimant\u2019s section 8(d)(1) award. Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 533, 844 N.E.2d at 423. However, the court determined it was unnecessary to address the employer\u2019s arguments as to the definition of \u201cdisability\u201d in section 8(d)(1) and found this court\u2019s discussion of that issue was improper. Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 533, 844 N.E.2d at 423-24.\nIn rendering its decision, the supreme court held the duration clause of section 8(d)(1) \u201cis meaningful to the Commission\u2019s initial determination of the proper award in any section 8(d)(1) case.\u201d Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 529, 844 N.E.2d at 422. \u201cBy its plain language, [section 8(d)(1)] allows arbitrators and the Commission the option of determining that a claimant\u2019s disability is likely to end, abate, or increase after a certain duration, and awarding compensation accordingly.\u201d Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 529, 844 N.E.2d at 422. Further, \u201cthe Act establishes that employees and employers alike must use the opportunity of their initial hearing to present evidence showing the likely duration of an injury and its effect on the claimant\u2019s earning capacity.\u201d Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 530, 844 N.E.2d at 422.\nThe supreme court noted that to obtain benefits under section 8(d)(1), the claimant \u201cmust prove (1) that he or she is partially incapacitated from pursuing his or her usual and customary line of employment and (2) that he or she has suffered an impairment in the wages he or she earns or is able to earn.\u201d Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 531, 844 N.E.2d at 422. The second prong of the section 8(d)(1) inquiry \u201cfocuses on earning capacity, rather than the dollar amount of an employee\u2019s take-home pay.\u201d Cassens, 218 Ill. 2d at 531, 844 N.E.2d at 422.\nEmployer argues the supreme court\u2019s analysis in Cassens supports its position. Citing various portions of the court\u2019s decision, it contends that the court \u201cmade clear\u201d that the reference to \u201cdisability\u201d in section 8(d)(1) \u201caddresses the physical/mental, as well as economic components of \u2018disability\u2019 for purposes of compensating the impairment of long-term earning capacity caused by the work injury.\u201d\nEmployer confuses the court\u2019s analysis of section 8(d)(1) as a whole with analysis of the phrase \u201cduration of disability\u201d or simply the word \u201cdisability.\u201d A discussion of section 8(d)(1) necessarily encompasses economic factors because its purpose is to compensate an injured employee for his reduced earning capacity. It does not follow that the specific phrase \u201cduration of disability\u201d within section 8(d)(1) must refer to economic disability rather than the duration of a claimant\u2019s physical or mental injury. As stated, the court expressly declined to address the issue of the definition of \u201cdisability\u201d as used in section 8(d)(1). A clear reading of Cassens shows it does not stand for the proposition employer suggests.\nAdditionally, this court has previously rejected the argument that a wage differential award should end at the age of retirement. In Fritz Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. App. 3d 550, 561, 518 N.E.2d 1289, 1296 (1988), the employer argued the Commission erred by not limiting its wage differential award to when the claimant turned 65, \u201cimplying that such loss could be a lifelong award long after [the claimant\u2019s] earning capacity would abate from retirement or nonrelated illness.\u201d We noted the employer \u201ccited no cases requiring an interpretation of th[e] statutory language [\u2018for the duration of his disability\u2019] other than its plain, ordinary meaning\u201d and we declined to read any such requirement into the Act. Fritz, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 561, 518 N.E.2d at 1296.\nThe definition of \u201cdisability\u201d announced in Petrie also applies to the definition of the word as used in section 8(d)(1) of the Act. The supreme court\u2019s decision in Cassens did not address this issue and does not alter the holding in Petrie. The Commission did not err by finding economic disability was not encompassed within the word \u201cdisability\u201d as used in section 8(d)(1).\nThe Commission also committed no error by sustaining claimant\u2019s objection to the evidence offered by employer regarding claimant\u2019s work-life expectancy. Employer sought to admit testimony and a report from Dr. Eubanks, an economist, who opined claimant\u2019s \u201cage at the time she is expected to exit the work force is within a range of age 58.27 to age 67.00 with a mid-point of age 62.64.\u201d His opinions were based on her gender, age, educational attainment level, status in the work force, trial date, and the Skoog and Ciecka work-life expectancy model.\nNot only are Dr. Eubanks\u2019s opinions speculative, they are also irrelevant to a determination of wage differential benefits. As discussed, the word \u201cdisability\u201d in section 8(d)(1) does not refer to economic disability and employer\u2019s proffered evidence is not relevant to determining the \u201cduration of [claimant\u2019s] disability.\u201d The opinion evidence also adds nothing to other wage-differential considerations such as claimant\u2019s incapacitation from employment or the impairment in the wages she earned or was able to earn. The Commission committed no error.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment, confirming the Commission.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Erica Rogina, of Wiedner & McAullife, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Nancy Shepard, of Katz, Friedman, Eagle, Eisenstein & Johnson, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UNITED AIRLINES, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Charlotte Graham, Appellee).\nFirst District (Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20142966WC\nOpinion filed January 18, 2011.\nRehearing denied February 18, 2011.\nErica Rogina, of Wiedner & McAullife, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNancy Shepard, of Katz, Friedman, Eagle, Eisenstein & Johnson, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0467-01", "first_page_order": 483, "last_page_order": 489 }