{ "id": 4307021, "name": "LAUREN REIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Rein v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "2011-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201410\u20140764", "first_page": "969", "last_page": "979", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "407 Ill. App. 3d 969" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 1224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544913 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550782 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988)" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5378999 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "842 N.E.2d 1219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766768 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387, 394" }, { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "in rejecting the insurance company's appeal, we noted \"[the insurance company's] suggestion would place a burden on policyholders and their counsel to file numerous unnecessary and questionable claims\"" }, { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "\"We have no quarrel with an insurer's right to limit its exposure ***.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000)" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521933 ], "weight": 17, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752-53" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467299 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "662-63" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5552527 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" }, { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1043" }, { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1046" }, { "page": "1048" }, { "page": "1046" }, { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1046" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/1040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 856, "char_count": 23433, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.214180063978996e-08, "percentile": 0.2682166025895718 }, "sha256": "a8ee37b8224b1112dac782ed590ebd408bc59739c74345bc4c47ea89f699eeae", "simhash": "1:09755df62221a4e7", "word_count": 3749 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:05.247121+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LAUREN REIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices McBride and R.E. Gordon concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe circuit court granted summary judgment to defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in plaintiff Lauren Rein\u2019s declaratory action seeking a judgment that she was entitled to insurance coverage following an injury-causing, hit-and-run accident. The circuit court held Rein\u2019s action was barred by State Farm\u2019s automobile policy provision requiring any arbitration or suit seeking uninsured motorist coverage be \u201ccommenced within two years after the date of the accident.\u201d Rein asserts her letter to State Farm sent six days before the two-year period expired, which stated her \u201cintention to pursue an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Claim,\u201d timely commenced the arbitration proceedings based on the appellate court\u2019s most recent decision from the Fifth District interpreting a similar automobile policy provision.\nWe decline to follow the Fifth District case. Instead, we follow two older First District cases that rejected a similar contention by an insured that the arbitration process was timely commenced based on a letter sent by the insured\u2019s attorney that did not expressly request arbitration or disclose an arbitrator on the insured\u2019s behalf within two years of the accident as required by the express terms of the automobile insurance policy. Consequently, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 5, 2007, Rein was injured in a hit-and-run, two-vehicle accident where the other driver was never identified. Rein was insured by a State Farm automobile insurance policy that provided coverage for bodily injury caused by the driver of an uninsured vehicle, including a \u201c \u2018hit-and-run\u2019 land motor vehicle whose owner or driver remains unknown.\u201d On March 30, 2009, Rein\u2019s counsel gave notice to State Farm via facsimile and certified mail stating that he represented Rein with regard to her auto accident. No prior contact between Rein and State Farm regarding the accident is disclosed in the record. Counsel\u2019s letter stated in pertinent part:\n\u201cYOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that it is our intention to pursue an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Claim against State Farm Insurance under the above-captioned policy on behalf of Laura A. Rein.\nPlease open a claim file on this matter.\nUpon receipt of this letter, please contact the undersigned so we may discuss the matter in greater detail.\u201d\nState Farm received the facsimile on March 30, 2009, and the certified letter on April 2, 2009. State Farm denied Rein\u2019s claim some time thereafter. Rein\u2019s letter made no mention of arbitration.\nRein filed a declaratory action on July 9, 2009, to compel State Farm to arbitrate her uninsured motorist claim.\nOn December 1, 2009, State Farm moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 2\u20141005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005 (West 2008)) contending Rein was barred from seeking arbitration by an express provision of the policy: \u201cUnder the uninsured motor vehicle coverages, any arbitration or suit against us will be barred unless commenced within two years after the date of the accident.\u201d State Farm argued Rein\u2019s letter did not \u201ccommence\u201d arbitration within two years of the accident consistent with interpretations of similar limitations provisions by two First District cases: Buchalo v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 404 N.E.2d 473 (1980), and Shelton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 652, 515 N.E.2d 235 (1987).\nRein responded there is only one appellate court and the Fifth District case of Hale v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 334 Ill. App. 3d 751, 778 N.E.2d 721 (2002), as the most recent explication on the issue, was controlling. Quoting Hale, Rein conceded her counsel\u2019s letter was \u201cnot perfect\u201d but her implied intent to commence arbitration was sufficient. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nState Farm urged the circuit court to disregard Hale, which gave a broader interpretation than Buchalo and Shelton to a similar limitations provision.\nAt oral arguments on the motion, Judge LeRoy K. Martin did not disagree with Rein\u2019s broad claim that a circuit court sitting in the First District was bound by all appellate court decisions regardless of the district. However, Judge Martin concluded that Hale conflicted with Buchalo and Shelton, which, as First District cases, he was bound to follow. Judge Martin granted summary judgment to State Farm.\nThis timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nSummary judgment is warranted when \u201c \u2018the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146, 787 N.E.2d 786 (2003) (quoting 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 2000)). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 146. We construe de novo provisions of an insurance policy. American Service Insurance Co. v. Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d 385, 842 N.E.2d 1219 (2006).\nRein raises three arguments to reverse the circuit court\u2019s grant of summary judgment: (1) there exists no conflict in First and Fifth District jurisprudence: Buchalo and Shelton are distinguishable and Hale is controlling; (2) her counsel\u2019s letter \u201ccommenced\u201d arbitration as it constituted the \u201cfirst step\u201d in the arbitration process; and (3) a strict interpretation of the policy\u2019s limitations provision contravenes public policy.\nState Farm counters the policy\u2019s limitations provision is valid; Rein\u2019s letter cannot reasonably be read as \u201ccommencing\u201d arbitration; and the circuit court correctly followed Buchalo and Shelton, which conflict with Hale.\nWe begin with Rein\u2019s public policy argument.\nPublic Policy\nIn her main brief, Rein cites Pasalka as the only authority for her claim. In Pasalka, the insurance company sought to apply its two-year limitations provision to uninsured motorist claims that its insureds were forced to file after the insurance company for the other drivers became insolvent. The insurance company for each of the other drivers became insolvent more than two years after the accident. Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 387. Ultimately, we held that the application of the two-year limitations period under those facts violated public policy because \u201cthis state requires that an uninsured motorist provision be written into every auto insurance policy.\u201d Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 387. We did not hold that the limitations provision itself was against public policy, but its application under the particular facts of Pasalka made the state-mandated protection \u201cillusory,\u201d which contravened public policy. Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 387, 394.\nWe find no authority for Rein\u2019s actual contention that the two-year limitations provision in State Farm\u2019s policy itself contravenes public policy. Hale, a case Rein contends we should follow, expressly rejected an identical claim. An insurance policy\u2019s two-year limitations provision is \u201cnot contrary to public policy.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 754 (citing Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1040, Coyne v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 279, 349 N.E.2d 485 (1976), and Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d 652). We are unpersuaded that a different result should obtain here.\nBuchalo and Shelton Are Not Distinguishable\nThe parties agree on one point: if Buchalo and Shelton cannot be distinguished, then they conflict with the holding in Hale. In that event, Rein argues we should follow Hale-, State Farm contends Buchalo and Shelton are the better reasoned decisions. All three cases are very similar to the case at bar.\nIn Buchalo, as here, the insured was injured by a hit-and-run driver that was never identified. Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1041. The insurance policy provided \u201c \u2018No *** arbitration proceedings *** shall be sustainable *** unless commenced within two (2) years after the occurrence of the loss.\u2019 \u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. To commence arbitration proceedings under the policy, \u201c \u2018each party shall, upon written demand of the Insured or upon written demand of the [insurance] Company, select *** [an] arbitrator.\u2019 \u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. Less than four months after the injury, the insured\u2019s counsel sent a letter to the insurer stating, \u201c T believe the best thing to do with respect to this case is to arbitrate. I will, in the future, forward you the name of our arbitrator.\u2019 \u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. The insured took no further action within the two-year period. Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1044. This court held the insured\u2019s \u201cletter does not constitute an unequivocal demand for arbitration.\u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1045. We found the letter \u201cinsufficient under the policy because it fails to name the plaintiff\u2019s arbitrator.\u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1046. We affirmed the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of the insured\u2019s petition to compel arbitration. Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1048.\nIn Shelton, the plaintiff-insured was injured by an underinsured driver. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The plaintiff\u2019s automobile insurance policy required the insured to commence \u201c \u2018suit, action or arbitration *** within two years after the date of the accident.\u2019 \u201d Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 655. About 18 months after the accident, plaintiff\u2019s counsel mailed a \u201c \u2018Notice of Attorney\u2019s Lien\u2019 \u201d to the insurer asserting that the insured had hired an attorney \u201cto prosecute her claim for underinsured motorist benefits *** and that he now claimed a lien therefor.\u201d Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The plaintiff took no further action before the expiration of the two-year limitations period. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 654. When her claim was denied, the insured filed suit to pursue underinsured motorist benefits. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The circuit court dismissed the insured\u2019s action as untimely; we affirmed the dismissal because the arbitration process was not commenced within two years following the accident. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 662-63.\nRein writes that Buchalo and Shelton are distinguishable. \u201cBuchalo involved a policy which required that \u2018each party shall \u201cupon written demand of the insured or upon written demand of the company, select a competent and disinterested arbitrator\u201d \u2019 within the two year limitations period in the policy.\u201d According to Rein, because no \u201cwritten request\u201d for arbitration is required by the State Farm provision, Buchalo is distinguishable. Shelton is distinguishable because the issue before us was waived in that case. \u201c[T]he insurance company was \u2018not afforded to submit\u2019 evidence or argument as to whether the notice of attorney\u2019s lien constituted valid notice and since the insured did not present the issue in the trial court, it was \u2018not properly before\u2019 the appellate court and hence was waived.\u201d We do not agree that the distinctions of Buchalo and Shelton offered by Rein are meaningful.\nWhile the State Farm policy in this case requires only a \u201crequest\u201d for arbitration, unlike the \u201cwritten demand\u201d for arbitration required in the policy before the Buchalo court, similar to the policy in Buchalo, the State Farm policy here required the insured to name an arbitrator in the request for arbitration: \u201cIf the insured requests arbitration, each party to the dispute shall select an arbitrator.\u201d Rein\u2019s failure to \u201cselect an arbitrator\u201d in her letter places her case within the ruling in Buchalo. The insured\u2019s letter in Buchalo was insufficient on two grounds: no unequivocal demand for arbitration was made and it \u201cfail[ed] to name the plaintiffs arbitrator.\u201d Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1046.\nNor does the language Rein quotes from Shelton distinguish it from this case. The language applied only to the \u201ctolling\u201d argument the insured in Shelton asserted. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 662. While the tolling argument was forfeited because it was not raised before the circuit court, the Shelton court observed, \u201cwe seriously doubt that there is any equation between a notice of attorney\u2019s lien and a \u2018proof of loss\u2019 [that might well have tolled the running of the limitations period].\u201d Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 663. In any event, Rein does not assert a \u201ctolling\u201d argument before us, which makes the quoted language inapposite. Rein nonetheless contends she preserved the issue of the \u201cadequacy and timeliness of notification\u201d in the proceedings below and her letter was not a mere notice of attorney\u2019s lien as in Shelton, but \u201cspecifically mentioned] that Plaintiff was seeking uninsured motorist benefits within the two years.\u201d Though the adequacy and timeliness of her letter were raised below, preservation of the issue adds no merit to the adequacy of the letter and the different nature of her letter does not distinguish her case from Shelton.\nWe find Buchalo and Shelton indistinguishable from the case before us. Each stands for the proposition that the requirements in the limitations provision of an insurance policy will be upheld. Under Buchalo, to commence arbitration proceedings, an insured\u2019s letter must make an unequivocal demand for arbitration and name the arbitrator on behalf of the insured consistent with the policy\u2019s provision. Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1045. Under Shelton, a policy\u2019s two-year limitations period to commence arbitration is binding on the insured. Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 655. In other words, for an insured\u2019s letter to commence the arbitration process, it must satisfy the express terms of the limitations provision of the insurance contract. This requirement is compelled by the well-established rule that a clear and unambiguous insurance policy provision is applied \u201c \u2018according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms.\u2019 \u201d Shelton, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 655 (quoting Dora Township v. Indiana Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 376, 378, 400 N.E.2d 921 (1980)); Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1045 (citing Dora Township, 78 Ill. 2d at 378).\nConflict With Hale\nEven without the guidance of Buchalo and Shelton and the authorities cited therein, we are unpersuaded by the reasoning in Hale that the bar in the limitations provision of the State Farm policy may be avoided by a letter such as Rein\u2019s.\nAs in Shelton, the insured in Hale was injured by an underinsured motorist. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 752. The automobile insurance policy contained a two-year limitations provision. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 752-53. The policy provided: \u201c \u2018Arbitration proceedings will not commence until we receive your written demand for arbitration.\u2019 \u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 753. Within two years of the accident, the insured\u2019s attorney sent a letter to the insurer stating that he had been retained to represent the insured and, essential to the Hale court\u2019s holding, that \u201c \u2018[i]t appears that we have an underinsured claim.\u2019 \u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 753. The insurance company denied coverage because no timely demand for arbitration was made. The circuit court dismissed as time-barred the insured\u2019s action seeking a declaration that the underinsured claim was timely made. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 753. The Fifth District reversed.\nThe Hale court found \u201c[t]he language utilized by [the insured\u2019s] attorney was not perfect but served the purpose of notifying [the insurer] of the underinsured-motorist claim.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755. It held the \u201ctimely notification of a claim is sufficient.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755. \u201cTo hold otherwise would mean that with every minor claim, the attorney would need to formally request arbitration or fear malpractice for failing to do so. The insurance industry could not desire that outcome because its companies would be inundated with premature arbitration demands.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nBecause the underlying action against the underinsured motorist remained unresolved at the two-year anniversary of the accident, the Hale court reasoned: the insured\u2019s \u201cattorney could not possibly know for certain whether he had [an underinsured motorist] claim, because at the time of the [letter] writing the underlying liability suit had not been concluded.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 754. Thus, without knowing whether the underinsured driver was liable, the insured\u2019s counsel in Hale could not reasonably be expected to demand arbitration on the insured\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage, which served as the insured\u2019s only avenue to resolve an underinsured claim. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755. Thus, the court found the insured\u2019s letter of notice of an underinsured motorist claim sent within two years of the accident constituted a timely written demand for arbitration. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755. Without identifying or discussing contrary cases, the court declared, \u201cTo the extent that other cases are contrary to our holding, we disagree with those cases.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755.\nOur disagreement with Hale is twofold.\nFirst, the Hale court appeared to hold that \u201cnotice\u201d of an under-insured claim could serve as a \u201cdemand\u201d for arbitration under the limitations provision. We disagree with the suggestion that the purpose behind a limitations provision is to require that notice be given. We are aware of no other authority that holds mere notice may somehow satisfy an express limitations provision of an insurance contract. Where a limitations provision requires explicit action by the insured to avoid the two-year bar, we are unconvinced that notice equates with explicit action. The dispositive question is whether the insured has commenced \u201csuit, action or arbitration\u201d within two years of the accident. The answer lies in the clear and unambiguous language of the limitations provision declaring what must be done to comply with that provision.\n\u201c[I]t is a well-settled precept of Illinois law that because the primary objective in interpreting the provisions of an insurance policy is to give effect to the parties\u2019 intentions, where a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, its language must be taken in its plain, ordinary and popular sense.\u201d Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 303, 757 N.E.2d 481 (2001). Thus, compliance with a limitations provision of an insurance contract, written in clear and unambiguous language, is the only means to avoid the two-year bar. We are unpersuaded that mere notice of an underinsured claim is sufficient when the limitations provision requires \u201ca written demand (or request) for arbitration.\u201d\nIf mere notification of a claim were sufficient to preserve an underinsured or uninsured motorist claim, an insured could simply notify the insurer it has such a claim and delay indefinitely naming an arbitrator on the insured\u2019s behalf. Stale claims would result, the avoidance of which the Hale court itself recognized was an aim of a limitations provision: \u201cA limitations period requires necessary litigation to be brought within such time so that the facts of the case can still be established with the utmost certainty before that proof becomes stale or completely lost.\u201d Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 754. To avoid stale claims, arbitration must be commenced within two years of an accident involving an underinsured or uninsured motorist claim. To commence arbitration, an insured must comply with the requirements in the policy\u2019s limitations provision; that is, an insured must make an \u201cunequivocal demand for arbitration\u201d (Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1045) and \u201cname the [insured\u2019s] arbitrator\u201d (Buchalo, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 1046) as the State Farm policy before us requires.\nSecond, Hale\u2019s concern over inundating insurance companies \u201cwith premature arbitration demands\u201d is misplaced. Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 755. We see no reason to concern ourselves with a burden the insurance companies chose to impose upon themselves. Cf. Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 393 (in rejecting the insurance company\u2019s appeal, we noted \u201c[the insurance company\u2019s] suggestion would place a burden on policyholders and their counsel to file numerous unnecessary and questionable claims\u201d). To the extent \u201cpremature arbitration demands\u201d become a burden on insurance companies based on the holdings in Buchalo, Shelton, and the instant case, we rest assured that insurance companies will either modify the provisions of their policies to ameliorate that burden or learn to live with those demands as apparently they have since Buchalo was decided in 1980. In any event, we cannot agree that the possibility insurance companies may face a high number of \u201cpremature arbitration demands\u201d means that we can ignore a clear and unambiguous limitations provision in an insurance contract that imposes certain requirements on an insured. See Pasalka, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 393 (\u201cWe have no quarrel with an insurer\u2019s right to limit its exposure ***.\u201d).\nWe decline to follow Hale as Rein urges.\nCounsel\u2019s Letter\nRein\u2019s letter did not constitute the \u201cfirst step\u201d in the arbitration process as she claims. Rein\u2019s letter did not mention arbitration. Nor can we agree that Rein\u2019s letter may reasonably be understood to request arbitration \u201cimplicitly.\u201d Even if such a reading were reasonable, the State Farm policy also required that within two years of the accident an arbitrator be selected by Rein to commence the arbitration process. No plausible claim can be made that her selection of an arbitrator was implicitly and timely made based on the contents of her letter.\nSingle Appellate Court\nWe briefly address Rein\u2019s claim that the circuit court below was required to follow Hale based on a holding from our supreme court: \u201c[I]t is \u2018fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding on all circuit courts regardless of locale.\u2019 [Citation.] The notion that circuit courts are bound only by the appellate court decisions from their own district is a relic of the pre-1964 Illinois Constitution of 1870 and has been expressly disavowed by our court.\u201d Bryant v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 473, 479, 778 N.E.2d 721 (2007) (quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988)).\nHowever, the cited rule applies only when no conflict in appellate court districts exist. \u201c[W]hen conflicts arise amongst the districts, the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate court of the district in which it sits.\u201d Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 92, 679 N.E.2d 1224 (1997); Bryant, 224 Ill. 2d at 478.\nThe circuit court correctly ruled that it was bound by Buchalo and Shelton, which are indistinguishable from the case at bar.\nCONCLUSION\nThe circuit court properly entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm and against its insured Lauren Rein in her declaratory judgment suit to compel arbitration of her uninsured motorist claim because the arbitration process was not commenced within two years following the accident. Rein\u2019s letter, sent six days before the expiration of the two-year period, failed to expressly \u201crequest\u201d arbitration and did not \u201cselect\u201d an arbitrator on Rein\u2019s behalf as required by the limitations provision of the State Farm policy.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "John S. Xydakis, EC., of Forest Park, for appellant.", "John R. Adams, of Taylor Miller LLC, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAUREN REIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201410\u20140764\nOpinion filed March 4, 2011.\nJohn S. Xydakis, EC., of Forest Park, for appellant.\nJohn R. Adams, of Taylor Miller LLC, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0969-01", "first_page_order": 985, "last_page_order": 995 }