{ "id": 4307963, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARIOUS M. BOWENS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bowens", "decision_date": "2011-02-23", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140462", "first_page": "1094", "last_page": "1123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "407 Ill. App. 3d 1094" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "872 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71-72", "parenthetical": "reviewing de novo the question of whether a sentence had been \"imposed\" for purposes of section 5-8-1(c)" }, { "page": "72", "parenthetical": "where trial court pronounced its sentence but later corrected its pronouncement after being reminded of certain facts before the sentencing hearing was concluded" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328971 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033-34", "parenthetical": "reviewing de novo the question of whether a sentence had been \"imposed\" for purposes of section 5-8-1(c)" }, { "page": "1034-35" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" }, { "page": "940-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256255 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "863 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "citing People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 447, 553 N.E.2d 368, 377 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607155 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citing People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 447, 553 N.E.2d 368, 377 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "931 N.E.2d 1184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190", "parenthetical": "explaining that when a defendant forfeits review of his claims and does not argue plain error, the appellate court should not reach the merits of those issues" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629573 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "explaining that when a defendant forfeits review of his claims and does not argue plain error, the appellate court should not reach the merits of those issues" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3633065 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/239/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "927 N.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "\"Where the defendant fails to prove prejudice, the reviewing court need not determine whether counsel's performance constituted less than reasonable assistance.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 903", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4300805 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908", "parenthetical": "\"Where the defendant fails to prove prejudice, the reviewing court need not determine whether counsel's performance constituted less than reasonable assistance.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "912 N.E.2d 1220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623855 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030946 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875001 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 N.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "893 N.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659-60", "parenthetical": "procedural default must be honored when a defendant fails to establish plain error" }, { "page": "659-60", "parenthetical": "procedural default must be honored when a defendant fails to establish plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "procedural default must be honored when a defendant fails to establish plain error" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "929 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 1136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4299716 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/1136-01" ] }, { "cite": "939 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reviewing the trial court's Rule 431(b) admonishments to determine whether error occurred at all before conducting its plain-error analysis" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630758 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "reviewing the trial court's Rule 431(b) admonishments to determine whether error occurred at all before conducting its plain-error analysis" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "determining whether error occurred at all before conducting its plain-error analysis" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705676 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "917 N.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 19-20, 879 N.E.2d 876, 887 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623714 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 19-20, 879 N.E.2d 876, 887 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "927 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1198" }, { "page": "1198", "parenthetical": "noting that structural error rarely occurs and has been found where, among other very limited circumstances, a defendant is tried before a biased judge" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12-13" }, { "page": "12-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461276 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "931 N.E.2d 1249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5767641 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/402/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "concluding that counsel's acquiescence to the court's response to a note from the jury constituted waiver" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511358 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63-64", "parenthetical": "concluding that counsel's acquiescence to the court's response to a note from the jury constituted waiver" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 F.3d 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 452504 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22", "parenthetical": "\"Many a defendant would like to plant an error and grow a risk-free trial ***. But steps the court takes at the defendant's behest are not reversible, because they are not error ***.\"" }, { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "\"[the] steps the court takes at the defendant's behest are not reversible, because they are not error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/86/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1290", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent, precluding a later claim of double jeopardy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3364206 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "966-67", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent, precluding a later claim of double jeopardy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468107 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782533 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "citing Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 602 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271470 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "citing Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 602 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3633305 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/239/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "931 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "Appleton, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4293914 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" }, { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610710 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "933 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630607 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252002 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.W.3d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 2650046 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/355/0620-02" ] }, { "cite": "2009 WI 31", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WI", "case_ids": [ 3768183 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b64" }, { "page": "\u00b627" }, { "page": "\u00b650" }, { "page": "\u00b650" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/316/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.Y.S.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782533 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271470 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1935, "char_count": 74692, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.904279511797898e-07, "percentile": 0.8453073905080952 }, "sha256": "de995c1af38b1b57d51fb69100058bf218ff98ece3a556595c562881921ee7c2", "simhash": "1:2aa4f8e4764c8c13", "word_count": 12428 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:05.247121+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARIOUS M. BOWENS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustice Myerscough concurred with the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Pope dissented, with opinion.\nOPINION\nDefendant, Darious M. Bowens, admitted at his January 2009 trial that he stabbed his girlfriend, Belinda Butler, 23 times in her chest, back, and arms. Despite this admission, he denied that he intended to kill her. Apparently unpersuaded, a jury convicted defendant of attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8\u20144, 9\u20141(a)(1) (West 2008)), aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143.3 (West 2008)), and two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143 (West 2008)). The trial court later sentenced him to 24 years in prison.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that he was denied a fair trial. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to (1) excuse the trial judge\u2019s husband from the jury for cause; (2) comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007); (3) allow him to impeach Butler with evidence of her prior felony conviction; (4) restrict the State from introducing a knife that was unconnected to him or the crime; (5) bar the State\u2019s lead investigator from sitting at the State\u2019s counsel table throughout the case; and (6) grant his motion to refer to Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption during closing arguments. As part of his argument, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of these errors justifies a new trial.\nDefendant also appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly increased his prison sentence from 20 years to 24 years. Because we conclude that (1) defendant received a fair trial and (2) the court did not increase his sentence, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. The State\u2019s Charges and Defendant\u2019s Trial Strategy\nIn February 2008, the State charged defendant with (1) attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8\u20144, 9\u20141(a)(1) (West 2008)), (2) aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143.3 (West 2008)), and (3) two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143 (West 2008)), alleging that defendant repeatedly stabbed Butler, intending to kill her.\nBefore discussing the evidence presented at defendant\u2019s January 2009 trial, we note that this case is rather unusual, given that defendant disputes almost none of the State\u2019s evidence. Instead, defendant\u2019s trial strategy \u2014 which defense counsel explained during his opening statement \u2014 was only to convince the jury that the State failed to show that defendant had the requisite intent to kill Butler.\nB. The Evidence Presented at Defendant\u2019s Trial\nButler testified that she and defendant were preparing dinner at her apartment. While their dinner was in the oven, the couple sat on the couch, talking and watching television. As Butler was finishing her second beer, defendant asked her whether they were going to have sex. Butler responded, \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant asked her whether she was still attracted to him, but Butler did not respond. Defendant then sat up on the edge of the couch, shook his head and said, \u201cI\u2019m sorry. I\u2019ve got to do this.\u201d Butler asked defendant whether she should be scared and he responded, \u201cYes.\u201d\nButler told defendant that she was going to call the police and reached for her cellular telephone. Before she could get to her phone, however, defendant was on top of her, stabbing her in the chest with a knife. Butler tried to get away, pleading for defendant to stop. Defendant stabbed Butler repeatedly in the chest, back, and arms. Suddenly, defendant stopped stabbing Butler, threw the knife into the hallway, and said, \u201cI\u2019ve got to get the fuck out of here.\u201d Defendant took Butler\u2019s cellular telephone and left.\nButler dragged herself next door to Gerry Gilmor\u2019s apartment. She banged on the door and pleaded, \u201cGerry, help me. He stabbed me. Please don\u2019t let me die.\u201d\nGilmor testified that she heard (1) pounding on the wall that she shared with Butler and (2) Butler yelling defendant\u2019s name. Shortly thereafter, Gilmor heard Butler at her kitchen door, pleading, \u201cMiss Gerry, Miss Gerry, please don\u2019t let me die.\u201d Gilmor rushed outside to find Butler sprawled half-on and half-off her porch. Gilmor called 9-1-1 and tried to stop the bleeding.\nResponding officers testified that Butler was conscious when they arrived. Butler told one officer, \u201c[H]e stabbed me. Please don\u2019t let me die.\u201d Officers searched Butler\u2019s apartment and found (1) a wooden-handled steak knife with a bent blade in the hallway; (2) blood on the walls, kitchen floor, carpet, and couch; and (3) defendant\u2019s bloodstained fingerprint on Butler\u2019s doorknob.\nA 9-1-1 dispatcher testified that she received the emergency call from Gilmor. While she was on the phone with Gilmor, her fellow dispatcher received a call from defendant, who was distraught and crying. Defendant admitted doing something \u201creally bad\u201d and then threatened to kill himself.\nDefendant\u2019s sister testified that defendant came to the house that she shared with defendant\u2019s mother, banging on the door and crying. Once inside, defendant admitted stabbing Butler. Shortly thereafter, defendant used the bathroom to wash Butler\u2019s blood from his arms.\nPolice arrived at defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s house to find defendant standing in the kitchen, crying and repeatedly telling them, \u201cJust kill me. Just shoot me.\u201d Defendant\u2019s mother was able to assist officers in arresting her son. Upon his arrest, officers discovered that defendant\u2019s shoes and jeans were blood-stained.\nThe paramedic who responded to the 9-1-1 call testified that Butler had multiple wounds and lacerations. She had lost a lot of blood and was having difficulty breathing. The paramedic explained that when he arrived at Gilmor\u2019s apartment, the injuries were so serious that it was \u201cjust one of those [situations] where you just kind of say, [\u2018]oh, crap[\u2019] *** and you *** immediately start addressing the issues at hand.\u201d Butler almost lost consciousness at least twice on the way to the hospital.\nButler\u2019s emergency-room doctor testified that she appeared to be \u201ccritically ill\u201d when she arrived. She was not communicating well and had stab wounds to her torso, arms, armpits, wrists, and back, some of which caused hemorrhages. Those wounds included three stab wounds to the \u201cblack box,\u201d a term he used to describe the critical area of the back and chest surrounding the heart. Butler was eventually transported by helicopter to a trauma center for additional medical care.\nC. The Jury\u2019s Verdict and Defendant\u2019s Sentence\nOn this evidence, the jury convicted defendant of attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8\u20144, 9\u20141(a)(1) (West 2008)), aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143.3 (West 2008)), and two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20143 (West 2008)). The trial court later sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. DEFENDANT\u2019S CLAIM THAT HE DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL\nDefendant argues that he was denied a fair trial. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to (1) excuse the trial judge\u2019s husband from the jury for cause; (2) comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007); (3) allow him to impeach Butler with evidence of her prior felony conviction; (4) restrict the State from introducing a knife that was unconnected to him or the crime; (5) bar the State\u2019s lead investigator from sitting at the State\u2019s counsel table throughout the case; and (6) grant his motion to refer to Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption during closing arguments. As part of his argument, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of these errors justifies a new trial. We address defendant\u2019s contentions in turn.\nA. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Failing To Excuse the Trial Judge\u2019s Husband From the Jury for Cause\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to excuse the trial judge\u2019s husband from the jury for cause. Specifically, defendant asserts that the court erroneously allowed her husband, Scott Bauknecht, to serve on the jury. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant has waived this contention.\n1. Waiver and Forfeiture\nWaiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a known right. People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 62, 933 N.E.2d 1186, 1191 (2010); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 229, 874 N.E.2d 43, 56 (2007). In the course of representing their clients, trial attorneys may (1) make a tactical decision not to object to otherwise objectionable matters, which thereby waives appeal of such matters, or (2) fail to recognize the objectionable nature of the matter at issue, which results in procedural forfeiture. Lovell v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 397 Ill. App. 3d 890, 898, 931 N.E.2d 246, 253 (2010) (holding that a challenge to the opponent\u2019s opening statement had not been preserved, with Justice Appleton noting in a special concurrence that defense counsel made a tactical decision not to object, which \u201c[did] not excuse the requirement to do so if the error [was] to be preserved for review\u201d (Lovell, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 902, 931 N.E.2d at 256 (Appleton, J., specially concurring))).\n2. Challenges for Cause and Peremptory Challenges\nProspective jurors may be challenged in two ways: (1) for cause or (2) peremptorily. A challenge for cause is a \u201cchallenge supported by a specified reason, such as bias or prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 245 (8th ed. 2004). A peremptory challenge, on the other hand, is \u201c[o]ne of a party\u2019s limited number of challenges that do not need to be supported by a reason.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 245 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that \u201ca party may not use such a challenge in a way that discriminates against a protected minority\u201d). Challenges for cause are limitless (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 434(c) (eff. May 1, 1985)) and are left to the discretion of the trial court (People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 419 (2010)). In contrast, peremptory challenges are limited by Supreme Court Rule 434(d), which allows defendants in a criminal case facing imprisonment seven such challenges. Ill. S. Ct. R. 434(d) (eff. May 1, 1985).\n3. The Pertinent Challenges in This Case\nFollowing voir dire questioning by the trial court and counsel, the court allowed counsel to strike jurors only within each respective panel of four. Defense counsel exercised four peremptory challenges (potential jurors 70, 10, 66, and 141) before accepting the first panel. During the selection of the second panel, the following exchange occurred regarding prospective juror Bauknecht:\n\u201c[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I\u2019m going to make a motion for cause on number 7, Bauknecht. I just, I don\u2019t have any legitimate legal basis. I don\u2019t know the research on this, but it just seems strange enough.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t think I can excuse him for cause. I will let you know for the record that we typically don\u2019t discuss much about work with each other, and I have gone to great lengths to not discuss anything about this case knowing that he was on upcoming jury duty.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I make the motion for cause. I don\u2019t have an argument on it.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t think I can excuse him for cause. I don\u2019t have a basis for cause. That\u2019s denied.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Judge, I\u2019m going to pause for a second here, please.\u201d\nShortly thereafter, defense counsel used his fifth peremptory challenge (potential juror 126). The defense then accepted that panel, which included juror Bauknecht. We note that when defendant accepted this second panel, he still possessed two unexercised peremptory challenges. Later, the defense exercised those last two peremptory challenges (jurors 78 and 149) during the selection of the final panel. In total, defendant exercised (1) four of his peremptory challenges before accepting the first panel of four jurors; (2) one peremptory challenge before accepting the second panel of four jurors, which included juror Bauknecht; and (3) two peremptory challenges before accepting the final panel of four jurors.\n4. The Alleged Error in This Case\nDefendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to remove juror Bauknecht for cause. As part of his claim, defendant posits that he did not exercise one of his two remaining peremptory challenges to remove juror Bauknecht because he had already allocated those challenges to remove other prospective jurors. As previously indicated, we conclude that defendant has waived his challenge in this regard.\na. The Application of Waiver to This Case\nThis court has repeatedly stated that \u201cwe will review the trial court\u2019s ruling on a challenge for cause only when an objectionable juror was forced upon a party after it had exhausted its peremptory challenges.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Grady v. Marchini, 375 Ill. App. 3d 174, 179, 874 N.E.2d 179, 184 (2007) (citing Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 602 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1992)). See People v. Green, 199 Ill. App. 3d 927, 931, 557 N.E.2d 939, 942 (1990) (holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more).\nHere, defendant challenged juror Bauknecht for cause. When the trial court denied his challenge, defendant did not exercise one of his then-remaining three peremptories to exclude juror Bauknecht. Instead, he peremptorily excused a different prospective juror from that panel and passed the remaining panel, including juror Bauknecht, to the State.\nHad defendant used a peremptory challenge for juror Bauknecht and later exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, he could have requested \u2014 if necessary \u2014 additional peremptory challenges, a request the trial court could have granted at its discretion. Indeed, defendant not only failed to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove juror Bauknecht, he affirmatively accepted the panel upon which juror Bauknecht sat.\nRegarding prospective jurors 126, 78, and 149, who were the first three jurors for whom defendant exercised peremptory challenges, we note that defendant did so without first challenging any of them for cause. He challenged juror Bauknecht for cause, but when the trial court denied that challenge, defendant did not use a peremptory challenge to excuse him. Defendant\u2019s actions in this regard demonstrate that in his view \u2014 at least for purposes of a fair trial \u2014 those prospective jurors were not as \u201cbad\u201d as juror Bauknecht. Otherwise, defendant would also have first challenged them for cause.\nIf defendant believed that a fair trial required juror Bauknecht to be excluded, he should have removed him from the second panel of prospective jurors with one of his remaining peremptory challenges. After all, this record clearly shows that defense counsel understood both the availability of defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges and how to use them. These circumstances compel the conclusion that defendant\u2019s decision not to peremptorily remove juror Bauknecht was an affirmative acquiescence to Bauknecht\u2019s jury service, which thereby constitutes a waiver of this issue on appeal. See People v. Hill, 353 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966-67, 819 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (2004) (holding that the defendant\u2019s acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent, precluding a later claim of double jeopardy).\nA possible explanation for defense counsel\u2019s failure to use a peremptory challenge to remove juror Bauknecht might be counsel\u2019s attempt to plant a seed of error, the fruit from which defendant is now trying to harvest on appeal. However, the law does not permit a party to intentionally fail to avail himself of the resources provided (in this case, peremptory challenges), only to complain about the result on appeal. See United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1996) (\u201cMany a defendant would like to plant an error and grow a risk-free trial ***. But steps the court takes at the defendant\u2019s behest are not reversible, because they are not error ***.\u201d). This is not unlike the situation where a deliberating jury sends a note to the trial court and defense counsel does not object to the court\u2019s inappropriate response. Such inaction bars the defendant from complaining about that response on appeal. See Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd., 303 Ill. App. 3d 58, 63-64, 707 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1999) (concluding that counsel\u2019s acquiescence to the court\u2019s response to a note from the jury constituted waiver).\nb. The Alleged Application of Plain Error to This Case\nWe note that despite defendant\u2019s insistence, plain-error analysis does not apply to this case. Plain-error analysis applies to cases involving procedural default (People v. Ahlers, 402 Ill. App. 3d 726, 733-34, 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (2010)), not affirmative acquiescence (see People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 547-48, 809 N.E.2d 103, 105 (2004)). In a situation like this, where defense counsel affirmatively acquiesces to actions taken by the trial court, a defendant\u2019s only challenge may be presented as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on collateral attack. (We note that defendant is not contending in this appeal that counsel was ineffective.)\nc. The Alleged Application of Structural Error in This Case\nWe likewise reject any notion that juror Bauknecht\u2019s jury service somehow constitutes structural error. In so doing, we reiterate our conclusion that no error occurred in this case, given that defendant affirmatively acquiesced to juror Bauknecht\u2019s service on his jury. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 722 (\u201c[the] steps the court takes at the defendant\u2019s behest are not reversible, because they are not error\u201d). However, even if defendant had not affirmatively acquiesced to juror Bauknecht\u2019s service, that service \u2014 if error at all \u2014 would not have been structural error on the facts of this case.\nAn error is structural when it \u201crenders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable in determining guilt or innocence.\u201d People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13, 927 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (2010). We acknowledge that the supreme court has determined that \u201ca trial before a biased tribunal would constitute structural error.\u201d People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 200, 917 N.E.2d 401, 418 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 19-20, 879 N.E.2d 876, 887 (2007)). However, a defendant must demonstrate that such bias actually existed. See Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 12-13, 927 N.E.2d at 1198 (noting that structural error rarely occurs and has been found where, among other very limited circumstances, a defendant is tried before a biased judge).\nHere, defendant has failed to assert actual bias, merely the appearance of such bias. Indeed, defendant acknowledges on appeal that (1) \u201cdefense counsel did not allege that there existed any actual bias, but nevertheless, the presence of the judge\u2019s spouse on the jury created an appearance of impropriety that should have been remedied\u201d and (2) \u201cthe trial judge seating her husband on the jury created an inexcusable appearance of judicial bias.\u201d (Emphases in original.)\nOn this record, we decline to address whether jury service by a trial judge\u2019s spouse in a case in which (1) that judge presides and (2) defendant has not acquiesced in that service, might constitute per se reversible trial error. (We note, however, that the record contains no suggestion of some compelling need for why the trial court thought it necessary for her spouse to serve as a juror in a case over which she presided, a circumstance that strikes this court as rather unusual.)\nB. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Failing To Comply With Rule 431(b)\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant has forfeited review of this issue.\n1. The Pertinent Portion of the Voir Dire in This Case\nOn the morning of voir dire, the trial court brought all 32 prospective jurors into the courtroom. After describing to the prospective jurors the charges that defendant was facing, the court explained the following principles of law:\n\u201cAs you will recall, probably all of you have heard this at least once last week, since this is a criminal trial, there are certain propositions of law that you must be willing to follow. Please listen carefully to those propositions as we will be asking each of you if you understand and accept these propositions.\nThe presumption of innocence stays with *** [defendant throughout the trial and is not overcome unless from all of the evidence you believe the State proved *** [defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has the burden of proving *** [defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *** Defendant does not have to prove his innocence. *** Defendant does not have to present any evidence on his own behalf and does not have to testify if he does not wish to. And if *** [defendant does not testify, that fact must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict.\u201d\nThe court next proceeded to name each of the potential witnesses in the case and explain to the potential jurors that they had a duty not to read or listen to any press reports about the case. The court thereafter called the first 16 potential jurors for questioning.\nAfter asking a series of questions of those potential jurors regarding their knowledge of the case, the court further questioned them as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** A few minutes ago, [the court] recited the basic principles of law in a criminal case. Do all of you recall the principles of law that [the court] stated a few minutes ago?\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (Nod heads.)\nTHE COURT: Everybody\u2019s indicating yes. Do each of you understand and accept those principles of law? If not, please raise your hand if there\u2019s any confusion or concern.\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (No response.)\nTHE COURT: Nobody\u2019s raising their hand. Do each of you believe you can give both sides a fair trial in this case?\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (Nod heads.)\nTHE COURT: If not, please raise your hand.\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (No response.)\u201d\nCounsel and the trial court then proceeded to conduct further voir dire of those 16 potential jurors.\nFollowing voir dire of those 16 potential jurors, the trial court began questioning the remaining 16 potential jurors. After asking several questions of those 16 potential jurors regarding their knowledge of the case, the court further inquired of them, as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay. Now [the court] did recite earlier this morning the principles of law that you must be willing to follow and accept in this case. Does everyone recall those principles of law? *** Defendant is presumed innocent. The State has the burden of proof. Everybody\u2019s acknowledging that. Do each of you understand and accept those principles of law? If not, please raise your hand.\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (Nod heads.)\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m getting a lot of nods in agreement so that\u2019s good. Do each of you believe you can give both sides a fair trial? If not, please raise your hand.\nPOTENTIAL JURORS: (Nod heads.)\nTHE COURT: [The court is] getting a lot of nods on that question as well.\u201d\nThe defense did not object to this method of complying with Rule 431(b)\u2019s mandate.\n2. The Alleged Error in This Case\nAlthough defendant concedes that he has forfeited his contention, he nonetheless asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it did not comply with Rule 431(b)\u2019s mandates because the court\u2019s \u201cafter-the-fact, vague reference to th[o]se important concepts\u201d when it asked whether the jury understood and accepted those concepts was insufficient to comply with the rule\u2019s mandate. Essentially, defendant posits that too large a gap in time existed between the court\u2019s reading of the Rule 431(b) concepts and the court\u2019s asking the prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted those concepts. We disagree.\nBefore deciding whether the trial court committed plain error, we will first determine whether error occurred at all \u2014 that is, we will decide whether the trial court violated Rule 431(b)\u2019s mandates. See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 939 N.E.2d 403 (2010) (reviewing the trial court\u2019s Rule 431(b) admonishments to determine whether error occurred at all before conducting its plain-error analysis). This requires us to construe Rule 431(b). Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 606. In other words, we must decide what Rule 431(b) requires.\nWhen the language of a supreme court rule is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court must apply that rule as written without resort to aids of construction. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 606. We review de novo the proper interpretation of supreme court rules. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 606.\nRule 431(b) requires that trial courts read certain principles of law to the jury and determine whether each juror understands and accepts those principles, as follows:\n\u201cThe court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted!,] the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant\u2019s failure to testify when the defendant objects.\nThe court\u2019s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.\u201d Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007).\nOur supreme court recently had occasion to interpret Rule 431(b). The supreme court\u2019s interpretation of that language was as follows:\n\u201cRule 431(b) *** mandates a specific question and response process. The trial court must ask each potential juror whether he or she understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule. The questioning may be performed either individually or in a group, but the rule requires an opportunity for a response from each prospective juror on his or her understanding and acceptance of those principles.\u201d Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 607.\nIn this case, the trial court fully complied with this mandate when it presented specific questions to which it received group responses. Specifically, the court (1) methodically explained each of the Rule 431(b) principles, which included the preamble that they should \u201clisten carefully\u201d to those principles because the court would later be asking them whether they \u201cunderstood and accepted\u201d those principles and, shortly thereafter, (2) asked each of the prospective jurors whether they indeed understood and accepted those principles, to which the court received affirmative group responses. The fact that the court did not ask those jurors whether they understood and accepted those principles immediately following its explanation of those principles does not constitute a violation of Rule 431(b) on the facts of this case.\nThis case is distinguishable in that regard from our recent decision in People v. Wrencher, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1144-45, 929 N.E.2d 1124, 1131-32 (2009), where this court concluded that error occurred when the trial court, during its voir dire questioning, explained the Rule 431(b) principles but did not ask the jurors whether they understood and accepted those principles until a significant time later (89 pages of transcript later, plus a 15-minute recess). Here, the record shows that the court directed the attention of both 16-member panels back to the Rule 431(b) principles it had recently explained before asking them whether they \u201cunderstood and accepted\u201d those principles (9 pages of transcript with no recess for the first panel of 16 prospective jurors, and 41 pages of transcript with no recess for the second panel of 16 prospective jurors). The record further shows that those panels understood the court\u2019s reference and responded affirmatively to the court\u2019s inquiries.\nAccordingly, we conclude that although a better practice would be for the trial court to ask prospective jurors whether they understand and accept the Rule 431(b) principles immediately (or close thereto) following its explanation of those principles, the court fully complied with Rule 431(b)\u2019s mandate on the facts of this case. Because no error occurred, let alone plain error, we honor defendant\u2019s procedural default. See People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593, 893 N.E.2d 653, 659-60 (2008) (procedural default must be honored when a defendant fails to establish plain error).\nC. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Not Allowing Him To Impeach Butler With Evidence of Her Prior\nFelony Conviction\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to impeach Butler with evidence of her prior felony conviction. Specifically, defendant asserts that the court\u2019s failure to allow him to impeach Butler with her previous domestic-battery conviction violated his constitutional right to confrontation, rendering his trial unfair (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78). As part of his argument, defendant posits that when a defendant is on trial, the court must be concerned about the danger of unfair prejudice related to the use of that defendant\u2019s previous convictions on cross-examination (People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971)), but when it is the State\u2019s witness, those concerns are substantially mitigated. Defendant\u2019s points are well taken. However, given the unique nature of this case, even if the court\u2019s failure to allow defendant to impeach Butler with her previous domestic battery conviction was erroneous and of a constitutional dimension, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn this context, an error is harmless when \u201cit appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\u201d People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 304, 870 N.E.2d 333, 367 (2007). To determine whether an error meets this standard, the reviewing court must consider, in pertinent part, the following: (1) whether the error \u201c \u2018might have contributed to the conviction\u2019 \u201d; and (2) whether the other evidence in support of the conviction is \u201c \u2018overwhelming. \u2019 \u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 304-05, 870 N.E.2d at 367-68 (quoting People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 428, 841 N.E.2d 889, 902 (2005), citing People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1981)).\nIn this case, defendant claims that he should not have been barred from presenting to the jurors Butler\u2019s previous conviction for domestic battery, which he posits would raise substantial doubt about her credibility in their minds. However, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that such an error, if error at all, could not have contributed to the jury\u2019s verdict in this case.\nFirst, the evidence implicating defendant in this case was overwhelming \u2014 indeed, defendant did not even contest the State\u2019s assertion that he was the one who repeatedly stabbed Butler. Further, defendant did not challenge Butler\u2019s credibility then, and does not challenge her credibility now. That is, defendant does not contend that Butler lied about anything when she testified. Defendant\u2019s trial strategy \u2014 as the defense explained to the jury during its opening statement \u2014 was only to convince the jury that he did not possess the requisite intent to kill her.\nMoreover, assuming that defendant had been permitted to impeach Butler with her previous conviction for domestic battery, and assuming further that such impeachment would have completely discredited Butler\u2019s testimony in the minds of the jurors, a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the State\u2019s other evidence. That additional evidence related to defendant\u2019s intent to kill Butler was as follows: (1) Gilmor\u2019s testimony that she heard Butler pounding on her kitchen door, pleading, \u201cplease don\u2019t let me die\u201d; (2) responding officers\u2019 testimony that Butler feared she was dying; (3) the 9-1-1 dispatcher\u2019s testimony that her fellow dispatcher received a call from defendant, not to summon help for Butler, but to admit doing something \u201creally bad,\u201d while threatening to kill himself; (4) defendant\u2019s sister\u2019s testimony that defendant (a) showed up at their mother\u2019s house covered in blood and (b) admitted stabbing Butler; (5) testimony from police that they found defendant standing in his mother\u2019s kitchen, crying and repeatedly asking them to kill him; (6) the responding paramedic\u2019s testimony describing the dire nature of Butler\u2019s condition when he arrived, namely, that Butler had multiple wounds and lacerations, had lost a lot of blood, and was having difficulty breathing; and (7) Butler\u2019s emergency-room doctor\u2019s testimony that she (a) appeared to be \u201ccritically ill\u201d when she arrived, (b) was not communicating well, and (c) had stab wounds to her torso, arms, armpits, wrists and back, including multiple stab wounds to a critical area surrounding her heart.\nIn light of defendant\u2019s trial strategy and the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s intent to kill Butler, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s failure to allow defendant to impeach Butler with her prior domestic-battery conviction, if erroneous at all, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nD. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Failing To Restrict the State From Introducing a Knife That Was Unconnected to Him or the Crime\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to restrict the State from introducing a knife that was unconnected to him or the crime. Specifically, defendant asserts that, over objection, the court improperly allowed the State to introduce into evidence a knife taken from defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home that was not relevant to its theory of the case. The State responds that defendant has forfeited this issue because he failed to include it in his posttrial motion and has failed to demonstrate that the use of the knife by the State was plain error. Defendant concedes that he forfeited this issue, but nonetheless asserts that because \u201cthis was a close case,\u201d we should review it for plain error. For the reasons that follow, we reject defendant\u2019s claim that the evidence presented in this case was close and agree with the State that defendant has forfeited review of this issue.\n1. Forfeiture and Plain-Error Review\n\u201cTo preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged error in a written posttrial motion.\u201d Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 611. Otherwise, he has forfeited the issue. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 612. Nonetheless, a defendant may bypass such forfeiture when plain error occurs. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613.\nPlain error occurs when the error is \u201cclear and obvious\u201d and (1) \u201cthe evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,\u201d or (2) \u201cthat error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007). Under the first prong, a defendant must prove that the unpreserved error was prejudicial. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564, 870 N.E.2d at 410. Under the second prong, the burden of proof is again on the defendant, but this time he must show that the error was serious \u2014 that is, it affected the fairness of the proceeding (People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 47, 912 N.E.2d 1220, 1229 (2009)) and \u201cchallenged the integrity of the judicial process\u201d (Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565, 870 N.E.2d at 410-11).\n2. Plain Error and This Case\nAs previously discussed, the usual first step in plain-error analysis is to determine whether any error occurred. See Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613 (determining whether error occurred at all before conducting its plain-error analysis). However, similar to the analytical framework we use to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (People v. Haynes, 399 Ill. App. 3d 903, 908, 927 N.E.2d 819, 824 (2010) (\u201cWhere the defendant fails to prove prejudice, the reviewing court need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance constituted less than reasonable assistance.\u201d)), the first step of plain-error analysis is merely a \u201cmatter of convention.\u201d People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). When, as here, the record clearly shows that plain error did not occur, we will reject it without further analysis.\nAlthough it is not at all clear to us from the record why (1) the State thought the knife from defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s house \u2014 which was not the knife recovered from the Butler\u2019s hallway \u2014 was probative and (2) the trial court admitted the knife into evidence, we need not definitively resolve whether the court\u2019s decision to admit the knife was erroneous. Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, this was not a close case because the evidence of defendant\u2019s intent to kill Butler was not closely balanced, nor did the introduction of the knife affect the fairness of the proceeding. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the introduction of the knife was erroneous, such an error did not remotely threaten to (1) tip the scales of justice against defendant or (2) challenge the integrity of the judicial process.\nAgain, the State presented extensive evidence of defendant\u2019s intent to kill Butler. Specifically, the State presented evidence from (1) Butler, regarding the circumstances leading up to the attack and the fact that defendant took her cellular telephone with him when he left her either dying or for dead; (2) Gilmor, regarding Butler\u2019s pleas to her not to \u201clet [her] die\u201d; (2) responding officers, regarding Butler\u2019s fear that she was dying; (3) the 9-1-1 dispatcher, regarding defendant\u2019s failure to report the attack to allow paramedics to respond; (4) defendant\u2019s sister, regarding defendant\u2019s actions immediately following the attack; (5) police, regarding defendant\u2019s hopes that they would kill him; (6) the responding paramedic, regarding the dire nature of Butler\u2019s condition when he arrived; and (7) the emergency-room doctor, regarding the critical and extensive nature of Butler\u2019s life-threatening wounds. Indeed, that Butler survived defendant\u2019s knife attack is amazing. But her survival does nothing to diminish the intent with which defendant stabbed Butler, which clearly was to kill her. That she survived merely shows that despite his intent and efforts toward that end, he is an incompetent killer.\nGiven this evidence and the nature of the alleged error in this case, we do not view the trial court\u2019s failure to bar the State from introducing the knife, if erroneous at all, as plain error. Accordingly, we honor defendant\u2019s procedural default. See Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 593, 893 N.E.2d at 659-60 (procedural default must be honored when a defendant fails to establish plain error).\nE. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Failing To Bar the State\u2019s Lead Witness From Sitting at Counsel\u2019s Table\nDefendant next contends that, over objection and despite a motion to exclude witnesses, the trial court erred by failing to bar the State\u2019s lead investigator from sitting at the State\u2019s counsel table throughout the case. Without pointing to any specific testimony, defendant implies that the investigator\u2019s mere sitting at counsel\u2019s table improperly influenced his testimony because he was able to hear the other witnesses\u2019 testimony, potentially allowing him to tailor his testimony to correspond to theirs. The State responds that defendant has forfeited this issue because he did not raise it in his posttrial motion. We agree with the State.\nAs previously explained, \u201c[t]o preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged error in a written posttrial motion.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 611. Otherwise, he forfeits appellate review of that issue. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 612.\nHere, defendant failed to include the alleged error in his written posttrial motion. Therefore, we conclude that he has forfeited review of that issue. Because (1) defendant does not contend that the alleged error amounts to plain error and (2) no error appears on the face of this record, we honor defendant\u2019s procedural default without further analysis. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 549, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2010) (explaining that when a defendant forfeits review of his claims and does not argue plain error, the appellate court should not reach the merits of those issues).\nE Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Barring the Defense From Referring to Butler\u2019s Alcohol Consumption During Its Closing Arguments\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it barred the defense from referring to Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption during its closing arguments. Specifically, defendant asserts that the court violated his right to effective assistance of counsel when it barred his attorney during closing argument from arguing the \u201creasonable inference that the alcohol might have affected [Butler\u2019s] perceptions.\u201d Given defendant\u2019s trial strategy and the State\u2019s evidence, we conclude that even if the court\u2019s decision to bar the defense from referring to Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption was erroneous, that error was harmless.\nPrior to closing arguments in this case, the defense argued vigorously to the trial court that it should be allowed to explain to the jury that it could infer from Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption (less than two beers) that she did not fairly recollect the events that took place the night defendant attacked her. The court responded that it would not allow the defense to argue that inference because the evidence at trial did not support that theory, given that the evidence at trial was that Butler was \u201con\u201d her second beer and that she only had problems recalling what happened after the attack. Although the record appears to support the court\u2019s discretionary call to bar the defense from arguing a theory for which not a shred of evidence had been presented, we need not reach the merits of defendant\u2019s claim of error because, even if it the court\u2019s decision did constitute error, that error was so clearly harmless.\nAn error that does not implicate a constitutional right is harmless when no reasonable probability exists that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 180, 863 N.E.2d 231, 235 (2006) (citing People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 447, 553 N.E.2d 368, 377 (1990)). Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant had been allowed to make his argument at closing and that the jury did, in fact, infer that Butler was so intoxicated that she did not correctly recall the events the night of the attack, so what? Defendant did not then \u2014 and does not now \u2014 contest that he was the person who stabbed Butler 23 times in the chest, back, and arms.\nGiven defendant\u2019s trial strategy and the State\u2019s overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s intent to kill Butler \u2014 which we have previously outlined at length \u2014 we conclude that the trial court\u2019s decision to bar the defense from referring to Butler\u2019s alcohol consumption during its closing arguments, if erroneous at all, was harmless.\nG. Defendant\u2019s Contention of Cumulative Error\nDefendant also contends that his trial was so \u201cplagued by judicial error\u201d that we should grant him a new trial. In short, defendant posits that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case denied him a fair trial. We disagree.\nCumulative error requires reversal when, as a result of multiple trial court errors, a defendant is denied a fair trial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 139, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (2000). To determine whether a defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been compromised, we must decide whether the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process has been compromised. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138, 724 N.E.2d at 940-41.\nDefendant\u2019s only trial strategy in this case was to convince the jury that he lacked the requisite intent to kill Butler. As previously noted, the jury was unpersuaded by this strategy and found him guilty. We also note that we have previously concluded that some of the errors defendant relies upon when making this cumulative-error claim are not errors in the first place.\nHaving reviewed defendant\u2019s contentions and the record in this case, it is an understatement to say that we are confident that the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process were not compromised. Put another way, we are convinced that defendant received a fair trial.\nIII. DEFENDANT\u2019S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INCREASED HIS SENTENCE\nDefendant also argues that the trial court improperly increased his prison sentence from 20 years to 24 years. Specifically, defendant contends that (1) the court had no authority to increase his sentence after it imposed the original 20-year term and (2) the court improperly considered the fact that he exercised his right to trial as a factor in aggravation. We address defendant\u2019s contentions in turn.\nA. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Lacked the Authority To Increase His Sentence From 20 Years to 24 Years\nDefendant first contends that the trial court lacked the authority to increase his sentence from 20 years to 24 years. Specifically, defendant asserts that once the court imposed a 20-year prison term, it could not deviate upward from that sentence without violating his right to due process of law. Because we conclude that the court did not \u201cimpose\u201d a 20-year prison term before it sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, we reject defendant\u2019s contention.\n1. The Pertinent Portion of the Sentencing Hearing in This Case\nAt defendant\u2019s April 2009 sentencing hearing, the trial court appeared to sentence defendant to 20 years in prison when it stated as follows:\n\u201c[W]hat sticks out in [the court\u2019s] mind is the victim impact statement. [\u2018]I still remember the terror I felt. And that\u2019s not going to go away in [7] years, 10 years, 30 years. [\u2019] So [the court] thinks a 20[-]year sentence to the Illinois Department of Corrections [(DOC)] is appropriate, and [the court] will sentence [defendant to 20 years in [DOC]. The fines that were requested by the State are imposed.\nWe\u2019re going to recess.\u201d\nShortly thereafter, however, the trial court returned to (1) explain the reason for its abrupt recess and (2) clarify its pronounced term of imprisonment, as follows:\n\u201cOkay. We are back on the record [in this case]. There was a recess due to outbursts and perhaps one of the spectators fainted or passed out or something. [The court] understand^] that *** they gave her oxygen and she did regain consciousness ***.\nSo, but [the court] primarily is concerned because [it] started speaking *** and then [was not] able to finish. And as [the court] started stating [its] sentence, [the court] said that 20 years [was] to [it] reasonable. However, the recommendation of the State was 24 years *** and it [was in] applying the 85 percent sentencing provision that [the court] had this 20 years in [its] mind ***.\nSo [the court\u2019s] sentence is the 24 years that was recommended by the State. *** 85 percent of that sentence will have to be imposed[,] which brings [it] down to 20 years. So [the court] want[s] to be clear *** that [the court] thought the State\u2019s recommendation was reasonable[,] but then [the court] started [and] had 20 [years] in [its] mind because that is the 85 percent rule ***.\nSo the sentence that [the court is] imposing for all the reasons that were set forth earlier is 24 years.\u201d\n2. Section 5\u20148\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections and the Standard of Review\nSection 5\u20148\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections states, in pertinent part, that a \u201ccourt may not increase a sentence once it is imposed.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(c) (West 2008). Defendant\u2019s claim in this case requires us to determine whether the trial court \u201cimposed\u201d a 20-year term of imprisonment because, given the plain language of section 5\u20148\u20141(c), if it did, the court could not later increase that sentence to 24 years. As this question requires us to interpret section 5\u20148\u20141(c), our review is de novo. See People v. Magee, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1033-34, 872 N.E.2d 63, 71-72 (2007) (reviewing de novo the question of whether a sentence had been \u201cimposed\u201d for purposes of section 5\u20148\u20141(c)).\n3. The \u201cImposition\u201d of a Sentence and the Trial Court\u2019s Sentence in This Case\nIn Magee, the court concluded that a sentence had not been \u201cimposed\u201d for purposes of section 5\u20148\u20141(c) until after the sentencing hearing had concluded. Magee, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 872 N.E.2d at 72 (where trial court pronounced its sentence but later corrected its pronouncement after being reminded of certain facts before the sentencing hearing was concluded). That court noted that to hold otherwise \u201cwould be unreasonable and a waste of judicial resources.\u201d Magee, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 872 N.E.2d at 72.\nIn this case, as the record demonstrates, the trial court misspoke when it first pronounced defendant\u2019s sentence. After a short recess, which the court was compelled to take because of a serious disruption in the courtroom, the court explained that it had misstated its sentence and corrected itself on the record, at which time it imposed defendant\u2019s 24-year sentence. We conclude that the court\u2019s actions in this regard were entirely appropriate.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Contention That the Trial Court Improperly Considered the Fact That He Exercised His Right to Trial as a Factor in Aggravation\nDefendant next contends that the trial court improperly considered the fact that he exercised his right to trial as a factor in aggravation at sentencing. In support of this contention, defendant relies on the following statement that the court made during a pretrial hearing: \u201c[I]f [defendant is] pleading guilty to something th[en] you are wasting [the court\u2019s] time on having a trial [and the court] can take that into consideration [at] sentencing.\u201d After reviewing the record, we conclude that the court did not consider defendant\u2019s decision to exercise his right to trial as an aggravating factor at sentencing.\n1. The Pertinent Exchange During the Pretrial Hearing\nPrior to trial, defendant moved to exclude Butler\u2019s statement, \u201cDon\u2019t let me die,\u201d on the basis that Butler was not qualified to give medical opinion testimony. In the course of arguing that motion, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and the trial court, which resulted in the court\u2019s denying defendant\u2019s motion:\n\u201c[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, let me just give the [c]ourt a little additional backdrop here. As we have stated from the get[-]go in open court, the issue here is not whether the act itself was committed. I think the evidence is going to be clear at trial.\nTHE COURT: Are you going to be admitting certain *** counts then ***[?]\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We\u2019ll be telling the jury in opening and closing statements that\u2014\nTHE COURT: Well, that would be [c]ount 2, Mount 3, Mount 4. They are all aggravated battery.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. This case is not about the aggravated battery.\nTHE COURT: Are you going to admit those three counts?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We\u2019re not pleading guilty to them, but it\u2019s going to be argued and the theory of the case to the jury is going to be that he is in fact guilty of the aggravated battery.\nTHE COURT: Then why are you not admitting them? Why are we going through a trial for something that he is admitting?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don\u2019t want to get into where we\u2019ve been with the negotiations.\nTHE COURT: [The court has] nothing to do with the negotiations.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand.\nTHE COURT: And believe me[, the court does not] want to go down that road either.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If the [c]ourt would just let the defense handle its own trial strategy, our trial strategy is that the jury needs to decide whether this is an aggravated battery or an attempted murder and if we take away from the jury the option of finding this is an aggravated battery, then I think that *** hurts *** [defendant's case. ***\nTHE COURT: Can that not still be on the table if he admits that he pled guilty to aggravated battery?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, if he admits to it, then the jury loses part of its role so\u2014\nTHE COURT: No. You\u2019re telling [the court] that [it is] supposed to have a trial, a four-day trial\u2014\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.\nTHE COURT: \u2014and bring in jurors on an aggravated domestic battery case that you are going to tell the jury you did?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We\u2019re going to get to trial for four days either way. We\u2019ve got an attempted murder charge here; and yes, we plan on having a strategy here where we tell the jury that we think that what happened here was an aggravated battery; and we\u2019re going to have a four-day trial regardless.\nTHE COURT: Well, we\u2019re not dragging this out[, the court will] tell you that.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. The evidence is going to be the same. The witnesses are going to be the same; and if he pled guilty to any of the counts, we\u2019d still have to have the exact same trial because the issue in this case is whether or not there was a mental state where there\u2019s [evidence] beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit murder.\nTHE COURT: Great. So that applies to Mount 1. What about Mounts 2, 3, and 4?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We don\u2019t have much of a defense on that. I think it\u2019s important that the [c]ourt realize in terms of the motions *** what the case really involves and what the role of the jury in this case is. So that\u2019s why I bring it up. Not that he wants to plead guilty but there\u2019s very little dispute in this case that there was a stabbing.\nIn fact, the evidence is going to be clear that [defendant] called the police and said that he had done a terrible thing and that he called the police and said the he had stabbed his girlfriend. And the question in this case is whether or not he did so with the intent to commit murder. We have been very open with the [c]ourt on that issue. We\u2019ve talked to the State about that issue. He\u2019s not going to plead guilty to it because the jury has to decide what it is, and there\u2019s no elongation of the trial.\nTHE COURT: They don\u2019t have to decide what it is. [The court] think[s] you are misrepresenting that. It can be both.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It could be or it could be one or the other.\nTHE COURT: No. It\u2019s guilty or not guilty of attempted murder, guilty or not guilty to aggravated domestic battery. No whatever. You are saying one or the other.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I\u2019m not going to debate the trial strategy, and I\u2019m telling the [c]ourt it\u2019s not going to affect the witnesses at all. I\u2019d like to argue the motion *** and he\u2019s not going to plead guilty ***. So any discussion on that\u2014\nTHE COURT: Fine.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don\u2019t think it\u2019s fair to ask [c]ounsel to even broach that subject because that\u2019s not what we\u2019re here about *** and if there\u2019s going to be a plea, it can be worked out by both parties *** and he has the right to have his trial.\nTHE COURT: He has the right to have his trial. He has the right to plead not guilty. If you are sitting here [saying], and [the court does not] know, [but it can\\ check [its] factors in aggravation[J but if he\u2019s pleading guilty to something that you are wasting [the court\u2019s] time on having a trialf the court] believe[s it] can take that into consideration in sentencing.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The [c]ourt can consider any aggravation [it] like[s], but I will tell the [c]ourt [that it] will see from the evidence at trial that there is a legitimate issue.\nTHE COURT: That may be with regards to [c]ount 1, but you are still telling [the court] that you are going to drag this out as to Mounts 2, 3, and 4.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We\u2019re not dragging anything out. [The court will] see from the evidence that it\u2019s the exact same evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\n2. The Trial Court\u2019s Clarification of Its Comments\nTwo days later, the trial court clarified its comments from the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion in limine, as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: This matter was before the [c]ourt on Tuesday for hearing on some motions ***. There was a considerable amount of discussion at that time concerning the trial, how much time we were going to need for trial, etc. And apparently it\u2019s been brought to the Mourt\u2019s attention that there was a concern about some comments that the [c]ourt may have made during the course of that proceeding.\nSo *** [defense counsel], [the court] *** had a phone conference with [you and the prosecutor,] and [the court] advised both of [you] that the purpose of [the court\u2019s] comments [was] to[,] if possible[,] shorten the length of the trial primarily because we have many other cases that also require trial. We have a limited amount of time, limited amount of resources, and [the court] wanted to make sure that if [it] set aside four days for a trial that we needed four days as opposed to perhaps being able to shorten this trial up to two days or three days. The attorneys basically after [the court\u2019s] questioning indicated that regardless of how *** [defendant chose to proceed it was going to be a four[-]day trial.\nSo [the court] understand[s] that either [defendant] or somebody in his family may have misinterpreted some comments [the court] made during that hearing. [The court] certainly did not mean to\nimply in any way nor did [the court] think the attorneys took it this way either[,] but a concern was raised to [defense counsel] that the [c]ourt was somehow suggesting that if [defendant] did not plead guilty to these charges[,] that the [c]ourt would take that *** into consideration in sentencing or actually would sentence him to a what the family views as a harsher sentence because he did not plead guilty to these charges before the trial.\nIs that an accurate summary ***?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [T]hat is accurate, Judge. I think that oftentimes people have their own mental state and know what they intend, but when it comes out it could be interpreted in a different way. And I as [c]ounsel being in front of [this court] in other cases have always felt that [this court\u2019s] been fair and impartial in every case, and I have absolutely no concerns at all that the [c]ourt would do so in this particular case.\nI think some of the comments in particular the [c]ourt indicated that it would consider it aggravation if the case proceeded unnecessarily and wasted the [c]ourt\u2019s time, and I think I viewed that as the flip side [of] that oftentimes there\u2019s mitigation if somebody pleads guilty.\nTHE COURT: Correct.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You can call that aggravation or the absence of mitigation. Obviously, it\u2019s appropriate for the [c]ourt to consider as mitigation if somebody pleads guilty and admits *** wrongdoing, then the [c]ourt would be appropriate in considering that.\nSo I didn\u2019t interpret the [c]ourt\u2019s comments as a bias or unfairness or a pressuring of *** [defendant to plead guilty. But I think that when it was heard by family members and *** [defendant, that those were the concerns. I\u2019ve spoken with *** [defendant since we were last in court and the family!,] and I brought the matter to the attention of the State\u2019s Attorney *** and *** the [c]ourt so that the [c]ourt would have the opportunity to clarify the comments and also admonish *** [defendant as to any rights that he may have in open court to file a motion for [substitution of judge based on cause and that another judge would hear that so I\u2019d like the [c]ourt\u2014\nTHE COURT: [The court] will go forward and do that.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: \u2014to do that. But that\u2019s a summary as to what happened.\nTHE COURT: All right. And, [prosecutor], anything you want to add to that?\n[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, that\u2019s how it was brought to my attention. ***\nI suppose as very experienced lawyers, we are looking at things in a very different context oftentimes than laypersons are[,] and I guess sometimes we have to be careful to not be too focused on the mechanics of what it is we do[J *** I think that\u2019s often what we get into[,] and *** I fully understood where the [c]ourt was going. We have this time allotted. It\u2019s always very busy during jury time. * * *\nIn that context, *** I felt it would be a good idea to get on the record to allow those laypersons to maybe get a greater depth of understanding because I certainly didn\u2019t take that as any suggestion the [cjourt was going to lean on *** [defendant or anything of that nature. But in retrospect, I could see how someone unschooled in what we do might take it that way.\nTHE COURT: Right. So *** the attorneys understood what the [cjourt was saying, and perhaps [the court] did not pick the right words in how [it] said it. ***\nSo [the court] certainly did not mean by [its] comments to suggest that or put any pressure on [defendant]. He has every right to have a trial. He should have his trial. He is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty, and that is the whole purpose of the trial. [The court] just wanted to make sure that this was going to be a four[-]day trial rather than having this be a two[-]day trial.\nSo having said that, [defendant], [your attorney] suggested and [the court] believe[s] he has discussed it with you, you do have a right to file a motion for substitution from this [cjourt for cause. *** That motion would be heard by another judge. [This court] would not hear it.\nSo, defense counsel, you indicated that you had spoken with [defendant] and the family. Do you need to speak with them again concerning the substitution or are you satisfied that you\u2019ve discussed it with him?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I have discussed it with [defendant] and the familyf,] but I think it would be appropriate to take a recess now that he\u2019s had the opportunity to hear the [cjourt\u2019s clarification.\nTHE COURT: Very good. [The court will] take a very short recess *** and when you are ready, let [the court] know.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you.\nTHE COURT: [B]ack on the record ***. ***\n[Defense counsel], you\u2019ve had an opportunity now to review this matter with your client and his family?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That\u2019s right, Judge. There\u2019s no anticipation of any motion for substitution of judge. We\u2019d like to keep the matter set for jury trial and proceed as currently set.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Very good. Then [the court] certainly apologizefs] for any misunderstanding.\ns\u00a3 *\nTHE COURT: All right. [Defendant], [your attorney] has discussed with you your right to file a motion for substitution of judge for cause. Yes?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: All right. And you\u2019ve heard the [c]ourt\u2019s comments, both the comments that *** gave rise to this and then [the court\u2019s] comments today. You\u2019ve discussed this option with [your attorney], and you do have the right to file this motion for substitution for cause. Is it your desire to not file that at this time?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: *** If you don\u2019t file it now, then we will go to trial[,] and I will be the judge hearing that trial. Okay?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Okay.\nTHE COURT: Nobody\u2019s forced you to not file this motion?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: Nobody\u2019s promised you anything if you don\u2019t file it.\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: Do you think you\u2019ve had a full opportunity to discuss this decision with [your attorney]?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And you are satisfied at this point based upon the clarification of [the court\u2019s] comments?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\u201d\n3. Defendant\u2019s Sentence in This Case\nAlthough the record ultimately shows that the trial court did not consider the fact that defendant exercised his right to trial as a factor in aggravation at sentencing, we can understand why defendant thought that it did, given the court\u2019s unfortunate wording. However, the court later clarified what it really meant to say. Nonetheless, we note that the court\u2019s pretrial remarks were unnecessary and regrettable. Defense counsel\u2019s explanation \u2014 which we note he was not required to give \u2014 should have satisfied the court. Indeed, the dialogue relating to defense counsel\u2019s trial strategy should not have taken place at all. Nonetheless, we conclude that the record from defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing demonstrates that the court did not consider defendant\u2019s exercise of his right to trial in determining the appropriate prison sentence.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State\u2019s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE POPE,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. In this case of first impression, despite a challenge for cause, the trial judge allowed her husband to be seated on a jury in a case over which she was presiding. While the majority finds this \u201cunusual,\u201d it fails to discuss the potential ramifications of having a judge\u2019s family member serve on a jury over which that judge is presiding, nor does the majority discuss defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial jury, nor the perception of the public of the fairness of our judicial system when the trial judge\u2019s spouse is allowed to sit as a juror despite a challenge for cause.\nThe majority seeks to accord responsibility to defendant, despite his challenge of the judge\u2019s husband for cause and preservation of the error in a posttrial motion. By the end of jury selection, no peremptory challenges remained for defendant to exercise. At the time of the cause challenge, counsel had already decided to use his two remaining peremptories on forthcoming potential jurors. The majority states defendant could have used a peremptory to strike the judge\u2019s husband and, if he later ran out of peremptories, could have asked the judge for an additional peremptory. However, where the trial judge refused a cause challenge with respect to her husband, it seems extremely unlikely defendant would have been successful in obtaining an extra peremptory challenge at a later time.\nThe majority fails to discuss the myriad of problems that can be foreseen when a trial judge allows a close family member to serve on a jury. First, as defendant points out in his posttrial motion, a judge\u2019s spouse would be expected to look unkindly upon a defense attorney who, in vigorously representing his client, engages in heated discussions with the judge. Additionally, under canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Conduct, also known as Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1), a judge is to disqualify herself in a proceeding in which the judge\u2019s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Ill. S. Ct. R. 63(C)(1) (eff. Mar. 26, 2001). A nonexhaustive list of examples is provided in subsections (a) through (e) of the canon. Certainly the gist of the rule recognizes it is improper for a judge to preside in a case where the trial judge could be called upon to make a ruling concerning a family member.\nThere are many reported decisions where it becomes necessary for a trial court to inquire into allegations of juror misconduct. If such an accusation were made against the trial judge\u2019s husband, the trial judge would have to rule on an issue directly impacting a family member. Additionally, other jurors might be inclined to be influenced by or to acquiesce in the juror-spouse\u2019s view of the case. A trial judge repeatedly admonishes the jurors during a trial to refrain from discussing the case, even with other jurors, prior to deliberations. Here, the jurors were all aware, as was defendant, that Mr. Bauknecht would be going home at the end of each day of this three-day trial to cohabitate with the trial judge. Certainly, in light of the special relationships between spouses, this created an appearance of special access by one of the jurors to a major player in the trial \u2014 the trial judge.\nThe majority also fails to discuss the out-of-state cases dealing with this very issue. Where, as here, no Illinois case has been decided on this issue, it is appropriate to look at other state court decisions involving similar circumstances.\nIn People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), the trial judge\u2019s wife was seated as a juror. No challenge was made to her service as a juror, despite full disclosure of her relationship to the trial judge. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 538. The defendant had several peremptory challenges remaining at the time. The defendant was convicted of rape and then moved to set aside the verdict because the judge\u2019s wife served as a juror. The New York court found the juror\u2019s service gave the unmistakable appearance of impropriety and rejected the State\u2019s position the defendant was required to show evidentiary proof of actual prejudice. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 538. The court found the interest of the \u201cpublic at large,\u201d and not just the defendant, needed to be served. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 538. Although not all ethical violations involving the appearance of impropriety necessarily warrant reversal and a new trial, the court found the right to the \u201cfact and appearance\u201d of a fair jury is so fundamental that the service of the judge\u2019s spouse as a juror required reversal of the defendant\u2019s conviction. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 539. The Hartson court found no actual prejudice need be demonstrated nor was it even necessary for the defendant to have challenged the juror to merit reversal.\nIn State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, 764 N.W.2d 737, a tried judge allowed his mother to be seated as a juror in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interestingly described its view of the situation as follows:\n\u201cThe immediate reaction of the members of the court upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the circuit court judge\u2019s mother on the jury raises red flags of danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule on matters involving a member of his or her family.\u201d Tody, 2009 WI 31, \u00b64, 764 N.W.2d 737.\nIn Tody, as here, the defendant\u2019s lawyer moved to strike the juror for cause, raising the close personal relationship between the juror and her son, the trial judge. In addition, despite having a peremptory challenge available, defense counsel refrained from applying it to the judge\u2019s mother. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the failure to exercise the peremptory challenge did not result in a waiver of the defendant\u2019s right to raise on appeal the issue of whether the juror\u2019s inclusion violated the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. Tody, 2009 WI 31, \u00b627, 764 N.W.2d 737.\nFurther, the court found the defendant was deprived of his right under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, of the Wisconsin Constitution to be tried by an impartial jury independent of the trial judge. Tody, 2009 WI 31, \u00b650, 764 N.W.2d 737. The Wisconsin court, as the New York court, did not require the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice, stating, \u201cA presiding judge\u2019s mother serving as a juror is a special circumstance so fraught with the possibility of bias that we must find objective bias regardless of the particular juror\u2019s assurances of impartiality.\u201d Tody, 2009 WI 31, \u00b650, 764 N.W.2d 737. The defendant\u2019s conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.\nLikewise, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed a defendant\u2019s rape conviction where the trial judge failed to strike his wife from the jury for cause in Elmore v. State, 144 S.W.3d 278 (Ark. 2004). The court perceived the undoubtedly close relationship between the trial judge and his wife as raising an appearance of impropriety. Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 280. The court recognized jurors would likely give more credence or weight to the judge\u2019s wife\u2019s views than other jury members. In reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction, the court noted a defendant\u2019s sixth-amendment right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a fundamental element of due process. Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 280. The fact the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges at the time the judge\u2019s wife was subject to voir dire, does not seem to have mattered at all to the result.\nIn sum, the court in Hartson reversed a conviction where the judge\u2019s spouse served on a jury without challenge, the Tody court reversed a conviction where the trial judge\u2019s mother served on the jury where the cause challenge was denied and the defendant still had peremptory challenges available, and none of the three out-of-state cases required a showing of actual prejudice.\nWhile this court has stated \u201cwe will review the trial court\u2019s ruling on a challenge for cause only when an objectionable juror was forced upon a party after it had exhausted its peremptory challenges\u201d (Grady v. Marchini, 375 Ill. App. 3d 174, 179, 874 N.E.2d 179, 184 (2007); Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 602 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1992)), none of the cited cases involved an appearance of impropriety concerning the trial judge.\nIn this case, defendant had a right under both the federal and state constitutions to a trial before an impartial jury. See U.S. Const., amend. VI; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78. Further, defendant had a right to a trial before a jury that appeared to be fair and impartial. \u201cTrial judges should not give grudging acceptance to the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.\u201d People v. Reid, 272 Ill. App. 3d 301, 309, 649 N.E.2d 593, 599 (1995).\nUnder these circumstances, where a trial judge denied a cause challenge to service by the judge\u2019s husband as a juror, I believe reversal and remand for a new trial is required. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. By this dissent, I do not mean to imply the trial judge or her spouse in fact engaged in actual impropriety. The appearance of impropriety alone, where the trial judge goes home each night of a three-day trial, to the same home where she resides with her husband-juror, is sufficient to call into question the fundamental fairness of defendant\u2019s trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE POPE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARIOUS M. BOWENS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140462\nOpinion filed February 23, 2011.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1094-01", "first_page_order": 1110, "last_page_order": 1139 }