{ "id": 4306523, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK T. CHILDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Childs", "decision_date": "2011-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140822", "first_page": "1123", "last_page": "1134", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "407 Ill. App. 3d 1123" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "924 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "in which this court - in a matter of first impression - concluded that the DNA-analysis fee is a fine because it does not reimburse the State for costs associated with prosecuting a defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 1028", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4295931 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1034", "parenthetical": "in which this court - in a matter of first impression - concluded that the DNA-analysis fee is a fine because it does not reimburse the State for costs associated with prosecuting a defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/1028-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777242 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4306500 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "noting that the McLean County Board enacted the drug-court fee on September 1, 2006, and the children's-advocacy-center fee on June 1, 2008, and concluding both assessments are mandatory fines" }, { "page": "306-07", "parenthetical": "vacating and reimposing a $10 drug-court fee and $15 children's-advocacy-center fee, concluding that this court can reimpose mandatory fines" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/406/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 Ill. App. 3d 958", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3716277 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965", "parenthetical": "concluding that the fees imposed under sections 5-1101(d-5) and 5-1101(f-5) are fines because they are \"not intended to specifically reimburse the State for costs it has incurred in prosecuting a defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/405/0958-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947", "parenthetical": "a reviewing court \"[w]ill not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461336 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "a reviewing court \"[w]ill not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5188017 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 N.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 569728 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "900 N.E.2d 1192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282606 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-48" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "840 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "quoting People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 347-48, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260089 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "quoting People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 347-48, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888", "parenthetical": "to prevail on a challenge to the charging instrument for the first time on appeal, a defendant must show prejudice in the preparation of his defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874941 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0472-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 27042, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14502216152370273 }, "sha256": "a26d3f0d186b79f3a9489fecb651e1c676beea9f10fadb9760c6273385f1d00e", "simhash": "1:8b6a541447351552", "word_count": 4457 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:05.247121+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK T. CHILDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nPresiding Justice Knecht and Justice McCullough concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn May 2009, the trial court found defendant, Frederick T. Childs, guilty of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault) (720 ILCS 5/8\u20144(a), 12\u201414(a)(2) (West 2008)) and later sentenced him to 12 years in prison.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State\u2019s charging instrument was defective; (2) the trial court erred by finding that the State was required only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit the offense of criminal sexual assault to convict him of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault); and (3) the McLean County circuit clerk lacked the authority to impose a (a) $10 drug-court fee and (b) $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5-1101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(d\u20146), (f\u20145) (West 2008)).\nBecause we accept the State\u2019s concession that the circuit clerk erred by imposing certain fees, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence as modified and remand for issuance of an amended sentencing judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. The Indictment\nIn April 2008, a grand jury indicted defendant, alleging that he committed the following offense:\n\u201cAttempted Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault\nIn that the defendant knowingly and with the intent to commit criminal sexual assault by the use of force took a substantial step toward the commission of that offense by hitting the victim, C.B., about the body, thereby causing bruising to C.B., and by ordering C.B. to remove her pants, and by removing his penis from his pants.\u201d\nB. The Stipulated Evidence Presented to the Trial Court\nAt an April 2009 stipulated bench trial, the parties agreed to the admission of (1) written statements by (a) the victim, C.B., who was 17 years old at the time of the incident, and (b) a Bloomington police officer; (2) a police crime lab report; and (3) several photographs, which showed the following.\nOn April 4, 2008, C.B. decided to leave a party and drive home. When C.B. informed her friends that she was leaving, defendant asked C.B. if she would give him a ride to his apartment. C.B. reluctantly agreed, noting that despite being at defendant\u2019s apartment with her friends on three previous occasions, she only knew defendant by his nickname.\nAs C.B. drove, defendant repeatedly reached over and rubbed C.B.\u2019s thigh with his hand. Each time defendant touched C.B., she pushed him away and told him to stop. When C.B. arrived at defendant\u2019s apartment building, defendant suddenly grabbed C.B.\u2019s steering wheel and told C.B. that she was (1) \u201cnot going anywhere\u201d and (2) \u201cwas going to have sex with him that night.\u201d C.B. cried and shouted that she was not going to have sex with defendant and that she needed to go home. Defendant responded, \u201cYou\u2019re not going anywhere, bitch,\u201d adding, \u201cYou\u2019re gonna stay here and I\u2019m gonna fuck you, bitch.\u201d Defendant then shifted C.B.\u2019s car into park and removed the ignition key.\nDefendant unzipped his trousers, exposed his penis, and told C.B., \u201cYou\u2019re gonna suck my dick, bitch.\u201d and \u201cI\u2019m gonna get some head from you.\u201d C.B. refused, again yelling that she had to go home. Defendant then (1) pulled his trousers up, (2) exited the car, (3) dangled C.B.\u2019s keys in front of her, and (4) taunted C.B. by saying, \u201cNow where you gonna go bitch?\u201d When C.B. attempted to make a call on her cellular phone, defendant returned to C.B.\u2019s car to stop her.\nDuring the ensuing struggle, defendant wrestled the phone from C.B. by repeatedly punching her in the face and body with such force that it dislodged C.B.\u2019s nose and ear piercings. With each punch, defendant yelled that C.B. \u201cwas going to have sex with him.\u201d C.B. estimated that defendant continued hitting her for at least four minutes until she relented because she was in \u201csignificant pain\u201d and believed that she had no other choice. C.B. told defendant that she would comply with his demands provided he stopped beating her and remained calm.\nAfter defendant told C.B. that she \u201cbetter do what the fuck I say bitch,\u201d defendant gave C.B. back her keys and told her to drive to an area near the rear entrance of his apartment building. After C.B. complied, defendant again removed the car\u2019s ignition key and ordered C.B. into the backseat. C.B. begged defendant to use a condom that she had supplied, but defendant responded that he did not need a condom because he intended to sodomize her. Defendant later agreed to use a condom based on C.B.\u2019s persistent cries that he do so. As defendant applied the condom, he told C.B. to remove her pants. C.B. told defendant that he could not have sex with her because she was menstruating but eventually complied with defendant\u2019s order (1) to remove her tampon, which she threw out the window, and (2) position herself on her hands and knees.\nAlthough defendant then attempted to penetrate C.B.\u2019s vagina and anus, he succeeded only in pushing his flaccid penis into C.B.\u2019s buttocks and against the back of her thigh. He did so with such force that he caused C.B. to repeatedly hit her head against the car window. About 30 seconds later, defendant stopped and ordered C.B. to put her clothes back on. Defendant told C.B. that (1) he had never done that before; (2) he \u201cwanted\u201d her, but he knew C.B. was not \u201cgoing to give it to [him]\u201d so he \u201chad to take it\u201d; and (3) she could not tell anyone about this incident. Defendant then pulled up his trousers, threw the condom out of the car window, and ran into his apartment. C.B. then drove home and described defendant\u2019s actions to her parents.\nThe following day, police collected a tampon and a condom near defendant\u2019s apartment. Testing later confirmed that the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) on those items matched C.B.\u2019s and defendant\u2019s respective DNA profiles. Three admitted photographs depicted (1) two separate bruises located on C.B.\u2019s left cheek and under her chin; (2) three separate bruises located on C.B.\u2019s right cheek, right ear, and forehead; and (3) a circular bruise on C.B.\u2019s thigh. After accepting the parties\u2019 stipulation, the trial court continued the trial until the next month.\nC. The Parties\u2019 Respective Arguments to the Trial Court\nWhen defendant\u2019s stipulated bench trial resumed in May 2009, the parties informed the trial court that their pending arguments did not concern the stipulated evidence previously presented but instead, how the law applied to that evidence.\nThe State argued that the evidence established defendant committed the offense of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault) as alleged in its indictment. In particular, that defendant intended to commit a criminal sexual assault that was aggravated by bodily harm, which the State identified as the bruising defendant had inflicted upon C.B. during his attempt to sexually assault her. With regard to that bodily harm, the State asserted that it was not required to prove that defendant intended to inflict bodily harm, but instead, that the bodily harm was a natural and reasonably foreseeable consequence of the force defendant used in attempting to commit a criminal sexual assault on C.B.\nIn response, defense counsel argued that at the time of the offense, the evidence established that defendant committed the offense of attempt (criminal sexual assault) in that defendant intended only to sexually penetrate C.B. by the use of force. In particular, defense counsel, noting that the elements of the aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault statute require the (1) completion of the criminal sexual assault and (2) an accompanying aggravating factor, contended that the State improperly \u201celevated\u201d defendant\u2019s act of attempt (criminal sexual assault) to attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault) by \u201cretrospectively\u201d using C.B.\u2019s bruises that later appeared, even though he had not committed an act of sexual penetration. Defense counsel summarized his argument as follows:\n\u201cIt\u2019s my argument, Your Honor, that at the time the force was used, it was just that. It was use of force as described in the statute defining criminal sexual assault and therefore[,] since we\u2019re talking about an uncompleted sex act, we are talking about an attempted criminal sexual assault.\u201d\nD. The Trial Court\u2019s Findings and Sentence\nFollowing arguments, the trial court made the following findings:\n\u201cIt is [the court\u2019s] belief and [its] finding that the intent required by the attempt statute is the intent to commit the core, or predicate, offense of criminal sexual assault. The intent to perpetrate bodily harm, the bruises in this case, as an aggravating factor is not a required, specific intent. ***\nThe intent to perpetrate, or to inflict the bruises, the bodily harm, in any event [the court] think[s] is fairly established beyond a reasonable doubt by *** the nature of *** defendant\u2019s assaultive conduct and his own statements. [The court] appreciate[s] that the premeditative dimension of the specific intent might well be that [defendant] wanted to \u2014 his intention, his premeditation was to secure sexual relations, and that he has not specifically contemplated the infliction of harm to do so, but his premeditation [the court believes], based on [defendant\u2019s] conduct and his statements, fairly established his contemplation that [the infliction of harm] was a possible recourse to which he would resort, and which he, indeed, resorted to. ***\n*** Defendant\u2019s statements belie the inferences that there was no intent, because he made statements indicating that he was going to secure what he wanted that night by force and by the infliction of injuries, which were the naturalf ]and[ ]probable consequences of the infliction of the force that [defendant] inflicted. [The court finds] that the retrospective analysis that [defense counsel] reflects upon simply is not foreclosed in these circumstances by virtue of the fact that this is an attempt offense.\u201d\nThereafter, the court found defendant guilty of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault).\nE. The Trial Court\u2019s Sentencing Order and the Circuit Clerk\u2019s Notice to Party\nFollowing a July 9, 2009, sentencing hearing, the trial court filed a sentencing order that imposed a 12-year prison sentence with 123 days of sentencing credit for time defendant spent in pretrial confinement. That same day, the court also filed a supplemental sentencing order, imposing the following financial obligations against defendant: (1) a $20 penalty under section 10(c)(2) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Act) (725 ILCS 240/10(c)(2) (West 2008)), (2) a $200 DNA-analysis fee under section 5\u20144\u20143(j) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5\u20144\u20143(j) (West 2008)), and (3) a $200 sexual-assault fine under section 5\u20149\u20141.7(b)(1) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5\u20149\u20141.7(b)(1) (West 2008)).\nOn July 10, 2009, the circuit clerk filed a notice to party, notifying defendant of the fines and court costs that had been assessed against him. The circuit clerk\u2019s notice, which was not signed by the trial court, included, in pertinent part, a (1) $10 drug-court fee and (2) $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee pursuant to sections 5-1101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code.\nOn July 14, 2009, the trial court filed an amended supplemental sentencing order again imposing only (1) a $20 Act penalty, (2) a $200 DNA-analysis fee, and (3) a $200 sexual-assault fine. On July 15, 2009, the circuit clerk filed another notice to party, which was not signed by the trial court, imposing, in pertinent part, (1) a $10 drug-court fee and (2) a $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee against defendant.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant argues that (1) the State\u2019s charging instrument was defective; (2) the trial court erred by finding that the State was required only to prove he intended to commit criminal sexual assault to convict him of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault); and (3) the circuit clerk lacked the authority to impose a (a) $10 drug-court fee and (b) $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code. We address defendant\u2019s contentions in turn.\nA. Defendant\u2019s Claim Regarding the State\u2019s Charging Instrument\nDefendant argues that the State\u2019s charging instrument was defective. Specifically, defendant contends that the State\u2019s indictment failed to allege that he had the requisite intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault and, as a consequence, failed to apprise him of the offense with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense. We disagree.\nThe timing of a challenge to the charging instrument is significant in determining whether a defendant is entitled to relief. People v. Davis, 217 Ill. 2d 472, 478, 841 N.E.2d 884, 888 (2005). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the charging instrument for the first time on appeal, \u201c \u2018a reviewing court need only determine whether the charging instrument apprised the defendant of the precise offense charged with enough specificity to prepare his or her defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.\u2019 \u201d People v. Burke, 362 Ill. App. 3d 99, 103, 840 N.E.2d 281, 284 (2005) (quoting People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 347-48, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001)). In other words, the question on appeal is whether the defect in the charging instrument prejudiced the defendant in preparing his defense. Davis, 217 Ill. 2d at 479, 841 N.E.2d at 888. In making this determination, a reviewing court may refer to the record. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348, 747 N.E.2d at 346.\nIn support of his contention that the State\u2019s indictment prejudiced him, defendant asserts that because the State\u2019s indictment charged, in part, that he \u201cknowingly and with the intent to commit criminal sexual assault by the use of force\u201d instead of charging him with \u201cknowingly and with the intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault by the use of force,\u201d the indictment failed to apprise him of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense. However, defendant fails to specify how the omission of the word \u201caggravated\u201d adversely affected his defense by articulating the actions his counsel would have otherwise taken if the State\u2019s indictment had included that word. See Davis, 217 Ill. 2d at 479, 841 N.E.2d at 888 (to prevail on a challenge to the charging instrument for the first time on appeal, a defendant must show prejudice in the preparation of his defense). Moreover, the record belies defendant\u2019s claim that his counsel was under the misapprehension that the State \u201chad only charged, and could only prove that [defendant] had the intent to commit the included offense of criminal sexual assault.\u201d\nIn this case, the record shows that at the start of defendant\u2019s April 2009 stipulated bench trial, defense counsel agreed with the State that the sole issue before the trial court concerned whether the stipulated evidence presented proved defendant guilty of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault), as the State had alleged in its indictment, or attempt (criminal sexual assault), as defense counsel advocated. In this regard, the record also shows that defendant\u2019s counsel was not only aware of the State\u2019s position with regard to the offense charged in the indictment, but also prepared in that he argued zealously in opposition to that position. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that the State\u2019s indictment failed to apprise him of the offense with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense. Further, defendant\u2019s conviction constitutes a bar to a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct, and defendant does not even argue otherwise.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the Trial Court Erred\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by finding that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that he intended to commit the offense of criminal sexual assault to convict him of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. We disagree.\n1. The Offense of Attempt\nSection 8\u20144(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code), provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Elements of the Offense.\nA person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/8\u20144(a) (West 2008).\n2. The Offense of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault\nSection 12\u201414(a)(2) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances existed during *** the commission of the offense:\n(2) the accused caused bodily harm[.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201414(a)(2) (West 2008).\nA person commits the offense of criminal sexual assault if he \u201ccommits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201413(a)(1) (West 2008). \u201c \u2018Sexual penetration\u2019 means any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth[,] or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or *** object into the sex organ or anus of another person, including but not limited to cunnilingus, fellatio[,] or anal penetration.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201412(f) (West 2008).\n3. The Trial Court\u2019s Findings\nIn support of his argument that the trial court erred, defendant contends that the offense of attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault) required the State to prove that he intended to commit the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault instead of merely proving that he intended to commit criminal sexual assault. Defendant\u2019s contention is misguided.\nAs previously outlined, the elements of attempt are (1) an intent to commit the specific offense and (2) an overt act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that offense. People v. Rincon, 387 Ill. App. 3d 708, 723, 900 N.E.2d 1192, 1205 (2008). Again, a person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault when he commits criminal sexual assault \u2014 that is, sexual penetration by the use of force \u2014 accompanied by a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor during the commission of the criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/12\u201414(a) (West 2008). Because the statutory offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault does not prescribe a mental state, the mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness must be implied. People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 633, 759 N.E.2d 83, 91 (2001).\nIf, during the course of a sexual assault, bodily harm is caused to the victim, it is unnecessary for the State to prove that such harm was inflicted knowingly or intentionally. People v. Russell, 234 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688, 600 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (1992). \u201cAn inadvertent or accidental infliction of simple bodily harm will nonetheless subject the assailant to conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, the trial court noted that the State was required to prove defendant intended to commit the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. However, the court further explained that, in accordance with the aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault statute, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to commit the offense of criminal sexual assault \u2014 which defendant admitted to the court he committed \u2014 and that the stipulated evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant inflicted bodily harm during his attempt to sexually assault C.B.\nIn other words, the trial court first concluded that the State did not need to prove that defendant intended to inflict bodily harm upon C.B. to prove attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault) as long as the State proved \u2014 as it did \u2014 that defendant intended to commit a sexual assault upon C.B. and, in the process, inflicted bodily harm upon her. We agree and view this result as consistent with Russell.\nAlthough this analysis is sufficient to decide this issue, we further note that the trial court also concluded that if the State did need to prove that defendant intended to inflict bodily harm upon C.B. to prove attempt (aggravated criminal sexual assault), the evidence was sufficient to do so. Again, we agree.\nHere, the stipulated evidence showed that defendant punched C.B. repeatedly until she acquiesced to defendant\u2019s sexual demands. In so doing, he inflicted bodily harm in the form of bruises on C.B.\u2019s face and thigh. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004) (a reviewing court \u201c[w]ill not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt\u201d).\nC. Defendant\u2019s Claim Regarding the Circuit Clerk\u2019s Imposition of Certain Fees\n1. The Imposition of the Drug-Court Fee and Children\u2019s-Advocacy-Center Fee\nDefendant also argues that the circuit clerk lacked the authority to impose a (1) $10 drug-court fee and (2) $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code. The State concedes that the circuit clerk erred by imposing the fees and we accept the State\u2019s concession.\nSections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145) of the Counties Code provide as follows:\n\u201cAdditional Fees to finance court system. A county board may enact by ordinance or resolution the following fees:\n$ ^ ^\n(d\u20145) A $10 fee to be paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty *** under Section 5\u20149\u20141 of the [Unified Code] to be placed in the county general fund and used to finance the county mental health court, the county drug court, or both.\n* * *\n(f\u20145) In each county in which a Children\u2019s Advocacy Center provides services, the county board may adopt a mandatory fee of between $5 and $30 to be paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty *** under Section 5\u20149\u20141 of the [Unified Code] for a felony ***.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5\u20141101(d\u20145), (f\u20145) (West 2008).\nSee People v. Williams, 405 Ill. App. 3d 958, 965 (2010) (concluding that the fees imposed under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145) are fines because they are \u201cnot intended to specifically reimburse the State for costs it has incurred in prosecuting a defendant\u201d); see also People v. Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305 (2010) (noting that the McLean County Board enacted the drug-court fee on September 1, 2006, and the children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee on June 1, 2008, and concluding both assessments are mandatory fines).\nIn People v. Swank, 344 Ill. App. 3d 738, 747-48, 800 N.E.2d 864, 871 (2003), this court defined the proper role of judicial and nonjudicial members in imposing statutory fines as follows:\n\u201cThe imposition of a fine is a judicial act. \u2018The clerk of the court is a nonjudicial member of the court and, as such, has no power to impose sentences or levy fines.\u2019 [Citation.] Instead, the circuit clerk has authority only to collect judicially imposed fines. [Citation.]\u201d\nIn this case, the record reveals that the trial court did not impose either (1) a $10 drug-court fee or (2) a $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee, which later appeared on the circuit clerk\u2019s July 2009 notice to party. Thus, because we have previously held that the drug-court fee and children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee are both mandatory fines, those assessments cannot be imposed by the circuit clerk. Accordingly, we (1) vacate the fines imposed by the circuit clerk and (2) reimpose the $10 drug-court fee and $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code. See Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 306-07 (vacating and reimposing a $10 drug-court fee and $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee, concluding that this court can reimpose mandatory fines).\nIn addition, we note that because the record shows that defendant spent 123 days in pretrial confinement on a bailable offense, he is entitled to receive a total credit of $25 to be applied to his $10 drug-court fee and $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee pursuant to section 110\u201414 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/110\u201414 (West 2008)).\n2. The Trial Court\u2019s Imposition of a $20 Act Assessment\nSection 10(b) of the Act mandates the imposition of an additional financial penalty when a defendant is convicted of a felony. 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008). If the trial court imposes fines on a defendant convicted of a felony, the additional Act penalty is calculated at \u201c$4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed.\u201d 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008). If no fines are imposed by the court, the additional Act penalty is $25 for crimes of violence and $20 for any other felony. 725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2008). In addition, any Act penalty imposed is not subject to the $5-per-day credit for incarceration on a bailable offense under section 110\u201414 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2008).\nHere, because this court imposed a $10 drug-court fee and $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee and the trial court had previously imposed a $200 sexual-assault fine and $200 DNA-analysis fee, defendant was assessed $425 in fines. See People v. Long, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034, 924 N.E.2d 511, 516 (2010) (in which this court \u2014 in a matter of first impression \u2014 concluded that the DNA-analysis fee is a fine because it does not reimburse the State for costs associated with prosecuting a defendant). Therefore, we vacate the court\u2019s imposition of a $20 penalty under section 10(c) of the Act and impose a $44 penalty under section 10(b) of the Act ($425 divided by $40 equals 10.6; 10 plus a \u201cfraction thereof\u201d multiplied by $4 equals $44).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we (1) affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence; (2) vacate the circuit clerk\u2019s imposition of fines; (3) impose a $10 drug-court fee and $15 children\u2019s-advocacy-center fee under sections 5\u20141101(d\u20145) and 5\u20141101(f\u20145), respectively, of the Counties Code, which are offset by credit for the time defendant served in pretrial custody; (4) vacate the trial court\u2019s imposition of a $20 Act penalty under section 10(c) of the Act, and (5) impose a $44 Act penalty under section 10(b) of the Act. We remand for issuance of an amended sentencing judgment consistent with this opinion. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed as modified and remanded with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Lawrence Bapst, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK T. CHILDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140822\nOpinion filed March 4, 2011.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Lawrence Bapst, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1123-01", "first_page_order": 1139, "last_page_order": 1150 }