{ "id": 5770811, "name": "In re Ch. W et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jerry Wells, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wells", "decision_date": "2011-03-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 4\u201409\u20140925, 4\u201410\u20140831 cons.", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "553", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "408 Ill. App. 3d 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 1086", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229714 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746-47" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444184 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463-64" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450528 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 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App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073728 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "noting the proper way for a party to ask the court to take judicial notice of material in the court file so that the court could determine what matters were admissible under the rules of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4299401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830", "parenthetical": "No. 4-09-0925" }, { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0825-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1119, "char_count": 29863, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.497341544922815e-08, "percentile": 0.3997949301291311 }, "sha256": "5871ada477afad0ba8800418ebfa0205fbeedc60d39c2088f09b485b1750fa43", "simhash": "1:2ab3f03c9e741931", "word_count": 4890 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:24.186889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re Ch. W et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jerry Wells, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nPresiding Justice Knecht and Justice Appleton concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn August 2009, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as to Ch. W (born in October 2001) and Ca. W. (born in September 2002), the minor children of respondent, Jerry Wells. The minor children\u2019s grandmother and adoptive mother, Dena Wells, is not a party to this appeal. After an adjudicatory hearing, the Champaign County circuit court found the minor children were neglected and dependent. In December 2009, the court made the minor children wards of the court and appointed the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as their guardian. Respondent appealed, contending (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) the State violated his due-process rights, and (3) the trial court erred by finding the minor children were neglected.\nIn April 2010, this court retained jurisdiction of the cause but remanded it to the Champaign County circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on respondent\u2019s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. In re Ch. W, 399 Ill. App. 3d 825, 830, 927 N.E.2d 872, 876 (2010) (No. 4\u201409\u20140925). On remand, respondent filed a motion for a new adjudicatory hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In October 2010, the Champaign County circuit court held a hearing on respondent\u2019s motion and found respondent was not denied effective assistance of counsel at the adjudicatory hearing. We now address the merits of all three of respondent\u2019s arguments on appeal and affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn 2004, respondent and Dena adopted the minor children, who are Dena\u2019s biological grandchildren. Dena suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. On March 26, 2009, DCFS became involved with the family after allegations were made that respondent had molested J.C., a neighbor child. The next day, Sheri Foley, a DCFS investigator, conducted separate forensic interviews of J.C. and Ch. W, which were recorded by both video and audio. Another DCFS investigator interviewed Ca. W and another playmate of respondent\u2019s children, H.S. Under a DCFS safety plan, Ch. W and Ca. W. remained in the home with Dena, and respondent lived elsewhere.\nIn April 2009, respondent was arrested and incarcerated. People v. Wells, No. 09\u2014CF\u2014746 (Cir. Ct. Champaign Co.). In June 2009, a grand jury charged respondent with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12\u201414.1(a)(1) (West 2006)) (Ch. W alleged victim) and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12\u201416(c)(1)(i) (West 2008)) (J.C. alleged victim) for his actions in March 2008. In the criminal case, the State moved to admit, inter alia, Ch. W.\u2019s statements to Foley under section 115\u201410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/115\u201410 (West 2006)). After holding a hearing on the motion and viewing the recordings of the interviews, Judge Heidi Ladd denied the motion as to Ch. W.\u2019s statements because Foley\u2019s questions were too leading to provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In October 2009, the State dismissed all of the criminal charges against respondent, and he was released from jail.\nOn August 14, 2009, the police took protective custody of the minor children when Dena was admitted to the hospital and had no one to care for the minor children. Three days later, the State filed its petition, alleging the minor children were (1) neglected under section 2\u20143(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2\u20143(1)(b) (West 2008)), in that their environment was injurious to their welfare when they resided with respondent as the environment exposed them to the risk of sexual abuse; and (2) dependent under section 2\u20144(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u20144(1)(a) (West 2008)) because they lacked a parent, guardian, or legal custodian to care for them due to respondent\u2019s incarceration and Dena\u2019s poor physical health.\nOn September 25, 2009, the trial court commenced the adjudicatory hearing, at which respondent was represented by David Apple-man. Dena admitted and stipulated to the dependent count of the petition, and the shelter-care report served as the factual basis for the admission. The court entered judgment in favor of the State and against Dena and then proceeded to hear evidence as to respondent. Only the pertinent testimony presented at the adjudicatory hearing is set forth below.\nFoley testified she had received specific training in forensic interviewing of children and had \u201cconducted 185 sexual[-]abuse reports.\u201d On March 27, 2009, Foley interviewed Ch. W. at the Child Advocacy Center, which had a child-friendly atmosphere. Foley indicated Ch. W was developmentally delayed and that, while Ch. W\u2019s language was clear, it was more on the level of a five-year-old than a seven-year-old. According to Foley, Ch. W. was comfortable during the interview and did not seem nervous or fearful. Foley stated that, due to Ch. W.\u2019s limited ability to answer open-ended questions, the questions asked her were more direct as to sexual abuse.\nWhen Foley was asked about what Ch. W. said regarding the charges being investigated, defense counsel made an objection for the record, which the trial court overruled. Foley testified Ch. W disclosed sexual touching by respondent, whom Ch. W. referred to both as father and grandfather. Specifically, Ch. W stated her father had touched her in the vaginal area.\nDuring the interview, Foley used both anatomically correct drawings and dolls. Ch. W. was able to identify and describe all the body parts on both the male and female drawings. Ch. W. also knew the differences between the genders and, for the most part, knew what every body part did in her own language. Foley admitted that, at certain points, Ch. W. was unable to identify certain body parts. Foley explained the dolls were tools used to help her understand what the child had stated happened. Foley showed Ch. W. all of the parts on the dolls, which were fully clothed. Foley asked Ch. W. to show her what happened, and Ch. W took the male doll\u2019s hand and touched it to the girl doll\u2019s vaginal area. Ch. W indicated it was skin-to-skin touching and Ch. W. was not wearing clothes. Foley testified Ch. W. stated it happened more than once but it was difficult to know a number with Ch. W.\u2019s age and developmental delays.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel asked Foley if she was able to make an estimate of Ch. W\u2019s mental age and what term Ch. W. used for \u201cvagina.\u201d He also asked a couple of questions about (1) what Ch. W called respondent and (2) Ch. W\u2019s biological father. In total, respondent\u2019s counsel asked Foley six questions on cross-examination.\nThe State also presented the testimony of Jeffrey Smith, the DCFS caseworker for respondent\u2019s family; Investigator Dwayne Roelfs, who interviewed respondent twice; and Deputy Andrew Good, an investigator with the Champaign County sheriff\u2019s department who observed Investigator Roelfs\u2019 two interviews of respondent. Investigator Roelfs testified respondent recalled an incident in his bathroom, in which Ch. W touched his partially erect penis. Respondent told her never to do it again. Respondent also recalled a time when he was giving Ch. W. a bath and was slightly aroused by bathing Ch. W.\nThe guardian ad litem presented the testimony of Deputy Kristin Zimmer, who had interviewed J.C.\nRespondent testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of his sister, Kathy Bush, and his brother, Greg Wells. Respondent testified that, due to his wife\u2019s medical problems, it was his job to bathe and dress the children. He denied touching Ch. W inappropriately. Respondent also explained he had a problem with incontinence and could not always get the door shut when using the bathroom. One time, when he was unable to get the door shut, Ch. W entered the bathroom and touched his penis. He slapped her hand and told her not to do it again. That had been three years earlier, and Ch. W. had not done it again. Bush and Greg testified they had not had any problems with respondent watching their children unsupervised.\nIn adjudicating the minor children neglected, the trial court noted it found the testimony of Foley to be \u201cparticularly convincing.\u201d Specifically, the court noted it found her interview was conducted under circumstances that enhanced the minor\u2019s credibility, rather than detracted from it. Besides Foley\u2019s testimony, the court noted Investigator Roelfs\u2019 testimony that, on at least one occasion, Ch. W. had touched respondent\u2019s penis.\nAt the December 2, 2009, dispositional hearing, the trial court found respondent was unfit and unable and Dena was unable to care for the minors. The court made the minors wards of the court and appointed DCFS as their guardian. The next day, the court filed a written dispositional order, noting no just reason existed to delay enforcement or appeal. On December 9, 2009, respondent filed a notice of appeal in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. May 30, 2008), and thus this court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2006). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (providing the rules governing civil cases govern appeals from final judgments in all proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, except for delinquency ones).\nOn appeal, this court found the appellate record was insufficient to address respondent\u2019s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and remanded the cause to the trial court for a hearing on the issue. In doing so, we retained jurisdiction of the appeal so we could address respondent\u2019s claims if needed. Ch. W., 399 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 927 N.E.2d at 876.\nOn remand, respondent filed a motion for a new adjudicatory hearing, alleging his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to (1) ask the trial court to take judicial notice of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling regarding Ch. W.\u2019s statements, (2) object to the testimony of Foley concerning her interview of Ch. W., (3) submit the recordings of Foley\u2019s interviews of the children, and (4) aggressively or thoroughly cross-examine Foley regarding the conduct of the interview.\nOn October 6, 2010, the Champaign County circuit court commenced a hearing on respondent\u2019s motion. At the hearing, the court considered (1) the verbatim transcript of the section 115\u201410 hearing in case No. 09\u2014CF\u2014746, which included Judge Ladd\u2019s oral ruling; (2) the recordings of the four DCFS interviews; (3) the appellate record in this case; and (4) respondent\u2019s testimony. Respondent testified he discussed Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling with Appleman. At the adjudicatory hearing, respondent asked Appleman how Foley could be testifying, and Apple-man \u201cshushed\u201d him so Appleman could hear what was being said.\nOn October 13, 2010, the trial court reconvened the hearing and heard the parties\u2019 arguments. The court found Appleman was not deficient for failing to raise (1) Dr. Buetow\u2019s opinion she did not find physical findings consistent with abuse and (2) Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling because the court could not have taken judicial notice of it. The court did find Appleman deficient for not (1) cross-examining Foley\u2019s testimony about her need to be more direct with Ch. W, (2) viewing the interview recordings, and (3) using the interview recordings as evidence or in cross-examination. While the court found some deficiencies, it concluded no reasonable probability existed a different result would have occurred given appropriate performance by trial counsel. The court noted the recording of Ch. W.\u2019s interview would not have detracted from the credibility of Foley\u2019s testimony.\nWhen the cause returned to this court, we gave it an additional number (No. 4\u201410\u20140831). Under the new number, the parties filed briefs addressing the trial court\u2019s October 2010 ruling on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motion. We now address the merits of all of respondent\u2019s contentions of error.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nRespondent argues the trial court erred by finding he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserts the court erred by finding (1) respondent\u2019s counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to object to Foley\u2019s testimony about Ch. W.\u2019s out-of-court statements, (2) it could not have taken judicial notice of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling, and (3) respondent\u2019s counsel\u2019s deficient performance did not prejudice respondent.\nSection 1\u2014 5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1\u20145(1) (West 2008)) grants minors and their parents the right to be represented by counsel in juvenile proceedings. While the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings is statutory and not constitutional, \u201cIllinois courts apply the standard utilized in criminal cases to gauge the effectiveness of counsel in juvenile proceedings.\u201d In re S.G., 347 Ill. App. 3d 476, 479, 807 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2004). Thus, courts review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in juvenile proceedings under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). S.G., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 807 N.E.2d at 1248.\nTo establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, one must prove (1) his counsel\u2019s performance failed to meet an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.2d 1158, 1163-64 (1999). To satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, the party must demonstrate counsel made errors so serious and counsel\u2019s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed by the sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI). Further, the party must overcome the strong presumption the challenged action or inaction could have been the product of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the party must prove a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the proceedings\u2019 result would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64.\nSince the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue on remand, our review of this issue is similar to reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a postconviction petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing. In such cases, our supreme court has applied the manifestly erroneous standard of review. See People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384, 686 N.E.2d 574, 582 (1997). The term \u201cmanifest error\u201d means error that is \u201cclearly evident, plain, and indisputable.\u201d Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d at 384-85, 686 N.E.2d at 582.\n1. Objection to Foley\u2019s Testimony\nRespondent argues the trial court erred by finding respondent\u2019s counsel was not deficient for failing to object to Foley\u2019s testimony about Ch. W.\u2019s out-of-court statements. On appeal, respondent asserts such statements were inadmissible under section 2\u201418(4) (c) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u201418(4)(c) (West 2008)) because they were not really made by Ch. W and did not relate to an allegation of sexual abuse.\nOur supreme court has instructed us to begin our review of a case by determining whether any issues have been forfeited. See People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106, 885 N.E.2d 1053, 1059 (2008). A review of the record shows that, in the trial court, respondent emphasized he was not arguing Foley\u2019s testimony was inadmissible but instead that it was unreliable. The supreme court has held a party forfeits its right to complain of an error where to do so would be inconsistent with the party\u2019s position in an earlier court proceeding. McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255, 730 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2000). Additionally, a party cannot complain of error that it induced the court to make or to which it consented. McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255, 730 N.E.2d at 3. Since respondent\u2019s argument on appeal is inconsistent with his argument in the trial court, we conclude respondent has forfeited this issue.\n2. Judicial Notice\nRespondent also asserts the trial court erred by concluding it would not have taken judicial notice of Judge Ladd\u2019s oral ruling at the section 115\u201410 hearing in respondent\u2019s criminal case.\nJudicial notice is an evidentiary concept that allows for the admission into evidence of matters without formal proof. National Aircraft Leasing, Ltd. v. American Airlines, Inc., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1017, 394 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1979). Since it is an evidentiary concept, the rules regarding the admission of evidence apply. See In re J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 629, 699 N.E.2d 167, 175 (1998) (noting the proper way for a party to ask the court to take judicial notice of material in the court file so that the court could determine what matters were admissible under the rules of evidence). In his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motion, respondent asserted his counsel should have asked the trial court to take judicial notice of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling but did not provide an evidentiary basis for doing so. At the hearing on the motion, respondent raised the issue of collateral estoppel, asserting the State should have been estopped from arguing Ch. W\u2019s statements to Foley were reliable because of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling.\nFor collateral estoppel to apply, the following minimum requirements must be met:\n\u201c(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 757 N.E.2d 471, 478 (2001).\nMoreover, \u201cApplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel must be narrowly tailored to fit the precise facts and issues that were clearly determined in the prior judgment.\u201d Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 390-91, 757 N.E.2d at 478.\nSection 115\u201410(a)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (725 ILCS 5/115\u201410(a)(2) (West 2006)) provides an exception to the hearsay rule in criminal cases for out-of-court statements made by the victim, \u201cdescribing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.\u201d However, section 115\u201410(b) provides, in pertinent part, such evidence is only admissible if:\n\u201c(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and (2) The child *** either:\n(A) testifies at the proceeding; or\n(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement[.]\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u201410(b) (West 2006).\nIn cases under the Juvenile Court Act, section 2\u201418(4) (c) of that act (705 ILCS 405/2\u201418(4)(c) (West 2008)) provides for the admissibility of \u201c[pjrevious statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect.\u201d While such statements are admissible, they are insufficient in themselves to support an abuse or neglect finding if they are uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination. 705 ILCS 405/2\u201418(4)(c) (West 2008).\nIn this case, Judge Ladd concluded Ch. W.\u2019s statements to Foley were inadmissible under section 115\u201410 because the leading nature of Foley\u2019s questions did not provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. See 725 ILCS 5/115\u201410(b)(1) (West 2006). Judge Ladd did not expressly find Ch. W.\u2019s statements were not (1) hers or (2) statements relating to an act of sexual abuse. In fact, in his brief, respondent asserts Judge Ladd\u2019s finding was \u201ctantamount\u201d to a finding Ch. W.\u2019s were not statements made by the minor relating to abuse. Collateral estoppel only applies to \u201cissues that were clearly determined in the prior judgment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 391, 757 N.E.2d at 478. Thus, collateral estoppel would not apply as argued by respondent on appeal.\nSince respondent has not provided a proper basis for the admissibility in this case of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling in the criminal case, we find the trial court did not err by finding it could not have taken judicial notice of Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling.\n3. Prejudice\nRespondent last asserts the trial court erred by concluding respondent\u2019s counsel\u2019s deficient performance did not prejudice respondent.\nAs stated, to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, respondent had to demonstrate \u201ca reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. \u201cA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.\nThe trial court found respondent\u2019s counsel was deficient for failing to (1) cross-examine Foley about needing to be more direct in questioning Ch. W. and (2) review and present the recording of Foley\u2019s interview of Ch. W. However, the court found respondent was not prejudiced by the deficiency because the recording of Ch. W.\u2019s statements made her report of abuse more credible. The court noted Foley did not lead Ch. W to the conclusion respondent was the one who did the inappropriate touching.\nAfter reviewing the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we conclude the trial court\u2019s reasoning and conclusion on the issue of prejudice were not manifestly erroneous. While Foley had to repeat and rephrase questions for Ch. W. and sometimes asked leading questions, the question to which Ch. W. pointed to a drawing representing respondent was open-ended. Foley had asked Ch. W. if anyone touched her privates. Moreover, when Ch. W responded by using the diagrams and dolls, it again was to open-ended questions.\nRespondent places a great deal of weight on Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling. However, he has failed to show the trial court was bound by that ruling. Moreover, Judge Ladd considered Ch. W.\u2019s statements in the context of a criminal proceeding. In a criminal proceeding, a defendant has a sixth-amendment right to confront and cross-examine a witness. U.S. Const., amend VI. The hearsay exception contained in section 115\u201410 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a narrow one that is also limited by our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). See People v. Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1001, 838 N.E.2d 328, 333 (2005). Neglect proceedings are civil in nature, and the respondent does not have a sixth-amendment right to confront witnesses and Crawford does not apply. In re C.M., 351 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916-17, 815 N.E.2d 49, 52 (2004). Accordingly, Judge Ladd had to consider the interview in the context of protecting an accused\u2019s constitutional right that is not present in this case.\nB. Due Process\nIn his original brief, respondent further asserted the State\u2019s offering of Foley\u2019s testimony at the adjudicatory hearing violated his right to due process.\n\u201cParents have a constitutional right to the custody of their children ***.\u201d In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d 628, 637, 848 N.E.2d 130, 137 (2006). The State\u2019s deprivation of that right must comply with due-process principles. O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 637, 848 N.E.2d at 137. Compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act and fundamental fairness provides the parent due process. O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 638, 848 N.E.2d at 138.\nThe applicable exceptions to the hearsay rule are different under the Criminal Procedure Code and the Juvenile Court Act. In the trial court, respondent admitted Ch. W\u2019s statements were admissible under section 2\u201418(4) (c) of the Juvenile Court Act. Thus, the State complied with the Juvenile Court Act.\nRespondent further argues the State\u2019s presentation of the evidence was fundamentally unfair. We disagree for several reasons. First, respondent has not shown the trial court in this case would have been bound by Judge Ladd\u2019s ruling. We note the First District rejected the argument collateral estoppel bars a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act based on criminal sexual abuse when the alleged perpetrator was acquitted of the criminal-sexual-abuse charges. In re A.A., 307 Ill. App. 3d 403, 405, 718 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1999). Second, as explained, Judge Ladd was dealing with a more narrow hearsay exception and had to take into consideration respondent\u2019s sixth-amendment right to confront witnesses, which he did not have in the neglect proceedings. Third, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act have a different purpose than criminal proceedings. In proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, the purpose is \u201cto secure for each minor subject thereto the care and guidance which will best serve the minor\u2019s safety and moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare, and the best interests of the community.\u201d In re Austin W, 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43, 823 N.E.2d 572, 580 (2005); 705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(1) (West 2008). Finally, respondent had the ability to cross-examine Foley and present the recordings of the interview to make the trial court aware of any reliability issues. (We have already addressed his counsel\u2019s failure to do so in the previous section.) Accordingly, we find the State did not violate respondent\u2019s due-process rights by introducing Foley\u2019s testimony about Ch. W.\u2019s statements.\nC. Neglect Finding\nLast, respondent asserts the trial court erred by finding the minors were neglected.\nThe State\u2019s petition alleged the children were neglected under section 2\u20143(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u20143(1)(b) (West 2008)), which provides a neglected minor is \u201cany minor under 18 years of age whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.\u201d Our supreme court has explained the terms \u201cneglect\u201d and \u201cinjurious environment\u201d do not have fixed meanings, but rather the meanings vary with the particular case\u2019s facts and circumstances. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463, 819 N.E.2d 734, 746-47 (2004). However, courts have interpreted \u201cinjurious environment\u201d to include \u201cthe breach of a parent\u2019s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463, 819 N.E.2d at 747 (quoting In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346, 730 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (2000)). Cases involving neglect allegations and adjudication of wardship are sui generis and thus are decided on the basis of their unique circumstances. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463, 819 N.E.2d at 747. The State bears the burden of proving the neglect allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, which means the neglect allegations are more probably true than not. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463-64, 819 N.E.2d at 747.\nOn review, this court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s neglect finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464, 819 N.E.2d at 747. \u201cA finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.\u201d Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464, 819 N.E.2d at 747.\nRespondent contends the trial court erred by finding the minor children were neglected because Ch. W\u2019s statements to Foley were not corroborated as required by section 2\u201418(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act. While section 2\u201418(4)(c) allows for the admission of the minor\u2019s previous statements regarding abuse or neglect allegations, it provides \u201cno such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u201418(4)(c) (West 2008).\nWe must begin our analysis by examining what the State\u2019s petition actually alleged. The State\u2019s petition alleged the minors were neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare when they resided with respondent in that said environment exposed the minors to risk of sexual abuse. Thus, the State had to prove a risk of sexual abuse to the minors, and not that Ch. W was sexually abused by respondent.\nInvestigator Roelfs testified that, during his second interview of respondent, respondent noted a time in which he was slightly aroused by bathing Ch. W During the interview, respondent also recalled a time when he was in the bathroom with his penis exposed. Ch. W. touched his partially erect penis, and he told her never to do it again. For the first time at the adjudicatory hearing, respondent explained he had incontinence and did not have time to shut the bathroom door. The aforementioned testimony is evidence of the minors being at risk of sexual abuse by respondent, and thus the trial court\u2019s finding of neglect was not based solely on Ch. W.\u2019s statements. Since other evidence of neglect as alleged in the petition existed, this case does not present a situation where the minor\u2019s hearsay statements alone supported the neglect finding.\nFoley\u2019s and Investigator Roelfs\u2019 testimony was sufficient for the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the minors were neglected as alleged in the wardship petition. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court\u2019s neglect finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Champaign County circuit court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Hensley, of Kennedy & Hensley, of Champaign, for appellant.", "Julia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re Ch. W et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jerry Wells, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201409\u20140925, 4\u201410\u20140831 cons.\nOpinion filed March 10, 2011.\nJohn B. Hensley, of Kennedy & Hensley, of Champaign, for appellant.\nJulia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 557, "last_page_order": 569 }