{ "id": 5769705, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILDIFONSO CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cervantes", "decision_date": "2011-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20140900", "first_page": "906", "last_page": "910", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "408 Ill. App. 3d 906" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434271 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273632 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" }, { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536099 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385575 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602559 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448551 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "\"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 620, "char_count": 11121, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4380859656296564 }, "sha256": "c5b6e41e909466f739a7882c7caf91ddaabe70f2554a0fc821bc106842a50aa5", "simhash": "1:bba48b2aff40520f", "word_count": 1835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:24.186889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILDIFONSO CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Ildifonso Cervantes, was convicted of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a\u20147) (West 2008)). The offense was a Class 4 felony because defendant\u2019s conduct proximately caused injuries to an officer. Defendant appeals, contending that his act of running from the police was not the proximate cause of the officer\u2019s injuries. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(d) (West 2008)), driving with a revoked license (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(d) (West 2008)), resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a\u20147) (West 2008)), and aggravated fleeing and eluding (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204.1(a)(4) (West 2008)). The trial court conducted a bench trial. We set out only the evidence relating to the charge of resisting a peace officer.\nRound Lake Beach police officer Kenneth Lupi testified that, on February 10, 2008, he received a report of a hit-and-run accident. He arrived at the address reported and saw a car that appeared to have been struck by another car. He noticed a blue Cadillac leaving the area. He activated his overhead lights and followed the Cadillac onto Lake Shore Drive. When the Cadillac did not stop, Lupi activated his siren; however, the Cadillac continued north on Lake Shore Drive.\nLupi saw the Cadillac drive through two stop signs without stopping. Eventually, he turned off his lights and siren because the Cadillac began to skid on ice and snow covering the road. After that, the Cadillac began to obey all traffic laws before stopping at a stop sign at 1500 Hainesville Road. The Cadillac soon pulled over in the vicinity of Williams Avenue and the driver got out. The driver, whom Lupi identified as defendant, began running through woods and backyards. Lupi chased defendant with the help of Sergeant Wayne Wilde, who had also arrived on the scene.\nThe weather was snowy, with temperatures below zero. Both Lupi and Wilde fell several times while chasing defendant. The pair chased defendant for about one minute before defendant fell and Wilde was able to catch up to him and keep him on the ground while a third officer handcuffed him.\nLupi testified that Wilde sustained abrasions to his shin, his little finger, and the side of his head. Lupi stated that Wilde injured his head when he slipped on an icy driveway on Williams Avenue. He injured his shin climbing a fence, and he injured his little finger falling on ice.\nWilde testified that he was behind Lupi\u2019s car as Lupi followed the Cadillac. Wilde saw the Cadillac pull off the road. The driver, whom he identified as defendant, fled through a backyard. Wilde exited his squad car and ordered defendant to stop. However, defendant continued running. Wilde chased him for about a minute. During the chase, Wilde sprained the little finger on his left hand and suffered abrasions on the left side of his forehead and his right shin from \u201chopping a fence.\u201d On cross-examination, Wilde acknowledged that defendant did not push or shove him. Rather, he slipped and fell on an icy driveway.\nThe court found defendant guilty of felony resisting a peace officer, noting that defendant should have foreseen that, upon running from the police, the officers would follow him. The court sentenced defendant to 18 months\u2019 probation including 90 days in the county jail. Defendant timely appeals.\nDefendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant\u2019s conduct proximately caused Wilde\u2019s injuries. He maintains that he did not punch or kick the officer and that the weather conditions on the date in question were such an extraordinary circumstance that defendant\u2019s conduct cannot be deemed the proximate cause of the officer\u2019s injuries.\nOne is guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer when he or she \u201cknowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer *** of any authorized act within his official capacity.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a) (West 2008). Moreover, a \u201cperson convicted for a violation of this Section whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer *** is guilty of a Class 4 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a\u20147) (West 2008). Thus, to convict defendant of a felony, the State had to prove that defendant\u2019s conduct proximately caused injury to a peace officer.\nWe note that subsection (a\u20147) is written as if proximate cause is in the nature of a sentencing enhancement. Subsection (a\u20147) provides that a \u201cperson convicted for a violation of this Section whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer *** is guilty of a Class 4 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a\u20147) (West 2008). Thus, read literally, the statutory enhancement does not apply until after an offender has been \u201cconvicted,\u201d in other words, at sentencing. Nevertheless, because proximate cause elevates the sentencing range, it is actually in the nature of an element of the felony offense, and the State had to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (\u201cOther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d).\nDefendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. When a defendant makes such a challenge, the question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact in question. People v, Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004).\nDefendant argues that his conduct did not proximately cause Wilde\u2019s injuries, because they resulted not from any act of defendant but from the severe weather conditions. Defendant posits that the weather was an extraordinary circumstance for which he cannot be held liable. We disagree.\nOur research has not disclosed any case specifically interpreting subsection (a\u20147). However, both parties rely on People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 (2006). There, the defendant was convicted of felony murder after an off-duty police officer shot and killed a codefendant while resisting a robbery attempt. The defendant contended that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the defendant\u2019s actions had to cause the victim\u2019s death but omitting an element of causation, foreseeability. The supreme court noted that Illinois law provides that a defendant may be charged with felony murder under the \u201c \u2018proximate cause\u2019 \u201d theory, i.e., that his acts were a proximate cause of the victim\u2019s death. Id. at 401. Although the supreme court found the instructions at issue adequate, it emphasized that foreseeability was indeed an element of proximate causation for purposes of the felony-murder statute, stating:\n\u201cIn general, Illinois law provides that a defendant may be charged with murder pursuant to the \u2018proximate cause\u2019 theory of felony murder. People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 (1997). The term \u2018proximate cause\u2019 describes two distinct requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58 (1999). We have stated, \u2018We believe that the analogies between civil and criminal cases in which individuals are injured or killed are so close that the principle of proximate cause applies to both classes of cases. Causal relation is the universal factor common to all legal liability.\u2019 Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 466. Legal cause \u2018is essentially a question of foreseeability\u2019; the relevant inquiry is \u2018whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.\u2019 Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. Foreseeability is added to the cause-in-fact requirement because \u2018even when cause in fact is established, it must be determined that any variation between the result intended *** and the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.\u2019 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a76.4, at 464 (2d ed. 2003).\u201d Id.\nHere, the trial court reasonably found that defendant\u2019s conduct of leading the officers on a chase through ice- and snow-covered yards and driveways proximately caused Wilde\u2019s injuries. Contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, the wintery conditions were not the type of \u201cextraordinary circumstance\u201d that would break the causal connection. Defendant was presumably aware of the weather conditions. When he chose to run from the pursuing police, it was reasonably foreseeable that the officers would continue the chase on foot and, in doing so, might be injured by falling on the snow or ice. It is simply not extraordinary to slip on ice in February. Moreover, Wilde testified that he suffered additional injuries by climbing a fence, which was apparently not related to the weather conditions at all. Again, defendant should reasonably have foreseen that a pursuing officer might be injured by a fall.\nDefendant, citing a comment to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions defining proximate cause, contends that a defendant\u2019s actions must be the sole proximate cause of an officer\u2019s injury. The comment refers to a case from this court \u201cdiscuss [ing] a principle of statutory construction when \u2018the\u2019 is used instead of \u2018a.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.24 (Westlaw through 2008 update), Committee Note (citing Sibenaller v. Milschewski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 717, 721-22 (2008)). Sibenaller observed that using the article \u201cthe\u201d usually refers to a specific thing, usually one that has already been mentioned, as opposed to \u201ca\u201d or \u201can,\u201d which can refer to a number of things. Sibenaller, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 722.\nWhile we do not dispute this principle, the statute at issue does not refer to \u201cthe sole proximate cause,\u201d but refers only to an injury \u201cproximately caused\u201d by a defendant\u2019s conduct. 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a\u20147) (West 2008). In the analogous context of felony murder, courts have routinely held that the State need not prove that a defendant\u2019s acts were the sole and immediate cause of death but, rather, must show that the defendant\u2019s acts were a contributing cause of death, such that death did not result from a source unconnected with or independent of those acts. See People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 387 (2007); People v. Martin, 112 Ill. App. 3d 486, 499 (1983). Here, it is clear that defendant\u2019s act of running from the officers was a contributing cause of Wilde\u2019s injuries, although it was not the only cause.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Clarke P. Devereux, of Durkin & Roberts, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILDIFONSO CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20140900\nOpinion filed March 16, 2011.\nClarke P. Devereux, of Durkin & Roberts, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0906-01", "first_page_order": 922, "last_page_order": 926 }