{ "id": 5769577, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROL A. ARONSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Aronson", "decision_date": "2011-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201410\u20140143", "first_page": "946", "last_page": "955", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "408 Ill. App. 3d 946" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265024 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5583757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208022 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5454888 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292043 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283090 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3614825 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "561-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186461 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0134-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 897, "char_count": 24068, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16990353491651444 }, "sha256": "29226aab3a14cec127d95d0209c0901250dc6a0e9a5936437b8d00ac3a900437", "simhash": "1:bacf34824a5b0963", "word_count": 3891 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:24.186889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROL A. ARONSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JORGENSEN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices McLaren and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nOn January 8, 2010, after a hearing, the trial court granted the petition of defendant, Carol A. Aronson, to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges. The State appeals, arguing that, in light of the trial court\u2019s finding that the arresting officer\u2019s testimony was credible, the court erred in finding that the State\u2019s inability to produce the video of defendant\u2019s performance on field sobriety tests required the suspension revocation. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn November 15, 2009, defendant was arrested for three alleged violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code): (1) driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(a)(2) (West 2008)); (2) speeding (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014601(b) (West 2008)); and (3) improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014709(a) (West 2008)). On December 11, 2009, defendant petitioned pursuant to section 2\u2014118.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2\u2014118.1 (West 2008)) to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges, challenging, among other things, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that she was driving under the influence of alcohol. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for January 8, 2010.\nA. Motion for Sanctions\nPrior to the hearing on the petition, defendant moved for sanctions against the State. According to the motion, on December 30, 2009, defendant subpoenaed the Oak Brook police department, requesting any videos relating to her case. On January 8, 2010, the police department\u2019s court-liaison officer informed defendant that the video of her stop and performance on the field sobriety tests was \u201cnot viewable.\u201d Defendant argued in her motion for sanctions that the State\u2019s failure to produce the video was tantamount to the loss or destruction of evidence and, therefore, the trial court had the discretion to sanction the State\u2019s unreasonable noncompliance with discovery. Defendant requested that, in light of the State\u2019s failure to properly preserve and produce the evidence, the court should, as a sanction, grant defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension.\nOn January 8, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for sanctions. There, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney explained to the court that, according to his conversation with \u201cthe officer,\u201d he understood:\n\u201c[T]here is a camera in the officer\u2019s vehicle. When he returned to the station, there was some sort of download process with the camera. There was a person at the police department, I do not have that person\u2019s name and I don\u2019t have that person in court with me today. The officer tells me that he is in charge of downloading the videos and things of that nature. This person told Officer Foltyniewicz that the video was unavailable, that it did not work. That being the case, there was a camera, I understand, but there is not an actual video of the stop.\u201d\nThe State represented that Officer Foltyniewicz was present in court and had an independent recollection of the events relating to the stop and arrest of defendant. Therefore, the State argued, the fact that there was no recording available did not warrant a sanction of rescission. Instead, the State asserted, the absence of a video should be considered as relevant to the weight of the evidence.\nBefore ruling, the court sought clarification that, according to the State, the field sobriety test video was \u201cin some fashion technically\u201d unavailable because it did not properly download. The State agreed, and defense counsel represented that he, too, was present when Officer Foltyniewicz explained that \u201che didn\u2019t know why there was no video. He has no knowledge.\u201d\nThe court denied the motion for sanctions, noting that there was no evidence presented that there was an intentional or willful destruction of any evidence. However, the court noted:\n\u201c[I]t is something that I think I can and, frankly, I will consider [at the rescission hearing]. There is a video. I have no explanation as to why that video doesn\u2019t exist. Again, I am not making any finding that it was willful or intentional, but the impact of that is going to be something that I can and I will consider during the course of the hearing. *** I will consider that failure to produce that video. I think it was something that was in the possession of law enforcement. It doesn\u2019t exist and there is no explanation for that, and that\u2019s a factor I can and will consider.\u201d\nB. Rescission Hearing\nThe rescission hearing commenced immediately after the court denied defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions. Defendant called as her first witness Officer Foltyniewicz, who testified to the circumstances surrounding his stop of defendant. In sum, Foltyniewicz testified that his attention was drawn to defendant\u2019s vehicle when defendant\u2019s vehicle slightly straddled a lane while at a stop light. He subsequently followed defendant through a construction zone where another lane had been added and orange \u201chorses\u201d blocked certain areas, and he witnessed her vehicle change lanes without signaling. At that time, Foltyniewicz activated his vehicle\u2019s emergency lights and defendant pulled over in an appropriate manner. After approaching the vehicle, Foltyniewicz smelled alcohol; defendant told him that her husband (in the passenger seat) had consumed alcohol that evening. Foltyniewicz did not notice anything unusual about defendant\u2019s speech, nor did he observe anything else about her that raised suspicion. However, he asked her to step out of the vehicle to determine whether she, as opposed to her husband, had consumed alcohol. Defendant exited the vehicle in an appropriate manner, with no apparent balance problems; she did not use the vehicle for support; she walked to the back of the vehicle without support; and she did not wobble, sway, or fall over. Foltyniewicz detected the odor of alcohol coming from defendant\u2019s breath, and he asked defendant to perform four field sobriety tests. Ultimately, he concluded that she failed three of the tests. Specifically, on the walk-and-turn test, defendant did not stumble or fall, but Foltyniewicz observed that defendant did not touch toe-to-heel, raised her arms more than six inches from her body, and did not follow instructions on the turn. Further, on the one-leg-stand test, defendant put her foot down before Foltyniewicz told her to stop. Finally, on the breath test, defendant formed a tight seal with her lips around the tube, but did not blow as instructed and, therefore, no results were obtained. According to Foltyniewicz, defendant admitted that she had earlier consumed one glass of wine. Foltyniewicz arrested defendant. In his testimony, Foltyniewicz made no mention of the alleged video recording.\nThereafter, defendant, a home health care nurse, testified to her version of the events, including her belief that she did not fail the sobriety tests. Specifically, defendant testified that she walked the walk-and-turn test as instructed, including touching heel-to-toe, and that she had her hands at her sides during the one-leg-stand test, but, because she was \u201cvery nervous,\u201d lights were shining, and \u201ca lot was going on,\u201d she did not know whether she held her arms more than six inches from her body. Defendant denied telling Foltyniewicz that she consumed any alcohol that night.\nIn closing, defense counsel argued that the video would have been dispositive of the case because, while Foltyniewicz testified that defendant failed the sobriety tests, defendant credibly testified that she passed the tests. In response, the State argued that Foltyniewicz testified more credibly to the events than defendant and that defendant offered no explanation for the problems with her driving that initially brought her to Foltyniewicz\u2019s attention.\nThe court granted defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the suspension. The court noted that Foltyniewicz was \u201cvery credible\u201d in its mind. However:\n\u201cThe concern that I have, the issue in my mind, is the field sobriety tests. Again, I think the officer testified credibly as to the defendant\u2019s performance ***. I found the officer to be more credible [than defendant]. The question I have, and this is troubling to me, is that there is a tape. It was inadvertently not recorded, destroyed, I don\u2019t know if you want to call it that, which is what the cases say. But there was a tape recording that we don\u2019t have. It wasn\u2019t intentional based upon what\u2019s been represented to me, but through no fault of the defense, they were diligent in trying to get a tape. I do not think that it automatically warrants reversal. If it was intentional, perhaps it would be different. But that\u2019s where I come down.\nIf it was a case where there was no tape, this call would be easy for me. I think the officer testified more credibly, but the absence of the tape raises a concern in my mind. Again, I don\u2019t find that it was intentional, it\u2019s inadvertent, but it\u2019s in control of the State. There\u2019s principles of civil law that indicate that if there\u2019s evidence that was in the possession of one party and it\u2019s destroyed, whether it\u2019s inadvertent or not, there is an inference to be drawn that it was detrimental to that party. Again, I don\u2019t know that, but that\u2019s the concern that I have is that there was a tape that the defense can\u2019t have, through no fault of theirs.\nIt\u2019s for that reason, and I am reluctant to do it, I don\u2019t know how to express that any better, reluctantly. The officer testified credibly. I think he behaved like a professional, but because of the absence of the tape, that it was inadvertently not recorded or destroyed, I am going to rescind the summary suspension.\u201d (Emphases added.)\nAfter orally announcing its ruling, the trial court signed a preprinted summary suspension order form that was filled out by defense counsel. The order reflected that the court had ruled in defendant\u2019s favor and checked, as its reason for the decision, the option: \u201cOfficer Failed to Answer Defendant\u2019s Subpoena (Code 4250).\u201d Similarly, the circuit court clerk completed and signed a form notice to the Secretary of State, indicating that, after a hearing, the court had ruled to rescind defendant\u2019s summary suspension because \u201cOFFC FAILED TO ANSWER.\u201d The State appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nStatutory summary suspension hearings are civil. People v. O\u2019Connor, 313 Ill. App. 3d 134, 136 (2000). A trial court\u2019s order to grant or deny a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension is a final and appealable order. Id. In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 560 (2008); People v. Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349 (2009). The burden then shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the suspension. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 560. In reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a petition to rescind a summary suspension, we defer to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, reversing them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but review de novo the court\u2019s ultimate determination of whether the petition to rescind should be granted. Id. at 561-62; see also People v. Tomczak, 395 Ill. App. 3d 877, 880 (2009); Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 350.\nThe State argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling was improper because, despite its denial of defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions, the court in fact sanctioned the State and granted the petition for rescission solely based on a video that was never created. The State argues that the court\u2019s ruling creates a new, \u201ctechnical,\u201d nonexistent statutory factor for rescinding summary suspensions that is contrary to this state\u2019s public policy to keep public highways safe.\nFirst, we are compelled to address the State\u2019s assertion that the court apparently did not understand that, as opposed to a video that existed and was lost or destroyed, \u201cthe video in question never came into existence.\u201d According to the State, the technical problem preventing a successful download equates to a video that never came into existence. However, the fact that a video could not be produced does not mean that a recording was not made. The court\u2019s understanding that the video camera in Foltyniewicz\u2019s car recorded the stop, but that the recording could not be produced because of a technical problem, is supported by the record. Specifically, at the hearing on the motion for sanctions, the State represented that there was a video camera in Foltyniewicz\u2019s car, that there was a downloading issue with the camera, and, consequently, that the video was unavailable. This assertion presupposes that there was a recording, because, if no recording was made, efforts to download would be unnecessary. Further, the State agreed with the court\u2019s characterization that the video was technically unavailable, and it did not assert to the court that, in fact, no recording was ever made. As such, we find unavailing the State\u2019s argument that the court effectively ruled that rescission is warranted whenever there is no tape recording of a stop. The court made no such ruling. Rather, noting that, if \u201cthere was no tape, this call would be easy for me,\u201d and that, \u201cin the absence of the tape\u201d (not a tape), it would rescind the suspension, the court simply concluded that there was a recording taken, but the State was unable to produce the recording. (Emphases added.)\nNext, we disagree with the State\u2019s assertion that the trial court rescinded the suspension as a sanction. The record reflects that the court denied defendant\u2019s motion for rescission as a sanction for the video\u2019s absence. In doing so, it made clear that, where there was no suggestion that the State intentionally destroyed the video, rescission as a sanction was inappropriate. Further, the court clarified that it agreed with the State\u2019s argument on the motion for sanctions that, while it was inappropriate under these circumstances to grant rescission solely based on the absence of the video, it could consider the video\u2019s absence when weighing the evidence. Nothing in the court\u2019s subsequent ruling on the petition to rescind reflects to us that the court departed from its position regarding sanctions.\nAs such, we disagree with the State that the court ultimately granted rescission based solely on the missing video. Indeed, the court\u2019s ruling reflects that it considered and weighed both defendant\u2019s and Foltyniewicz\u2019s testimony. The court determined that Foltyniewicz testified credibly. However, the court also discussed the general proposition that, when evidence in one party\u2019s control is missing or destroyed, an inference may be drawn that the evidence was detrimental to that party. Thus, in its process of weighing the in-court testimony, the court factored into its deliberations that the video would have spoken to the credibility of the testimony and presumptively would have weighed against the State. As such, although the court found Foltyniewicz more credible than defendant based solely on their testimony, the court implicitly determined that defendant\u2019s testimony (which, incidentally, it did not state was incredible), when bolstered by the presumption that the video would have been detrimental to the State, outweighed Foltyniewicz\u2019s testimony such that rescission was warranted. We also note that, in finding Foltyniewicz\u2019s testimony credible, the court inherently accepted his testimony that weighed in defendant\u2019s favor, i.e., that she did not have slurred speech, had no apparent balance problems, did not use the vehicle for support, etcetera. We cannot conclude that the court\u2019s findings in this regard are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Giving deference to the court\u2019s findings that Foltyniewicz\u2019s testimony was outweighed by the evidence in defendant\u2019s favor and, accordingly, that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol, we agree that rescission was warranted.\nThe cases relied upon by the State do not warrant a different conclusion. For example, in People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 258 (2004), the defendant moved to dismiss DUI charges against him, arguing that he could not receive a fair trial because the State lost a videotape of his field sobriety tests. The trial court granted the request, and this court reversed on the basis that dismissal of the charges was an excessive sanction for the inadvertent loss of the tape. Id. Nevertheless, while we found dismissal of the charges to be a sanction disproportionate to the discovery violation, we stated that it would be appropriate for the factfinder to consider \u201cless drastic\u201d options, such as that \u201cthe absence of the videotape requires an inference that the tape\u2019s contents are favorable to defendant.\u201d Id. at 262. Here, the trial court rejected defendant\u2019s request for rescission as a sanction (similar to the defendant\u2019s request for outright dismissal of the charges in Camp) and, instead, proceeded to a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, and in accord with Camp, the trial court applied to its deliberations the \u201cless drastic\u201d option of inferring that the absent video contained contents favorable to defendant.\nSimilarly, People v. Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1999), is in several respects distinguishable from the instant case. In Schambow, the defendant objected to the State\u2019s inadvertent destruction of audiotapes that contained police radio communications from the time of the defendant\u2019s DUI arrest. The trial court rescinded the defendant\u2019s summary suspension as a discovery sanction. Rejecting the defendant\u2019s due process argument, the appellate court reversed the rescission, finding, among other things, that the audiotapes would have held little exculpatory value on the question of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, whether the defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test, or whether his BAG exceeded legal limits. Id. at 768. Here, in contrast, the court did not rescind the suspension as a sanction or prior to hearing, and we note that, unlike the audiotapes in Schambow, a video recording of defendant\u2019s performance on the field sobriety tests would be extremely relevant and potentially exculpatory on the question of reasonable grounds.\nPeople v. Leannah, 72 Ill. App. 3d 504 (1979), also fails to impact our decision. In Leannah, a videotape of the defendant at the police station on the night of his arrest was accidentally destroyed. The trial court, before trial, dismissed the charges against the defendant as a sanction for the State\u2019s discovery violation. The appellate court reversed, rejecting the defendant\u2019s due process claims and finding the sanction too harsh under the circumstances. Id. at 508. Again, here, the trial court did not rescind the suspension as a sanction prior to hearing. Instead, the court held an evidentiary hearing and weighed the evidence. Accordingly, we disagree with the State that the foregoing cases hold that a missing video cannot justify rescission. Rather, the cases do not address the factual situation here, where the court did not dismiss charges or rescind because a video was missing, but, rather, applied a presumption to its weighing of the evidence.\nFinally, we note that we also disagree with the State\u2019s assertion that the court\u2019s ruling here granted rescission on a \u201ctechnicality.\u201d For example, this is not a situation where rescission was granted because an officer failed to forward to the clerk of the court a sworn report \u2014 a curable defect having no real prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 171 (2006). Instead, the court considered that a recording was made on the very issue disputed by the parties, i.e., whether reasonable grounds existed for Foltyniewicz to believe that defendant was driving while intoxicated. That video, which might have held exculpatory value for defendant, was unavailable. The court did not rescind the suspension as a sanction to the State, but it did inherently find that the information presumed to be on the video, coupled with defendant\u2019s testimony, outweighed the evidence in the State\u2019s favor.\nIn conclusion, we reject the State\u2019s argument on appeal that the trial court erred in rescinding defendant\u2019s summary suspension.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nThe six other options the order form provides as reasons for rescinding the summary suspension include: (1) \u201cNo D.U.I. Arrest (Code 4230)\u201d; (2) \u201cNo Warning Given (Code 4215)\u201d; (3) \u201cNo Reasonable Grounds (Code 4220)\u201d; (4) \u201cDid Not Refuse Test (Code 4240)\u201d; (5) \u201cNot a B.A.C. of 0.08 or more (Code 4245)\u201d; and (6) \u201cOther (explain)_(Code 4255).\u201d\nThe defendant may challenge the suspension on four bases: (1) whether the defendant was placed under arrest for an offense under section 11\u2014501 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501 (West 2008)); (2) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, another drug, or both; (3) whether the defendant received the statutory motorist\u2019s warning and refused to complete the test or tests; and (4) whether the test or tests disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. 625 ILCS 5/2\u2014118.1(b)(1) through (b)(4) (West 2008).\nIn light of our conclusion that the court did not rescind the suspension as a sanction, we conclude that, despite its selection on the order, the court inherently granted the rescission because the video\u2019s contents would have been relevant to the issue of reasonable grounds. While the court signed the order form (prepared by defense counsel) that marked the officer\u2019s \u201cfailure to answer\u201d as the basis for its decision, we do not believe that the selection appropriately fits the court\u2019s oral findings. For example, an officer\u2019s \u201cfailure to answer\u201d likely pertains to cases where an officer fails to answer a subpoena to appear at the hearing and, even then, rescission is not automatic. See 625 ILCS 5/2\u2014118.1 (West 2008) (\u201c[T]he hearing may be conducted upon a review of the law enforcement officer\u2019s own official reports; provided however, that the person may subpoena the officer. Failure of the officer to answer the subpoena shall be considered grounds for a continuance if in the court\u2019s discretion the continuance is appropriate.\u201d (Emphasis added.)). Under the facts here, reading the court\u2019s selection of an officer\u2019s \u201cfailure to answer\u201d as akin to a statement that it based its decision to rescind solely on the officer\u2019s failure to produce the video would suggest that rescission was granted as sanction. Clearly, however, the court did not intend to impose rescission as a sanction here. Rather, as further explained below, we read the court\u2019s ruling as finding that the video would have been relevant to witness credibility on \u201creasonable grounds.\u201d Thus, although the failure to answer the subpoena for the video was part of the court\u2019s basis for rescission, the \u201creasonable grounds\u201d option on the order form would have been the more appropriate selection, and we rely on the court\u2019s oral findings rather than the checked box.\nThe State moved to cite foreign authority. We granted the State\u2019s motion; however, we do not find it necessary to rely on the foreign authority.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JORGENSEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Edward M. Maloney, of Ahern, Maloney, Moran & Block LLC, of Skokie, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROL A. ARONSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201410\u20140143\nOpinion filed March 16, 2011.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nEdward M. Maloney, of Ahern, Maloney, Moran & Block LLC, of Skokie, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0946-01", "first_page_order": 962, "last_page_order": 971 }