{ "id": 5769295, "name": "PACE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs and Citation Petitioners-Appellees, v. EXPRESS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant (Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Citation Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Pace Communications Services Corp. v. Express Products, Inc.", "decision_date": "2011-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201410\u20140743", "first_page": "970", "last_page": "981", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "408 Ill. App. 3d 970" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271525 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238267 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 F.3d 1282", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 2913196 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1290" }, { "page": "1291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/488/1282-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 F.3d 1086", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1362702 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090-91" }, { "page": "1090" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/149/1086-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 F.2d 710", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1591316, 3610247 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "liability insurer for a manufacturer with nationwide distribution was subject to jurisdiction in any forum where insured was likely to be sued" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/794/0710-01", "/us-app-dc/254/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "907 F.2d 911", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914", "parenthetical": "insurer purposefully availed itself of Montana's jurisdiction where it contracted to indemnify and defend claims arising there" }, { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/907/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 F.3d 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11931985 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "insurer's choice to provide coverage for all 50 states constituted purposeful availment of any individual state's forum" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t would be a muddled policy for courts to decide that there was no personal jurisdiction in such situations as this, forcing the already-once successful plaintiffs into a foreign jurisdiction *** to collect their judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/4/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 F.3d 786", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9042277, 9172942 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "insurance policy's nationwide-coverage clause established sufficient contacts between the insurer and Arkansas to satisfy the due process clause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/319/0786-01", "/f3d/393/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 F.3d 1207", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8972484 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1215", "parenthetical": "by including Georgia within its covered territory, the insurer purposefully sought to provide coverage for accidents in Georgia and had full knowledge that it could be haled into Georgia courts and required to make payments there based on the coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/412/1207-01" ] }, { "cite": "832 F.2d 282", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544395 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-87" }, { "page": "284-85" }, { "page": "285-86" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/832/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579565 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-61" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "761-62" }, { "page": "759, 762" }, { "page": "759" }, { "page": "763-64" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4302995 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/401/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 408", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200640 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 462", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205101 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 U.S. 457", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141572 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/311/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3715904 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/405/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4301419 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" }, { "page": "1080" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/401/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7227", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1085, "char_count": 29642, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1698855802017801 }, "sha256": "99b5cfb5b479366b1c43c8bc39253590799123adff168003a792c8327f907457", "simhash": "1:babd5d64e0ccd66d", "word_count": 4584 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:24.186889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PACE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs and Citation Petitioners-Appellees, v. EXPRESS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant (Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Citation Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Zenoff and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe circuit court of Lake County entered an agreed order between plaintiffs, Pace Communications Services Corporation and Tunica Pharmacy, Inc., and defendant, Express Products, Inc., providing for a monetary judgment against defendant that could be satisfied only through the collection of the proceeds of any applicable liability insurance policy. Plaintiffs then issued a citation to discover assets against citation respondent, Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Cumberland), an insurer of defendant. Cumberland moved to dismiss the citation, arguing in part that a nationwide coverage clause within the liability policy it issued to defendant was an insufficient basis for the court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Cumberland also sought dismissal based on improper service. The trial court denied Cumberland\u2019s motion. We granted Cumberland\u2019s petition for leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(3) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006)), and we now affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business also located in Pennsylvania. Cumberland is a New Jersey corporation with offices in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Ohio. Cumberland issues policies for fire loss and commercial general liability, insuring property and businesses in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware. Cumberland issued defendant sequential annual liability policies covering the period from April 26, 2001, to April 26, 2003. The policies both contain the same material terms and provide a general aggregate limit of $2 million; a personal and advertising injury limit of $1 million; a per-occurrence limit of $1 million; and other limits not relevant here. The policies state that Cumberland \u201cwill have the right and duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 \u201d seeking damages covered by the policies if the injury or offense took place in the \u201c \u2018coverage territory,\u2019 \u201d the definition of which includes the \u201cUnited States of America.\u201d\nPlaintiffs filed a class action complaint against defendant in December 2004 alleging that it violated provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 (2000)) by faxing unsolicited advertisements to persons and companies in Illinois and other states, without the recipients\u2019 consent. As amended, the complaint alleged improper faxes between the dates of February 2002 and October 2004. Defendant tendered its defense to Cumberland and another insurance company. Cumberland initially took the position that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify defendant, but it later agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. Cumberland and the other insurance company filed actions in Pennsylvania seeking declarations that they had no obligation to defend or indemnify defendant.\nOn October 13, 2009, the Lake County circuit court entered an agreed order whereby judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs, as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons, and against defendant for $7,999,999.96. The settlement provides that the judgment can be satisfied only from the proceeds of defendant\u2019s insurance policies.\nAlso on October 13, plaintiffs caused a citation to discover assets to be issued on Cumberland via the Illinois Department of Insurance.\nOn November 12, 2009, Cumberland filed a motion to dismiss the citation, pursuant to section 2\u2014619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619 (West 2008)). Cumberland argued that: (1) it was not a resident of Illinois and not subject to the personal jurisdiction of Illinois courts; (2) plaintiff did not properly serve it with the citation; and (3) there were prior-filed suits pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.\nPlaintiffs filed an amended citation on May 26, 2010. On May 28, 2010, plaintiffs served the citation on the Department of Insurance and on Cumberland directly via certified mail.\nOn June 29, 2010, the trial court denied Cumberland\u2019s motion to dismiss. It found that Illinois courts had personal jurisdiction over Cumberland based on the nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause in the insurance policies. It also found that plaintiffs\u2019 service of process on Cumberland complied with the requirements of section 123 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Insurance Code) (215 ILCS 5/123 (West 2008)), and it further granted plaintiffs leave to file a third citation. Last, the trial court found that the Pennsylvania lawsuits did not involve the same parties, because plaintiffs were not a part of those suits.\nPlaintiffs filed a third citation on July 27, 2010, and served it directly on Cumberland on August 2, 2010.\nOn July 26, 2010, Cumberland sought leave to appeal the trial court\u2019s decision finding personal jurisdiction over it. We granted the petition on August 31, 2010.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Cumberland argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Cumberland was amenable to: (1) the personal jurisdiction of the Illinois courts; and (2) service under the Insurance Code.\nA. Personal Jurisdiction\nWe begin with the issue of personal jurisdiction. When seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for jurisdiction. MacNeil v. Trambert, 401 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1080 (2010). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the assertion of jurisdiction is unreasonable. Bell v. Don Prudhomme Racing, Inc., 405 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228 (2010). Where, as in this case, the trial court determined the issue of personal jurisdiction based solely on documentary evidence, we review its ruling de novo. MacNeil, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 1080.\nIllinois\u2019s long-arm statute, section 2\u2014209 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014209 (West 2008)), controls the authority of Illinois courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents. Bell, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 228. Section 2\u2014209(c) states that a court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis permissible under the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014209(c) (West 2008). Accordingly, if the contacts between a defendant and Illinois satisfy both federal and Illinois due process requirements, an Illinois court may exercise jurisdiction, and we need not consider whether the defendant performed any of the acts enumerated in the long-arm statute. Bell, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 229.\nTo satisfy federal due process requirements, a nonresident defendant must \u201chave certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Personal jurisdiction is present under such circumstances because where a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it invokes the benefits and protections of the state\u2019s laws, and it is therefore not unreasonable to require the defendant to submit to litigation in that forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).\nThe requirements for personal jurisdiction differ depending on whether \u201cgeneral\u201d jurisdiction or \u201cspecific\u201d jurisdiction is sought. Bell, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 229. General jurisdiction arises when a state \u201cexercises personal jurisdiction *** in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum\u201d (Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984)), and it results from a defendant\u2019s continuous and systematic business contacts with the forum (Bell, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 230). In this case, the trial court found personal jurisdiction over Cumberland based on specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction arises where the defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum\u2019s residents and the litigation is based on alleged injuries arising out of or relating to the defendant\u2019s activities. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. For an Illinois court to have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the following criteria must be met: (1) the defendant had minimum contacts with Illinois such that it was fairly warned that it may be haled into an Illinois court; (2) the action arose out of or was related to the defendant\u2019s contacts with Illinois; and (3) it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in Illinois. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP v. City of East Chicago, 401 Ill. App. 3d 947, 954 (2010).\nIn finding specific jurisdiction over Cumberland, the trial court relied primarily on Bevins v. Comet Casualty Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 758 (1979), and Rossman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 832 F.2d 282, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1987). Bevins is the only Illinois case that the parties have cited, and that our research has revealed, touching upon the effect on personal jurisdiction of an insurance policy\u2019s nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause. In Bevins, the plaintiffs and a man named Edward Chrisman were involved in a car accident in West Virginia that resulted in injuries to the plaintiffs. Chrisman had automobile insurance through the defendant, Comet Casualty Company (Comet), which was an Illinois corporation. Bevins, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 759-61. Comet was not licensed to do business in West Virginia and had never solicited insurance applications or issued insurance contracts to West Virginia residents. Id. at 763. The plaintiffs obtained judgments against Chrisman and Comet in the West Virginia courts. Id. at 761-62. Comet did not pay the judgment amounts, so the plaintiffs filed a petition to register the judgments in Illinois. Id. at 759, 762. Comet argued, among other things, that the West Virginia courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it, rendering the judgments void. Id. at 759.\nIn deciding whether the West Virginia courts had jurisdiction over Comet, the Illinois Appellate Court looked to West Virginia\u2019s statutory criteria for obtaining jurisdiction over an insurance company not registered in that state. Id. at 763-64. The statute allowed jurisdiction for, inter alia, \u201cany other transaction of business\u201d in the state. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 764. The Bevins court stated:\n\u201cThe facts above set forth show that [Comet] agreed to insure Chrisman against all liability regarding personal injury and property damage as a result of the use of the automobile in any State without limitation. The reasonable expectation raised from this policy is that [Comet] would provide coverage wherever the insured would be located and in any State in which the automobile was used.\u201d Id.\nThe court stated that the facts also showed that Comet performed a number of acts in West Virginia, such as writing letters to parties in that state and seeking information concerning the occurrence and injuries. The court concluded that Comet was doing business by these acts, allowing the West Virginia courts to acquire jurisdiction over it. Id.\nCumberland argues that Bevins lacks precedential value here because the court did not interpret Illinois\u2019s long-arm statute and did not find the existence of specific jurisdiction based solely on a nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause. However, the Bevins court stated that both the Illinois long-arm statute and the applicable West Virginia statute exhibited a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. Bevins, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 763. Further, while Comet\u2019s actions in sending letters to West Virginia and seeking information about the accident and injuries were cited by the court in determining that West Virginia had personal jurisdiction over Comet, it also relied on Comet\u2019s nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause. Thus, while the Bevins court\u2019s analysis is not dispositive here, neither is it completely irrelevant.\nWe now examine Rossman. There, a father and son who were Illinois residents owned a car. The father paid insurance premiums in Illinois to Consolidated Insurance Company. The son later moved to Virginia and took the car with him, and he was involved in a car accident there. The plaintiffs suffered injuries and obtained judgments in Virginia against the son. Rossman, 832 F.2d at 284-85. They then sought a declaratory judgment against Consolidated for coverage. The federal district court found that it had personal jurisdiction over Consolidated, a ruling that the insurer challenged on appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 285-86. The court stated that Virginia\u2019s long-arm statute allowed jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process, so the statutory and due process analyses were identical. Id. at 286 n.1. It concluded that Consolidated\u2019s nationwide-coverage clause created the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. The court stated that because Consolidated \u201cspecifically promised to defend its policyholders from any claim or suit arising from a loss or accident within its policy territory, which included the entire United States,\u201d its \u201cexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state is an express feature of its policy.\u201d Id. at 286. The court continued:\n\u201cPresumably, Consolidated offers this type of broad coverage to induce customers to buy its policies and to pay higher premiums for them. The benefits thereby accruing to Consolidated are neither fortuitous nor incidental. [Citation.] This type of clause, assuring policyholders that they will be covered under a broad range of circumstances in a broad range of forums, is basic to the product that Consolidated markets. If Consolidated wished to avoid suit in Virginia or any other forum, it could have excluded that state from the \u2018policy territory\u2019 defined in the policy. Consolidated is well aware that such a limitation would make its policy less marketable.\u201d Id. at 287.\nThe court further found that the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\nThe majority of federal appellate courts have similarly held that policies that provide liability coverage within the entire United States will create the minimum contacts necessary for the insurer to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the insured event took place. See McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2005) (by including Georgia within its covered territory, the insurer purposefully sought to provide coverage for accidents in Georgia and had full knowledge that it could be haled into Georgia courts and required to make payments there based on the coverage); Ferrell v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 393 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (insurance policy\u2019s nationwide-coverage clause established sufficient contacts between the insurer and Arkansas to satisfy the due process clause); Payne v. Motorists\u2019 Mutual Insurance Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1993) (insurer\u2019s choice to provide coverage for all 50 states constituted purposeful availment of any individual state\u2019s forum); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990) (insurer purposefully availed itself of Montana\u2019s jurisdiction where it contracted to indemnify and defend claims arising there); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (liability insurer for a manufacturer with nationwide distribution was subject to jurisdiction in any forum where insured was likely to be sued).\nCumberland recognizes the foregoing authority but urges us to rely on OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998), instead. There, the defendant in a patent infringement suit filed a declaratory judgment action against its insurers in a Kansas federal district court to establish coverage. Id. at 1090-91. Kansas\u2019s long-arm statute was coextensive with the requirements of federal due process. Id. at 1090. The insurers moved to dismiss the action, based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that, by agreeing to defend the policyholder against claims anywhere in the United States, the insurer created the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1092.\nThe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause was not sufficient to support the district court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction. In its analysis, the court criticized Rossman and other cases applying a similar analysis. It stated that Rossman was \u201ctroublesome\u201d because:\n\u201c[f]irst, the court\u2019s holding is based almost entirely on foreseeability. The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned that' \u201cforeseeability\u201d alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.\u2019 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 ***. Second, within its foreseeability analysis, by chastising the defendant for having the ability to exclude certain forums from coverage and not exercising that ability, the court placed great weight on what the defendant did not do. Such reliance, however, is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court\u2019s mandate that minimum contacts be based on the defendant\u2019s affirmative actions which create a substantial connection with the forum state.\u201d Id. at 1094.\nThe court further stated that it disagreed with the assumption that \u201cby agreeing to defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being sued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dispute arises.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1095.\nThe OMI court did agree that, by including a nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause, the insurer created some showing of minimum contacts with Kansas, albeit \u201ccontacts which [were] qualitatively low on the due process scale.\u201d Id. The court then considered these contacts in light of the several factors used to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction violated notions of fair play and substantial justice. It ultimately determined that subjecting the insurers to litigation in Kansas, which did not have a genuine interest in the dispute and with which the insurers had only tenuous contacts, would be unreasonable. Accordingly, it reversed the district court\u2019s decision denying the insurers\u2019 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1098.\nCumberland argues that the OMI court correctly reasoned that it does not logically follow that, by agreeing to provide a defense to its insured in a particular state, the insurer also agrees to allow itself to be sued personally in the same state. However, the effect of a nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause relates to the issue of minimum contacts, which alone do not create personal jurisdiction, as they must be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. Further, both Rossman and OMI conclude that a nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause creates minimum contacts; the point on which they differ is the strength of those minimum contacts.\nWe additionally note that the Tenth Circuit subsequently toned down its criticism of Rossman in TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007). There, the court stated that \u201cinsurers establish minimum contacts with a forum state by affirmatively choosing to include the forum state in the territory of coverage.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1290. The court further stated:\n\u201cBy reserving the right to defend insured entities and by agreeing to make indemnity payments within the territory of coverage, the Insurers have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in any forum state within the covered territory. These actions are neither incidental nor accidental; the Insurers have explicitly contracted for them and have received higher premiums in exchange for them.\u201d Id. at 1291.\nStill, we recognize that the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that such contacts were relatively weak. Id.\nIn any event, consistent with Bevins, we agree with the majority of the federal appellate courts that a nationwide-territory-of-coverage clause gives rise to the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction over the insurer if the forum is where the insured event took place. Minimum contacts must proximately result from the defendant\u2019s own actions that create a substantial connection with the forum state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. As the aforementioned federal appellate courts have stated, and as the Tenth Circuit has also recognized, an insurer makes a deliberate choice to include the entire nation in its territory of coverage for the purpose of offering a marketable insurance plan and receiving higher premiums. See Rossman, 832 F.2d at 287. \u201cThus litigation requiring the presence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purposefully contracted for by the insurer\u201d (Farmers Insurance Exchange, 907 F.2d at 914), and the nationwide coverage constitutes \u201cpurposeful availment of any individual state\u2019s forum\u201d (Payne, 4 F.3d at 456). Further, contrary to the concerns of OMI, where an insured sued its insurer outside the insurer\u2019s forum, here a party injured by the insured sued the insured in the injured party\u2019s forum and now seeks to collect from the insurer. Accordingly, the first factor required for specific jurisdiction is present: Cumberland had minimum contacts with Illinois such that it had fair warning that it may be haled into an Illinois court.\nThe second factor required for specific jurisdiction, that the action arose out of or was related to Cumberland\u2019s contacts with Illinois, is also satisfied. Cumberland issued defendant liability policies that included Illinois in their coverage area; defendant was found to have injured parties in Illinois; and plaintiffs are seeking recovery from Cumberland in Illinois for damages allegedly covered by defendant\u2019s policies.\nLast, we look at the third factor, whether it is reasonable to require Cumberland to litigate in Illinois. In making this assessment, we look at the minimum contacts in light of the following considerations to determine whether asserting jurisdiction would comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice: the burden on the defendant; the forum\u2019s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; the judicial system\u2019s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of disputes; and the states\u2019 shared interest in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77. Cumberland\u2019s burden of litigating in Illinois is not unreasonable considering that it was, under its insurance policy, willing to defend its insured nationwide. Illinois has an interest in adjudicating the dispute, because Illinois parties have allegedly been injured and have obtained an agreed order in their favor in an Illinois court. Cumberland argues that the vast majority of class members are not Illinois residents, but because some are Illinois residents and the judgment is from an Illinois court, this state has an interest in adjudicating the dispute between plaintiffs and Cumberland. This consideration relates to the next factors as well; plaintiffs\u2019 interest in convenient and effective relief and the judicial system\u2019s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of disputes both favor Illinois, as plaintiffs are seeking to satisfy an Illinois judgment. See Payne, 4 F.3d at 457 (\u201c[I]t would be a muddled policy for courts to decide that there was no personal jurisdiction in such situations as this, forcing the already-once successful plaintiffs into a foreign jurisdiction *** to collect their judgment.\u201d). These factors distinguish this case from OMI, where the insurer was a foreign company and the forum state was held to have \u201cno genuine interest in the dispute.\u201d OMI Holdings Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098. The states\u2019 shared interest in furthering social policies does not weigh in favor of either Illinois or an alternative forum, presumably Pennsylvania. Since the considerations as a whole weigh in favor of asserting jurisdiction in Illinois, it is reasonable to require Cumberland to litigate here under federal due process standards.\nWe now look at Illinois due process requirements. To satisfy the due process provision of the Illinois Constitution, a court may exercise jurisdiction \u201conly when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.\u201d Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 275 (1990). Cumberland argues that jurisdiction is not reasonable in this case because it committed no acts in Illinois in relation to the policies it issued defendant and in fact it committed virtually no acts in Illinois of any kind. Cumberland argues that the focus of the citation proceeding, if it is allowed to proceed, will be on insurance policies that were issued by a Pennsylvania resident to a Pennsylvania resident, and Illinois law will not even come into play in determining coverage under the policies. Cumberland reiterates that most of the class members are not Illinois residents, and it argues that most of the alleged actionable injuries occurred outside of Illinois.\nCumberland\u2019s argument is not persuasive. Under its insurance policies, Cumberland was willing to defend its insured against claims in Illinois, thereby invoking the privileges and benefits of the Illinois courts. Plaintiffs have obtained a judgment in Illinois against Cumberland\u2019s insured, the judgment can be satisfied only through insurance proceeds, and the judgment covers acts that allegedly fall under Cumberland\u2019s policies and for which Cumberland allegedly was obligated to defend its insured in this forum. Under these circumstances, it is fair, just, and reasonable to require Cumberland to litigate in Illinois.\nIn sum, the trial court correctly concluded that exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Cumberland comports with both federal and Illinois due process standards. Based on our resolution of this issue, we do not examine whether Illinois also has general jurisdiction over Cumberland.\nB. Service\nCumberland additionally argues that the trial court erred by finding that Cumberland was amenable to service under section 123 of the Insurance Code. Plaintiffs respond that Cumberland was properly served under section 123 and, more importantly, that the issue is moot because they subsequently served Cumberland directly with citations. As stated, plaintiffs initially served Cumberland through the Department of Insurance on October 13, 2009. On May 28, 2010, plaintiffs served an amended citation on the Department of Insurance and on Cumberland directly via certified mail. On June 29, 2010, the trial court denied Cumberland\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding in relevant part that the original service complied with Insurance Code requirements. The trial court also granted plaintiffs leave to file a third citation. Cumberland sought leave to appeal on July 26, 2010. Plaintiffs filed a third citation the following day and served it on Cumberland on August 2, 2010.\nCumberland argues that the issue of the applicability of section 123 is not moot, because the third citation was issued after its petition for leave to appeal and the trial court has not yet ruled on the validity of the service of that citation. However, a \u201ccourt should not decide a case when the occurrence of events after an appeal has been filed makes it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief and the judgment would have only an advisory effect.\u201d Estate of Bass v. Katten, 375 Ill. App. 3d 62, 66 (2007). That is the situation here, as even if we determined that Cumberland was not properly served under the Insurance Code, we would not reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Cumberland\u2019s motion to dismiss, because Cumberland was subsequently served on two other occasions. Furthermore, the May 28, 2010, service occurred before the hearing on Cumberland\u2019s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Cumberland argued against the validity of that service. However, Cumberland fails to argue in its brief why the May 28 service may have been defective, thereby forfeiting the issue for review. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006) (points not argued in the appellant\u2019s brief are forfeited). Accordingly, we need not address the propriety of the initial service through the Department of Insurance.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County circuit court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen A. Rehfeldt and James P. Moran, both of Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, P.C., of Wheaton, for appellant.", "Brian J. Wanca and David M. Oppenheim, both of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, and Phillip A. Bock, of Bock & Hatch, LLC, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PACE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs and Citation Petitioners-Appellees, v. EXPRESS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant (Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Citation Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201410\u20140743\nOpinion filed March 22, 2011.\nRehearing denied April 27, 2011.\nStephen A. Rehfeldt and James P. Moran, both of Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, P.C., of Wheaton, for appellant.\nBrian J. Wanca and David M. Oppenheim, both of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, and Phillip A. Bock, of Bock & Hatch, LLC, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0970-01", "first_page_order": 986, "last_page_order": 997 }