{ "id": 7326520, "name": "AMERICAN SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "American Service Insurance v. United Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "2011-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20143070", "first_page": "27", "last_page": "36", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 27" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2774560 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Horan v. Blowitz, 13 Ill. 2d 126, 132, 148 N.E.2d 445 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "citing Horan v. Blowitz, 13 Ill. 2d 126, 132, 148 N.E.2d 445 (1958)" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898619 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/90/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 90 Ill. App. 2d 356, 365, 232 N.E.2d 750 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3268370 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850-51", "parenthetical": "quoting Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 90 Ill. App. 2d 356, 365, 232 N.E.2d 750 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604565 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 1065", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3553849 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2889753 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "754 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259112 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "882 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276683 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 901, "char_count": 23792, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18892394884798303 }, "sha256": "5c570403133bb9ebf8a6fdc06b158e1714b8372fb2ddc3ca4fb3b09b0c4f2486", "simhash": "1:e893d290773cd7d6", "word_count": 3891 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LAMPKIN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nPresiding Justice Hall and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nPlaintiff, American Service Insurance Company (ASI), appeals the trial court\u2019s order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, United Automobile Insurance Company (UAIC). In so doing, the trial court determined that, because UAIC had rescinded its policy, defendant owed no duty to defend or indemnify a claim resulting from a February 2, 2004, car accident in which plaintiffs insured was injured. On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because defendant improperly rescinded its policy where defendant\u2019s insured did not make any material misrepresentations on her insurance application and had no duty to notify defendant of changes to her application responses. Plaintiff further contends defendant waived its right to rescind coverage of the insured by failing to promptly act after learning of an accident prior to the accident at issue. Based on the following, we affirm.\nFACTS\nOn April 9, 2003, Janice Baker applied for an insurance policy with UAIC vis-\u00e1-vis Lincoln Insurance Agency, an independent agency. The application was completed by telephone. In the application, Baker was asked, \u201c[I]s there any operator in the household under 25 years of age?\u201d Baker answered \u201cno.\u201d When asked the \u201cNames of all Operators,\u201d Baker listed herself and her husband, John Webb. \u201cOperator\u201d was not defined in the policy. Baker testified at her deposition that she understood the term \u201coperator\u201d to mean a driver. The application was signed by Baker\u2019s agent.\nUAIC issued a policy to Baker providing bodily injury and property damage liability from April 9, 2003, to April 9, 2004, on a 1986 Chevrolet Monte Carlo. The policy excluded Baker\u2019s husband, John, from coverage. The declarations page contained the following disclosure:\n\u201cCoverage afforded is only with respect to the coverages indicated herein by a specific premium charge or charges. The limit of the company\u2019s liability against each such coverage shall be stated herein, subject to all terms of this policy. Insured warrants that there are no other drivers in the household other than those listed in the application or endorsement.\u201d\nThe policy provided coverage to Baker, as the named insured, and \u201cany other person using such automobile to whom the named insured has given permission, provided the use is within the scope of such permission.\u201d\nIn addition, the conditions section of the policy provided:\n\u201cIf there has been a misrepresentation or false warranty, made with actual intent to deceive or which materially affects either the risk or hazard assumed by the Company, made by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation for this policy, or breach of condition of such policy, and if said misrepresentation or false warranty or breach of condition is stated in the policy or endorsement or rider attached thereto, or in written application for this policy, then this policy shall be null and void and of no benefit, provided, however, that the Company, during the lesser of the first year of the policy or the first term of the policy, rescinds the policy and declares this policy void. If the policy has been in effect more than the lesser of one year or the first policy term, then the Company shall not rescind this policy. Notwithstanding any other provision in this policy, this policy shall provide no coverage or benefit to any person who makes a fraudulent statement or omission or engages in fraudulent conduct with respect to any accident or loss for which coverage or a benefit is sought under this policy or any renewal of this policy.\u201d\nFurther, the conditions section of the insurance policy contained a paragraph entitled \u201cDeclarations,\u201d which provided:\n\u201cBy acceptance of this policy, the insured named in item 1 [Baker] of the Declarations agrees that the statements contained in the Application, a copy of which is attached to and forms part of this policy, have been made by him or on his behalf and that said statements and the statements of the Declarations and any subsequent Application accepted by the Company are offered as an inducement to the Company to issue or continue this policy and that the same are his agreements and representations, and that this policy is issued and continued in rebanee upon the truth of such statements and representations and that this policy embodies all agreements existing between himself and the Company or any of its agents relating to this insurance.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nOn May 4, 2003, the UAIC policy was amended to change the covered vehicle to a 1993 Ford Thunderbird. An amended declarations page was issued providing that \u201cthis declaration page with \u2018policy provisions\u2019 and all other applicable endorsements complete your policy.\u201d Two drivers were listed, Baker and John. Baker was listed as the principle driver and John was listed as \u201cexcluded.\u201d\nOn May 14, 2003, Baker\u2019s son, Devin Webb, received his learner\u2019s driving permit. On June 10, 2003, Devin was driving Baker\u2019s insured vehicle with her permission and was involved in a car accident with a light pole. The accident resulted in property damage, but no bodily injuries. On June 17, 2003, Baker called UAIC to report the accident. Baker and Devin agreed to provide recorded statements to UAIC.\nIn her recorded statement, Baker informed UAIC that her son was driving the insured vehicle with her permission when he was involved in the accident. Baker said that her son had lived with her at 9004 S. Ada Street in Chicago, Illinois, for l k years. Baker said that, since \u201cApril 4, 2003,\u201d Devin operated her vehicle two times per week. Devin did not have a driver\u2019s license; Devin had a \u201cblue slip.\u201d When asked why Devin was not disclosed to \u201cthe agent,\u201d Baker replied that Devin is \u201cnot an operator\u201d but that she thought she \u201cmentioned him.\u201d\nIn his recorded statement, Devin reported living with Baker, having a \u201cblue slip,\u201d and driving Baker\u2019s car \u201cevery other day\u201d since April 9, 2003. Devin said he usually drove with his mother as a passenger because of his \u201cblue slip\u201d; however, when the accident occurred, Devin was driving alone.\nUAIC informed Baker that Devin was a \u201cDNOR\u201d or a driver not on the policy, and there was a \u201ccoverage issue\u201d that needed to be resolved. It is uncontested that Baker continued to make premium payments for her insurance.\nWilliam Raniere, in-house counsel for UAIC, testified at his deposition that UAIC first became aware Devin lived in Baker\u2019s home and was 17 years old after Baker reported the June 10, 2003, accident.\nDevin obtained his driver\u2019s license on August 14, 2003. Sometime prior to February 1, 2004, Baker requested that the insured vehicle on her policy be amended to a 1991 Ford Taurus. Devin\u2019s name was not added to the policy.\nOn February 2, 2004, Devin was involved in another accident while driving Baker\u2019s insured vehicle. LaTonya Terrell and Bruce Jones, Devin\u2019s uncle, were passengers in the car with Devin. LaTonya sustained bodily injuries. The accident involved a parked car, which was damaged as well.\nOn March 15, 2004, after Baker contacted UAIC to report the second accident, UAIC rescinded her policy effective April 9, 2003, as a result of a material misrepresentation in the application. Baker\u2019s insurance premiums were returned thereafter.\nAt her deposition, Baker testified that Devin did not drive her vehicle prior to April 9, 2003. Baker attested that she was not in the car with Devin during the June 10, 2003, accident. Baker further testified that she and Devin were sued by the owner of the parked car involved in the February 2, 2004, accident. Baker said UAIC refused to defend that lawsuit and refused to indemnify Baker for the judgment. Baker said the accident was reported to the Illinois Secretary of State, who subsequently suspended her driver\u2019s license and Devin\u2019s driver\u2019s license for lack of insurance coverage.\nAt his deposition, Devin testified that he never drove Baker\u2019s car prior to receiving his learner\u2019s permit. After receiving his learner\u2019s permit, Devin said he only drove the car while Baker was a passenger. Devin testified that, after his license was suspended following the February 2, 2004, accident, he continued to drive when necessary and was arrested three times for driving on a suspended license.\nLaTonya was insured by ASI with coverage against uninsured motorists. LaTonya filed an uninsured motorist claim because Baker\u2019s policy had been rescinded by UAIC. On October 13, 2005, ASI filed a complaint requesting declaratory relief against LaTonya and UAIC such that: (1) Devin was an insured under the UAIC policy when the February 2, 2004, accident occurred; and (2) ASI owed no duty to provide uninsured motorist coverage or any other coverage to LaTonya as a result of the February 2, 2004, accident.\nOn March 10, 2006, UAIC filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint against ASI, LaTonya, Devin, Janice, John, Billy Terrell, and American Ambassador Insurance, a/s/o Stephen Thomas. UAIC requested declaratory relief such that: (1) the UAIC policy was rescinded and thus there was no coverage for the February 2, 2004, accident; (2) a judgment against American Ambassador Insurance, a/s/o Stephen Thomas, that UAIC was not obliged to pay or defend any claims resulting from the February 2, 2004, accident; and (3) UAIC was not obliged to pay out any sums under its policy.\nOn October 15, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UAIC and denied summary judgment in favor of ASI. The trial court concluded that UAIC properly rescinded its policy where there was a material misrepresentation on Baker\u2019s application because Baker failed to disclose Devin as a minor household driver. Moreover, Baker failed to comply with her duty of good faith and fair dealing when she failed to update UAIC with the material information that Devin obtained his driver\u2019s permit 35 days after the insurance application was completed. The court further concluded that UAIC did not waive its right to rescind the policy. This appeal followed.\nDECISION\nSummary judgment is appropriate when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 2002). When cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed, the parties agree that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and only a question of law is at issue; therefore, the parties invite the trial court to decide the issues based on the record. Greenwich Insurance Co. v. RPS Products, Inc., 379 Ill. App. 3d 78, 84, 882 N.E.2d 1202 (2008). We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35, 754 N.E.2d 314 (2001).\nI. Material Misrepresentation\nASI contends there could be no material misrepresentation justifying the rescission of the insurance policy because Baker was asked to list all operators, drivers, users, and co-owners on her application and Devin was not an operator, driver, user, or co-owner at the time as he did not receive his learner\u2019s permit until after the application was submitted and the policy was issued.\nPrior to rescinding an insurance policy, an insurer must satisfy the following criteria set by section 154 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code):\n\u201cNo misrepresentation or false warranty made by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation for a policy of insurance, or breach of a condition of such policy shall defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation, false warranty or condition shall have been stated in the policy or endorsement or rider attached thereto, or in the written application therefor. No such misrepresentation or false warranty shall defeat or avoid the policy unless it shall have been made with actual intent to deceive or materially affects either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the company.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/154 (West 2002).\nMateriality is determined by considering whether a reasonably careful and intelligent person would have regarded the facts omitted as substantially increasing the chances of the events insured against so as to cause a rejection of the application or different conditions such as higher premiums. Ratliff v. Safeway Insurance Co., 257 Ill. App. 3d 281, 288, 628 N.E.2d 937 (1993). A material misrepresentation may result where an insured fails to disclose material information or provide complete information in response to a question. Cohen v. Washington National Insurance Co., 175 Ill. App. 3d 517, 520, 529 N.E.2d 1065 (1988). \u201cAn insurance applicant has the duty to act in good faith, and an insurer is entitled to truthful responses so that it may determine whether the applicant meets its underwriting criteria. Thus, the applicant must disclose all information and let the insurer determine the materiality of the *** information.\u201d Garde v. Country Life Insurance Co., 147 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1032, 498 N.E.2d 302 (1986). An insurance policy may be voided even if the insured\u2019s misrepresentation was a mistake or made in good faith. Ratliff, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 288.\nIt has been found that the nondisclosure of a 20-year-old driver residing in the same household as the insured is a misrepresentation materially affecting the risk assumed by the insurer. Id. \u201c \u2018It is a matter of common knowledge that the rate frequency of accidents for drivers between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four is substantially greater than that for all drivers who are twenty-five years of age or more.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Id.\nIn the case before us, the insurance application contained a section entitled \u201cQuestions Pertaining To Applicant And All Members of Household.\u201d That section contained 12 questions. In relevant part, the application asked \u201cis there any operator in the household under 25 years of age?\u201d Baker responded, \u201cno.\u201d The section also contained several blank lines to provide the \u201cnames of all operators.\u201d Baker was listed as an operator; John was listed as an operator with the word \u201cexclude\u201d where his driver\u2019s license number was requested; Devin was not listed as an operator. At the bottom of the application, a disclosure entitled \u201capplicant\u2019s statement\u201d appeared:\n\u201cThe applicant hereto states that he read this application and attests that all answers given by him to the questions asked herein are truthful to the best of his knowledge and belief and that said answers were made as inducement to the insurance company to issue a policy, and it is a special condition of this policy that the policy shall be null and void and of no benefit or effect whatsoever as to any claim arising thereunder in the event that the attestations or statements in this application shall prove to be false or fraudulent in nature.\nIt is understood that a copy of this application shall be attached to and form a part of the policy of insurance when issued and that it is intended that the company shall rely on the contents of this application in issuing any policy of insurance or renewal thereof.\u201d\nMoreover, as stated earlier, the policy provided:\n\u201cNotwithstanding any other provision in this policy, this policy shall provide no coverage or benefit to any person who makes a fraudulent statement or omission or engages in fraudulent conduct with respect to any accident or loss for which coverage or a benefit is sought under this policy or any renewal of this policy.\u201d\nAlthough not defined in the policy, it is clear from Baker\u2019s recorded statement and her deposition testimony that she understood the term \u201coperator\u201d to mean driver. Even assuming it was not a material misrepresentation to omit Devin as an operator on the April 9, 2003, application, Baker had an obligation, as a condition of the policy, to inform UAIC once Devin did begin driving the vehicle. See 215 ILCS 5/154 (West 2002). The application, the policy, and the declarations page each reveal the importance of accurate information, including the names and ages of all eligible drivers. Moreover, the amended declarations page issued as a result of the May 4, 2003, request to update the vehicle information states that the \u201cinsured warrants that there are no other drivers in the household other than those listed in the application or endorsement.\u201d\nIn their recorded statements, both Baker and Devin recognized that he regularly drove the vehicle after the application was submitted. The record does not reveal the exact date upon which Devin began driving the vehicle, whether before the application date or immediately after; however, the record clearly demonstrates that Devin began operating the vehicle once he obtained his learner\u2019s permit on May 14, 2003. Baker never contacted UAIC to update the drivers included in the policy and did not disclose Devin as a driver on either occasion when she deemed it necessary to alert UAIC that the insured vehicle had been changed, on May 4, 2003, and sometime before February 1, 2004, or even after Devin had obtained his driver\u2019s license on August 14, 2003.\nBarely one month after its completion, the application no longer accurately reflected the eligible operators in Baker\u2019s household as a result of Baker\u2019s omissions. The amended declaration pages also failed to accurately reflect the eligible operators. UAIC, therefore, could no longer rely on the application\u2019s contents. The policy terms disclaimed that the UAIC policy was \u201cissued and continued in reliance\u201d on the truth of Baker\u2019s representations on the application and any subsequent application. In order to allow for an accurate underwriting process, UAIC found it necessary to ask the applicant whether there were any operators under the age of 25 in the household. Moreover, UAIC found it necessary to disclaim on the amended declaration page that there were no other drivers in the household other than those listed. \u201c \u2018An insurer is interested in ascertaining the true owner of a car particularly where the policy covers any person who may be driving the car with the owner\u2019s consent. *** The status, number and character of the persons who are likely to be driving the car with the owner\u2019s permission are also material to risk.\u2019 \u201d Safeway Insurance Co. v. Duran, 74 Ill. App. 3d 846, 850-51, 393 N.E.2d 688 (1979) (quoting Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 90 Ill. App. 2d 356, 365, 232 N.E.2d 750 (1967)). There is no doubt Baker had been sufficiently notified that Devin\u2019s status as an operator, i.e., driver, was of great relevance.\nAs previously stated, it is well established that drivers under the age of 25 are involved in accidents with much greater frequency. Devin fell into the increased-risk category because he was 17 years old when he obtained his learner\u2019s permit. Once Devin began operating Baker\u2019s vehicle, the insurance policy failed to adequately provide for UAIC\u2019s increased risk exposure. Raniere\u2019s deposition testimony demonstrated that the addition of Devin as a driver on Baker\u2019s policy would have resulted in an increased premium of $845.\nWe, therefore, conclude that Baker generated material misrepresentations when she failed to notify UAIC that Devin was operating the insured vehicle. The facts demonstrate that Devin was not merely a passive user; thus, even if his use was permitted, the insurance coverage did not extend to his regular operation of the vehicle. The policy provided that a misrepresentation would cause the policy to be \u201cnull and void and of no benefit\u201d and that a fraudulent statement or omission in relation to a benefit \u201csought under this policy or any renewal of this policy\u201d would result in \u201cno coverage or benefit.\u201d Consequently, UAIC was within its rights to rescind Baker\u2019s policy.\nII. Waiver of Rescission Rights\nASI contends UAIC waived any right it had to rescind Baker\u2019s policy because UAIC failed to promptly act on those rights when UAIC first learned Devin was driving the insured vehicle, instead waiting nine months until Devin\u2019s second accident before rescinding the policy. ASI further contends the trial court improperly relied upon section 154 of the Code to conclude UAIC acted to rescind the policy within the applicable one-year time period.\nRescission is the cancellation of a contract thereby restoring the parties to their initial status. Illinois State Bar Ass\u2019n Mutual Insurance Co. v. Coregis Insurance Co., 355 Ill. App. 3d 156, 165, 821 N.E.2d 706 (2004) (citing Horan v. Blowitz, 13 Ill. 2d 126, 132, 148 N.E.2d 445 (1958)). Section 154 of the Code provides:\n\u201cWith respect to a policy of insurance as defined in subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 143.13, except life, accident and health, fidelity and surety, and ocean marine policies, a policy or policy renewal shall not be rescinded after the policy has been in effect for one year or one policy term, whichever is less.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/154 (West 2002).\n\u201c[A] material representation under section 154 *** renders the policy voidable, not void ab initio, and an insurer can waive this right if it does not invoke it promptly.\u201d Coregis, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 167. In Core- gis, this court noted that, while not applicable to the facts of that case, the legislature \u201chas since spoken as to the outer limit of what constitutes promptness by imposing a one-year time limit within which an insurer must act to void a policy based upon a material misrepresentation under section 154.\u201d Id. at n.4.\nContrary to ASI\u2019s argument, UAIC rescinded Baker\u2019s insurance policy within the proscribed time period. The policy was first issued on April 9, 2003, and it was rescinded on March 15, 2004. ASI\u2019s construction of section 154 impermissibly restricts the statute. The statute does not merely create a bar for when an insurance policy can no longer be rescinded. As stated in Coregis, the legislature created a time period, namely, one year, that satisfies \u201cprompt\u201d rescission.\nMoreover, Baker\u2019s policy itself supports UAIC\u2019s rescission. The conditions section of the insurance policy said:\n\u201cNotice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change in any part of this policy or stop the Company from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy, signed by a duly authorized representative of the Company.\u201d\nThe insurance policy expressly reserved UAIC\u2019s rescission rights despite its knowledge in June 2003 that Devin was driving the insured vehicle.\nWe, therefore, conclude that UAIC did not waive its rescission rights.\nCONCLUSION\nBecause Baker materially misrepresented the fact that Devin was an operator of her insured vehicle and UAIC acted within the one-year time limit, UAIC properly rescinded Baker\u2019s insurance policy. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of UAIC.\nAffirmed.\nWe assume the date is a typographical error because the insurance application was completed on April 9, 2003.\nThe amended declarations page updating the insured vehicle to a Ford Taurus, which occurred sometime before February 1, 2004, did not contain the same language.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LAMPKIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Newman Raiz, LLC, of Chicago (James P Newman and William H. Ransom, of counsel), for appellant.", "Shelist Law Firm LLC, of Chicago (Samuel A. Shelist, of counsel), for ap-pellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20143070\nOpinion filed April 18, 2011.\nNewman Raiz, LLC, of Chicago (James P Newman and William H. Ransom, of counsel), for appellant.\nShelist Law Firm LLC, of Chicago (Samuel A. Shelist, of counsel), for ap-pellee." }, "file_name": "0027-01", "first_page_order": 43, "last_page_order": 52 }