{ "id": 7327614, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID D. BURTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Burton", "decision_date": "2011-04-11", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201409\u20140747", "first_page": "321", "last_page": "335", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 321" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292043 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 F.3d 135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 4037660 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/576/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847599 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5556567 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 F.3d 340", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 4221112 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "in applying fact-specific inquiry to decide whether someone has apparent authority, it is more reasonable for an officer to believe that a third party has full access to an open crate than, for example, a defendant's purse or briefcase" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/598/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186532 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191830 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822-23", "parenthetical": "fourth amendment protection varies depending on facts of each case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "999 F. Supp. 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1282082 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "finding invalid third-party consent to search pants pocket" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/999/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 F.3d 457", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 5755900 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "finding valid third-party consent to search jacket pocket" }, { "page": "464", "parenthetical": "the defendant by his conduct abandoned any privacy interest he had in coat when he was present during the search but did not indicate by his actions that he had a privacy interest or otherwise claim an ownership interest therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/583/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833427 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983-84" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "983-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 705", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339929 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477765 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" }, { "page": "197-98" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2954034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "adopting in Illinois Matlock's common-authority test in third-party-consent cases" }, { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" }, { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172884 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6214176 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "187-88" }, { "page": "188-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286528 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3633031 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/239/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275967 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0103-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1230, "char_count": 37368, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.3288477722853265e-08, "percentile": 0.2724299756472289 }, "sha256": "c5acda55e69af1bc0d7dac4a06ee3f96b8080e7cc87b297c53d207c2f20c6a5b", "simhash": "1:ea9ab587c45c7029", "word_count": 6216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID D. BURTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JORGENSEN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices McLaren and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nOn June 3, 2009, after a bench trial, defendant, David D. Burton, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.1(a), (e) (West 2008)), unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.1(a), (e) (West 2008)), possession of a firearm without a firearm owner\u2019s identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), 14(c)(3) (West 2008)), and being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24\u20141.7(a)(3) (West 2008)). Prior to trial, on April 15, 2009, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and to suppress the weapon that formed the basis of the charges. On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because there was no valid consent for the warrantless search of his coat pocket. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Motion to Suppress\nThe evidence at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress revealed that, on October 14, 2008, defendant resided at a Carol Stream apartment with his girlfriend of seven years, Candace Garland, and her two children, mother, and three siblings. Defendant resided at the apartment for approximately nine months (from February 2008 until his arrest on October 14, 2008). The apartment contains a front living space, a kitchen, two bedrooms, and a bathroom. At one time, defendant and Garland shared the back bedroom. Both agreed, however, that, as of October 14, 2008, Garland did not share the back bedroom with defendant, i.e., defendant was the only person to use the bedroom. The bedroom contains a closet with two doors such that the closet may be accessed from the bedroom and the bathroom. In the closet is a stacked washing machine and dryer that the apartment\u2019s occupants use. Garland kept some clothing and other items in the closet next to the washing machine and closer to the bathroom, and defendant kept all of his clothes on the opposite closet wall, closer to the bedroom and separate from Garland\u2019s belongings. Garland\u2019s name is on the lease to the apartment; defendant\u2019s name is not.\nOn October 14, 2008, at 8:44 p.m., a radio dispatch alerted Carol Stream police officers John Bucholz and Peter Spizzirri to a possible domestic incident at the apartment. At 8:46 p.m., the officers arrived at the apartment. Garland answered the door and invited the officers inside. Defendant was in the back bedroom, but walked to the front area of the apartment after the officers entered. According to defendant, he was on his cell phone at the time, asking his mother to send over a truck so that he could take his belongings, including his furniture, and leave the apartment. Spizzirri confirmed that he heard defendant on his cell phone making arrangements to leave the residence.\nThe officers informed Garland that police had received a call from her brother and sister about a domestic disturbance. While there was, apparently, an earlier disagreement between defendant and Garland\u2019s sister, both Garland and defendant denied that it was a physical altercation. According to the officers, there were no apparent physical injuries to either party and the apartment contents were undisturbed (i.e., no furniture knocked over or other evidence of a fight). Nevertheless, to make further inquiries, Bucholz walked with Garland toward the kitchen while Spizzirri and defendant remained in the front room. At 8:49 p.m. (three minutes after their arrival), while the officers were separately speaking with Garland and defendant, the dispatcher announced to the officers that there was sensitive information for them and, at 8:52 p.m., the dispatcher informed the officers that, according to Garland\u2019s brother and sister, defendant kept a gun and drugs in the apartment, specifically, in a closet/laundry room off of one of the bedrooms and in an attic access panel in the ceiling of that closet.\nAt that time, Bucholz walked Garland toward the bedroom and explained that there might be a gun and drugs in the closet. Garland appeared surprised and \u201ca little upset\u201d and pointed out the closet to Bucholz. According to Bucholz, Garland told him to \u201cgo ahead and search.\u201d Thereafter, Garland signed a consent-to-search form authorizing the officers to search the \u201capartment.\u201d After Garland signed the form, Bucholz left her in the bedroom and walked to the front room to give the form to Spizzirri, to give to defendant. Bucholz then returned to the bedroom; he was not present when Spizzirri asked defendant to sign the form. Garland testified that she could hear only parts of the conversation and heard defendant say that he was not going to sign the form, because Garland\u2019s signature was already on it.\nAccording to Spizzirri, after receiving the radio transmission about a possible weapon and drugs, he, for safety reasons, patted down defendant and instructed him to sit at the kitchen table. Bucholz and Garland walked to the bedroom; Bucholz ultimately returned with a consent-to-search form that he and Garland had already signed. Bucholz gave Spizzirri the form, and Spizzirri told defendant about the dispatch information concerning drugs and weapons. Spizzirri asked defendant to sign the form, and \u201c[defendant said] you can search. Go ahead and search. He said, I will not sign the form because I\u2019m not on the lease. I don\u2019t see as to why I would have to sign that form if I\u2019m not on the lease.\u201d Spizzirri summarized that, while defendant refused to sign the consent form, he did not refuse consent to search the apartment:\n\u201cQ. You also asked for consent to search the apartment?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And he refused?\nA. No, he did not.\nQ. He gave you consent?\nA. He said, go ahead and search the apartment, but I will not sign the form because I\u2019m not on the lease.\u201d\nDefendant testified that, as of the time of the suppression hearing, he had been convicted of seven felonies in nine years and, therefore, he understands his rights. When Spizzirri asked defendant to sign the consent form, \u201cI refused\u201d and \u201ctold him no. I told him it wasn\u2019t my apartment, really, and he says like, Miss Garland signed the lease. I said, okay. So, why do you need me to sign this?\u201d Defendant further explained that he did not sign the consent form because \u201cI just didn\u2019t want to sign it.\u201d He testified that, in response to Spizzirri\u2019s verbal request for permission to search the apartment, \u201cI told him no.\u201d Defendant agreed that he told Spizzirri that he (defendant) \u201chad no need\u201d to sign the consent form, because Garland was on the lease and had already signed it.\nAfter bringing the consent form to defendant, Bucholz returned to the bedroom and began searching the closet. According to Bucholz, Garland, told him that both she and defendant kept personal items in the closet. He began his search with the attic access in the closet, where he found drug-related items, including spoons with white residue on them and a \u201cPyrex cup that had been used to cook drugs in.\u201d Spizzirri left defendant in the front room and joined Bucholz in the search. Spizzirri located the gun in a large, men\u2019s coat that was hanging in the closest. The coat also contained defendant\u2019s birth certificate and an IRS document with defendant\u2019s name on it. Defendant was subsequently arrested.\nAfter hearing closing arguments, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The court found that Garland clearly consented to a search of the entire apartment, but that the State did not meet its burden of establishing that defendant consented to the search. Nevertheless, the court concluded, Garland had the authority to consent to a search of both the bedroom and the closet because it was a common area to which she had access.\nDefendant moved the court to reconsider. At oral argument on the motion to reconsider, the court disagreed with defendant that he \u201cexpressly refused consent.\u201d The court summarized that the testimony at the suppression hearing included Spizzirri\u2019s position that defendant told the officers that they could go ahead and search, but that he would not sign the consent form. While defendant had testified that he neither gave verbal consent to the search nor signed the written consent to search, the court found lacking an \u201cexpress refusal of consent\u201d to search or a \u201cclear and unequivocal objection\u201d to the search. The court further clarified that it did not find the testimony to reflect that, when expressly asked for consent, defendant said \u201cno.\u201d Instead, the court explained that, while it found that the State did not meet its burden on consent, it had not made specific findings on what defendant did or did not say. \u201cHe maybe didn\u2019t consent, but he didn\u2019t object. And I think this case [Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006)] requires a clear and unequivocal objection.\u201d\nB. Trial\nAs relevant to this appeal, the trial testimony largely mirrored the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. Garland reiterated that, while both she and defendant stored items in the closet, their items were separate and in different parts of the closet. Defendant kept a few coats in the closet; he was the only person to wear the coats \u2014 he did not let anyone else borrow them.\nGarland\u2019s brother, Corey Kirkendoll, age 13, testified that he was not allowed to touch defendant\u2019s things or borrow his clothes. Nevertheless, when asked whether he was ever told not to touch defendant\u2019s things, Corey responded \u201cno.\u201d Corey clarified that he had access to the closet and did his own laundry, but that he did not touch defendant\u2019s belongings when he used the washer and dryer.\nBucholz testified that, when he told Garland that dispatch informed him that there might be guns and drugs in the apartment, \u201cshe was upset. She was \u2014 she had a surprised look on her face and just seemed genuinely upset that that stuff might he in her apartment.\u201d Before Bucholz asked her, Garland immediately told him to search and directed him to the closet with the washer and dryer. Bucholz further testified that the first area he searched in the closet was the attic access, where he found a Pyrex glass measuring cup and spoon with white residue on them, as well as a copper scrubbing material. Next, Spizzirri came in and began searching the closet; Bucholz saw Spizzirri search a coat and find a loaded handgun. According to Bucholz, \u201cit was obvious that it was a man\u2019s jacket.\u201d Bucholz testified that, before beginning the search, he received formal consent from Garland to search the apartment and Spizzirri received verbal consent from defendant.\nSpizzirri confirmed that, when he entered the closet, Bucholz had just completed pulling down items from the overhead attic access area. Spizzirri then began going through \u201cmale clothing\u201d hanging just past the door leading into the closet from the bedroom. He searched inside the pockets of a large men\u2019s coat and located a handgun. According to Spizzirri, approximately 10 to 15 minutes passed from the time the officers entered the apartment to locating the weapon.\nIn closing argument, presumably to dispute ownership of the weapon, defense counsel noted that, even if the coat was obviously a man\u2019s coat, that \u201cdoesn\u2019t necessarily mean a man wears it. Coats\u2014 especially winter coats can be worn by anybody.\u201d Counsel further argued that, although Corey testified that he did not touch defendant\u2019s things, \u201cin this household I think it would have been impossible not to touch other people\u2019s things.\u201d He noted that, while defendant might have had some privacy in the bedroom and in the bathroom, the apartment was \u201ca mess,\u201d there were only two closets, things were stored everywhere, and everyone used and accessed the closet. He represented, \u201c[t]hat closet was by no means a place that [defendant] exercised exclusive possession and control over. Everyone had access to it.\u201d In addition, counsel argued that nothing about defendant\u2019s behavior in the apartment suggested that he was trying to hide anything from police. Counsel conceded, \u201cwhen he ultimately was asked if they could search, he said yes. He didn\u2019t sign the form[,] but he said yes. That\u2019s the officer\u2019s testimony.\u201d Counsel later again conceded that defendant \u201csaid go ahead and search. He didn\u2019t sign for it, but he verbally gave consent.\u201d\nThe trial court convicted defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon, possession of a firearm without a FOID card, and being an armed habitual criminal. The court found that the gun belonged to defendant, noting that the gun was found in a man\u2019s coat along with an IRS letter to defendant and that, according to Garland\u2019s testimony, the coat belonged to defendant and he was the only person who wore it. (The court also noted that it had observed Garland as being a small woman.) The court sentenced defendant to six years\u2019 imprisonment on each count, the terms to run concurrently (and later amended the sentence on one conviction to five years).\nDefendant moved the court to reconsider, reasserting his argument that the evidence should have been suppressed due to an unlawful search. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant argues that reversal is warranted for two reasons: (1) Garland lacked authority to consent to a search of defendant\u2019s coat pocket; and (2) regardless of Garland\u2019s authority, defendant expressly refused consent to the search. When reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, reversing them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but review de novo the court\u2019s ultimate determination of whether suppression is warranted. People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 265-66 (2010). On appeal, we remain free to consider not only the record at the suppression hearing, but also the trial evidence (see People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 34-36 (1984); People v. Robinson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 822, 830 (2009)), and to draw our own conclusions from the evidence. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 266.\nA. Garland\u2019s Authority to Consent to Search\nDefendant argues first that Garland lacked the authority to consent to a warrantless search of his coat pocket. Preliminarily, however, we must address the State\u2019s argument that defendant forfeited this argument by not raising it below. Specifically, the State argues that, in his motion to suppress, defendant argued only generally that there was no consent to search the closet and bedroom. Defendant did not argue that his coat pocket was a closed container beyond the scope of third-party consent. Moreover, the State adds, defendant at trial did not argue that Garland could not consent to a search of his coat because it was a closed container. Rather, defendant\u2019s theory at trial was only that the contraband was not his. Indeed, as to consent, the State notes, defense counsel at trial conceded in his closing argument that defendant verbally consented to the search. Thus, the State argues, we should not consider defendant\u2019s closed-container argument.\nWe do not agree that this issue is forfeited. While it is true that, in the motion to suppress, defendant generally argued lack of valid consent as it pertained to the closet, as opposed to, specifically, his coat pocket, defendant\u2019s consistent argument below was that his rights were violated when police executed a warrantless search without valid consent thereto: this was his argument at the suppression stage; he objected at trial to testimony regarding the search on the basis that his motion to suppress was improperly denied; and, finally, he argued in his posttrial motion that the motion to suppress had been improperly denied. Accordingly, although defendant\u2019s argument that Garland lacked authority to consent to the search of his coat pocket is more specific than those arguments raised below, it still touches on the lack of valid consent for a warrantless search and we decline to find it forfeited.\nThe United States and Illinois Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and, generally, searches without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). An exception to the warrant requirement exists where law enforcement officers obtain consent to the search from either the person whose property is being searched or from a third party who possesses \u201ccommon authority\u201d over the premises. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Consent is determined by whether a reasonable person would have understood \u2014 by an individual\u2019s words, acts, or conduct \u2014 that consent had been granted. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Common authority rests \u201con mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes\u201d such that each assumes the risk that the other may permit the common area to be searched. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; see also People v. Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1974) (adopting in Illinois Matlock\u2019s common-authority test in third-party-consent cases). Therefore, the authority justifying third-party consent is based not on the law of property but, rather, on the idea that mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control for most purposes makes it reasonable to recognize that each may, in his or her own right, permit the inspection. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 197 (1998). The State bears the burden of establishing common authority. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181.\nCommon authority may be either actual or apparent. In other words, under the \u201capparent authority\u201d doctrine, a warrantless search does not violate the fourth amendment where the police receive consent from a third party whom the police reasonably believe possesses common authority, but who, in fact, does not. Id. at 187-88. The reasonableness standard is objective: would the facts available to the officer cause a reasonable person to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If so, the search is valid. Id. at 188-89. If not, however, an officer may not blindly accept a person\u2019s consent to search, and a warrantless search without further inquiry is unlawful. Id. Again, the State bears the burden of proving that the officers were objectively reasonable in their belief that the consenting person had the authority to consent. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 317 (1994).\nHere, defendant does not dispute that Garland possessed actual authority to consent to a search of the closet. Indeed, defendant conceded at the scene that it was not his apartment and that the officers did not need his signature on the consent form because Garland, the leaseholder, had already signed it. Further, it is undisputed that Garland (and all of the apartment\u2019s occupants) had access to the closet and that Garland kept personal belongings therein. Defendant does dispute, however, that Garland had actual or apparent authority to justify the warrantless search of his \u201cclosed container,\u201d i.e., his coat pocket. With respect to actual authority, he asserts that the evidence is undisputed that the coat was his and that he was the only person to wear it. Further, with respect to apparent authority, he argues that the police could not have reasonably believed that Garland had authority to permit the search of his coat because, within the closet, his clothing was separate from Garland\u2019s and the officers quickly discerned that it was \u201cobviously a man\u2019s jacket.\u201d Defendant argues that the scope of Garland\u2019s consent could not include \u201cthe inside contents of closed objects hidden from view.\u201d At that point, defendant argues, the officers were required to make further inquiry into whether Garland could consent to a search of his coat pocket, because the apparent-authority doctrine does not permit officers to assume consent in ambiguous circumstances. Therefore, defendant argues, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the gun and, absent that evidence, his convictions cannot stand and must be reversed. We disagree and conclude that Garland had apparent common authority to consent to the search.\nDefendant\u2019s argument is premised on the notion that a homeowner\u2019s consent to search a home does not extend to another person\u2019s private, closed container or object to which the homeowner has no access. See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197-98; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725 (1984) (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.). Defendant likens his coat pocket to a closed object and asserts that it was an enclosed space within a common area. \u201c[Cjontainers used to hold one\u2019s most personal belongings command a higher degree of privacy,\u201d and such closed containers or objects might include lockers, suitcases, zipped duffel bags, and purses. People v. Miller, 346 Ill. App. 3d 972, 983-84 (2004); see also People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 318 (1994). In some cases, pockets have been considered closed spaces for purposes of determining whether third-party consent to search was lawful. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding valid third-party consent to search jacket pocket); United States v. Robinson, 999 F. Supp. 155, 163 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding invalid third-party consent to search pants pocket). The inquiry into whether the party consenting to a search of closed items has apparent or actual authority to do so is necessarily fact specific. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (fourth amendment protection varies depending on facts of each case); see also Miller, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 984. Moreover, in assessing apparent authority, \u201c[w]e cannot use hindsight; the circumstances at the time of the entry control the determination whether the police reasonably believed that they had obtained valid consent.\u201d People v. Huffar, 313 Ill. App. 3d 593, 597 (2000).\nHere, before searching the closet, the officers knew that: Garland was a leaseholder of the apartment and defendant was not; defendant and Garland were in a dating relationship and had, for most of the duration of defendant\u2019s stay in the apartment, shared the back bedroom that accessed the closet; Garland and defendant continued to share the closet with both keeping clothes and personal items therein; the closet was not locked or private but, rather, contained two doors, including one that accessed the apartment\u2019s only bathroom; the closet held the apartment\u2019s washing machine and dryer; and all eight people residing in the apartment had access to the closet to, at a minimum, do laundry. We conclude, based on this information, that, even if Garland lacked actual authority to permit the search of defendant\u2019s coat (an issue we do not reach), the officers reasonably believed that Garland possessed authority to permit a search of the closet, including defendant\u2019s coat.\nFurther, we note that defendant\u2019s actions reinforced the reasonableness of the officers\u2019 belief that Garland held authority to permit the search. Specifically, defendant remarked that, because he was not named on the lease and Garland had signed the form, the officers did not need him to sign the form. In addition to this comment, defendant made no effort to object to or stop the search as it progressed. Accordingly, the officers\u2019 belief that Garland held authority to consent to the search, and, according to their testimony, that defendant had acquiesced to the search, was reasonable where defendant\u2019s silence during the search was coupled with his explanation for his decision not to sign the form, i.e., because he did not think he had standing to sign the form, not, specifically, because he objected to the search. See, e.g., Adams, 583 F.3d at 464 (the defendant by his conduct abandoned any privacy interest he had in coat when he was present during the search but did not indicate by his actions that he had a privacy interest or otherwise claim an ownership interest therein); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure \u00a78.3(g), at 179 (4th ed. 2004) (claim of third-party common authority can be reasonably relied upon by police where other person is present and could be expected to object if the claim of authority were in error, but is silent).\nDefendant makes much of the facts that, within the closet, he and Garland did not intermingle their clothes and that it was obvious to the officers that the coat belonged to a man. We disagree with defendant that the fact that the coat was \u201cobviously\u201d a man\u2019s inherently created a sufficiently ambiguous situation rendering the officers unreasonable in not making further inquiries regarding the scope of Garland\u2019s consent. Regardless of the gender for which the coat was designed: (1) coats can be worn by anybody; and (2) there is nothing in the record to indicate that, in this closet where she kept her belongings, Garland could not access or touch defendant\u2019s things. Moreover, we note again that defendant\u2019s assertion that he effectively had no standing to consent to the search fostered Garland\u2019s apparent authority to search \u201cthe apartment.\u201d Defendant did not express that Garland\u2019s apparent authority was qualified or limited and, thus, the officers were reasonable to believe that Garland\u2019s consent extended to even a man\u2019s coat.\nIn this vein, we disagree that this case is like James, 163 Ill. 2d at 318, where the driver\u2019s authority to consent to a search of the automobile did not extend to a purse found on the passenger seat. The court in James noted that a purse is not normally shared by two or more persons. Id. Nor is this case like Miller, where the third-party consent did not extend to a zipped duffel bag found in a locked locker that police pried open. Miller, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84. Here, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, there was no evidence presented that his coat was \u201chidden from view.\u201d Defendant did not take any action with respect to the coat that might indicate that he held a particular expectation of privacy to it as opposed to any other object in the closet. For example, the coat was not enclosed in a zipped hanging bag, or placed inside a closed suitcase, or removed from the closet and stored somewhere in the bedroom where, at that point in time, only he resided. See United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 347 (7th Cir. 2010) (in applying fact-specific inquiry to decide whether someone has apparent authority, it is more reasonable for an officer to believe that a third party has full access to an open crate than, for example, a defendant\u2019s purse or briefcase). For these reasons, it was not unreasonable for the officers to be unconcerned that the coat might be subject to heightened privacy concerns. Accordingly, we do not think the officers unreasonably believed that Garland\u2019s consent to search the closet for a gun and drugs included defendant\u2019s coat therein where, clearly, the coat could contain the object of the search, i.e., a weapon or drugs. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (\u201cThe scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.\u201d).\nSimilarly, we do not find convincing in these circumstances defendant\u2019s argument that Garland could not consent because the coat belonged to him and he alone wore it. One factor to be considered in assessing common authority is whether the parties had joint access to the item searched. See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197. The mere fact that the apartment occupants did not, in fact, wear defendant\u2019s coat does not reflect that the consenting party \u2014 Garland, defendant\u2019s girlfriend of seven years who shared the closet with him \u2014 \u201cwas denied the mutual use, access to, or control over it.\u201d (Emphases added.) Id. at 198 (where the defendant lived with his girlfriend in her house and they shared a bedroom, court upheld the girlfriend\u2019s consent to a search of a closed box in the bedroom, even though she did not know what was inside it and told the police that it belonged to the defendant, because the fact that the defendant alone used the box did not mean that the girlfriend had been denied mutual access to it); see also Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d at 89-90 (wife\u2019s consent to search of dresser where husband kept clothes was upheld because \u201c[t]he mere fact that the [husband] alone may have used this dresser drawer while his wife may have used another or another dresser does not indicate that the wife was denied the mutual use, access to or control of the drawer\u201d); People v. Ford, 83 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63 (1980) (wife could consent to search of tool box in basement even though it belonged to her husband and only he used the tools; basement was not locked and wife was not instructed not to handle the tools, so the mere fact that only he used them did not indicate that the wife was denied mutual use, access to, or control over them). Here, the mere facts that the coat belonged to defendant and that only he wore it do not mean that Garland was denied mutual access to it in the closet that they shared. Accordingly, we conclude that the police were reasonable in their belief that Garland could consent under the apparent-authority doctrine to a search of defendant\u2019s coat in the closet.\nB. Defendant\u2019s \u201cExpress Refusal\u201d to Consent\nDefendant argues next that, even if we conclude that Garland had actual or apparent authority to search, his express refusal to allow the search invalidated Garland\u2019s authority and rendered the search unlawful. Relying on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), defendant argues that a third party\u2019s consent to search property over which he or she shares common authority does not trump the express refusal of consent from the person whose belongings are being searched. Defendant argues that the trial court here erred in reasoning that an individual refusing consent must clearly and unequivocally object to the search. Rather, defendant contends, he refused consent and he did not need to do anything further. Accordingly, defendant argues, the subsequent search of his belongings was invalid. We disagree.\nIn Randolph, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a warrantless search based on one co-occupant\u2019s consent is valid if the other co-occupant, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, was present at the scene and \u201cexpressly refuse[d] to consent.\u201d Id. at 106. There, the defendant\u2019s estranged wife consented to a search of the marital residence after the defendant had \u201cunequivocally refused\u201d to give consent to search the house. Id. at 107. The court held that \u201ca warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Id. at 120.\nHere, we agree with the trial court that defendant did not expressly refuse to consent to the search. According to his own testimony, defendant\u2019s express refusal to sign the form was based on his belief that, because he was not named on the lease, it was unnecessary. Defendant did not testify that he told the officers that he would not sign the form because he did not want them to search, nor did he testify that, in fact, he did not sign the form because he objected to the search. Rather, defendant explained to the officers that he did not need to sign because he was not named on the lease, and then he proceeded to sit in the front room while the search took place. He never indicated that he wanted the search to cease, and he did not take any other action that could reasonably be interpreted as an express refusal of consent. We note that, although defendant testified that when asked for verbal consent to the search he said \u201cno,\u201d the trial court here did not credit that testimony. Specifically, the trial court stated that it did not find the testimony to reflect that, when expressly asked for consent, defendant said \u201cno.\u201d Instead, the court explained that, while it found that the State did not meet its burden on consent, it had not made specific findings on what defendant did or did not say. The court instead found that the evidence lacked the express refusal of consent. The trial court is in the best position to judge witness credibility, and we cannot conclude that its finding that defendant did not expressly refuse consent is against the manifest weight of the evidence. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 266 (trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony).\nDefendant points to People v. Sweborg, 293 Ill. App. 3d 298, 302 (1997), where a defendant, in response to an officer\u2019s request to search the trunk of his car, replied \u201c \u2018No. I really don\u2019t want you to.\u2019 \u201d While the officer searched the trunk, the defendant repeated, \u201c T thought I told you I didn\u2019t want you to look through my personal items,\u2019 \u201d and he put his hand over a guitar case that was in the trunk and that the officer was trying to open. Id. at 303. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court\u2019s assessment that the defendant consented to the search when he showed the officer how to remove the key from the ignition but then withdrew the consent when the officer searched the trunk. Instead, the court found that consent was never given, holding that \u201c[a] \u2018No\u2019 means literally that. There are no requirements for a defendant to couch his denial of consent in anything but a simple statement saying \u2018No.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 304. Here, however, defendant did not simply say \u201cno\u201d or \u201cno, I really don\u2019t want you to\u201d search. Nor did he try to interrupt the search at any point. Instead, defendant said that he would not sign the form, because the officers did not need his consent. Defendant\u2019s refusal to sign the form was not a clear refusal to consent to the search.\nFurther, citing United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2009), defendant analogizes this case to a defendant\u2019s refusal to sign a Miranda form, which, he asserts, must, absent a prior or contemporaneous statement showing a willingness to speak, be interpreted as an election not to waive Miranda rights. Id. at 141. Nevertheless, defendant quickly asserts that he is by no means suggesting that the refusal to sign a consent-to-search form is per se an express refusal of consent, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. To the contrary, we read defendant\u2019s argument to be exactly that. Defendant acknowledges that he and the officers at the suppression hearing diverged on whether he verbally consented, but, even if we accept the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant did not verbally consent, we are left only with defendant\u2019s refusal to sign the form \u2014 again, the court specified that it had not found that, when expressly asked for consent, defendant said \u201cno.\u201d That finding is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant does not wish us to consider the reasons he expressed for not signing the form, which had nothing to do with expressing an objection to the search. As such, by asking us to find that he expressly refused consent by simply not signing the form, defendant indeed asks us to find that a refusal to sign a consent-to-search form is, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances, a per se express refusal of consent. We decline to do so.\nAccordingly, we agree with the trial court that, in these circumstances, defendant\u2019s refusal to sign the form does not equate to the express refusal of consent to the search contemplated by Randolph and that defendant\u2019s reliance on that case is misplaced.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nPrior to trial, the State nol-prossed the charges related to possession of drug paraphernalia and, after trial, the court found defendant not guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.\nActually, the State asserts that defendant \u201cwaived\u201d the argument, but the State confuses waiver, a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, with forfeiture, the failure to raise an issue that could have been raised and, therefore, is barred. See People v. Tomczak, 395 Ill. App. 3d 877, 879 (2009).\nWe note that defendant\u2019s entire argument regarding Garland\u2019s authority to consent to the search of his coat is irrelevant if he consented to the search. At trial, defense counsel conceded that defendant verbally consented to the search. However, the concession, which was not evidence, matters not to our analysis. We ultimately conclude that the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress must be affirmed because Garland\u2019s consent rendered the search valid and because defendant did not expressly refuse consent to the search.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JORGENSEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James K. Leven, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID D. BURTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201409\u20140747\nOpinion filed April 11, 2011.\nJames K. Leven, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0321-01", "first_page_order": 337, "last_page_order": 351 }