{ "id": 7328607, "name": "UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAURE BROTHERS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "United National Insurance v. Faure Bros.", "decision_date": "2011-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201410\u20142214", "first_page": "711", "last_page": "720", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 711" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "567 F. Supp. 1400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3577937 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1406" }, { "page": "1407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/567/1400-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435844 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 U.S. 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5698490 ], "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/131/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5121664 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/312/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682181 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "provisions in insurance policies that exclude or limit coverage must be construed liberally against the insurer" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059916 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706738 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "08 L 02503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 785, "char_count": 22725, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.301981745586105e-08, "percentile": 0.38779056230691444 }, "sha256": "1dab46bb4b3865f7c3bc36b78e27914873898db576ef7db5882176183b70ec81", "simhash": "1:cee27d6221e7b576", "word_count": 3589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAURE BROTHERS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRIS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Karnezis and Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nHere we are called upon to determine whether a duty to defend arises under a general liability insurance policy. Plaintiff, United National Insurance Company (United National), issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to defendant, Faure Brothers Corporation (Faure Brothers). One of Faure Brothers divisions, Gateway Warehouse Company, Inc. (Gateway), is in the business of warehousing chemical products, relabeling them and having them shipped as per the direction of its customers. Gateway was sued by Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (Air Products), alleging negligence resulting in the mislabeling of its products. Faure Brothers demanded that United National defend the negligence lawsuit, which was refused, and Faure Brothers undertook its own defense. United National filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend Faure Brothers, or to indemnify it, in the underlying action. Faure Brothers answered and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that United National had a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify Faure Brothers in the underlying action. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in United National\u2019s favor holding it had no duty to defend. The circuit court reasoned that the complaint filed by Air Products in the underlying action did not allege an \u201coccurrence\u201d as defined by the policy. After construing the allegations of the underlying complaint liberally in favor of the insured, Faure Brothers, we hold that the allegations fall within, or potentially fall within, the policy\u2019s coverage. United National has a duty to defend Faure Brothers in the underlying action. We reverse the circuit court\u2019s summary judgment order.\nJURISDICTION\nOn June 9, 2010, the circuit court granted United National\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied Faure Brothers\u2019 motion for summary judgment and set the matter for status on June 30, 2010. On June 30, 2010, the circuit court ordered that the June 9, 2010, entry of summary judgment in United National\u2019s favor is final and ap-pealable, stating \u201c[tjhere is no just cause to delay the enforcement or appeal of the order of June 9, 2010.\u201d Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).\nBACKGROUND\nUnited National issued its commercial general liability insurance policy No. L7169715 \u2014 B to Faure Brothers with an effective date of February 1, 2006 through February 1, 2007. Section I of the policy outlines the insurance coverage and exclusions United National agreed to provide Faure Brothers. Section I also includes what was excluded from United National\u2019s coverage. Section I of the policy states in relevant part:\n\u201c1. Insuring Agreement.\na. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 *** to which this insurance does not apply. *** But:\nh. This insurance applies only to \u2018bodily injury\u2019 and \u2018property damage\u2019 only if:\n(1) The \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 is caused by an \u2018occurrence\u2019 that takes place in the \u2018coverage territory\u2019; and\n(2) The \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 occurs during the policy period.\n2. Exclusions.\nThis insurance does not apply to:\n(n) Recall of Products, Work, or Impaired Property\nDamages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of:\n(1) \u2018your product\u2019;\n(2) \u2018your work\u2019; or\n(3) \u2018impaired property\u2019;\nif such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.\u201d\nSection V of the policy provides definitions for the terms \u201coccurrence,\u201d \u201cproperty damage,\u201d and \u201cyour work.\u201d The policy does not define the term \u201caccident.\u201d Section V states, in relevant part:\n\u201c12. \u2018Occurrence\u2019 means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\n15. \u2018Property damage\u2019 means:\na. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or\nb. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the \u2018occurrence\u2019 that caused it.\n19. \u2018Your work\u2019 means:\na. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and\nb. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.\n\u2018Your work\u2019 includes:\na. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of \u2018your work\u2019; and\nb. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.\u201d\nIn March of 2008, Air Products filed the underlying lawsuit in this case, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Gateway Warehouse Co., No. 08 L 02503 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.). Air Products, a customer of Gateway, which is a division of Faure Brothers, alleged one count of negligence and one count of negligence-res ipsa loquitur against Gateway. In its complaint, Air Products alleged it stored various chemical products in Gateway\u2019s warehouse facility and that Gateway was to relabel certain of the chemicals for Air Products. Air Products alleged Gateway affixed the proper label on the wrong or improper chemicals. In October of 2006, Gateway shipped the mislabeled chemicals to one of Air Product\u2019s customers, the Henkel Corporation. Henkel used the mislabeled chemical in producing one if its adhesive products. Henkel then sold adhesive products that were made with the mislabeled chemical to Becton, Dickinson and Company Medical Systems (BD) and Smiths Medical ASD, Inc. (Smiths). The adhesive product bought by BD and Smiths \u201cdid not perform or otherwise work as the products were intended due to the inclusion of the mislabeled chemical product.\u201d BD and Smiths notified Henkel of the damages they sustained, which in turn made a claim against Air Products for damages sustained by all three companies. Air Products satisfied and paid the claims brought by Henkel and BD \u201cin an amount in excess of $380,000.00.\u201d The complaint alleged that Air Products \u201cexpects to satisfy and pay Smiths\u2019 claim in excess of $14,000.00.\u201d\nIn count I of its complaint, Air Products alleged Gateway owed Air Products a duty \u201cto use due care and caution while storing, labeling, shipping into the stream of commerce and otherwise handling the subject chemicals and other chemical product in its warehouse.\u201d Air Products alleged that the damages it paid to Henkel, BD, and Smiths were directly and proximately caused by Gateway\u2019s negligence. Specifically, Air Products alleged that Gateway was negligent in the following ways:\n\u201ca. carelessly and negligently mislabeling chemical product;\nb. failing to adhere to the instructions provided by [Air Products] for properly labeling the subject chemicals;\nc. failing to take the proper protections, safeguards and other measures to ensure that the subject chemicals were labeled properly;\nd. failing to properly direct, supervise, train or manage its employees, agents and/or contractors with respect to properly labeling the subject chemicals;\ne. failing to properly direct, supervise, train or manage its employees, agents and/or contractors with respect to taking the proper precautions, safeguards and other measures to ensure that the subject chemicals were labeled properly;\nf. shipping into the stream of commerce mislabeled, hazardous chemical product;\ng. failing to comply with governing codes, regulations, ordinances and/or standards ***;\nh. failing to comply with governing codes, regulations, ordinances and/or standards ***; and/or\ni. otherwise failing to use due care under the circumstances.\u201d\nCount II incorporated count I and added that \u201c[ujnder the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, *** Gateway was negligent while storing, labeling, shipping into the stream of commerce and otherwise handling the subject chemicals and other chemical product in its warehouse.\u201d\nFaure Brothers tendered defense of Air Products\u2019 complaint to United National. United National denied Faure Brothers\u2019 request to defend it. Faure Brothers undertook its own defense and paid Air Products $210,000 under the terms of a settlement agreement between the parties.\nIn March of 2009, United National filed its first amended complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend Faure Brothers, or to indemnify it, in the underlying action. In April of 2009, Faure Brothers answered and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that United National had a duty to defend and indemnify it in the underlying action. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in United National\u2019s favor as to the duty to defend the claim. The circuit court reasoned that the complaint filed by Air Products in the underlying action did not allege an \u201coccurrence\u201d as defined by the policy issued to Faure Brothers.\nANALYSIS\nBefore this court, Faure Brothers argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in United National\u2019s favor as to the duty to defend the claim because the underlying action was for negligence. Faure Brothers argues that its negligence, the mislabeling of the chemicals, was an \u201caccident\u201d and, consequently, an \u201coccurrence\u201d under the policy issued to it by United National. Faure Brothers argues, based on the insurance policy, that United National had a duty to defend it in its lawsuit with Air Products. United National argues that it did not have a duty to defend the underlying lawsuit and, thus, summary judgment was proper because the mislabeling of the chemical was not an \u201coccurrence\u201d under the policy and Air Products\u2019 claim against Faure Brothers was not a claim for \u201cproperty damage\u201d under the policy. In the alternative, United National argues Air Products\u2019 claim in the underlying action is excluded from coverage.\nSummary judgment is proper where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 2008). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, not try a question of fact. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. We recognize that \u201c [although summary judgment can aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, it remains a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be allowed only where the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.\u201d Id. We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Id.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court, in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., explained an insurer\u2019s duty to defend:\n\u201cAn insurer\u2019s duty to defend its insured is much broader than its duty to indemnify. [Citations.] In order to determine whether the insurer\u2019s duty to defend has arisen, the court must compare the allegations of the underlying complaint to the policy language. [Citations.] The allegations in the underlying complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. [Citation.] If the court determines that these allegations fall within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the insured against the underlying complaint. [Citations.]\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 125 (1992).\nThe \u201cduty to defend arises even if only one of several theories is within the potential coverage of the policy.\u201d General Agents Insurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 215 Ill. 2d 146, 155 (2005). Even if the underlying complaint contains allegations that are false or fraudulent, the insurer will still have a duty to defend its insured if the underlying complaint alleges facts that potentially fall within the policy\u2019s coverage. Id. In order for an insurer to deny defending an action, it must be \u201cclear from the face of the underlying complaint that the allegations set forth in that complaint fail to state facts that bring the case within or potentially within the insured\u2019s policy coverage.\u201d Id. at 154.\nIt is the burden of the insurer to affirmatively prove that an exclusion in an insurance policy applies. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 267 (2006). Provisions in insurance policies that exclude or limit coverage must be construed liberally against the insurer. Id. The same liberal standard applied to determinations of whether an insurer has a duty to defend is applied to determinations of whether an exclusion applies. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 78 (1991).\nWe will first address whether the underlying complaint alleged an \u201caccident\u201d and, thus, an \u201coccurrence\u201d under the policy. The policy covers only \u201cproperty damage\u201d caused by an \u201coccurrence.\u201d The policy defines \u201coccurrence\u201d as \u201can accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\u201d The policy does not define the term \u201caccident.\u201d The Illinois Supreme Court has, however, defined the term \u201caccident\u201d in insurance cases. Rich v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79 (2007). In Illinois:\n\u201c \u2018[I]f an act is performed with the intention of accomplishing a certain result, and if, in the attempt to accomplish that result, another result, unintended and unexpected, and not the rational and probable consequence of the intended act, in fact, occurs, such unintended result is deemed to be caused by accidental means.\u2019 \u201d Rich, 226 Ill. 2d at 378 (quoting Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 19 (1953)).\nChrist v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 312 Ill. 525 (1924); United States Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889). Determination of whether an occurrence is an accident is focused on \u201cwhether the injury is expected or intended by the insured, not whether the acts were performed intentionally.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 409 (2004).\nOur review of the complaint in the underlying action shows that the allegations focused solely on negligent acts of Faure Brothers and did not make any allegations that Faure Brothers expected or intended the resulting mislabeled chemicals. From the point of view of Faure Brothers, it was contracted to label the chemicals before putting them into the stream of commerce. However, unexpectedly, it mislabeled the chemicals. Therefore, the result was not expected and, thus, an accident. The underlying complaint made an allegation of an \u201caccident,\u201d and, therefore, an \u201coccurrence,\u201d under the policy.\nUnited National also argues that Air Products\u2019 complaint does not make a claim for \u201cproperty damage\u201d under the policy. The policy defines \u201cproperty damage\u201d as \u201cphysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property *** or *** [l]oss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.\u201d The Illinois Supreme Court defines \u201c \u2018physical injury\u2019 \u201d as \u201cdamage to tangible property causing an alteration in appearance, shape, color or in other material dimension.\u201d Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 312 (2001). It \u201cdoes not include intangible damage to property, such as economic loss.\u201d Id. Further, \u201cthe diminution in value of a whole, resulting from the failure of a component to perform as promised, does not constitute a physical injury.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Id.\nThe underlying complaint contains allegations Gateway shipped the mislabeled chemical product to one of Air Products\u2019 customers, Henkel Corporation. Henkel used the mislabeled chemical \u201cby incorporating it into the formulation of one of Henkel\u2019s adhesive products.\u201d The adhesive products were then sold to BD and Smiths. In its complaint, Air Products alleges \u201cas such, BD\u2019s product and Smiths\u2019 product *** did not perform or otherwise work as the products were intended due to the inclusion of the mislabeled chemical product in the formulation of the adhesive product produced by Henkel.\u201d Air Products further alleged that \u201cBD and Smiths notified Henkel of the damage sustained in assembly of their products.\u201d Construing the allegations in the complaint liberally in favor of Faure Brothers, we find the allegations potentially fall within the policy\u2019s coverage. The allegations do not concern an intangible loss, the diminution of value, or the failure to perform as promised; rather, they concern damages based on the wrong chemical being used in formulating the adhesive product. The harm did not occur because the chemicals did not perform as promised but, rather, because Henkel was negligently given the wrong chemical. Furthermore, the second definition of property damage contained in the policy does not require physical injury but rather the \u201c[ljoss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.\u201d Under this definition, it is clear that the allegations in the complaint allege damages based on Faure Brothers\u2019 improper labeling of the chemicals. Henkel, BD, and Smiths all had damages based on the loss of use of the defective adhesive products.\nLiberally construing the allegations of the complaint in favor of Faure Brothers, we find the allegations either fall within, or potentially within, the coverage of United National\u2019s policy with Faure Brothers. Therefore, United National had a duty to defend Faure Brothers in the underlying action. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 125 (\u201cThe allegations in the underlying complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. [Citation.] If the court determines that these allegations fall within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the insured against the underlying complaint.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)).\nIn the alternative, United National argues that exclusion \u201cn\u201d of the policy precludes coverage, where the exclusion provides,\n\u201cDamages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of:\n(2) \u2018Your Work[.]\u2019\nif such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.\u201d\nIn United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64 (1991), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a similar exclusion clause, which read:\n\u201c \u2018Damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair, replacement or loss of the use of the named insured\u2019s products or work completed by or for the *** insured or of any property of which such products or work form a part, if such products, work or property are withdrawn from the market or from use because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency therein.\u2019 \u201d Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d at 80.\nThe supreme court described the exclusion clause in Wilkin as a \u201c \u2018sis-tership\u2019 exclusion\u201d that \u201cexcludes coverage \u2018in cases where, because of the actual failure of the insured\u2019s product, similar products are withdrawn from use to prevent the failure of these other products, which have not yet failed but are suspected of containing the same defect.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 81 (quoting Honeycomb Systems, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The supreme court held the \u201c \u2018sistership\u2019 \u201d exclusion \u201cdoes not apply, however, to the product that has already failed while in use and caused damage to the property of a third party.\u201d Id. (citing Honeycomb Systems, Inc., 567 F. Supp. at 1407). The supreme court held that the exclusion clause did not preclude coverage because the product in Wilkin had already failed, resulting in damage. Id.\nAs in Wilkin, the product in this case, the mislabeled chemicals, already failed and caused damage to a third party, Air Products. This is shown in Air Products\u2019 complaint, which alleges that it has already satisfied and paid claims based on the damages of Henkel and BD and that it was expecting to satisfy Smiths\u2019 claim. It did not seek to withdraw products to prevent future failure of products. In construing the exclusion provision in this case liberally in Faure Brothers\u2019 favor and against United National, we find that exclusion (n) does not preclude coverage. Pekin Insurance Co., 367 Ill. App. 3d at 267 (provisions in insurance policies that exclude or limit coverage must be construed liberally against the insurer).\nCONCLUSION\nFollowing our review of the record, and in construing the underlying complaint liberally in favor of the insured, Faure Brothers, we conclude that the allegations in the underlying complaint fall within, or potentially within, the coverage of the policy. Therefore, we find that United National did have a duty to defend Faure Brothers in the underlying action. The circuit court erred when it entered summary judgment as to the duty to defend in United National\u2019s favor. On remand, the circuit court should enter judgment in favor of Faure Brothers as to the issue of whether United National had the duty to defend Faure Brothers in the underlying action.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and remanded.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Horvath & Weaver, EC., of Chicago (John F. Horvath, Rosemarie J. Guad-nolo, and Renata M. Koleda, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago (James K. Horstman and Melissa H. Dakich, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAURE BROTHERS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201410\u20142214\nOpinion filed May 17, 2011.\nRehearing denied June 9, 2011.\nHorvath & Weaver, EC., of Chicago (John F. Horvath, Rosemarie J. Guad-nolo, and Renata M. Koleda, of counsel), for appellant.\nCray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago (James K. Horstman and Melissa H. Dakich, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0711-01", "first_page_order": 727, "last_page_order": 736 }