{ "id": 7328721, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Taylor", "decision_date": "2011-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201409\u20140517", "first_page": "881", "last_page": "915", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 881" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "\"A defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.\"" }, { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "\"A defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452092 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "testimony of a treating physician may be offered only in regard to factual matters of which the doctor has personal knowledge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072114 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "citing Waterford v. Halloway, 142 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1986) (testimony of a treating physician may be offered only in regard to factual matters of which the doctor has personal knowledge)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610581 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2979887 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 1095", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284342 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03" }, { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983489 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448624 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782482 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "holding that because testifying doctor was a treating physician, his testimony should not have come as a surprise to the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5138652 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n opposing party will not be surprised when a treating physician testifies, because the witness was initially associated with the issues in litigation for reasons other than the sole purpose of rendering an opinion at trial.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 527 (2000)" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3616214 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "challenge on the basis of youth has been held to be race-neutral" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228767 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "\"other circumstances may have led prosecutors not to challenge\" white venirepersons possessing the same traits as challenged African-American venirepersons" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211240 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467-68", "parenthetical": "challenge on the basis of employment positions is a race-neutral reason" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597251 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778576 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147596 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 765", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340390 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767-68", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "768" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5934407 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/546/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736047 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53-54", "parenthetical": "a defendant has the right to choose which defense theory to present to the trier of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554192 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" }, { "page": "925" }, { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385528 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "once a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness has been raised, the trial court has a duty to hold a fitness hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3948572 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826213 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292575 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836-37" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/396/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564-65", "parenthetical": "citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "in order to claim plain error, defendant must show \"first\" that an error occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490742 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183315 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126425 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152731 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592134 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224783 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 437", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481180 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4300791 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/399/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630758 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" }, { "page": "614", "parenthetical": "\"[a] finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it would affect his right to a fair trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "96-97" }, { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2053, "char_count": 90394, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18894981908211636 }, "sha256": "9d0cc7cde79a4a12e4ef6642de02383ca5e5a5af3830369569ffd89ca07c702f", "simhash": "1:8b6bb166234e18e5", "word_count": 14675 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Cahill and McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Alexander Taylor, an African-American, was convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen; aggravated battery to an employee of a hospital engaged in the performance of her duties and aggravated battery that knowingly caused her great bodily harm. After a hearing to reconsider defendant\u2019s initial sentence of three concurrent terms of 5 years\u2019 imprisonment, the trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of 3 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections, with a credit of 850 days for time considered served. On appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his convictions, claiming that the trial court: (1) failed to conduct a proper fitness hearing and, as a result, abused its discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial; (2) erred and violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the State exercised two of its peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude two African-American venirepeople from the jury; (3) failed to comply with the mandate of Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)); and (4) improperly allowed the State to present the testimony of one of the victim\u2019s medical physicians because: (a) the State failed to disclose \u201ca statement of the doctor\u2019s qualifications\u201d as an expert in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001)); (b) the medical physician\u2019s testimony concerning \u201cthe victim\u2019s psychological injuries was irrelevant\u201d; (c) the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201ccontained inadmissible hearsay concerning medications prescribed by a psychiatrist and neurologist\u201d; and (d) the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201cconcerning the medications prescribed to [the] victim.\u201d We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn November 11, 2006, defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of aggravated battery: one count of aggravated battery of Leonard Giles, a 60-year old hospital security supervisor, pursuant to section 12 \u2014 4.6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144.6(a) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery of a senior citizen); and two counts of aggravated battery of Vida Cataba, a hospital staff nurse, pursuant to section 12 \u2014 4(b)(7) (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(7) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery to hospital personnel engaged in the performance of her duties) and section 12 \u2014 4(a) (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(a) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery that knowingly caused great bodily harm). The charges arose from a physical altercation that occurred while defendant was a patient in a psychiatric unit of the Lincoln Park Hospital where Giles and Catalla were employed.\nOn December 5, 2006, the Cook County public defender\u2019s office was appointed to represent defendant. An assistant public defender requested a behavioral clinical examination (BCX) for defendant to determine his fitness to stand trial because defendant was a psychiatric patient at the time of the offenses.\nOn March 12, 2007, a fitness hearing was held and Dr. Susan Messina, a clinical psychologist employed by the Forensic Clinical Services (FCS), was the only witness to testify concerning defendant\u2019s fitness. Dr. Messina testified that she was a licensed psychiatrist, and the parties stipulated to her qualifications as an expert. Dr. Messina testified that she interviewed defendant on December 11, 2006, and February 8, 2007. She testified that she also reviewed defendant\u2019s medical and arrest records. She further testified that she conducted a mental status examination of defendant and opined that defendant demonstrated an understanding of the charges against him, the legal proceedings, and the roles of court personnel.\nDr. Messina also testified that defendant would often become \u201ctangential\u201d in his responses and \u201cfocus *** on his own victimization.\u201d She testified that defendant had a \u201cdistorted perception based on his paranoia and suspiciousness and distrust.\u201d Based on those observations, she opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant was not fit to stand trial because he would be unable to assist counsel in his defense. She further opined that \u201cwith appropriate clinical attention and medication\u201d defendant could be restored to fitness for trial within one year. Based on Dr. Messina\u2019s testimony, the trial court entered an order finding defendant unfit to stand trial and ordered defendant to be \u201cconfined in the least constrictive secure in-patient setting by the Department of Human Services.\u201d\nAt a status hearing on September 24, 2007, the State informed the trial court that it had received a psychiatrist\u2019s written report concerning defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial from the Chester Mental Health Center, where defendant was confined. The State did not mention who wrote the report and it was not included in the record. According to the State, the report stated that defendant was able to understand the nature of the charges against him and would be able to cooperate in his defense. The State also informed the trial court that a psychiatrist from FCS was prepared to examine defendant on September 25, 2007, and provide an opinion concerning his fitness to stand trial. The trial court instructed defense counsel that a fitness restoration hearing was necessary if defendant was found fit to stand trial and set a date for a fitness restoration hearing to be held on November 7, 2007.\nOn September 26, 2007, Dr. Nishad Nadkarni, an FCS staff psychiatrist, submitted to the trial court a written evaluation concerning his opinion on defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. In his written evaluation, Dr. Nadkarni stated that he evaluated defendant on September 25, 2007, and opined that defendant manifested \u201csevere antisocial and borderline character pathology.\u201d He opined that defendant demonstrated to him \u201can adequate understanding of the charges against him, and adequate comprehension of the nature of courtroom proceedings and the roles of various courtroom personnel.\u201d He further opined that defendant demonstrated a capacity to assist counsel in his defense, found no evidence that he suffered from adverse effects from his medication regimen that would impair his fitness, and opined that \u201cany observations of noncooperativity *** should be interpreted as volitional on his part.\u201d Dr. Nadkarni opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant \u201cis currently restored to fitness to stand trial, with medication.\u201d He stated that defendant\u2019s medication regimen consisted of Seroquel, an antipsychotic, and Depakote, a mood stabilizer.\nOn November 7, 2007, defense counsel informed the trial court that Dr. Nadkarni was unavailable to testify at the fitness restoration hearing, and the trial court continued the matter to December 3, 2007. On that date, Dr. Nadkarni did not testify and the record is not clear whether he even appeared or provided reasons for his failure to testify. Defense counsel then requested that a psychiatrist other than Dr. Nadkarni reevaluate defendant concerning his fitness to stand trial. The trial court ordered defendant to be reevaluated by an FCS psychiatrist other than Dr. Nadkarni and continued the matter to January 7, 2008.\nOn January 7, 2008, Dr. Andrew Kulik, an FCS forensic psychologist, submitted to the trial court a written evaluation concerning his opinion on defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. In his written evaluation, Dr. Kulik stated that he evaluated defendant on December 14, 2007, and opined that defendant demonstrated that he \u201cis cognizant of his charge [s], understands the nature and purpose of legal proceedings, and shows the ability to cooperate with counsel in his defense if he so chooses.\u201d He also opined that defendant was responding well to his medication regimen of Seroquel and Depakote, and not experiencing any side effects that would impair his fitness to stand trial.\nDr. Kulik also opined in his written evaluation that, after reviewing \u201cthe available records and information\u201d he obtained during his interview, he found \u201cno report or documentation\u201d that indicated defendant experienced any symptoms of mental disease or defect which would have caused him \u201cto lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the alleged offense.\u201d Dr. Kulik opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant \u201cis fit to stand trial with medication, *** was legally sane at the time of the alleged offense, *** and had the ability to understand Miranda [warnings] at the time of his arrest.\u201d\nDefense counsel informed the trial court that the public defender\u2019s office was hiring a private psychiatrist to evaluate defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial and requested a continuance to obtain the private psychiatrist\u2019s evaluation and have that medical provider review Dr. Kulik\u2019s written evaluation. The trial court granted defense counsel\u2019s request for a continuance.\nThe matter was continued to May 6, 2008, when defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had been evaluated by a private psychiatrist who agreed with the opinion of Dr. Kulik that defendant is fit to stand trial with medication. The private psychiatrist\u2019s name is not in the record and there is also no written evaluation in the record from the private psychiatrist concerning defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. Defense counsel then stated to the trial court that she would be able to stipulate to defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. The State then summarized the parties\u2019 stipulation as follows:\n\u201cTHE STATE: Fitness with medication. The stipulation would be that [defendant] was originally seen by Dr. Kulik *** pursuant to court order on December [3], 2007, in order to render an opinion regarding fitness to stand trial, fitness with meds, sanity and ability to understand Miranda [warnings].\nThe defendant was found by the doctor within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that he was fit to stand trial with medication. Dr. Kulik found he is cognizant of his charge[s], understand^] the nature and the legal proceedings, showed the ability to cooperate with counsel if he so chose.\nAlthough he has been diagnosed with mental illness, he, at that time, appeared to be fairing well with his current medication. At that time his medication was Seroquel, an antipsychotic, and [Depa-kote], a mood stabilizer.\nThe doctor also opined the defendant was not experiencing any side effects at that time from that medication. I believe [defense counsel] asked Dr. Kulik [sic] at the request of the Public Defender\u2019s Office to evaluate the defendant as well, and he was in concurrence most recently with that same diagnosis.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Correct.\u201d\nFollowing the parties\u2019 stipulation to defendant\u2019s fitness, the trial court did not make any oral or written findings whether defendant was fit to stand trial. The parties then discussed the possibility of a plea offer of time served because, at that point in time, defendant had served 561 days. The defendant was offered three years\u2019 imprisonment and the trial court continued the matter to June 2, 2008.\nOn June 2, 2008, defendant declined the plea offer and the trial court set a trial date for July 14, 2008. On that date, the trial court continued the trial date to September 9, 2008.\nOn August 6, 2008, defense counsel filed a motion with the trial court requesting a hearing to determine whether defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive an insanity defense. In the motion, defense counsel stated that she believed that asserting an insanity defense and self-defense would be in defendant\u2019s best interest. However, after discussing the two defenses with defendant, she claimed that defendant was adamant that he wanted to assert only a self-defense claim.\nThe trial court held a hearing on defense counsel\u2019s motion on August 13, 2008. The trial court explained to the defendant that if he asserted only a self-defense claim and was found guilty of the charges he could be sent to a penitentiary, whereas if he asserted an insanity defense and he was able to show he was insane at the time of the offense, or if he was found not guilty, he would not be sent to a penitentiary but to another mental health facility. The following colloquy took place between the trial court and defendant:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Taylor, do you understand what I\u2019m saying?\nDEFENDANT: I understand what you\u2019re saying.\nTHE COURT: Can you explain what you understand?\nDEFENDANT: I understand that if \u2014 if\u2014if\u2014\nTHE COURT: If you are found insane at the time of the offense\u2014\nDEFENDANT: If I\u2019m found to be insane.\nTHE COURT: You may be sent to \u2014 where are we talking?\nDEFENDANT: I know they sent me to \u2014 they said they send me to Elgin [Mental Health Center], but they sent me to Chester [Mental Health Center], They almost killed me out there. The guards strangled me. They tore up all my property. ***\nTHE COURT: I know, you told me about this before.\nDEFENDANT: It was crazy. I don\u2019t want to have to go through that again. Plus, I\u2019m innocent of this crime\u2014\nTHE COURT: Tell me what I just tried to explain to you about the difference between an insanity defense\u2014\nDEFENDANT: I know. You said that if I\u2019m found guilty by reason of insanity I go out to one of those places like a hospital. They said I [was] supposed to go to Elgin last time. I didn\u2019t. I went to Chester and they almost killed me out there, you know what I\u2019m saying.\nTHE COURT: I also said that if you\u2019re found guilty as charged, you might go where?\nDEFENDANT: The penitentiary, but I\u2019m not guilty, so I\u2019m going to fight.\u201d\nThe trial court found that defendant\u2019s waiver of his insanity defense was given knowingly and voluntarily and entered a written order with that finding. The trial court set a new trial date of October 16, 2008.\nOn October 16, 2008, jury selection began. Following the swearing in of the venire, the trial court informed and questioned the venire of 22 people concerning certain principles of law, namely: (1) that a defendant is presumed innocent; (2) that he must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf. However, the trial court did not inform the potential jurors of a fourth principle of law, namely (4) that a defendant\u2019s failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against him. These four principles are now commonly known as the \u201cZehr principles.\u201d See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (2010); People v. Hammonds, 399 Ill. App. 3d 927, 946 (2010).\nWith respect to the first three principles of law, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201c[1.] Under the law the defendant is presumed to he innocent of the charges against him. Is there anyone among you who has any problem with that legal provision that the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him? If so, please state your objection now. There is no response.\nThis presumption remains with the defendant throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberation on the verdict and it is not overcome unless from all this evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty.\n[2.] The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. And this burden remains on the State throughout the case. Are there any among you who have any problems with that requirement of the law? That the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout the case? If so, please voice your exception at this time. There is no response.\n[3.] The defendant is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to present any evidence on his own behalf. He may rely upon the presumption of innocence. Again, is there anyone among you who has any exception to that provision of the law? If so, make your exception known at this time. There is no response.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not object to the trial court\u2019s instructions or its questioning of the venire. Following the trial court\u2019s questioning of the venire, the State requested that the trial court excuse venireper-son A.T., an African-American, for cause because of his arrest record. The trial court declined to excuse him for cause and the State exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse him.\nThe State exercised a second peremptory challenge against venire-person YW., an African-American, who testified that she was employed as a caseworker, attended church regularly, was unmarried, had no children, and had not been the victim of a crime. Both parties then agreed on and selected the first panel of jurors, which consisted of four jurors, three of whom were African-American.\nThe State then exercised its third peremptory challenge against venireperson L.H., an African-American, who testified that she works with children as a group worker\u2019s aid. After the State exercised a peremptory challenge against her, defense counsel raised a Batson claim, arguing that a prima facie Batson claim had been established based on the State\u2019s use of all three of its peremptory challenges against African-Americans. The following colloquy took place between the trial court and the State:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I agree [that three of the four of the jurors in the first panel are African-American], and it is a consideration. All of the challenges have been against African-Americans. That\u2019s a consideration also. And I think it is the primary consideration to be addressed.\nAnd I will say as to Mr. T***, I understand it. I understand and believe that there is a [race-]neutral basis for challenging Mr. T***. But as to Ms. H***, Ms. W***, an argument might be made without challenging these people, we would now have in a second panel 3/4ths of that panel may be African-American as well. And so I await an explanation concerning Ms. W*** and [Ms.] H***.\nTHE STATE: Okay. Well first of all, as far as the reason for excusing these jurors, there\u2019s an abundance of people who work in the case worker field, the social worker field. We have only seven pe-remptories. We can\u2019t strike every social worker. But people in that field *** I would think would be sympathetic to the defense. *** [T]his is a case that involved someone who was a patient at a hospital, being cared for at a hospital while he was admitted. So the primary reason is people in the social work field. Ms. H*** is a young woman who works in that field that seems like she would be sympathetic to a patient in a hospital.\nAs far as Ms. W***, she is a case worker in the same field that would be sympathetic with the issues in this case.\u201d\nIn response, defense counsel stated that the State accepted venire-person E.V, a non-African-American, who testified that she has been a caseworker for the Department of Human Services for 22 years, is married to a caseworker in a supervisory position, has four children, and had been a victim of sexual abuse as a child and a victim of domestic violence. Defense counsel also stated that the State accepted venireperson D.J., a non-African-American, whom defense counsel argued could be considered a caseworker because she testified that she is employed as a supervisor with the Illinois Action for Children, which subsidizes child care.\nThe State asserted that E.V and D.J. were employed in supervisory positions \u201cas opposed to working in the field.\u201d Defense counsel responded that E.V had testified that she was a caseworker and that her husband was a caseworker in a supervisory position. The trial court stated as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: From what I know of the case, I don\u2019t know that one culture would be predisposed. *** [I]t\u2019s not a police case, so I don\u2019t know that one culture would be more suited for the defense case or the prosecution case, regarding what I expect the testimony to be.\u201d\nThe trial court found that the State\u2019s reasons for challenging VW and L.H. were race-neutral reasons and allowed the challenges over defense counsel\u2019s objections. The parties then selected the second panel of jurors, which consisted of three jurors. E.V was not selected to the jury, but D.J. was selected to the jury. A second pool of venire-persons was sworn in and interviewed and another 7 venirepersons were selected to the jury, for a total of 12 jurors and 2 alternates. The ratio of African-American jury panel members to non-African-American jury panel members is not clear from the record, nor is that ratio discussed in the parties\u2019 appellate briefs.\nAt trial, the State called five witnesses in its case-in-chief. The witnesses included Catalla and Giles, the victims; Osarosemwen Erha-bor, a counselor in the psychiatric unit; Yvonne Arrington, the charge nurse in the psychiatric unit; and Dr. Salud Martinez, Catalla\u2019s treating medical physician.\nCatalla testified that on October 23, 2006, she was working as a staff nurse distributing medication to patients in the psychiatric unit of Lincoln Park Hospital. She described the psychiatric unit as being divided into two wings, a \u201cgeneral care\u201d wing, which she testified was for patients requiring \u201cless supervision,\u201d and a \u201cspecial care\u201d wing for patients requiring \u201cmore supervision.\u201d She testified that on that day she was assigned to the general care wing and heard a commotion in the special care wing.\nCatalla testified that she then heard a \u201ccode gray\u201d announced over the psychiatric unit\u2019s loudspeakers. She testified that a code gray is a warning to unit\u2019s staff members that a psychiatric patient is \u201cout of control\u201d and that all available staff members in that unit must respond to assist in restraining or secluding the patient from other patients. She testified that, after she heard the announcement, she left the general care wing and entered the special care wing, where she observed defendant talking to his mother on a hospital telephone located in a hallway. She testified that defendant appeared \u201cvery angry, very hostile, totally out of control.\u201d She also testified that she heard defendant using racial slurs and threatening staff members.\nCatalla testified that other staff members responded to the code gray announcement, including Arrington, Erhabor, and Giles. Catalla testified that she attempted to talk with defendant to calm him, but defendant continued to shout into the telephone, \u201cthey want to give me a shot!\u201d She testified that she had observed defendant shouting for approximately 10 to 15 minutes, but that another, unnamed, staff member informed her that defendant had been shouting for approximately one hour.\nCatalla testified that she then devised a plan to physically move defendant into a \u201cquiet room\u201d to seclude defendant from the other patients in the special care unit. She testified that she planned to use a three- to four-inch thick twin-sized mattress as a shield so that she and the other staff members could come close enough to defendant to immobilize him by grabbing his arms and legs and then move him into the quiet room. Catalla testified that she, Arrington and Giles held the mattress while Erhabor walked alongside of them as they approached defendant. She testified that she was unclear as to what happened after they came close to defendant because the next thing she remembered was that she woke up in the hospital\u2019s emergency room.\nThe State then offered into evidence three photographs of Catalla, without objection. The trial court received the photographs into evidence and they were published to the jury. Catalla testified as a foundation that the three photographs were taken on October 24, 2006, at the hospital and accurately depicted the injuries to her face on that date.\nGiles testified that he responded to the code gray announcement and observed defendant talking on a telephone at the end of a hallway and shouting at staff members. He testified that the staff members told him that they planned to use a mattress as a shield in order to approach defendant.\nGiles testified that he assisted the staff members in approaching defendant with the mattress. He testified that when they drew near, defendant \u201cbolted out\u201d from behind the mattress and struck him twice in the head. He testified defendant \u201cknocked\u201d him and Catalla to the floor and that he became unconscious after he fell to the floor.\nThe State offered into evidence four photographs of Giles, without objection. The trial court received the photographs into evidence and they were published to the jury. Giles testified as a foundation that the three photographs were taken on October 23, 2006, at the Chicago police department and accurately depicted the injuries to his face on that date.\nErhabor testified that he accompanied the staff members who approached defendant with the mattress. He testified that as they approached, defendant struck Catalla and Giles with his hands and fists. He testified that defendant struck Catalla \u201cmultiple times.\u201d He testified that she then fell to the floor and appeared \u201cunresponsive.\u201d Erha-bor also testified that defendant struck Giles multiple times and Giles also fell to the floor. He further testified that defendant started kicking Catalla and Giles in the face as they lay on the floor.\nArrington testified that she accompanied the staff members who approached defendant with the mattress. She testified that defendant came around the other side of the mattress and struck Catalla and Giles until they fell to the floor. She testified both of them appeared unconscious and defendant began \u201ckicking and stomping them.\u201d She testified that she threw herself over Catalla\u2019s body and screamed for defendant to stop. She testified that \u201c[a]fter a point, [defendant] just froze in his tracks,\u201d looked around, and then ran to the other end of the hallway. She testified that defendant was later restrained by police officers.\nWhen the State called Dr. Salud Martinez as a witness, defense counsel requested a sidebar conference. At the sidebar conference, defense counsel informed the trial judge that they had not received Dr. Martinez\u2019s curriculum vitae (CV) as they had previously requested. Prior to trial, defendant had filed a \u201cMotion for Discovery\u201d requesting the State to disclose, inter alia, a list of all statements by persons whom the State may call as a witness, and \u201c[a]ny reports or statement of experts made in connection with the particular case.\u201d The State responded that Dr. Martinez was not going to provide an expert opinion, only the medical testimony of a treating \u201cmedical doctor\u201d concerning the injuries Catalla sustained and the course of her treatment. The trial court allowed Dr. Martinez to testify over defense counsel\u2019s objection.\nDr. Martinez testified that she is a \u201cgeneral practitioner, family practice.\u201d She testified that she graduated from the University of Santa Tomas in the Philippines and did her residency training at Lincoln Park Hospital. She further testified that she is licensed to practice medicine in Illinois and is an attending physician at Lincoln Park Hospital, where she has a private practice.\nDr. Martinez testified that Catalla had been her patient since 2002. She testified that the hospital\u2019s emergency room staff contacted her at her home on the evening of October 23, 2006, to inform her that Catalla\u2019s medical condition required admittance to the hospital. She testified that she instructed the emergency room staff to admit Catalla and arrived the following day to examine her.\nDr. Martinez testified, without objection, that Catalla told her she was suffering from a headache had blurry vision, pain in left chest, left arm, and \u201csome weakness\u201d of the left hand. She testified that Catalla told her she had been injured at work. Dr. Martinez observed that Catalla had swelling and abrasions to the left side of her face, a bruise around the left eye, and \u201calso some subconjunctival hemorrhage\u201d in her left eye which she defined as bleeding inside her eye.\nDr. Martinez also testified, without objection, to the medical treatment Catalla received in the emergency room. She testified that Catalla had received pain medication for her headache and that she was given magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan, which, she testified, \u201cwas negative for any hemorrhage or mass or anything.\u201d She did not testify to the results of the MRI. Dr. Martinez also testified, without objection, that she examined Catalla the following day with the use of a magnetic resonance angiography (MRA) to check for bleeding inside her eye. She did not testify concerning the results of the MRA.\nDr. Martinez testified, without objection, that she consulted with a hospital neurologist and that after the neurologist\u2019s examination, Catalla was prescribed \u201cpills *** for Namenda\u201d which Dr. Martinez testified \u201cis for kind of increase of the memory *** because [Catalla] could hardly remember what exactly happened.\u201d\nDr. Martinez testified that she diagnosed Catalla with a concussion. She also testified that \u201c[t]here was no bleeding [s]o we call that concussion secondary to some kind of trauma to the head.\u201d\nThe State further asked Dr. Martinez to describe Catalla\u2019s demeanor and \u201chow she was acting\u201d on October 24, 2006. Dr. Martinez testified without objection that Catalla appeared scared and that she \u201ccould hardly remember.\u201d Dr. Martinez further testified without objection that Catalla told her that she still suffered from headaches, blurry vision, weakness in her arm, and pain in her chest and arm and that she \u201ccould hardly sleep.\u201d\nThe State asked Dr. Martinez whether Catalla continued to suffer from her injuries when she was discharged from the hospital on October 26. Defense counsel objected based on relevance and hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and Dr. Martinez responded that Catalla still complained to her that she continued to suffer from headaches, nervousness, lack of sleep and anxiety. Dr. Martinez also testified that she requested a hospital psychiatrist to examine Catalla before she was discharged and that the psychiatrist prescribed Effexor, which is \u201clike a stimulant.\u201d When asked by the State to how Effexor works, defense counsel objected without a basis and the trial court overruled the objection. The trial court allowed Dr. Martinez to respond \u201cif she knows.\u201d Dr. Martinez stated that \u201cwhen [a person is] depressed, [Effexor] increased] [the person\u2019s] personality a little.\u201d\nDr. Martinez further testified, without objection, that Catalla received \u201ctranscent [sic] (phonetic), something to relax, like a Valium, *** something for pain, [and] eye drops\u201d when she was discharged from the hospital. She also testified that she referred Catalla to a psychiatrist and a \u201cspecialist for the eyes.\u201d\nThe State showed Dr. Martinez the three photographs of Catalla previously received into evidence. Dr. Martinez described the injuries to Catalla\u2019s face that were depicted in the photographs.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Dr. Martinez concerning Catalla\u2019s treatment after she was discharged from the hospital. Dr. Martinez testified that she examined Catalla approximately every two weeks following her discharge up to the time of trial. She further testified that she submitted to Catalla\u2019s employer, Lincoln Park Hospital, periodic medical reports to document Catalla\u2019s injuries and her inability to return to work.\nDefense counsel requested a sidebar conference and claimed that the State failed to tender the medical reports. The State responded as follows:\n\u201cTHE STATE: Judge, we have complied with our discovery. We have subpoenaed the records of [Dr. Martinez]. We tendered everything we have regarding the treatment of Catalla. The defense has also subpoenaed these records. *** The fact that [Catalla] continues to see a doctor through today\u2019s date *** is not a discovery violation. They have a record of the injuries she sustained as a result of this. They are aware of the extent of the injuries she received on October 23rd, 2006. That information has been disclosed. There is no surprise or anything new here.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not request a continuance, but made an oral motion for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.\nAfter the State rested, the defense made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. Defense counsel then proceeded with defendant\u2019s defense. The parties stipulated that if Chicago police detective Frank Esposito were called to testify, he would testify that he was assigned to investigate the matter and that he interviewed Catalla and Giles on October 24, 2006.\nEsposito would testify that Catalla told him that defendant was talking on the telephone to his mother when the incident began and that Catalla tried to persuade defendant to hang up the telephone and to take his medication, but he refused. Catalla \u201ctalked to [defendant] for approximately 20 minutes.\u201d The code gray was then announced and Giles arrived. Catalla and Giles then jointly \u201ctried to persuade [defendant] to hang up the telephone and take his medication, but he refused.\u201d Catalla and Giles then \u201cpicked up a mattress in an attempt to push [defendant] away from the [telephone] and gain control of him.\u201d\nDefendant did not testify on his own behalf, and the defense rested. The parties made closing arguments and following jury deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty on the three counts of aggravated battery. Defendant filed a posttrial motion which the trial court denied at a sentencing hearing on December 2, 2008. After a hearing on aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of five years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nOn December 18, 2008, defense counsel filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider defendant\u2019s sentence. The trial court held a hearing on that motion on February 18, 2008. During that hearing, defendant interjected, \u201c[Go on] give me the lethal injection. I don\u2019t want to go through this shit. Just [go on] and kill me.\u201d The trial court had defendant taken back to his holding cell and then stated as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: During the pendency of this case, I have watched Mr. Taylor dwindle away to a shell of the person that he once was. I don\u2019t know what\u2019s the cause of this. But I do not believe sentencing is intended to be cruel and unusual in any way. I believe that\u2019s the effect it\u2019s having on Mr. Taylor.\u201d\nThe trial court then reduced Taylor\u2019s sentence to 3 concurrent terms of 3 years\u2019 imprisonment with credit for 850 days for time considered served.\nThis appeal follows.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his convictions, claiming that the trial court: (1) failed to conduct a proper fitness hearing and, as a result, abused its discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial; (2) erred and violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the State exercised two of its peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude two African-American venirepeople from the jury; (3) failed to comply with the mandate of Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)); and (4) improperly allowed the State to present the testimony of one of the victim\u2019s medical physicians because: (a) the State failed to disclose \u201ca statement of the doctor\u2019s qualifications\u201d as an expert in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001)); (b) the medical physician\u2019s testimony concerning \u201cthe victim\u2019s psychological injuries was irrelevant\u201d; (c) the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201ccontained inadmissible hearsay concerning medications prescribed by a psychiatrist and neurologist\u201d; and (d) the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201cconcerning the medications prescribed to [the] victim.\u201d\nA. Proper Fitness Hearing\nFirst, defendant claims that a new trial is warranted because the trial court erred when it failed to: (1) conduct an adequate fitness restoration hearing; and (2) failed to sua sponte order a new fitness evaluation when there existed a bona fide doubt that he was fit to stand trial.\n1. Fitness Restoration Hearing\nThe due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution bars the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 326 (2000). A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial. 725 ILCS 5/104\u201410 (West 2008). A defendant is unfit if he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. 725 ILCS 5/104\u201410 (West 2008); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512 (1991). \u201cFitness speaks only to a person\u2019s ability to function within the context of trial; it does not refer to sanity or competence in other areas.\u201d People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 524 (1995). A person may be fit for trial although his mind may be otherwise unsound. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d at 524. When a defendant is found unfit and treatment has been ordered, a trial judge must periodically review the issue of defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial and set the matter for a hearing upon receiving a report that defendant has attained fitness. 725 ILCS 5/104\u201420(a) (West 2008).\nAt a hearing to determine defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial, the trial court may conduct its own inquiry into the defendant\u2019s fitness. 725 ILCS 5/104\u201411(c) (West 2008). Where the parties stipulate to what an expert would testify, the trial court may consider this stipulated testimony in reaching its determination of defendant\u2019s fitness. People v. Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d 111, 116 (1984). However, the defendant\u2019s fitness may not be determined solely on the parties\u2019 stipulation to the expert\u2019s conclusions that defendant is fit to stand trial. Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d at 116; People v. Contorno, 322 Ill. App. 3d 177, 179 (2001). \u201cUpon considering these stipulations and personally observing defendants, the [trial] court could find defendant ] fit, seek more information, or find the evidence insufficient to support a finding of restoration to fitness.\u201d Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d at 116. A trial court\u2019s determination that a defendant is fit to stand trial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1996); People v. Baugh, 358 Ill. App. 3d 718, 732 (2005); People v. Cleer, 328 Ill. App. 3d 428, 431 (2002); People v. Newell, 196 Ill. App. 3d 373 (1990).\nAs an initial matter, the State argues that the defendant forfeited this issue because he did not raise it at trial or in his posttrial motion. However, the plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence \u2014 so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)). The burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87. In order to determine whether plain error is applicable, we must first determine whether any error occurred. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 559.\nThe evidence was overwhelming that defendant was restored to fitness to stand trial with medication. Dr. Kulik interviewed the defendant and made a finding that the defendant manifested an understanding of the legal proceedings and demonstrated an ability to assist his counsel in his defense. See 725 ILCS 5/104\u201410 (West 2008) (requiring defendant to understand the legal proceedings and assist counsel in his defense). Dr. Kulik formulated a diagnosis of defendant\u2019s mental disorders and provided the medication regimen prescribed to the defendant to stabilize those mental disorders. Dr. Kulik further provided a prognosis that defendant was \u201c[faring] well\u201d with his medication regimen and opined that defendant did not suffer adverse effects from the medication. The defendant was further evaluated by Dr. Nadkarni, whose findings were similar to Dr. Kulik\u2019s findings and opinions, and he also found defendant was restored to fitness to stand trial with medication. In addition, defense counsel had an independent evaluation of his client by a private psychiatrist who also opined that defendant was restored to fitness to stand trial with medication.\nMoreover, the record shows that defendant was present at each pretrial proceeding, and the trial court had numerous opportunities to observe defendant. There is no evidence in the record that defendant disrupted the proceedings and there is also no evidence in the record that defense counsel alerted the trial court that defendant was unwilling or unable to assist in his defense.\nDefendant argues that this case is similar to People v. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d 833 (2009). In Esang, the trial court questioned the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial based on his actions during pretrial proceedings and ordered a clinical examination. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836. The defendant refused to cooperate during the fitness examination and the evaluating psychiatrist opined he was unfit to stand trial. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836. A jury heard the evidence of defendant\u2019s fitness and then found defendant unfit to stand trial. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836. It also found that there was a substantial probability that, if provided with treatment, he would attain fitness within one year. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836. The defendant was then placed in the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. The defendant continually objected to further fitness proceedings, insisting that he was fit to stand trial and that the proceedings merely delayed the presentation of his defense on the criminal charges. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836.\nMonths later, the trial court received a \u201c90-day evaluation\u201d report concerning defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial submitted by a psychologist and a psychiatrist that interviewed the defendant. The evaluation report indicated that defendant \u201c \u2018vehemently refused all psychotropic medication,\u2019 \u201d but nevertheless concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 836-37.\nThe trial court then held a restoration fitness hearing in which it stated to defendant, \u201c[i]n order to put the case back on the trial calendar, we must restore you to fitness, which can be done simply by stipulating to [the written evaluation].\u201d The trial court asked the defendant whether he was \u201cin concurrence\u201d with the psychiatrists\u2019 opinion, to which the defendant responded that he was. The trial court then found defendant fit to stand trial and appointed the office of the public defender to represent him at trial. The assistant public defender later advised the trial court that the defendant refused to assist in his defense. The trial court again questioned defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial and ordered another clinical evaluation. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 837.\nOn appeal, this court found that the trial court failed to independently analyze and weigh expert testimony in finding defendant fit at the first restoration fitness hearing and appeared to base its finding that the defendant was restored to fitness solely on the \u201cdefendant\u2019s stipulation\u201d to the psychiatric conclusions in the written evaluation. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 837.\nWe first stated that the trial court\u2019s acceptance of defendant\u2019s opinion that he was able to cooperate with counsel made a \u201csham out of the [restoration fitness] hearing\u201d because the defendant\u2019s statements were unreliable because the written evaluation stated defendant refused all psychotropic treatments suggested and that his condition had minimally changed from the earlier finding that he was unfit to stand trial. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 840 (citing People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d 611, 616-17 (1964)). We further found that the trial court indicated a \u201cclear doubt\u201d concerning the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial both before and after the first restoration hearing. Esang, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 840.\nThe case at bar is distinguishable from Esang. First, there was no indication in the record that the trial court questioned defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial or sua sponte ordered an evaluation in response to its observations of defendant during pretrial proceedings. Second, the written evaluations of Dr. Kulik and Dr. Nadkarni, unlike the written evaluation in Esang, indicated that defendant cooperated during the evaluation and responded well to his medication. Third, as previously noted, the record does not show that the parties merely stipulated to Dr. Kulik\u2019s conclusion that defendant was restored to fitness with medication, but that they stipulated to Dr. Kulik\u2019s basis for his conclusions. Also Dr. Nadkarni testified to his conclusions. Fourth, as previously noted, there is nothing in the record that indicates that defendant refused to assist counsel in his defense at any time prior to trial.\nDefendant also argues that the record shows that the trial court based its finding of fitness solely on the conclusions of Dr. Kulik because it did not make any oral or written finding concerning defendant\u2019s fitness, but merely set the matter for trial. However, \u201cwe are aware of no statute or supreme court rule that requires trial courts to either independently question a defendant or make express findings of fact regarding fitness.\u201d People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 287 (2004). In addition, as we have previously noted, the trial court had the benefit of Dr. Nadkarni\u2019s testimony and the statement of defense counsel that defendant\u2019s private evaluation by their own psychiatrist mirrored that of Dr. Kulik and Dr. Nadkarni. We cannot find any error in the trial court\u2019s handling of the fitness matter.\n2. Bona Fide Doubt\nFurthermore, we cannot find that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte ordering a new fitness evaluation and hearing.\nDefendant claims that the evidence that shows that there was a bona fide doubt of his fitness was his decision to waive an insanity defense and his unwillingness to assist in the preparation of that defense. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65 (1997) (once a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s fitness has been raised, the trial court has a duty to hold a fitness hearing). Defendant bears the burden of proving there is a bona fide doubt of fitness and \u201cmust demonstrate that facts existed at the time of his trial which raised a bona fide doubt of his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense.\u201d People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512-13 (1991).\nThe trial court determined that defendant properly waived an insanity defense after it held a hearing, at defense counsel\u2019s request and pursuant to People v. Gettings, 175 Ill. App. 3d 920 (1988), to determine whether defendant could waive an insanity defense.\nIn Gettings, the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court found that when a trial court is advised by defense counsel that a competent defendant has decided to waive a viable insanity defense over defense counsel\u2019s objection, the court must ascertain whether the waiver is voluntary and intelligent before it is accepted. Gettings, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 924. The Gettings court ruled that the trial court must then discuss with the defendant whether or not the defendant has been advised of the availability of the defense; what reason the defendant has for waiving the defense; whether or not the defendant understands the consequences of waiving an insanity defense; and whether or not defendant understands the consequences of a successful insanity defense. Gettings, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 925.\nIn this case, the trial court advised the defendant of the insanity defense and inquired to the reason defendant had for waiving it. Defendant repeatedly asserted that he did not intend to hurt anyone, but acted solely in self-defense. Defendant further insisted that he was innocent of the charges against him and did not want to assert an insanity defense. Defendant was also frightened of a previous mental health facility where he had been confined and did not want to return to a similar facility. Defendant was admonished of the consequences of his decision by his defense counsel and the trial court. As a result, the evidence shows the trial court properly followed the requirements in Gettings and found defendant waived the insanity defense voluntarily and intelligently. Gettings, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 924.\nWe also cannot find that defendant\u2019s refusal to raise an insanity defense evidenced an unwillingness to assist defense counsel. In this case, defendant was admonished of the consequences of his decision by his defense counsel and the trial court, and he clearly chose not to assert an insanity defense, which was his right to do. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 53-54 (1992) (a defendant has the right to choose which defense theory to present to the trier of fact).\nDefendant further claims the remarks made by defendant at the hearing to reconsider his sentence on February 18, 2008, to \u201c[Go on] and kill me\u201d as evidence that indicated a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness. Defendant also points to the trial judge\u2019s remarks at that same hearing concerning defendant\u2019s \u201cdeteriorated mental state\u201d as further support of a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness. Those remarks occurred approximately four months after defendant\u2019s trial.\nHowever, we find no evidence, and defendant does not cite any, that shows the remarks alerted the trial court that defendant was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense at any point during the trial such that the trial court was required to sua sponte order another psychiatric evaluation and hold a fitness hearing.\nIn sum, the trial court did not commit error in conducting the fitness restoration hearing or by failing to sua sponte order a new fitness evaluation and hearing. Where \u201cthere is no error at all,\u201d there cannot be plain-error analysis. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005). Accordingly, this claim is forfeited.\nB. Batson Claim\nSecond, defendant claims that a new trial is warranted because the State used its peremptory challenges to exclude two African-American jurors from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).\nIn Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment\u2019s equal protection clause prohibits the State from using a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror solely on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Under Batson, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated where the facts show that the State excluded an African-American venireper-son on the assumption that the person will be biased in favor of defendant simply because of their shared race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.\nThe United States Supreme Court provided a three-step analysis for evaluating claims of discrimination in jury selection. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006). First, the moving party has the burden to show that the nonmoving party exercised its peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97); People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (2000). If a prima facie case is made, the process moves to the second step where the burden of persuasion shifts to the nonmoving party to present a race-neutral reason for excusing the venireperson. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98); see also Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 323-24. \u201cAlthough the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, \u2018the second stop of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible\u2019; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices.\u201d Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (per curiam)).\nOnce the nonmoving party presents its reason for excusing the ve-nireperson in question, the process moves to the third step in the analysis. In that third step, the trial court must determine whether the moving party has sustained its burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). \u201cThis final step involves evaluating \u2018the persuasiveness of the justification\u2019 proffered by the prosecutor, but \u2018the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.\u2019 \u201d Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).\n1. Prima Facie Case\nIn determining whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection has been established, the following relevant circumstances should be considered: (1) the racial identity between the defendant and the excluded venirepersons; (2) the pattern of strikes against African-American venirepersons; (3) the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venireper-sons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses. People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996); People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 426 (1993); People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 425-26 (1992).\nHere, the trial court found that a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson was established. Our review of the evidence in light of all the relevant circumstances also reveals that a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson was established. However, defendant does not argue that finding on appeal. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s determination that the State\u2019s race-neutral reasons for excusing two venirepersons was in error.\n2. Race-Neutral Reasons\nOur analysis now focuses on the second step to determine whether the State provided race-neutral reasons for excusing L.H. and VW A race-neutral reason is an explanation based on something other than the race of the venireperson. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).\nIn the case at bar, the State provided its \u201cprimary reason\u201d for excusing L.H. and YW. was not based on their race, but on their employment in \u201cthe social worker field,\u201d claiming they could be sympathetic to the defense. Employment in the social work field has been held to be a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. See People v. Hemphill, 230 Ill. App. 3d 453, 467-68 (1992) (challenge on the basis of employment positions is a race-neutral reason) (citing People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231 (1989)). The State also provided an additional reason for excusing L.H., claiming \u201cshe is a young woman\u201d and youth as a basis for a peremptory challenge has been held to be a race-neutral reason. See People v. Taylor, 171 Ill. App. 3d 261 (1988) (challenge on the basis of youth has been held to be race-neutral).\n3. Trial Court\u2019s Determination\nOur analysis now focuses on the third step where the trial court must determine whether defendant has carried his \u201cultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation.\u201d As previously noted, this burden never shifts from the moving party. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338 (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).\nA trial court\u2019s third step finding on the ultimate issue of discrimination rests largely on credibility determinations. People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 502 (2006) (citing McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 527 (2000)). Consequently, the trial court\u2019s finding is entitled to \u201cgreat deference\u201d and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365; Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 502; McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 527; People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 175 (1996). As the United States Supreme Court observed in Hernandez, there will seldom be much evidence bearing upon the ultimate question of discrimination and the \u201cbest evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. The evaluation of the attorney\u2019s state of mind is most often \u201cbased on demeanor and credibility\u201d and thus \u201clies \u2018peculiarly within the trial judge\u2019s province.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).\nFollowing the State\u2019s reasons for excluding L.H. and VW, defense counsel argued that the State\u2019s reasons were pretextual. Specifically, defense counsel pointed to the State\u2019s acceptance of venireperson E.V, a non-African-American, who testified that she is a caseworker, and venireperson D.J., a non-African-American, whom defense counsel argued \u201ccould be considered\u201d a social worker because she is employed as a supervisor with the Illinois Action for Children, which subsidizes child care.\nThe State responded that E.V and D.J. were employed in supervisory positions \u201cas opposed to working in the field,\u201d although, as defense counsel correctly pointed out, E.V testified that she was a caseworker and that it was her husband who held a supervisory position.\nWe cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant failed to establish purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. We first consider that at the time defendant raised his Batson claim, the parties had agreed on and selected the first panel of jurors which consisted of four jurors, three of whom were African-American. Next, as noted, the State provided valid race-neutral reasons for excusing L.H. and VW based on their employment as social workers and L.H.\u2019s youth. In addition, the State provided an additional reason for excusing some, but not all, social workers from the venire, namely, that it had only seven peremptories and social workers were in \u201cabundance,\u201d so it could not excuse every social worker.\nAs noted, defense counsel argues that the State\u2019s reasons were nevertheless pretextual because it accepted venirepersons E.V and D.J., who were non-African-American social workers, but excused L.H. and VW, who were African-American social workers.\nEven assuming that L.H., VW., E.V and D.J. all shared the same trait as \u201csocial workers,\u201d the mere fact that the State challenges a African-American venireperson for a reason which is equally applicable to a non-African-American juror does not show in and of itself that the offered explanation is pretextual. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 431 (1993). A peremptory challenge may be based on a combination of traits. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 431. As the Illinois Supreme Court has stated:\n\u201c[I]n many instances there will be no single criterion that serves as the basis for the decision whether to excuse a particular [venireper-son]. A characteristic deemed to be unfavorable in one prospective juror, and hence grounds for a peremptory challenge, may, in a second prospective juror, be outweighed by other, favorable characteristics.\u201d People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (1989).\nIn this case, the evidence in the record showed that L.H. was not only excused based on her employment as a social worker, but also excused based on her youth, which, as noted, is a race-neutral reason for exclusion. Taylor, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 268. Defendant does not argue that youth was a trait possessed by either E.V, D.J., or VW. Furthermore, D.J. was employed in a supervisory position, which was not a trait possessed by either L.H., V.W., or E.V.\nWhile defendant correctly points out that E.V testified that she is employed as a \u201ccaseworker\u201d similar to V.W, E.V also testified during voir dire to a number of traits different than those of V.W E.V. testified that she is a caseworker, has been employed in the same position for 22 years, she is married to another caseworker who holds a supervisory role, she has four children, and she has been the victim of domestic violence and was also a victim of sexual assault as a child. V.W., on the other hand, testified that she is a caseworker, attends church regularly, is unmarried, has no children, and has never been the victim of a crime. Clearly there were other traits that the State may have considered in not challenging E.V. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 243 (1989) (\u201cother circumstances may have led prosecutors not to challenge\u201d white venirepersons possessing the same traits as challenged African-American venirepersons).\nThe trial court also found defense counsel\u2019s concern that the State\u2019s reasons were pretextual unfounded because there was no indication that \u201cone culture would be predisposed\u201d and \u201cmore suited for the defense case or the prosecution case\u201d and found that the State provided race-neutral reasons for excusing L.H. and V.W. Although the makeup of the jury was not found in the record on appeal, the fact that three out of the four jurors selected on the first panel were African-American shows that the State had already agreed on a jury with strong African-American representation.\nOur review of the evidence in light of all the relevant circumstances reveals that defendant did not meet his \u201cultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation.\u201d Given the \u201cgreat deference\u201d accorded to the trial court\u2019s ruling and based on our review of the evidence, we cannot find that the trial court\u2019s determination that there was no intentional discrimination was clearly erroneous.\nC. Supreme Court Rule 431(b)\nThird, defendant claims that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because the trial judge failed to question the prospective jurors regarding all four principles enumerated in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), and codified in Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff. May 1, 2007)). Under that rule, the trial court must ask jurors whether they understand and accept that: (1) defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him; (2) the State must prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) defendant is not required to present evidence on his behalf; and (4) defendant has the right not to testify and his failure to do so cannot be held against him. Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). Specifically, defendant argues that he was prejudiced where the trial court failed to admonish the potential jurors regarding defendant\u2019s right not to testify.\nThe State claims that defendant forfeited review of this error because he failed to object at trial or raise it in a posttrial motion. To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the error in a written posttrial motion. People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant admits that he failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal, but urges us to review the error under the plain-error doctrine.\n\u201c[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). Under the first prong, the defendant must show that the evidence at trial was so closely balanced that the error alone \u201cthreatened to tip the scales of justice against him.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Under the second prong, the defendant must prove that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the trial and questions the integrity of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Under either prong of a plain-error analysis, it is the defendant rather than the State who bears the burden of persuasion. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187.\nHowever, before considering plain error, we must first determine whether an error occurred at all. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (in order to claim plain error, defendant must show \u201cfirst\u201d that an error occurred). Here, there is no dispute that the trial court erred in failing to strictly comply with Rule 431(b) when it failed to even discuss with the venire that defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him.\nIn his appellate brief, defendant claims that this violation of Rule 431(b) falls under the second prong of plain error because it constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal. However, after defendant filed his appellate brief, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (2010). In Thompson, our supreme court found that a trial court\u2019s violation of Rule 431(b) \u201cdoes not fall within the very limited category of structural errors and, thus, does not require automatic reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 611. In addition, defendant does not claim that the trial court\u2019s failure to strictly comply with Rule 431(b) resulted in a biased jury. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 614 (\u201c[a] finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it would affect his right to a fair trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process\u201d). Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court\u2019s Rule 431(b) violation in this case warrants automatic reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nIn his reply brief, which defendant filed after the Thompson decision, he claims that we should now consider the error under the first prong of plain error because the evidence at trial was closely balanced. In support of his argument defendant argues that the evidence was close concerning his intent and the element of great bodily harm. As to intent, defendant argues that the \u201cjury could have believed\u201d that because he was in a psychiatric ward and \u201chad a fear of being medicated,\u201d he reasonably acted in self-defense. As to the element of great bodily harm, defendant argues that the \u201cjury may have believed\u201d that Catalla suffered only bodily harm and not great bodily harm after considering Catalla\u2019s testimony that she was punched and kicked several times and the photographs entered into evidence that \u201cshow only a bruised eye.\u201d\nWe do not find defendant\u2019s argument, that the evidence was closely balanced, persuasive. At trial, Catalla testified that defendant was \u201cout of control\u201d and that a code gray was called as a result. Catalla testified that she tried to calm defendant by speaking with him, but he would not calm down. Catalla testified that she and other staff members approached defendant with a mattress in an attempt to physically restrain him, but she was unable to remember the events that followed because she woke up in the emergency room.\nGiles also testified that defendant moved around the mattress as they approached and punched and kicked Catalla and Giles until they both fell to the floor. Giles further testified that defendant continued to kick and stomp on them while they were on the floor. Giles testified that both Catalla and Giles were rendered unconscious as a result of the beating.\nIn addition, Erhabor and Arrington also testified at trial. They both testified that they observed defendant punch Catalla and Giles until they fell to the floor. They also testified that defendant continued to kick Catalla and Giles while they were on the floor and that both Catalla and Giles fell unconscious during the attack.\nFurthermore, Dr. Martinez testified to the extent of the injuries that Catalla suffered as a result of the attack. She testified that when she examined Catalla in the hospital she observed that Catalla had bruising around her eye and lacerations on the left side of her face. Dr. Martinez further testified that Catalla complained of headaches and pain on the left side of her face and chest. Dr. Martinez further testified that she diagnosed Catalla with a concussion.\nIn sum, we find that defendant has not shown that the evidence was closely balanced on any of the elements of the offense for which he was convicted. Thus, the error did not rise to the level of plain error, under either prong of the plain-error doctrine.\nD. Dr. Martinez\u2019s Testimony\nFourth, defendant claims that the trial court improperly allowed the State to present the testimony of one of the victim\u2019s treating medical physicians because: (a) the State failed to disclose \u201ca statement of the doctor\u2019s qualifications\u201d as an expert in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001)); (b) the medical physician\u2019s testimony concerning \u201cthe victim\u2019s psychological injuries was irrelevant\u201d; (c) the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201ccontained inadmissible hearsay concerning medications prescribed by a psychiatrist and neurologist\u201d; and (d) the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the medical physician\u2019s testimony \u201cconcerning the medications prescribed to [the] victim.\u201d\n1. Supreme Court Rule 412\nDefendant initially argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Martinez to testify, over defense counsel\u2019s objections, as an expert witness because the State failed to provide a statement of the medical physician\u2019s qualifications as an expert in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412. Defendant further argues the State failed to provide medical reports authored by Dr. Martinez also in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412.\nOur standard of review for evaluating a discovery violation is whether the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Hendricks, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1102 (2001). Although the judgment of the trial court is given great weight, a reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion when a defendant is prejudiced by the discovery violation and the trial court fails to eliminate the prejudice. People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 559 (1982). \u201c[T]he purpose of the discovery rules is to protect the accused against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation.\u201d People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 63 (1999). Although compliance with the rules is mandatory, failure to comply with the discovery rules does not require reversal absent a showing of prejudice. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 63 (citing People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (1993)). The burden of showing surprise or prejudice is upon the defendant, and the failure to request a continuance is a relevant factor in determining whether the testimony actually surprised or unduly prejudiced the defendant. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 78.\nSupreme Court Rule 412 governs disclosure to the accused in criminal cases and provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c(a) Except as is otherwise provided in these rules as to matters not subject to disclosure and protective orders, the State shall, upon written motion of defense counsel, disclose to defense counsel the following material and information within its possession or control:\n(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the accused *** and a list of witnesses to the making and acknowledgment of such statements.\n(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including *** a statement of qualifications of the expert.\u201d Ill. S. Ct. R. 421(a) (eff. Mar. 1, 2001).\nIn arguing that Dr. Martinez\u2019s provided expert testimony, defendant cites Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony that she was not the emergency room physician at the time, but was Catalla\u2019s \u201cfamily physician\u201d and \u201cthus under the control of Catalla.\u201d Furthermore, Dr. Martinez testified concerning \u201cother doctors\u2019 diagnoses\u201d of Catalla and compiled information to ensure that Catalla could stay on leave from her employment. The State argues that the trial court properly allowed Dr. Martinez to testify as a \u201ctreating physician,\u201d which is distinguishable from an expert witness.\nIn Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 234-35 (1988), our supreme court distinguished between the two as follows:\n\u201cTreating physicians *** typically are not \u2018retained to render an opinion at trial\u2019 [under the language of the rule] but are consulted, whether or not litigation is pending or contemplated, to treat a patient\u2019s physical or mental problem. While treating physicians may give opinions at trial, those opinions are developed in the course of treating the patient and are completely apart from any litigation. Such an opinion is not formed in anticipation of a trial, but is simply the product of a physician\u2019s observations while treating the patient, which coincidentally may have value as evidence at a trial. In this respect, the opinions of treating physicians are similar to those of occurrence witnesses who testify, not because they were retained in the expectation they might develop and give a particular opinion on a disputed issue at trial, but because they witnessed or participated in the transactions or events that are part of the subject matter of the litigation.\u201d Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234-35.\nUnder Tzystuck, whether a doctor is a treating physician or an expert depends on the physician\u2019s relationship to the case, not on the substance of his testimony. Cochran v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 935, 940 (1990). A treating physician is one consulted for treatment whereas an expert is one consulted to render an opinion at trial. People v. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d 465, 485 (2009) (citing Cochran, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 941); see also Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234.\nIn determining whether Dr. Martinez testified as an expert or a treating physician, we find People v. Cortez, 361 Ill. App. 3d 456 (2005), instructive. In Cortez, the defendant was convicted of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing a physician, who was not disclosed as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 412, to testify as to the effect of the use of an alcohol swab and the administration of a saline solution on the results of the defendant\u2019s blood test. The Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court, citing Tzystuck, rejected the defendant\u2019s claim, holding that, although the physician\u2019s testimony technically constituted an \u201copinion,\u201d it was not rendered in anticipation of litigation. Cortez, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 466. Rather, the appellate court stated that the opinion was \u201c \u2018simply the product of [the] physician\u2019s observations while treating the [defendant].\u2019 \u201d Cortez, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 466 (quoting Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234-35). Also in rejecting the defendant\u2019s claim, the appellate court reasoned that, as a practical matter, if the court were to adopt his position, all treating physicians would be required to testify as experts. Cortez, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nIn the case at bar, we cannot say that Dr. Martinez was an expert witness as opposed to a treating physician for discovery purposes. Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony was a product of her observations while treating her patient Catalla in the hospital, and she was not retained to provide an opinion at trial.\nDr. Martinez testified that she was contacted by emergency room personnel to inform her that Catalla needed to be admitted. Dr. Martinez testified that she began treatment of Catalla the following day and continued to treat her until she was released from the hospital. She further testified that she examined Catalla every two weeks following her release through the trial date.\nDr. Martinez further testified that Catalla complained of headaches, blurred vision, pain in her left arm and left side of her chest, and weakness in her left arm. Dr. Martinez testified that she examined Catalla and used the diagnostic tools of a CAT scan, MRI and MRA. She also testified that she diagnosed Catalla with a concussion and prescribed eye drops, pain medication for her headache, and \u201ctran-scent [sic]\u201d for lack of sleep.\nDr. Martinez testified that, while Catalla was in the hospital, she consulted with a neurologist and a psychiatrist concerning Catalla\u2019s remarks that she had difficulty remembering the events of the incident and had difficulty sleeping. She testified that the neurologist and the psychiatrist had prescribed medication during the course of Catalla\u2019s hospital stay. She did not testify to the neurologist\u2019s and psychiatrist\u2019s diagnoses. Rather, she provided only her opinion that Catalla suffered from a concussion.\nMoreover, we cannot say that defendant was prejudiced by Dr. Martinez\u2019s medical testimony or failure to produce her curriculum vitae. The State disclosed to defendant the names of Dr. Martinez and other treating physicians before trial in response to defendant\u2019s interrogatories. The State also informed defendant that it would call Dr. Martinez as a \u201cmedical doctor\u201d to testify at trial. The defendant was in possession of Catalla\u2019s hospital records before trial and was allowed to depose Dr. Martinez before she was called as a witness. That deposition afforded the defense the opportunity to obtain Dr. Martinez\u2019s qualifications as a medical doctor, and all of her findings and opinions. See Kim v. Evanston Hospital, 240 Ill. App. 3d 881, 890 (1992) (\u201c[A]n opposing party will not be surprised when a treating physician testifies, because the witness was initially associated with the issues in litigation for reasons other than the sole purpose of rendering an opinion at trial.\u201d); People v. Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42 (1992) (holding that because testifying doctor was a treating physician, his testimony should not have come as a surprise to the defendant).\nDefendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the State committed a discovery violation by failing to produce Dr. Martinez\u2019s medical reports sent to Lincoln Park Hospital concerning Catal-la\u2019s inability to return to work. Defendant argues that even if Dr. Martinez is not considered an expert for discovery purposes, the State was still required to produce the medical reports because Rule 412 applies to all witnesses, not just experts. Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a) (i) (eff. Mar. 1, 2001) (requiring the State, upon written motion of defense counsel, to disclose the names of persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements). However, when a defendant challenges a trial court\u2019s ruling on a purported discovery violation, we first determine whether a discovery violation occurred. People v. Hood, 213 Ill. 2d 244, 256 (2004).\nHere, we cannot find that a discovery violation occurred. The State argued at trial that it did not have the medical reports in its possession. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a) (eff. Mar. 1, 2001) (requiring the State to disclose material and information within its \u201cpossession or control\u201d). Also, there is no evidence that the State had those medical reports in its possession or control or that the hospital supplied them to the State. In addition, the State did not rely on the medical reports in their case-in-chief, rather, the medical reports were first discovered existing during defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Dr. Martinez.\nEven if we found that a discovery violation had occurred, we cannot say that a new trial is warranted. While compliance with the discovery requirements is mandatory, the failure to comply with these requirements does not require a reversal absent a showing of surprise or undue prejudice. People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (1993). As noted, the burden of showing prejudice is upon the defendant, and the failure to request a continuance is a relevant factor in determining whether the testimony at issue actually surprised or unduly prejudiced the defendant. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 78. \u201cA defendant cannot request only the most drastic measures, such as either an immediate mistrial or the total exclusion of testimony by a witness, and then on appeal argue that he is entitled to a new trial when these requests are not granted.\u201d Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 78-79; see also People v. Foster, 76 Ill. 2d 365, 384 (1979) (\u201c[If an undisclosed] statement was so earthshaking as to require complete reorganization of the defendant\u2019s case, counsel should have asked for a continuance or recess for that purpose [when the reports were discovered as existing] ***. His failure to do so is persuasive evidence that the prejudice here alleged was in fact trivial.\u201d).\nIn the case at bar, defendant stated at the sidebar conference that he was surprised by Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony that she provided medical reports to the hospital concerning Catalla\u2019s treatment following her discharge. However, defendant did not request a continuance or recess to obtain them to determine their importance. Instead, he moved immediately for a mistrial.\nIn addition, our review of the record shows that defendant was not prejudiced by Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony concerning the existence of medical reports. The State disclosed to defendant the name of Dr. Martinez and the names of other treating physicians before trial in response to defendant\u2019s interrogatories. The State also informed defendant that it would call Dr. Martinez as a \u201cmedical doctor\u201d to testify at trial. The defendant was in possession of Catalla\u2019s hospital records before trial and defendant\u2019s cross-examination shows that he was aware that Dr. Martinez continued to treat Catalla following her discharge from the hospital. We cannot find any prejudice as a result of any failure to produce medical reports in the record of this case.\n2. Irrelevant Testimony\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s claim that Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony concerning Catalla\u2019s \u201cpsychological harm, the medications prescribed by other [physicians], and the purpose of such medication\u201d was irrelevant and \u201cintended to evoke the sympathies of the jury.\u201d\nIn order to properly preserve any alleged error for appellate review, \u201ca defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the issue again in a posttrial motion.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).\nDefendant does not argue that he preserved this error. Our review of Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony at trial shows that defendant did not object concerning psychological harm to Catalla, the medications prescribed to Catalla, or the purpose of such medications. Defendant also did not raise the issue in his posttrial motion but now raises this claim for the first time on appeal. Thus, defendant failed to preserve this error for review and has forfeited those issues before us.\nDefendant also fails to request us to review this claim for plain error. The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to reach an un-preserved error when either: (1) the evidence in the case is closely balanced, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005). When a defendant fails to request this court to review a claim under plain error, he again forfeits the issue. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010) (\u201cA defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.\u201d); People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000).\n3. Hearsay Statements\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s claim that Dr. Martinez testified concerning medications namely, \u201cNamenda, Effexor, and \u2018transcent\u2019 [sic] or Tranxene\u201d prescribed by \u201cother doctors\u201d constitutes inadmissible hearsay.\nAs previously noted, in order to properly preserve any alleged error for appellate review, \u201ca defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the issue again in a posttrial motion.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.\nDefendant argues that he preserved this claim for review and points to a sidebar conference when defense counsel raised her concern that Dr. Martinez would testify concerning \u201cposttraumatic stress when she has no qualifications to talk about it.\u201d Defendant further points to his posttrial motion which stated that \u201c[t]he court erred in allowing hearsay testimony into the trial.\u201d\nHowever, our review of Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony at trial shows that defendant did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that a neurologist prescribed Namenda to Catalla. Defendant also did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that a psychiatrist prescribed Catalla Effexor. Defendant further did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that \u201c[Catalla] was given transcent [sic] (phonetic).\u201d Thus, defendant failed to preserve this error.\nDefendant also fails to ask us to review this claim for plain error. The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to reach an unpre-served error when either: (1) the evidence in the case is closely balanced, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. As noted, when a defendant fails to request this court to review a claim under plain error, he forfeits the issue. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 (\u201cA defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.\u201d); Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d at 502-03.\nHearsay is a statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, made by the declarant at a time when he or she was not testifying at trial. People v. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1106 (2009). However, a treating medical physician can testify to that which is in medical records concerning the patient\u2019s medical history, which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Herron v. Anderson, 254 Ill. App. 3d 365, 377 (1993). In addition, the medication that a patient is taking is \u201creliable and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.\u201d Herron, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 377. Thus, even if defendant did not forfeit this issue, Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony was properly allowed.\n4. Foundation\nLast, we consider defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Martinez to testify concerning the medications Namenda, Effexor, and \u201ctranscent [sic]\u201d prescribed to Catalla by \u201cother doctors,\u201d or the reasons such medications were prescribed because the State did not lay a proper foundation that Dr. Martinez was \u201cqualified to testify about such matters.\u201d Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 132 (2007).\nFirst, we find defendant\u2019s claim that Dr. Martinez provided reasons the medications were prescribed to Catalla misstates the facts. As previously noted, Dr. Martinez did not testify to the neurologist\u2019s and psychiatrist\u2019s diagnoses or provide reasons why Catalla was prescribed those medications.\nNext, in order to properly preserve the alleged error that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony concerning the medications for appellate review, \u201cdefendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the issue again in a posttrial motion.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.\nOur review of Dr. Martinez\u2019s testimony at trial shows that defendant did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that \u201cNamenda is for kind of increase of the memory, this and that, because she could hardly remember.\u201d Defendant also did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that Catalla was prescribed another medication, \u201ctranscent [sic] (phonetic), something to relax, like a chloraseptic, you know, like a Valium, something like that.\u201d Defendant failed to preserve the errors concerning Namenda and \u201ctranscent [sic]\u201d and thus, the errors are forfeited.\nThe trial transcript also shows that defendant did not object when Dr. Martinez testified that \u201c[the psychiatrist] started her on Effexor\u201d which Dr. Martinez then explained, \u201cis like a little like a stimulant.\u201d Thus, that error is also forfeited.\nHowever, the trial transcript does show that defendant objected when the State specifically asked Dr. Martinez, \u201cWhat does [Effexor] actually do?\u201d The trial court allowed Dr. Martinez to testify over defendant\u2019s objection, \u201cif she knows.\u201d Even if defendant preserved this error, we cannot say that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for this testimony.\nAs previously noted, Dr. Martinez testified at trial that she was Catalla\u2019s treating medical physician while Catalla was in the hospital following the physical altercation with defendant. She was not testifying as an expert witness. As part of her treatment, Dr. Martinez referred Catalla to a psychiatrist, who prescribed Effexor following that consultation. Effexor was thus part of Catalla\u2019s medical history and Dr. Martinez would have personal knowledge of the effects of known medication. See Atkins v. Thapedi, 166 Ill. App. 3d 471, 475 (1988) (citing Waterford v. Halloway, 142 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1986) (testimony of a treating physician may be offered only in regard to factual matters of which the doctor has personal knowledge)). In addition, the trial court allowed Dr. Martinez to testify concerning the effects of Effexor if she knew. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Martinez to testify concerning the effects of Effexor.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nThe record does not state whether Dr. Martinez is board certified in a specific specialty of medicine.\nThe record and the parties\u2019 appellate briefs do not indicate L.H.\u2019s age.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Melissa C. Chiang, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary E Needham, and Stacia D. Weber, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201409\u20140517\nOpinion filed March 4, 2011.\nRehearing denied June 10, 2011.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Melissa C. Chiang, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita M. Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary E Needham, and Stacia D. Weber, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0881-01", "first_page_order": 897, "last_page_order": 931 }