{ "id": 7328803, "name": "In re MERRILEE M., Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Merrilee M., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Merrilee M.", "decision_date": "2011-04-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201410\u20140103", "first_page": "983", "last_page": "988", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 983" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4292303 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014, 1017" }, { "page": "1018" }, { "page": "1024-25" }, { "page": "1025" }, { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5474426 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621581 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349-50" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448124 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0030-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 11326, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18895117051225765 }, "sha256": "c2e9c9d24993b09c2ff86d168a6bdf3c7619729cee5e2cb36f0cc00a1b1b0e1d", "simhash": "1:d9ea9f7665b8deec", "word_count": 1802 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MERRILEE M., Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Merrilee M., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Bowman and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nRespondent, Merrilee M., appeals from the trial court\u2019s ruling that she be involuntarily admitted to the Department of Human Services pursuant to section 3 \u2014 600 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3\u2014600 (West 2008)). Respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s order should be vacated because it applied an unconstitutional standard when finding that she was a person subject to involuntary admission. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court\u2019s order.\nBACKGROUND\nOn November 23, 2009, a petition for respondent\u2019s involuntary admission to Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC) was filed with the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and found respondent to be subject to involuntary admission for 90 days. Respondent then brought this timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nBefore addressing the merits of respondent\u2019s contentions on appeal, we must first address the issue of mootness.\nThis appeal is moot because the 90-day period covered by the trial court\u2019s order has already expired. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). \u201cAn appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.\u201d In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50 (2006). Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine, such as (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the involuntary admission order could return to plague the respondent in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent\u2019s life. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-62 (2009); J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350; In re Wathan, 104 Ill. App. 3d 64, 65-66 (1982).\nThe collateral-consequences exception applies here. The record reveals that, prior to her admission, respondent was employed as a registered nurse. As such, her license was automatically suspended upon the determination that she was subject to involuntary admission. 225 ILCS 65/70\u20145(c) (West 2008). Her license may be reinstated only upon a court\u2019s finding that she is no longer subject to involuntary admission and upon the Board of Nursing\u2019s recommendation for reinstatement. 225 ILCS 65/70\u20145(c) (West 2008). Although there is a procedure by which respondent may regain her license, we conclude that the suspension of her license and the necessity of seeking the reinstatement of that license are sufficiently significant collateral consequences to warrant a review of respondent\u2019s contention on appeal.\nThe State contends that any negative employment consequences of the suspension of respondent\u2019s license are overshadowed by the negative employment consequences of respondent\u2019s being fired from her last job and being investigated by the Du Page County sheriffs department for employment-related activities. The record does not support the State\u2019s contentions. Respondent testified that she was not fired from her last job; rather, the family to which she was assigned by her nursing agency asked her not to come back due to her making a report with the Department of Children and Family Services. Dr. Syed Waliuuddin, a staff psychiatrist at EMHC, testified that respondent had hinted that she was fired, but that respondent did not provide any details of what actually happened. Similarly, there is no definitive indication in the record that respondent was being investigated by the sheriffs department for employment-related activities. Rather, the State simply asked respondent whether she had spoken with investigators from the sheriffs department regarding her departure from her last job. Respondent stated that any conversations that occurred were between her and the sheriff\u2019s department. Nothing indicates that respondent did, in fact, speak with the sheriffs department and that, if she did, the conversations were a result of her being investigated for employment-related activities.\nTurning to the merits, respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s order for her involuntary admission should be vacated as void because the trial court relied on a standard that previously had been held unconstitutionally vague. The petition for involuntary admission alleged that respondent was mentally ill and, because of that illness, she was (1) reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct (see 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014119(1) (West 2008)) and (2) unable to understand her need for treatment and, if she were not treated, she would be expected to suffer mental and emotional deterioration to the point that she would reasonably be expected to engage in dangerous conduct (see 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014119(3) (West 2008)). The trial court found \u201cthat the evidence is clear and convincing that as a result of this mental illness, [respondent] is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct which may include threatening behavior or conduct that places her or another individual in reasonable expectation of harm.\u201d According to respondent, because the definition of \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d that was in effect at the time of the trial court\u2019s decision previously had been found to be unconstitutionally vague (In re Torski C., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1010 (2009)), the trial court\u2019s order holding her to be subject to involuntary admission on the basis that she was reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct must be vacated as void.\nThe State argues that respondent has forfeited this contention by failing to raise it in the trial court. We disagree. Before beginning her closing argument, respondent\u2019s attorney stated that she objected to a decision based on section 1 \u2014 119(3) of the Code because of the Torski decision. We believe that this was sufficient to put the State and the trial court on notice that respondent was challenging involuntary admission on the basis that she was reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct. Moreover, respondent\u2019s failure to raise the issue in a posttrial motion does not result in forfeiture, as a posttrial motion is not required in nonjury proceedings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(3)(ii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).\nWhen the petition was filed, the Code defined a person subject to involuntary admission as follows:\n\u201c(1) A person with mental illness and who because of his or her illness is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct which may include threatening behavior or conduct that places that person or another individual in reasonable expectation of being harmed;\n(2) A person with mental illness and who because of his or her illness is unable to provide for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious harm without the assistance of family or outside help; or\n(3) A person with mental illness who, because of the nature of his or her illness, is unable to understand his or her need for treatment and who, if not treated, is reasonably expected to suffer or continue to suffer mental deterioration or emotional deterioration, or both, to the point that the person is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014119 (West 2008).\n\u201cDangerous conduct\u201d was defined as \u201cthreatening behavior or conduct that places another individual in reasonable expectation of being harmed, or a person\u2019s inability to provide, without the assistance of family or outside help, for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious harm.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014104.5 (West 2008).\nRespondent contends that the trial court\u2019s order that she be involuntary admitted should be vacated because the definition of \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d is unconstitutionally vague. In support of her argument, respondent relies exclusively on Torski. In Torski, the State sought, and was granted, the involuntary admission of the respondent based on section 1 \u2014 119(3) of the Code. Torski, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, 1017. On appeal, the respondent argued, among other things, that the definition of \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d found in section 1 \u2014 104.5 of the Code was unconstitutionally vague. Torski, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. The Fourth District agreed, holding that the definition of \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d encompassed conduct that would not constitutionally support the liberty deprivation associated with involuntary admission. Torski, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1024-25. The court also held that the definition allowed for the arbitrary application of the statute to mentally ill individuals who engaged in merely unusual or annoying behavior. Torski, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1025. Accordingly, the Fourth District vacated the order of involuntary admission, because it was based on section 1 \u2014 119(3) of the Code, which incorporated the term \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d as defined in section 1 \u2014 104.5 of the Code. Torski, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1027.\nHaving reviewed and carefully considered the matter, and for the reasons stated in Torski, we conclude that the Fourth District correctly held that the definition of \u201cdangerous conduct\u201d found in section 1 \u2014 104.5 of the Code is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the order for respondent\u2019s involuntary admission must be vacated. We note that, although the respondent in Torski was involuntarily admitted based on section 1 \u2014 119(3) of the Code while the trial court here relied on section 1 \u2014 119(1), both section 1 \u2014 119(1) and section 1 \u2014 119(3) require a finding that the respondent is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct, as defined in the unconstitutional section 1 \u2014 104.5. Thus, respondent\u2019s admission may not be sustained under either section 1 \u2014 119(1) or section 1 \u2014 119(3).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the above-stated reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is vacated.\nVacated.\nThe supreme court allowed an appeal in Torski and then dismissed the appeal as moot on September 15, 2010 (In re Torski C., No. 109623 (Sept. 15, 2010) (minute order)), in light of the legislature\u2019s passage of new language in section 1 \u2014 119 (see Pub. Act 96\u20141399 (eff. July 29, 2010) (amending 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014119 (West 2008))).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Veronique Baker and Teresa L. Berge, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.", "John A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MERRILEE M., Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Merrilee M., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201410\u20140103\nOpinion filed April 28, 2011.\nVeronique Baker and Teresa L. Berge, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0983-01", "first_page_order": 999, "last_page_order": 1004 }