{ "id": 7328865, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY LEE ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "2011-05-11", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201409\u20140682", "first_page": "1058", "last_page": "1078", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "409 Ill. App. 3d 1058" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "890 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "705" }, { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "finding the police may, as a matter of course, order the occupants out of a vehicle once it is lawfully stopped and the nature of the investigatory stop is not affected merely by virtue of an officer's using handcuffs" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277492 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1132" }, { "page": "1133" }, { "page": "1133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "903" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "903" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29936 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "885 N.E.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" }, { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "19-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "926 N.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 1067", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4293442 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/1067-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415360 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" }, { "parenthetical": "\"While the trial judge may, in some instances, have a responsibility to act on letters mailed by a defendant to the court, here, defendant subsequently appeared in court with counsel and could have properly presented any matter to the court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615171 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "holding no Krankel hearing is required when a defendant's underlying claim is related to a matter of trial tactics" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5596214 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781337 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "797 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637-38", "parenthetical": "discussing and applying Krankel and the rules derived therefrom" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974982 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-79", "parenthetical": "discussing and applying Krankel and the rules derived therefrom" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1045", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" }, { "page": "1049" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156888 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 1278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1280", "parenthetical": "\"It is reasonable for police to search the arrestee *** for evidence that the arrestee could conceal or destroy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781340 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "\"It is reasonable for police to search the arrestee *** for evidence that the arrestee could conceal or destroy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543502 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193089 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are determinative. [Citation.] One indicium of reliability of information exists when the facts learned through police investigation independently verify a substantial part of the informant's tip.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58945 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331-32", "parenthetical": "finding significant aspects of the informant's story, especially those predicting the defendant's future behavior, were sufficiently corroborated by the police to furnish reasonable suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9508406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J." }, { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "\"The anonymous call *** provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2626888 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "finding officers' knowledge of a confidential informant's identity was not an indicium of reliability as the informant's identity was not made known to the defendant and the informant would not be subjected to cross-examination" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "concluding, since the informant had not been used as such before, the police officer effecting the Terry stop \"could not accurately judge the informant's veracity\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980667 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "794" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "868 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362-63" }, { "page": "363" }, { "parenthetical": "\"a strong inference that a person is a direct witness to the offense is more indicative of reliability than a weak inference that the tipster had a source of inside information\"" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "discussing the enhanced reliability of tips made to police emergency numbers, which \"are not truly anonymous even when [the callers] fail to identify themselves by name\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "noting criminal liability for making false reports to police \"lends reliability to\" information obtained from identifiable informants (internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 1044", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269313 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048-49" }, { "page": "1049" }, { "page": "1050" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 N.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578341 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "796 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" }, { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0007-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1718, "char_count": 53658, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3110718038001443 }, "sha256": "fd1196be14dc89e9fc6296b281d3b0e0583d26c6c5387d296f99461a5ee020d5", "simhash": "1:22a4104027c0baf7", "word_count": 8450 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:27.574146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY LEE ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Appleton and Pope concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn March 2009, following a bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant, Henry Lee Allen, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. In April 2009, the court sentenced defendant on his possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment; finding it was an included offense, the court did not sentence defendant on his possession conviction. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred by (1) denying defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, (2) not inquiring into defendant\u2019s pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) \u201csentencing\u201d defendant to three years\u2019 mandatory supervised release (MSR) instead of two. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn October 2008, the McLean County grand jury indicted defendant with (1) unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2008)), a Class 2 felony, and (2) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2008)), a Class 4 felony. Count I of the two-count indictment alleged defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed with the intent to deliver a substance containing cocaine. Count II alleged he knowingly and unlawfully possessed less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine. The indictment indicated defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing on count I and extended-term sentencing on count II.\nA. Defendant\u2019s Motion To Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence\nIn December 2008, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In January 2009, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant\u2019s evidence consisted of the testimony of Jason Williamson and Jason Tuttle.\nJason Williamson testified he was working as a police officer with the LeRoy police department on October 17, 2008, when he was approached on the street by Brian Fromhertz. Williamson knew From-hertz from several prior contacts. Fromhertz had been a suspect, a defendant, or an arrestee on several occasions. From these prior contacts, Williamson knew Fromhertz was a cocaine addict who, because he did not have a driver\u2019s license, received drugs through regular deliveries. Fromhertz had told Williamson his dealer lived in Bloomington and delivered drugs to Fromhertz\u2019s residence in LeRoy. Williamson testified Fromhertz\u2019s assertions his dealer was based in Bloomington had not been confirmed through any investigation.\nFromhertz had not served as an informant before, as far as Williamson knew, but on October 17, 2008, he expressed an interest in setting up a sting. Fromhertz suggested he was going to call his drug dealer and request a cocaine delivery. As Williamson was busy making an arrest when Fromhertz approached him, Williamson asked From-hertz to discuss it with him later. When Williamson arrived at the police station to continue processing the arrest, Fromhertz was waiting for Williamson there and repeated his suggestion. Again, Williamson told Fromhertz to wait so they could discuss Fromhertz\u2019s proposal later. Approximately 20 or 30 minutes later, Williamson received a phone call from Fromhertz. Fromhertz told Williamson he had called his dealer in Bloomington, who was on the way to LeRoy to deliver drugs to Fromhertz. As Williamson was still processing the arrest, Williamson called Tuttle, a McLean County sheriffs deputy, gave him Fromhertz\u2019s phone number, and asked him to address Fromhertz\u2019s complaint. Throughout this process, Williamson was unaware of From-hertz\u2019s motives for seeking police intervention in the drug transaction.\nLater, after processing the arrest, Williamson was present at From-hertz\u2019s residence when defendant was arrested there. A vehicle had been stopped for suspected involvement in Fromhertz\u2019s drug transaction. Williamson spoke with the driver while Tuttle spoke with defendant, who was the front-seat passenger. Although he knew a search of the vehicle was conducted, Williamson could not recall whether any contraband had been found as a result of the search.\nAfter placing the driver under temporary custody, Williamson observed a search of defendant\u2019s mouth. Williamson heard Tuttle ask defendant what was in his mouth and observed Tuttle grab defendant to prevent him from swallowing the contents of his mouth and tell him \u201cto spit it out.\u201d Williamson could not remember Tuttle\u2019s physical contact with defendant in detail but observed Tuttle grab defendant and defendant spit out several Baggies of suspected crack cocaine.\nOn cross-examination, Williamson clarified what he had told Tuttle during their initial phone conversation about Williamson\u2019s October 17, 2008, contact with Fromhertz. Williamson specified he told Tuttle he knew (1) Fromhertz did not have a driver\u2019s license and was unable to drive, (2) Fromhertz was a habitual cocaine user, (3) Fromhertz had told LeRoy police he received his cocaine from people in Bloomington, and (4) Fromhertz was expecting a cocaine delivery from those people that evening.\nTuttle testified he was a deputy with the McLean County sheriffs department on October 17, 2008. Tuttle knew Fromhertz from prior contacts when Fromhertz lived in Bloomington. Although he did not know Fromhertz was a drug addict, Tuttle knew Fromhertz associated with \u201cthose types of people.\u201d\nOn October 17, 2008, Tuttle had a series of phone conversations with Williamson and Fromhertz. Initially, Williamson called Tuttle and requested him to call Fromhertz about a possible drug transaction with some people from Bloomington. Williamson did not tell Tuttle Fromhertz had already arranged the delivery. Williamson gave Tuttle Fromhertz\u2019s phone number.\nTuttle called Fromhertz. Fromhertz said he had arranged a cocaine delivery, which was in progress. He expected the drugs to be delivered in a vehicle containing a white woman, a white man, and a black man. He said his contact, the white man, went by \u201cT.J.\u201d Tuttle testified Fromhertz seemed \u201cpretty scared.\u201d Fromhertz told Tuttle he did not have $400 to pay for the drugs being delivered. He expected the delivery to arrive in approximately 15 minutes. Tuttle and another deputy left Bloomington toward LeRoy.\nWhen Tuttle was exiting 1-74 in LeRoy, Tuttle received a second call from Fromhertz. Fromhertz said he had just talked to T.J., who said he was exiting 1-74 in LeRoy. Tuttle could observe there were only three vehicles exiting 1-74 in LeRoy at that time: his car, the other deputy\u2019s car, and a third car behind theirs. Tuttle and the other deputy exited toward Fromhertz\u2019s residence and pulled into a gas station to allow the third car to pass. When it passed, Tuttle observed there were three people in the car. He identified the driver was a white woman and the front-seat passenger was a black man but could not identify the race or gender of the backseat passenger. Tuttle and the other deputy followed the car.\nTuttle called Fromhertz with a description of the vehicle. Tuttle asked Fromhertz whether that was the vehicle Fromhertz expected, but Fromhertz could not say based on the car\u2019s description. From-hertz told Tuttle if the car parked in the lot behind Fromhertz\u2019s apartment building, then it was the correct car. Tuttle followed the car and observed it park \u201cdirectly\u201d behind Fromhertz\u2019s apartment. Tuttle parked his car perpendicular to the suspect car with his lights illuminating its passenger compartment. At that point, Tuttle was able to identify the rear passenger as a white man. Tuttle testified he was 99% certain the suspect car was the one being used to deliver drugs to Fromhertz.\nTuttle, the other deputy, and Williamson approached the car. They obtained the names of each person in the car. The white man in the backseat was named Thomas J. Tillman. Tuttle began questioning defendant, the front-seat passenger. Tuttle asked defendant what he and the other people in the car were doing. Defendant gestured toward Tillman and said they were visiting one of Tillman\u2019s friends. Tuttle asked Tillman what his friend\u2019s name was, and Tillman said his friend\u2019s name was Brian.\nAt that point, the officers requested the three people get out of the car. Defendant was placed in restraints. Tuttle conducted a pat-down search of defendant\u2019s person, looking for weapons and \u201cpossibly drugs.\u201d Tuttle did not find any weapons or drugs on defendant\u2019s person. A search of the vehicle was also conducted, but no contraband was found.\nTuttle called Fromhertz to get an identification. Looking from his apartment window, Fromhertz identified Tillman as T.J., his contact. Fromhertz could not recognize either defendant or the driver but reported he knew T.J. was an intermediary between drug purchasers and a black, male drug dealer. Tuttle told Fromhertz the police could not find any drugs on the suspects or in their car and asked him where the cocaine was ordinarily located on their person when he bought it from them. Fromhertz told Tuttle to check the suspects\u2019 mouths.\nTuttle approached Tillman first. He shone a flashlight at Tillman\u2019s mouth and asked him to open his mouth and lift his tongue. Tillman complied, and Tuttle did not observe any drugs or anything suspicious about the way Tillman performed the test. Tuttle next shone the flashlight at defendant and asked him to open his mouth and lift his tongue. Defendant complied. When he opened his mouth and stuck his tongue out, defendant kept his upper lip tucked under his upper teeth and Tuttle suspected there was an object behind his upper lip. Defendant was not giving Tuttle a full view of what was in his mouth. Based on his experience performing jail-intake searches, Tuttle recognized defendant\u2019s behavior as suspicious of concealing contraband. According to Tuttle, people undergoing this search ordinarily open their mouths wide and expose their upper and lower teeth.\nAt that point, Tuttle made physical contact with defendant to determine the nature of the object defendant was concealing. Tuttle \u201cpinched\u201d defendant\u2019s upper lip with his thumb and forefinger. From the touch, Tuttle \u201ccould tell\u201d there was an object there. Tuttle believed the object was contraband. He told defendant \u201cto spit it out.\u201d Defendant said, \u201c[Ojkay, I\u2019m going to give it to you.\u201d He spat out one plastic Baggie containing suspected cocaine. Tuttle could tell there were more objects concealed behind defendant\u2019s upper lip. He observed defendant sucking in his cheeks, apparently to \u201cwork up enough saliva to swallow\u201d the remaining contents. Tuttle reached out with his pinky finger in an attempt to reach in between defendant\u2019s lip and gums to remove the remaining contraband. Defendant jerked away. \u201c[S]ome-what of a struggle\u201d ensued. Eventually, several more Baggies of suspected cocaine were produced from defendant\u2019s mouth. Tuttle estimated 15 minutes elapsed from his initial contact with the suspect vehicle in Fromhertz\u2019s parking lot to his discovery of contraband on defendant\u2019s person. Although he did not know it when he was searching defendant, sometime later, Tuttle learned defendant had been on MSR, or what used to be known as parole, at the time of these events.\nFollowing the evidence, the trial court heard the parties\u2019 arguments on defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant argued Fromhertz\u2019s information was not sufficiently reliable to provide police a reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause justifying either the initial restriction of defendant\u2019s mobility or the search of his mouth resulting in the seizure of contraband. Further, defendant argued the search of defendant\u2019s mouth \u2014 particularly, the use of force and compulsion in the search \u2014 was not justified by defendant\u2019s status as a parolee.\nThe State argued the initial investigatory stop or detention of defendant and the vehicle he occupied were supported by a reasonable suspicion based on Fromhertz\u2019s information. Further, the State argued, as a parolee, defendant (1) lacked grounds to challenge the search of his mouth and (2) enjoyed only a limited expectation of privacy such that the search of his mouth need be supported only by a reasonable suspicion, which Tuttle acquired before conducting the search. Alternatively, the State contended Tuttle had probable cause to search defendant\u2019s mouth based on Fromhertz\u2019s information and Tuttle\u2019s observation.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court found the officers initiated a Terry investigation (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) when they approached the suspect vehicle and questioned the passengers. It concluded this stop was supported by an articulable suspicion the passengers in the car were involved in an ongoing crime based on From-hertz\u2019s information, which the officers independently confirmed by observing the vehicle. With respect to the search of defendant\u2019s person, the court concluded defendant, as a parolee, had a reduced expectation of privacy. Quoting People v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35, 45, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (2008), the court stated, \u201c[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.\u201d Further, the court concluded whether the officer performing the search has prior knowledge of the parolee\u2019s status is irrelevant to the determination of whether a suspicionless search of a parolee is justified. Based on these findings and conclusions, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Pro Se Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel\nThroughout the proceedings against him in this case, on several occasions, defendant raised questions regarding the performance of his trial counsel and his desire either to obtain substitute counsel or to proceed pro se.\nOn November 21, 2008, after counsel had been appointed for defendant, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss. Defendant\u2019s motion was addressed that same day at a status hearing. Defense counsel requested the motion be made part of the record but declined to adopt it since he found it was unfounded. The trial court admonished defendant determinations of trial strategy were left to his appointed attorney. Defendant then requested substitution of counsel, claiming a \u201cconflict of interest\u201d with appointed counsel, stating, \u201cWe don\u2019t agree on anything.\u201d The court explained defendant\u2019s disagreement with trial counsel did not constitute a conflict of interest and allowed a continuance for defendant to request a different attorney through the public defender\u2019s office.\nOn December 3, 2008, defendant appeared before the trial court for another status hearing. Defense counsel noted defendant\u2019s request for a different attorney from the public defender\u2019s office was denied. The court admonished defendant it considered defendant\u2019s appointed counsel \u201cvery thorough and efficient\u201d and \u201ceminently qualified\u201d to represent defendant in his case. The court gave defendant some time to speak with his attorney. Later, when the court recalled defendant\u2019s case and inquired into its status, defense counsel indicated a continuance would possibly be beneficial. Defendant interjected, \u201cI asked you to file a motion to suppress evidence, brother. That\u2019s all I asked you.\u201d The court set a new status hearing.\nOn December 5, 2008, a letter from defendant to his attorney was accepted into the trial court file. The letter was dated November 28, 2008, and was notarized on December 2, 2008. In it, defendant requested counsel prepare a motion to suppress and a motion for a \u201cBill of Particulars.\u201d\nAlso on December 5, 2008, a letter dated December 1, 2008, and notarized December 2, 2008, from defendant to the trial court was filed. In this letter, defendant again requested a substitution of his trial counsel. Defendant referred to counsel\u2019s request to incorporate defendant\u2019s pro se motion to dismiss into the record in case of an appeal as \u201ccriminal.\u201d He complained counsel held the opinion a motion to dismiss or a motion to suppress would be unfounded. He asserted the court was able to \u201cseek the replacement of any attorney whenever you witness the accused[\u2019s] rights before the court being infringed upon.\u201d A second copy of this letter was filed on December 9, 2008.\nOn December 15, 2008, defendant\u2019s pro se motion to suppress was filed. On December 29, 2008, defendant filed a pro se \u201cMOTION OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL\u2019S [sic],\u201d again apparently alleging a \u201cconflict of interest\u201d with his appointed counsel.\nAlso on December 29, 2008, defendant appeared before the trial court for another status hearing. Defense counsel indicated defendant requested to represent himself. Defendant clarified he preferred to be represented by a different attorney but, if his options were to represent himself or be represented by his present appointed counsel, he would choose to proceed pro se. Defendant later stated of his attorney, \u201c[W]e just constantly have a conflict of interest.\u201d When the court asked him whether he meant he disagreed with his attorney\u2019s advice, defendant replied, \u201cThe only advice he gave me is to cop out.\u201d The court admonished defendant it was familiar with defense counsel\u2019s work and knew him to be accomplished, experienced, and capable of representing defendant well. Defendant stated he wished to proceed pro se \u201c[i]f that\u2019s the only way I can get you to grant this motion to suppress.\u201d After defendant again stated his intention to represent himself, defense counsel explained he had prepared a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. He and defendant disagreed as to the basis for a motion to suppress, but counsel believed there were grounds to argue for suppression, and counsel was prepared to file the motion if defendant\u2019s request to proceed pro se were withdrawn or denied. Upon counsel\u2019s representations, defendant agreed to withdraw his motion to represent himself. Defendant\u2019s trial counsel thereafter filed the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the proceedings on which are detailed above.\nOn March 2, 2009, after a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty and set a sentencing hearing for April 17, 2009. Between his conviction and sentencing, several documents drafted by defendant pro se were accepted into the court\u2019s file, including a \u201cMOTION OF RECONSIDER GUILTY YERDICK [sic] [and] NOTICE OF APPEAL,\u201d letters to the circuit clerk requesting certain documents be filed and forwarded to the trial judge and the State and requesting copies of trial transcripts, a \u201cMOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,\u201d another \u201cNOTICE OF APPEAL,\u201d another \u201cMOTION OF RECONSIDER GUILTY VERDICK [sic],\u201d and two letters from defendant to the court, identical copies of one of which were filed March 13, March 17, and March 20, 2009.\nIn one undated letter to the trial court, file stamped March 27, 2009, and containing a notary public\u2019s seal but not her signature, defendant raised several contentions of error involving his representation by appointed counsel. Defendant claimed the court violated a canon of judicial conduct regarding a defendant\u2019s right to be heard by telling defendant it \u201ccould not accept any legal documents from [him] because [he] had a [sic] attorney.\u201d Defendant complained the court \u201cknew\u201d he and his attorney \u201cwas [sic] not seeing eye to eye through[ ]out the duration of this proceeding, yet *** still refused to accept legal document [sic] from [him] that can lawfully prove [his] innocence.\u201d Defendant further asserted the court violated a canon of judicial conduct requiring judges to \u201cbe faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it\u201d and \u201cbe unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.\u201d With respect to this alleged violation, defendant stated,\n\u201cMy attorney *** did not even attempt to defende [sic] me. You and I both know that for if he did I\u2019ll [sic] be at home with my wife right now instead of here pleading my case to you. If he would of [sic] done the paper[ ]work like I lawfully requested of him you would of [sic] looked at them, but becouse [sic] he did not you would not even look at the facts and evidence of this case.\u201d\nDefendant also claimed the court violated a canon requiring a judge with knowledge of a violation of the judicial canons or the rules of lawyer ethics to initiate disciplinary matters. Defendant claimed his attorney \u201cwas not trying to do anything for [him] and this is irrefutable of [sic] the record.\u201d \u201cYou just continue to be bias [sic] toward me,\u201d defendant wrote the court, \u201cby ignore [sic] me and saying [defense counsel] is a good attorney.\u201d\nOn April 17, 2009, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court noted defendant\u2019s pro se filings. The court stated it had reviewed the filings \u201csimply to see what they were\u201d but had not \u201cread through all of them.\u201d The court asked defense counsel whether he planned to adopt any of them. Defense counsel requested the documents titled as notices of appeal or motions for reconsideration of the verdict be ignored. Counsel adopted defendant\u2019s March 17, 2009, \u201cMOTION FOR NEW TRIAL\u201d and the accompanying copy of defendant\u2019s letter to the court filed that same day, which counsel believed presented an independent basis for a new trial. After arguments based on these adopted pro se filings requesting a new trial, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion, noting it had considered all of the arguments contained in the documents, some of which counsel had not specifically addressed. The court proceeded to sentencing.\nOn April 21, 2009, defendant\u2019s attorney filed a motion to reconsider sentence, asserting the sentence was excessive. On August 7, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion. Following arguments, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion and admonished defendant of his appellate rights. On defendant\u2019s behalf, the court ordered a notice of appeal be prepared and appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) as counsel on appeal. When the court asked defendant whether he had any questions about the appellate process, defendant requested a continuance of posttrial procedures and asked the court to dismiss his attorney and appoint new counsel \u201cto prepare [his] post-trial motions and raise issues for the Appellate Court.\u201d The court clarified OSAD would be defendant\u2019s attorney for the remainder of proceedings and would advise him going forward.\nC. Trial and Sentencing\nOn February 6 and March 2, 2009, defendant was tried in a two-day bench trial. The evidence consisted of testimony by Williamson, LeRoy police officer Nathan Wilkins, McLean County sheriffs department detective Tim Tyler, forensic scientist Joni Little, McLean County sheriffs deputy Joe Reidy, Tillman, Fromhertz, and Tuttle. Defendant elected not to testify and did not present any evidence on his behalf. Following evidence and arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of both counts charged in the indictment, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.\nOn April 17, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant. A presentence investigation report was admitted as evidence. Four letters were admitted as evidence at defendant\u2019s behest. The court considered the evidence and the parties\u2019 recommendations. It noted defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing on his possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction. It found the possession conviction was for a lesser included offense and, as such, did not warrant sentencing. It sentenced defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment. On its written sentencing judgment, the court indicated defendant would be required to serve three years of MSR following his prison term.\nOn August 7, 2009, following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, (2) whether the court erred by failing to inquire into defendant\u2019s posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) whether the court erred by \u201csentencing\u201d defendant to three years\u2019 MSR instead of two. We consider each argument in turn.\nA. Suppression of Evidence\nFirst, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Specifically, defendant argues the initial detention and investigation of defendant were not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion and the search of defendant\u2019s person was not supported by probable cause. Further, defendant argues the search was not justified by defendant\u2019s status as parolee as the officer performing the search did not know defendant was on MSR at the time of the search. The State responds the initial detention was justified because Fromhertz\u2019s information gave officers a reasonable, articulable suspicion defendant was involved in an ongoing crime. Further, the State maintains defendant, as a parolee, enjoyed a lower expectation of privacy such that only a reasonable suspicion was needed to justify the search of defendant\u2019s person. Alternatively, the State contends the seizure of contraband was made pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest which, in turn, was supported by probable cause based on Fromhertz\u2019s verified information. We conclude the search in which the evidence defendant seeks to suppress was seized was permissible.\n1. The Fourth Amendment and Terry\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, \u201cThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ***.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76 (\u201cThe people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches [and] seizures ***.\u201d). This amendment applies to the states through the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d at 40, 885 N.E.2d at 1037. The fourth-amendment right exists \u201cwherever an individual may harbor a reasonable \u2018expectation of privacy\u2019 [citation].\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. The fourth amendment applies to all seizures of a person, even those involving only a brief detention. People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 108, 759 N.E.2d 899, 902 (2001).\nThe specific incidents of the fourth amendment \u201cmust be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. \u201cReasonableness under the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 108, 759 N.E.2d at 902. In Terry, however, the United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement for brief investigatory detentions in certain circumstances. Id. at 108-09, 759 N.E.2d at 902. Under Terry, \u201ca police officer may briefly stop a person for temporary questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.\u201d Id. at 109, 759 N.E.2d at 902. Determining whether such a stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment involves a dual inquiry; a court must assess \u201cwhether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.\n2. Initial Detention\nIn this case, the parties initially dispute whether Fromhertz\u2019s information provided a sufficient basis for the police to detain defendant. We agree with the State the initial contact between law-enforcement authorities and defendant did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.\nFirst, we must consider whether and when defendant was seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment, \u201c[f]or if there was no seizure, then the fourth amendment was not implicated at that point.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 111, 759 N.E.2d at 903. Both parties assert defendant was seized when police officers approached the vehicle defendant occupied and began questioning defendant and the driver. We agree. \u201cA seizure occurs when, by physical force or a show of authority, a police officer limits a citizen\u2019s liberty. [Citation.] More plainly, a police officer \u2018seizes\u2019 a person when he or she accosts that person and denies that person the freedom to walk away.\u201d People v. Leggions, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1132, 890 N.E.2d 700, 704 (2008). Here, a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position would have felt he lacked the freedom to discontinue contact with the police when two squad cars blocked the vehicle in which defendant sat and two officers positioned themselves on either side of the car and engaged the passengers in an investigatory conversation. This encounter was akin to a traffic stop, which constitutes a seizure for fourth-amendment purposes. People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13-14, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003).\nNext, we must determine whether this seizure was reasonable. Under Terry, a brief investigatory detention is justified at its inception if the police officer effecting the stop can \u201cpoint to specific and articu-lable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant that intrusion.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109, 759 N.E.2d at 902. The Supreme Court of Illinois has provided further guidance about Terry stops, as follows:\n\u201cWe have previously held that a totality-of-circumstances approach will achieve a fairer balance between public and private interests. [Citation.] The central issue is *** whether the information, taken in its totality, and interpreted not by technical legal rules but by factual and practical commonsense considerations, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the person stopped had committed an offense.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 583, 795 N.E.2d 253, 262 (2003), overruled on other grounds by People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004).\nFurther, the supreme court has stated:\n\u201cViewed as a whole, the situation confronting the police officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly. The facts supporting the officer\u2019s suspicions need not meet probable cause requirements, but they must justify more than a mere hunch. The facts should not be viewed with analytical hindsight, but instead should be considered from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time that the situation confronted him or her.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110, 759 N.E.2d at 903.\n\u201cIn evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court should objectively consider whether the information known to the officer at the time of the stop would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a stop was necessary to investigate the possibility of criminal activity.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1048-49, 868 N.E.2d 359, 362 (2007).\nHere, the parties dispute whether the information provided by Fromhertz gave rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. In evaluating whether a stop is warranted, a court \u201cshould consider the quality and content of information known to officers as well as the reliability of the source of the information.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 1049, 868 N.E.2d at 362. Information provided to police by a third-party informant may give rise to reasonable suspicion \u201cif the information is reliable and allows an officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 1049, 868 N.E.2d at 362-63. \u201cIn determining whether an informant\u2019s statements provide sufficient basis for a Terry stop, a reviewing court should consider the informant\u2019s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.\u201d People v. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792, 734 N.E.2d 216, 221 (2000).\nNot all informants\u2019 tips merit the same treatment as \u201ctips may vary greatly in their value and reliability and *** one simple rule will not cover every situation.\u201d In re J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d 381, 385, 539 N.E.2d 764, 766 (1989); see also id. at 385-86, 539 N.E.2d at 766 (\u201cWhere some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would warrant either no police response or require further investigation before a stop would be justified, other situations, such as when a victim of a crime seeks immediate police aid and describes his assailant or when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime, would justify the police making an appropriate response.\u201d).\nCourts in Illinois have noted various indicia of reliability for evaluating informants\u2019 tips although, due to the commonsense nature of the inquiry, no list of such indicia can be exhaustive. \u201c[CJourts may give greater weight to information provided by an eyewitness or victim of a crime than they would to information provided by persons who do not fall into those categories.\u201d Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 868 N.E.2d at 363; see also id. (\u201ca strong inference that a person is a direct witness to the offense is more indicative of reliability than a weak inference that the tipster had a source of inside information\u201d). Information is more credible if the informant implicates himself in the criminal activity he is reporting. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 734 N.E.2d at 223. Information from an informant whose identity is known to police and who is available for cross-examination is generally more credible than an anonymous tip or one from a confidential source. See Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 868 N.E.2d at 364 (discussing the enhanced reliability of tips made to police emergency numbers, which \u201care not truly anonymous even when [the callers] fail to identify themselves by name\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1050-51, 868 N.E.2d at 364 (noting criminal liability for making false reports to police \u201clends reliability to\u201d information obtained from identifiable informants (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.))); cf. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 734 N.E.2d at 223 (finding officers\u2019 knowledge of a confidential informant\u2019s identity was not an indicium of reliability as the informant\u2019s identity was not made known to the defendant and the informant would not be subjected to cross-examination). A tip providing predictive information and readily observable details will be deemed more reliable if these are confirmed or corroborated by the police. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (finding significant aspects of the informant\u2019s story, especially those predicting the defendant\u2019s future behavior, were sufficiently corroborated by the police to furnish reasonable suspicion); cf. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (\u201cThe anonymous call *** provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility.\u201d).\nUnder the totality of the circumstances of this case, Fromhertz\u2019s tip and the investigatory steps taken by police were sufficient to justify defendant\u2019s detention in its inception. Police obtained a reasonable suspicion of defendant\u2019s involvement in an ongoing crime from several particularly relevant circumstances. First, Williamson and Tuttle knew Fromhertz from prior contacts. Although he had not served as an informant and his veracity had not been tested in such a context before, Fromhertz\u2019s veracity could be at least minimally measured insofar as the information provided in this case was consistent with information he had told Williamson in the past and information known by Williamson and Tuttle based on their own observations. Williamson was aware of Fromhertz\u2019s cocaine addiction prior to October 17, 2008, and Fromhertz had told him he obtained drugs from people in Bloom-ington. Tuttle knew Fromhertz used to live in Bloomington. Thus, Tuttle and Williamson could verify Fromhertz\u2019s report he was buying drugs from a person traveling from Bloomington was consistent with what they already knew about him. Although Fromhertz\u2019s earlier statement his cocaine dealer was based in Bloomington had not been independently investigated or confirmed, the consistency of his statements gave Williamson and Tuttle some indication of his veracity as an informant. Cf. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 734 N.E.2d at 223 (concluding, since the informant had not been used as such before, the police officer effecting the Terry stop \u201ccould not accurately judge the informant\u2019s veracity\u201d).\nSecond, Fromhertz\u2019s identity was known to Williamson and Tuttle and was never concealed from defendant. This case is therefore distinguishable from cases involving anonymous tips and confidential sources, where greater indicia of reliability are required for a tip to supply reasonable suspicion. Indeed, Williamson and Tuttle identified Fromhertz as the source of their information at the suppression hearing and, later, Fromhertz testified at defendant\u2019s trial and defendant cross-examined him.\nThird, Fromhertz identified the basis of his information in his initial contacts with Williamson, stating he himself was going to be involved in a drug transaction. The identification of the basis of information is significant in itself. Further, Fromhertz\u2019s implication of himself in the crime he was reporting lends reliability to his information.\nFourth, the remarkable circumstances of Fromhertz\u2019s tip demanded immediate police involvement. The crime Fromhertz reported was expected to occur within approximately 15 minutes of his initial contact with Tuttle, who was approximately 15 minutes away from the site of the drug transaction. Further, Fromhertz was potentially in personal danger if Tuttle was unable to intervene; Fromhertz sounded noticeably afraid when they spoke, and a violent confrontation was possible if his dealer became aware Fromhertz did not intend to pay for the drugs and had sought intervention by the police. Needless to say, Fromhertz\u2019s proposed sting created a unique situation \u201cso far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly.\u201d Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110, 759 N.E.2d at 903.\nFifth, Fromhertz provided Williamson and Tuttle with detailed predictive information, which they confirmed before detaining defendant and which indicated his possession of inside information. This predictive information included the race, gender, and number of occupants of a car traveling from Bloomington in the direction of LeRoy at a specific approximate time, the precise location of the car at the 1-74 exit at a specific time, and the car\u2019s destination in the parking lot at Fromhertz\u2019s apartment building. All of these details were confirmed by police before they initiated the Terry stop. Tuttle\u2019s identification of the suspect vehicle immediately after Fromhertz reported its location based on a phone conversation with one of its occupants is particularly indicative of the reliability of Fromhertz\u2019s information. Through these corroborated predictive details, From-hertz demonstrated he had inside information about the criminal activity he was reporting.\nUnder these circumstances, defendant\u2019s detention was supported by a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in an ongoing crime.\n3. Scope of Investigation and Probable Cause\nDefendant argues, even if defendant\u2019s seizure was reasonable in its inception, the search resulting in the discovery of contraband exceeded the scope of any permissible investigation under Terry. As the officers who effected the Terry stop obtained probable cause to arrest defendant during the permissible course of their investigation, we conclude the search of defendant\u2019s mouth was permissible.\nThe second inquiry under Terry is whether the police activity in question \u201cwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. This requires us to consider \u201cthe length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out.\u201d (Emphases omitted.) Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 14, 796 N.E.2d at 1029. \u201c[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer\u2019s suspicion in a short period of time.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Generally, while a pat-down search or frisk of the detainee to detect concealed weapons is permissible where an officer has reason to believe the detainee is armed and dangerous, a search for evidence during a Terry stop violates the fourth amendment. People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 170, 535 N.E.2d 837, 845 (1989).\nDefendant contends the search of his mouth exceeded the limited scope of a Terry stop. The State responds the officers obtained probable cause to arrest defendant during the course of their investigation and the subsequent search was a permissible search incident to arrest. As we conclude the search of defendant\u2019s mouth was an allowable search incident to an arrest which was, in turn, supported by probable cause developed within the permissible scope of the Terry stop, we need not consider defendant\u2019s argument the search was impermissible under a Terry analysis.\n\u201cIn order to make a valid, warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable cause to arrest.\u201d People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 278, 769 N.E.2d 10, 16 (2002). \u201cProbable cause exists for an arrest when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers is such that a reasonably prudent person would believe that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime.\u201d In re D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 517, 523, 793 N.E.2d 46, 51 (2003). Though a higher standard than reasonable suspicion (Leggions, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1133, 890 N.E.2d at 705), probable cause does not require evidence sufficient to convict (People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 83, 518 N.E.2d 82, 87 (1987)). As with reasonable suspicion, whether probable cause to arrest exists is a practical, commonsense determination. As the supreme court observed in People v. Cabrera, 116 Ill. 2d 474, 485, 508 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1987):\n\u201cThe courts, in striking a balance between the need to protect citizens from invasions of their privacy at the whim of police officers and the countervailing need to allow leeway for efficient enforcement of the laws, are sensitive to the fact that policemen must often make their decisions to arrest or not to arrest under ambiguous circumstances and must exercise their judgment, at the risk of making a mistake. In dealing with probable cause, *** as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.)\nLike reasonable suspicion in the Terry context, probable cause can be established as the result of an informant\u2019s tip and verification of the tip by police. D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 523, 793 N.E.2d at 51. The considerations for evaluating an informant\u2019s tip in the context of probable cause are the same as in the context of reasonable suspicion. See id. (\u201cThe informant\u2019s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are determinative. [Citation.] One indicium of reliability of information exists when the facts learned through police investigation independently verify a substantial part of the informant\u2019s tip.\u201d).\nIn this case, the totality of the circumstances indicates officers developed probable cause to arrest defendant during the course of their Terry investigation. The scope of the investigation in this case expanded naturally and reasonably in response to the information the officers lawfully obtained. When they initiated defendant\u2019s detention, Tuttle and Williamson obtained the identities of the occupants in the suspect vehicle, verifying the backseat passenger\u2019s initials, race, and sex were those of Fromhertz\u2019s contact, T.J. When questioned, defendant indicated the occupants\u2019 purpose at the apartment building where they stopped was to visit Tillman\u2019s friend. Tillman subsequently verified the first name of the friend they were visiting was Brian, Fromhertz\u2019s first name. At that point, the officers ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle and defendant was placed in hand restraints. Both these steps are permissible as a matter of course during a Terry stop of a vehicle. See Leggions, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1133, 890 N.E.2d at 705 (finding the police may, as a matter of course, order the occupants out of a vehicle once it is lawfully stopped and the nature of the investigatory stop is not affected merely by virtue of an officer\u2019s using handcuffs). Further, by the time Tuttle conducted the search of defendant\u2019s mouth, Fromhertz had positively identified Tillman as his drug contact, clarified Tillman\u2019s role as an intermediary in their drug transactions between himself and a black, male drug dealer, and indicated he regularly observed drug dealers conceal drugs in their mouths. The latter information helped explain why the preceding searches had not resulted in detection of the drugs being delivered.\nAt least following Tuttle\u2019s final conversation with Fromhertz, which occurred less than 15 minutes after police initiated contact with defendant, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Tuttle\u2019s position would have been justified in the belief defendant was probably committing a crime. As the investigation was reasonable in both duration and scope of inquiry, we hold the officers developed probable cause to arrest defendant in the permissible course of the Terry stop. Accordingly, we hold the search of defendant\u2019s mouth resulting in the seizure of the evidence defendant sought to suppress was a valid search incident to his arrest. See People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503, 639 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (1994) (\u201cIt is reasonable for police to search the arrestee *** for evidence that the arrestee could conceal or destroy.\u201d). As we conclude the search and seizure were valid under traditional fourth-amendment principles, we need not consider the effects of defendant\u2019s status as a parolee on the suppression of evidence.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Posttrial Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nNext, defendant argues the trial court erred by not inquiring into defendant\u2019s posttrial pro se complaints of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, defendant claims he was entitled to some inquiry by the court into the allegations contained in the undated letter filed on March 27, 2009. Defendant argues the court\u2019s failure in this regard violated People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), and its progeny. We disagree.\nIn Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 187-88, 464 N.E.2d at 1048, the defendant filed a posttrial pro se motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court denied his request for new counsel to assist him in arguing his motion. The supreme court, on the recommendation of both parties on appeal, remanded the case for a new hearing on the motion, at which the defendant was entitled to new counsel. Id. at 189, 464 N.E.2d at 1049; see also People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-79, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637-38 (2003) (discussing and applying Krankel and the rules derived therefrom).\nNew counsel is not automatically required when a defendant files a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, \u201cthe operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125, 636 N.E.2d 485, 497 (1994). \u201cA court can conduct such an inquiry in one or more of the following three ways: (1) questioning the trial counsel, (2) questioning the defendant, and (3) relying on its own knowledge of the trial counsel\u2019s performance in the trial.\u201d People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833 N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005). Where the claim lacks merit or pertains to matters of trial strategy, new counsel need not be appointed. People v. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d 520, 533, 585 N.E.2d 99, 105 (1991). Further, a defendant who fails to bring such a claim to the trial court\u2019s attention forfeits it notwithstanding having presented it in a letter to the court. See People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. App. 3d 97, 109, 518 N.E.2d 741, 749 (1988) (\u201cIt would also appear[ ] *** that the trial judge, defendant\u2019s counsel, and the State were all unaware of defendant\u2019s letter as no mention was made of it, and defendant did not himself refer to it ***. [Citation.] Thus, defendant did not pursue the matter contained in his letter and[ ] *** waived any issue in this regard on appeal.\u201d).\nHere, as in Lewis, defendant failed to raise his March 27, 2009, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel before the trial court in subsequent appearances \u2014 namely, his April 17, 2009, sentencing hearing and the August 7, 2009, hearing on his motion to reconsider sentence \u2014 despite being present with defense counsel. Defendant thereby forfeited these claims. See id. (\u201cWhile the trial judge may, in some instances, have a responsibility to act on letters mailed by a defendant to the court, here, defendant subsequently appeared in court with counsel and could have properly presented any matter to the court.\u201d).\nMoreover, were we to consider defendant\u2019s argument, we would find it unpersuasive. Defendant\u2019s letter filed on March 27, 2009, raised two complaints with trial counsel\u2019s performance. First, defendant complains he and his attorney did not \u201csee eye to eye,\u201d apparently referring to defendant\u2019s earlier complaints regarding counsel\u2019s decision not to file a motion to dismiss or a motion for a \u201cBill of Particulars.\u201d However, this alone would not support an ineffective-assistance claim as matters of trial strategy are left to counsel. See Crane, 145 Ill. 2d at 533, 585 N.E.2d at 105 (holding no Krankel hearing is required when a defendant\u2019s underlying claim is related to a matter of trial tactics). Further, defendant repeatedly complained of disagreements between himself and his attorney. By the time defendant raised this issue in his posttrial letter, the court observed defendant\u2019s concerns were addressed when (1) the court granted defendant a continuance to allow him to apply for new counsel through the public defender\u2019s office and (2) defense counsel filed a motion to suppress as requested by defendant. The court\u2019s own knowledge of these complaints and the attempts by itself and defense counsel to resolve them would have satisfied any inquiry into this claim which may have been required by defendant\u2019s letter.\nSecond, defendant alleges a complete failure on counsel\u2019s part to present a defense. This is clearly refuted by the record on appeal, which shows defense counsel demonstrated competence and diligence in, among other things, (1) preparing and arguing pretrial and post-trial motions, (2) preserving objections and arguments for appeal, (3) presenting opening and closing arguments, (4) cross-examining the State\u2019s witnesses, and (5) reasonably accommodating defendant\u2019s preference for obtaining substitute counsel. Thus, the trial court\u2019s observation of counsel\u2019s performance throughout the proceedings would have satisfied any inquiry into this claim which may have been required by defendant\u2019s posttrial letter to the court.\nC. Class X Sentencing for Lesser Felonies and MSR\nFinally, defendant argues the trial court erred by \u201csentencing\u201d him to the three-year MSR term provided for a Class X offense (see 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(d)(1) (West 2008)). Specifically, defendant maintains he should instead be required to serve the two-year MSR term for Class 2 felonies (see 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(d)(2) (West 2008)) despite receiving a Class X sentence as a recidivist. Defendant argues this result is required by a plain reading of the MSR statute (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(d) (West 2008)) or, alternatively, by the doctrine of lenity. This court has rejected these arguments in People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 418, 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000), and People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1069-72, 926 N.E.2d 402, 404-06 (2010), respectively. We decline defendant\u2019s invitation to revisit this court\u2019s holdings in Smart and Lee. Accordingly, we hold the court did not err by imposing the MSR term provided for a Class X offense when it sentenced defendant as a Class X offender.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY LEE ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201409\u20140682\nOpinion filed May 11, 2011.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1058-01", "first_page_order": 1074, "last_page_order": 1094 }