{ "id": 2486698, "name": "In re ESTATE OF FRED REINHARD, Deceased.-(KATHERINE MURPHY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST NATIONAL BANK, Ex'r, et al., Respondents-Appellees.)", "name_abbreviation": "Murphy v. Northwest National Bank", "decision_date": "1976-08-11", "docket_number": "No. 62808", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5354381 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2726166 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2559343 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0395-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 428, "char_count": 7346, "ocr_confidence": 0.902, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4368783662676859 }, "sha256": "6bd8158e88f8fe7a5132bf25ff38dd1d2a2d26bcd926544bec412bc8c11665b6", "simhash": "1:d6402ad1d0de9688", "word_count": 1207 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:47:10.337116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF FRED REINHARD, Deceased.\u2014(KATHERINE MURPHY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST NATIONAL BANK, Ex\u2019r, et al., Respondents-Appellees.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIERINGER\ndelivered the opinion of-the court:\nThis is an appeal from a ruling of the circuit court in construing a will. The court below found ambiguity in the will, wherein the residuary clause of the will provides for equal distribution among six persons named in article 4.02, but article 4.02 of the will and codicil names 12 persons. The appellant did request of the circuit court, and does now seek, intestate distribution. The court below decreed the entire estate pass by the terms of the testator\u2019s will and codicil, and distribution of the estate be made to the 12 legatees, in shares ranging from one sixth to one forty-eighth share per legatee. The decree is the subject matter of the instant appeal.\nThe issue presented is whether the court erred in ordering testamentary distribution of the residue of the estate under a patently ambiguous article, even though the testator\u2019s intent could be reasonably determined.\nFred Reinhard, the testator, died leaving an estate of approximately *95,000, of which approximately *70,000 was in the personal estate. The real estate was devised by specific bequest and is not part of this suit. When the specific legacies of *16,850 and the approximate cost of administration are subtracted from the *70,000 personal estate, the remainder, or amount involved in this appeal, is *45,000.\nOn January 11, 1973, Fred Reinhard executed a will. Article IV, paragraph 4.02, of this will, which was admitted to probate, bequeaths all the residue of the deceased\u2019s estate to:\na. Katherine Murphy (*300)\nb. Mr. and Mrs. Edward Long (*5,000)\nc. Frank Higgins (*2,000)\nd. Mr. and Mrs. L. Manke (*250)\ne. Mrs. Milda Hammers (*300)\nf. Lucille Gibbs (*7,000)\nArticle IV further provides that any residue remaining after the above distribution \u201cshall be divided equally among the foregoing six persons.\u201d\nArticle IV, paragraph 4.02 of the codicil dated May 14, 1973, and admitted to probate, cancelled the bequest of *7,000 to Lucille Gibbs in item \u201cf\u201d and substituted instead:\nf. Curtis Dunlap (*3500) and added:\ng. James Dunlap (*3500)\nh. Reiner Reichert (*1000)\ni. Mr. and Mrs. John Eichholz (*1000)\nThe codicil further provides \u201cratifying the remainder\u201d of the will dated January 11, 1973.\nA petition in supplemental proceedings was filed by Katherine Murphy alleging a patent ambiguity in article 4.02 of the will and codicil, wherein the residue is to be distributed to six persons in six portions but that eight persons are named in the first paragraph of 4.02 of the will, and 12 persons are named in both the will and the codicil. The petitioner alleged further that it was impossible to determine the intent of the testator from the language of the will and codicil, and prayed the residue be distributed to the petitioner as intestate heir.\nThe petitioner, Katherine Murphy, was the sister and sole heir at law of the deceased testator. Subsequent to filing the petition, Katherine Murphy died intestate, leaving as her sole heirs Norman D. Murphy and Mary C. Murphy, her children, who were substituted as petitioners instead of Katherine Murphy, deceased.\nThe answer of the attorney for the executor of the estate admitted that eight persons were named in the original will and a total of 12 persons were named in the will and codicil, that the residuary clause directed distribution to six persons in six portions, and admitted that a patent ambiguity existed thereby. The answer denied the impossibility of arriving at the testator\u2019s intention and alleged affirmatively that the intention of the testator can be ascertained from extrinsic evidence.\nThe court found the testator intended his entire estate to pass by the terms of the will and codicil. The decree ordered the residue be distributed in one-sixth portions; that three persons named individually in the will take a full one-sixth share, that two husband and wife pairs named as such in the will each share in one-sixth portions, that three persons named individually in the codicil each have one-fourth of a one-sixth portion, that a husband and wife pair named as such in the codicil share in a one-fourth of a one-sixth portion.\nThe petitioner claims when a patent ambiguity exists in a will as a result of a mistake in drafting, the court may not add words to give meaning, and instead the court must construe the will in favor of the heir according to the law of intestate distribution.\nThe problem of construing a will which includes inconsistent provisions has not escaped the scrutiny of the Illinois Supreme Court. In Cahil v. Michael (1942), 381 Ill. 395, 405, 45 N.E.2d 657, the court stated:\n\u201d \u00b0 The court will prefer any construction of a will to avoid intestacy. [Citations.] The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause. [Citations.] 0 0 0 The courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions rather than to ignore or declare both of them void. [Citations.] \u00b0 \u00b0\nMore recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wise v. First National Bank (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 623, 627-28, 141 N.E.2d 1, stated:\n\u201cThe cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascertain and give effect to the testator\u2019s intention by examining the will as a whole, and if at all possible, to arrive at a construction * * * and thus prevent intestacy. [Citations.] Unless a contrary intention^ is clearly expressed, it will be presumed that a testator intended to dispose of all his property by will, and this presumption is so strong that any reasonable construction will be adopted to avoid an opposite result. \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 \u201d\nIn the instant case the court below rendered a reasonable construction of inconsistent clauses in an otherwise clear and proper will. Unquestionably, the will of Fred Reinhard is replete with his general intention that his entire estate pass by its terms.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has also examined the question raised by the petitioner as to whether extrinsic evidence may be used in order to determine the intent of the testator when there exists a patent ambiguity in the will. We think dispositive of the issue is the court\u2019s holding in Weir v. Leaf green (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 406, 412, 186 N.E.2d 293, where the court stated:\n\u201cWe do not feel that it is necessary to decide whether or not a particular ambiguity is patent or latent and hold that, if the will, when considered as a whole and in light of the surrounding circumstances, is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered in construing it. [Citations.]\u201d\nSince the will in question displayed uncontroverted proof the testator intended all of his estate to pass by its terms, and since the testator\u2019s intention could reasonably be determined by reconciling inconsistent provisions, it was proper for the court below to distribute the residue by the court\u2019s construction of the will and codicil. We think it was correctly done.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJOHNSON, P. J, and BURMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIERINGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "James M. Tourek, of Chicago, for appellant.", "William H. LeVitus, of Chicago, for appellee Northwest National Bank." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF FRED REINHARD, Deceased.\u2014(KATHERINE MURPHY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST NATIONAL BANK, Ex\u2019r, et al., Respondents-Appellees.)\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 62808\nOpinion filed August 11, 1976.\nJames M. Tourek, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam H. LeVitus, of Chicago, for appellee Northwest National Bank." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 130, "last_page_order": 134 }