{ "id": 2489331, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRA BRAINERD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brainerd", "decision_date": "1976-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 75-153", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5373887 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852087 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5-6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833958 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11763540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 F.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2224095 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/432/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426412 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 548, "char_count": 8198, "ocr_confidence": 0.904, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.10449464408662e-08, "percentile": 0.38076003658900576 }, "sha256": "e74287449fafe5298f786f7b897d409ed712f86dff13be8e08fdeb741e6aa61c", "simhash": "1:1b3d18556f159b67", "word_count": 1370 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:47:10.337116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRA BRAINERD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted in a jury trial of possession of more than 200 grams of a substance containing amphetamines, a controlled substance (111. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56%, par. 1402(a)(6)). He was sentenced to a term of 4 years to 4 years and 1 day. He appeals, contending that the statute is unconstitutional and alternatively that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because evidence seized from his automobile pursuant to a claimed unlawful arrest resulted in his conviction.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the law is unconstitutional, based upon his claim in his brief that the grading of offenses and penalties upon the weight of the \u201csubstance containing\u201d a controlled substance rather than upon the weight of the contraband substance itself results in an arbitrary and unreasonable legislative classification has been withdrawn in oral argument. See People v. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d 1 (1976).\nDefendant contends only that the evidence should have been suppressed because the officers acted on an uncorroborated tip from an unreliable informer and thus lacked probable cause to arrest him.\nThe officers acted upon information received from one James Fitzpatrick, a student at Northern Illinois University, who had been arrested for possession of amphetamines. Fitzpatrick indicated that he was ashamed of his activities and was concerned about embarrassing his family and himself in his small home community. He told the officers that he had arranged for a drug transaction with a man named \u201cIra\u201d in order to purchase 10,000 amphetamine tablets in West Chicago earlier that evening. He said he lost his way and failed to keep the appointment but was arrested when he returned to De Kalb and officers found a controlled substance \u201cleft over from a previous deal.\u201d He said that he had never met \u201cIra\u201d but had dealt with a former roommate who had told him approximately 2 weeks prior to the incident that if he needed \u201cspeed\u201d he should contact \u201cIra.\u201d Fitzpatrick admitted dealing in drugs over a period of years. The State\u2019s attorney told Fitzpatrick that he could possibly be granted immunity from the charge of possession of amphetamines if he were able to furnish the police with information leading to a larger drug dealer within 48 hours.\nFitzpatrick was then released from custody and returned to his residence in De Kalb at approximately 9:45 the evening of July 30,1974. A short time later Fitzpatrick called and said that \u201cIra\u201d had called him proposing that they meet at T.K.\u2019s Tavern in De Kalb and close the deal; that \u201cIra\u201d had told Fitzpatrick that he was wearing a checkered shirt, that he had long blond hair and that he would be with a lady companion whom he did not want to involve in the drug transaction. The caller referred to Fitzpatrick as \u201cfarmer,\u201d a name which Fitzpatrick\u2019s roommate commonly called him. The man told him that he was going to pretend that he had borrowed some tools and they would go out to the car and get the tools. Immediately after the conversation Fitzpatrick notified the police and the assistant State\u2019s attorney involved in his questioning and they instructed him to meet \u201cIra\u201d and proceed with the transaction.\nThe officers searched Fitzpatrick and found nothing out of the ordinary. Fitzpatrick then went into T.K.\u2019s Lounge. One of the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s assistants was stationed inside the tavern to observe and a detective was at the rear entrance of the Lounge. The assistant State\u2019s attorney and another detective were in front of the tavern. After a short time Fitzpatrick exited T.K.\u2019s Lounge and entered a neighboring tavern. He then reentered the Lounge and met with a person who was identified during the court proceedings as the defendant, and who fitted the description previously given to the officers by Fitzpatrick. A female companion was in the company of the defendant. She stated that the defendant had made a \u201ccouple\u201d of phone calls while they were at T.K.\u2019s Lounge; that the defendant introduced her to Fitzpatrick when he came into the tavern; and that there was a conversation between Fitzpatrick and the defendant about going out to the back and getting tools out of the defendant\u2019s car to return to Fitzpatrick.\nAfter defendant and Fitzpatrick remained in the Lounge for approximately 30 minutes one of the officers was instructed to go into the tavern to inquire about the delay. On a prearranged signal to indicate when defendant and Fitzpatrick were leaving the Lounge one of the officers followed the defendant and Fitzpatrick out the rear door and alerted the outside watchers. Defendant was seen entering a vehicle by unlocking the driver\u2019s side. He unlocked the passenger door to allow Fitzpatrick to enter; then reached into the back seat and got a bag of amphetamines which he placed on the front seat of the vehicle. He began to drive Fitzpatrick to another parking lot where the latter\u2019s car was located. The officers followed the car out of the parking lot and stopped the vehicle after approximately a block and one-half.\nWhen the officers approached the car they found a brown paper bag containing the 10,000 amphetamine tablets situated between defendant and Fitzpatrick on the front seat and seized it.\nInitially the State contends that the defendant has waived his right to question the reasonableness of the arrest and the related seizure because no objection was interposed at the trial in the written post-trial motion or in the written motion in arrest of judgment. In the memorandum of law which defendant\u2019s counsel supplied to the trial court, counsel raised the reasonable doubt issue, contending only that the State did not prove constructive possession of the contraband, i.e., that it was under the immediate control of defendant and that defendant had knowledge of its presence.\nWhere the grounds for a new trial are stated in writing the defendant is limited on review to the errors therein raised. (People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 366-67 (1970).) While in a proper case we may take notice of errors which deprive the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial even though not raised in the trial court (People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280, 282-83 (1973) and may apply the \u201cplain error\u201d rule (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)), we do not consider that this is appropriate here. We would agree with the State that although the defendant initially filed a motion to suppress in which he questioned the validity of the arrest and the subsequent seizure of the drug it is apparent that defendant, through his privately retained counsel, did not choose to challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling denying the motion and therefore elected to abandon the argument. Cf. United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 996.\nMoreover, we would reach the same result on the merits. We find adequate facts in the record to support the trial court\u2019s ruling that the arrest was made on the basis of probable cause and that the seizure was lawful. In the absence of prior established reliability, which, of course, was not here involved, the law requires independent corroboration of the informer\u2019s information in order to show probable cause to act upon it. (See People v. Beattie, 31 Ill. 2d 257, 260 (1964).) There is corroboration in this record. The surveillance of T.K.\u2019s Lounge resulted in corroboration of the facts already stated by Fitzpatrick. Cf. People v. Bolender, 24 Ill.\nApp. 3d 804, 805-06 (1974); see People v. Denham, 41 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 (1968); see also People v. Atkinson, 21 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260 (1974).\nFor the reasons stated the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGUILD, P. J., and HALLETT, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward F. Diedrich, of De Kalb, and Ralph Ruebner and Joshua Sachs, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "James A. Carr, State\u2019s Attorney, of Sycamore (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRA BRAINERD, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District (1st Division)\nNo. 75-153\nOpinion filed August 23, 1976.\nEdward F. Diedrich, of De Kalb, and Ralph Ruebner and Joshua Sachs, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJames A. Carr, State\u2019s Attorney, of Sycamore (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 211, "last_page_order": 215 }