{ "id": 2488560, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN CHARLES LEE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lee", "decision_date": "1976-09-02", "docket_number": "Nos. 75-394, 75-395 cons.", "first_page": "502", "last_page": "505", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 502" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501268 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927578 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L. Ed. 2d 1000", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 909", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6198981, 6198282, 6198507, 6198739, 6198110 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0909-05", "/us/425/0909-02", "/us/425/0909-03", "/us/425/0909-04", "/us/425/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 583", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519506 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 L. Ed. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6174493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168334 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2868728, 2865417 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0936-01", "/ill-app-3d/27/0936-02" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972102 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2787031 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 827", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2701782 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0827-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2872794 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0124-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 6992, "ocr_confidence": 0.896, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.656522608155051e-07, "percentile": 0.6936037583658352 }, "sha256": "97890980d6869acb8780e63a62cfe70bad74a7a60ff4cdf087350ef7f4607b30", "simhash": "1:faba8f72ac0098b5", "word_count": 1210 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:47:10.337116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN CHARLES LEE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn separate jury trials the defendant was convicted of two charges of armed robbery occurring on the same day and sentenced to consecutive terms of not less than four years and no more than five years in the penitentiary for each offense. He appeals, contending that the denial of his motion to suppress his confession and various trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. He also challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that his confession should have been suppressed is based essentially on the failure of the prosecution to call one of the officers who was present when the statement was taken.\nThe burden of proving that a confession is voluntary is, of course, upon the State, but the objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of voluntariness must be made in the trial court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114\u201411(d).) If the defendant does not object to the State\u2019s failure to call all material witnesses in the trial court defendant will be deemed to have waived this claim of error on appeal. See People v. Glanton, 33 Ill. App. 3d 124,140-41 (1975); People v. West, 25 Ill. App. 3d 827, 830-31 (1975).\nDefendant did not object in the trial court. From our review of the record we find no substantial infringement of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to give us reason to excuse the waiver by application of the \u201cplain error\u201d doctrine. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 615(a); compare People v. Willis, 26 Ill. App. 3d 518, 524-25 (1975).\nDefendant next contends that the court erred in admitting evidence which he claims was wrongfully seized from his automobile. We also find no merit in this argument which, we further note, was not presented in any manner in the trial court by either a motion to suppress evidence or in a post-trial motion. In addition, the argument is not meritorious in view of the facts.\nAn armed robbery at a furniture store in Elgin was reported to the police at shortly past noon on January 6, 1975. They were advised that two black men, one with a gun and the other with a knife, had taken money from an employee of the store. A second armed robbery which occurred at a jewelry store in Elgin at approximately 2 p.m. was later reported to the police. The police noticed a car driven by a black man who \u201cseemed to be intent on what was going on back towards the area of the jewelry store,\u201d as he was driving in the area. The officer followed the car and saw that it made a turn into a dead end street approximately 1M blocks from the jewelry store. When the car reached the end of the street the driver began to turn it around. An officer approached the vehicle intending, as he testified, to check the driver\u2019s identification. The driver did not obey the officer\u2019s signal to stop but accelerated past him. The officers then chased the vehicle for approximately one-half mile during which time the driver drove past stop signs and a stop light without stopping. The defendant was searched for weapons outside of his vehicle but none were found. He was then placed in the squad car. The officers checked the front seat area of the defendant\u2019s car and found a stocking cap which was related to the identification in one of the armed robberies and a butcher knife which was related to another of the robberies. Defendant was charged with the motor vehicle violations.\nFollowing the defendant\u2019s driving of his car past the officer and his commission of the several traffic violations in his flight the officers clearly had probable cause to stop the defendant and to arrest him for those violations, as well as to further investigate his conduct. However, the search of his car after he had been removed to the squad car may not be properly justified as an incident to his lawful arrest in view of the lack of control which the defendant then had over his vehicle. While the circumstances could reasonably indicate that the police were dealing with a criminal rather than an ordinary traffic offender the search of the vehicle could not be justified in order to either insure the safety of the officers or to prevent an escape. See People v. Palmer, 62 Ill. 2d 261, 264 (1976).\nHowever, we conclude that the search of the car without a warrant was reasonable given the circumstances. The officers were looking for two black men reported to have committed an earlier armed robbery. When they investigated a report of a second armed robbery at a jewelry store in Elgin they saw defendant driving away from the area of the store\u2019s location looking back towards the store in a manner they could reasonably view as suspicious. And when they stopped him to investigate defendant fled and in the chase committed motor vehicle offenses. The total circumstances justified a reasonable belief on the part of the police that defendant was involved in criminal activities. See People v. Hering, 27 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 (1975).\nDefendant\u2019s automobile could arguably have been seized, driven to the station and a warrant secured to search, but we do not consider that the failure to do so under the circumstances before us made the search of the automobile at the scene any less reasonable. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); Texas v. White, _U.S__, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209, 96 S. Ct. 304, 305 (1976); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 2469-70 (1974); cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 425 U.S. 909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).\nDefendant\u2019s final argument that the consecutive sentences were improper is also without merit. Consecutive sentences may be imposed for crimes which are \u201cpart of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(a).) Here, however, the two armed robberies were separated in time and by place and involved different victims. They were therefore separate crimes for which consecutive sentences could be imposed in exercise of the court\u2019s discretion. (See People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 78 (1972); People v. Simmons, 29 Ill. App. 3d 911, 912-14 (1975).) In addition, the trial judge properly set forth sufficient reasons for the imposition of the consecutive sentences. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(b).) We find no abuse of discretion.\nThe judgments are therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGUILD, P. J., and HALLETT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Charles D. Sheehy, Jr., both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN CHARLES LEE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District (1st Division)\nNos. 75-394, 75-395 cons.\nOpinion filed September 2, 1976.\nRalph Ruebner and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Charles D. Sheehy, Jr., both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0502-01", "first_page_order": 530, "last_page_order": 533 }