{ "id": 2491408, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeLOUIS SIBLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sibley", "decision_date": "1976-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 61945", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "624", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 616" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2961755 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.E. 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.Y. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 78013 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/218/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.E. 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 847170 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/202/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11767201, 11766531, 11766566, 11766759, 11767023, 11767089, 11766834, 11766972, 11767158, 11766684, 11766623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0972-11", "/us/402/0972-01", "/us/402/0972-02", "/us/402/0972-05", "/us/402/0972-08", "/us/402/0972-09", "/us/402/0972-06", "/us/402/0972-07", "/us/402/0972-10", "/us/402/0972-04", "/us/402/0972-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5346057 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5407342 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2843173 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 57", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171363 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966390 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 1064", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5378787 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067" }, { "page": "1066" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/1064-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926227 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428466 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0296-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 865, "char_count": 18157, "ocr_confidence": 0.902, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6266433855453668e-07, "percentile": 0.6881887708511191 }, "sha256": "11e1e47d7c502c8c604c7b885a795f47c6751bf8152166d9c8e433b36766cb1c", "simhash": "1:8b7a41b66fae04fd", "word_count": 3095 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:47:10.337116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeLOUIS SIBLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, DeLouis Sibley (defendant) was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to 6 to 18 years. In his appeal he contends solely that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145.\nAfter disposition of defendant\u2019s motion for substitution of judges, the trial was continued a number of times by agreement of the parties or on defendant\u2019s motion. On June 17, 1974, defendant answered ready for trial. The parties agree that October 11, 1974, was the 116th day in the calculation of expiration of the statutory period and that October 15, 1974, was the final permissible day for commencement of trial.\nOn October 11,1974, defendant then being in custody, the State moved for an extension of time for trial because of the unavailability of a material witness. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(c).) This witness was Mack Johnson, victim of the armed robbery allegedly committed by defendant. The petition for extension was unverified and was signed by an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. It alleged that attempts were made by an investigator to locate Johnson on October 3, October 7 and October 8, 1974. It further alleged that on each of these dates this attorney had spoken to the victim\u2019s sister, Mary Johnson. She had informed him that, some three weeks after defendant\u2019s arrest, Mack Johnson had been threatened by a person who had represented that she was defendant\u2019s sister and was also a policewoman. Mary Johnson also stated that on subsequent dates written threats had been slipped under the door of Mack Johnson\u2019s home. As a result, Mr. Johnson\u2019s wife became distraught and left Illinois and he had gone to find her.\nThe trial court conducted a full hearing on this petition. The police investigator in effect verified the principal allegations of the petition with reference to his efforts to locate Mack Johnson, the victim, commencing with October 3,1974. Mary Johnson, sister of the victim, testified that she did not know where her brother was, but, that he had received notes put under his door. Also, the victim\u2019s wife had told the witness that she had left the city a short time after these notes had disappeared as a result of a burglary of their home. In addition, this witness testified to threats made to the complaining witness by some \u201cnice looking\u201d young lady about 24 years old who had told him that she was a sister of the defendant and that, if the victim appeared in court, \u201che would be in trouble.\u201d\nIn response, the defendant called his mother who testified that defendant had three sisters. One of these ladies, some 35 years old, was unable to appear in court because she was working and was the sole support of four children. In addition, the two remaining sisters of defendant both testified that they did not at any time threaten Mack Johnson, had never seen the man, had never told him that they were policewomen, and never placed letters under the door of his apartment. Both of these witnesses testified that they had no contact with defendant subsequent to his arrest. Defendant testified in his own behalf that on October 2,1974, he was present in court and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney told the judge that the witnesses, including Mack Johnson, were present in court on October 2, 1974, but the court had continued the case because the State\u2019s Attorney was engaged in another trial. An assistant public defender testified that on August 6,1974, he had spoken to a third person named Katy Jones who stated that she had seen Mack Johnson, the victim, on the preceding day.\nNo objection was made by either side to those portions of the above summarized testimony which were hearsay. Therefore, the trial judge would have been obliged to give all of the hearsay evidence \u201cits natural probative effect.\u201d People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299, 347 N.E.2d 733.\nAt the close of the hearing, the court heard argument of counsel. Before arguments were completed, the court stated:\n\u201cAt this point I will grant an individual bond in the amount of *20,000.1 would release Mr. Sibley on that bond. I would continue the matter until November 15 on that date for trial.\u201d\nCounsel for Mr. Sibley then requested that the court wait for \u201ca moment.\u201d After a pause, defense counsel, Mr. Goldberg, stated:\n\u201cJudge, prior to issuing an T Bond we would ask the Court for a ruling on the motion.\n\u201cTHE COURT: I would deny the motion for the extension of the term.\u201d\nThe following occurred:\n\u201cMr. Goldberg: You\u2019re denying the motion for extension of the term.\nThe Court: Correct.\nMr. Goldberg: Then, Judge, in that case the defendant would not want the T Bond at this time and would consider answering ready for trial and demanding trial.\nI would indicate that our records indicate that the term is Tuesday.\nThe Court: I would note your request. Individual Bond in the amount of *20,000 would stand, gentlemen.\nMr. Goldberg: You are issuing, giving an T Bond anyway?\nThe Court: Right. Whether he elects to take it, I have no control over. If he stays voluntarily, I would not consider that as being in custody. I would extend the term in [e]ffect forty days by my releasing him at this point.\nMr. Goldberg: Judge, the defendant does not wish to accept the T Bond.\nThe Court: He doesn\u2019t have to.\nMr. Goldberg: He doesn\u2019t want to accept it.\nThe Court: If he fails to sign the same, I will have to be confronted with that at that point, but I am rendering a *20,000 individual bond.\nWhat date does the State suggest then?\nThe Court: So there is no mistake, I would extend the term for \"forty days.\u201d\nO # #\n\u201cThe Court has the right at any time upon either side\u2019s motion or my own to change the bond in any way, shapre [sic] or form it deems appropriate. Under these circumstances, I deem it appropriate to set an individual bond in the amount of *20,000 which means he will be free on bond. I would continue to note he demands trial.\u201d\nThe court then continued the cause to November 6, 1974. On that date defendant appeared in open court with his attorney of record and moved that he be discharged pursuant to the pertinent statute on the ground that more than 120 days had elapsed since his arrest. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion and set the case for trial on November 15, 1974. On November 15, the case was again continued to November 18, 1974. On November 21, a jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery. In post-trial motions, defendant\u2019s counsel renewed his motion that defendant be discharged because of the statutory requirement of speedy trial. These motions were denied and sentence was imposed.\nIn this court, defendant contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by issuing the individual bond on his own motion in an attempt to evade the intent of the applicable statute and that the court had lost jurisdiction to try defendant by releasing him as it did.\nIllinois law, reflected in the statute providing for speedy trials, requires that a defendant who is in custody be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrest. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(a).) A defendant who is at liberty \u201con bail or recognizance e \u00b0 e \u201d must be tried with 160 days from the date he demands trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(b).) These relevant statutes implement the constitutional mandates for speedy trial (U. S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78) and generally operate \u201cto prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues \u00b0 0 People v. Anderso0n (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441, 292 N.E.2d 364.\nIn the case before us, defendant was released from custody on the 116th day on recognizance. Therefore, it would appear that the 160-day time period for defendants \u201con bail or recognizance * * became applicable. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(b).) Because he was tried within that 160-day period, no statutory violation occurred in this case and defendant need not be discharged. Consequently, we do not reach the issue of constitutional violation, because the pertinent statute was complied with.\nDefendant contends that by releasing him and extending the applicable time period, the trial court violated its duty to provide defendant with an impartial trial and thereby rendered the statute meaningless. We disagree. Defendant relies primarily on People v. Gooding (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 316 N.E.2d 549, rev d on other grounds (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 298, which, in our opinion, presents a situation readily distinguishable from that before us. In Gooding, a defendant was released from custody on the 118th day by a sheriff, without authorization by the trial court. The reviewing court discharged defendant because he was not tried within 120 days, noting that (21 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1067):\n\u201cThe release of any defendant must be accomplished in an orderly and legitimate manner. It is an absurd argument that a defendant can be incarcerated for a period of time only to be released upon the caprice of the sheriff or the State\u2019s attorney in order the avoid the 120-day rule. To sanction such conduct would amount in rendering section 103 \u2014 5 meaningless.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s release in the instant case was effected by the trial judge who exercised the authority vested in him by statute to set and \u201calter the conditions of the bail bond.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 110\u20146) and to release a defendant on his recognizance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 110\u20142). Therefore, we cannot regard Gooding as authoritative in the case before us.\nDefendant further contends that by releasing him in the manner noted above, the trial court of its own motion intervened on behalf of the State, thereby denying defendant\u2019s right to an impartial tribunal. In this regard, defendant relies on Ward v. Village of Monroeville (1972), 409 U.S. 57, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267, 93 S. Ct. 80, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant\u2019s right to due process of law was violated by a hearing conducted by a mayor who had a possible interest in the outcome of the proceeding. In People v. Gross (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 421, 279 N.E.2d 492, the trial court refused to permit a defendant to present his pro se pretrial motions. This court held that the defendant had been denied due process of law. In the case before us, there is no hint that the trial judge had any interest in the result of defendant\u2019s trial or that he denied defendant an opportunity to be heard. The authorities cited by defendant are therefore inapplicable. Defendant\u2019s allegation of judicial bias rests solely upon the court\u2019s order releasing him on his own recognizance. As shown above, the court\u2019s action was in accord with applicable Illinois statutes and does not constitute prejudice merely because the result did not please defendant. Charges of judicial prejudice should not be made without reasonable basis. Such basis does not exist here as shown by the fact that no issue of prejudicial action by the trial judge has been raised by defendant relating to the jury trial at which defendant was found guilty.\nAdministration of criminal justice with complete fairness and propriety imposes mutual obligations upon the State and the defendant. The obligation of the State in connection with the right to speedy trial by compliance with the implementing statute has been formulated many times. \u201cThe supreme court has held time and again that technical evasions of this rule by the State will not be tolerated.\u201d (People v. Gooding (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1066, citing People v. Spicuzza (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 152, 311 N.E.2d 112.) Conversely, the creation and enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights for the protection of defendants cannot be used for manipulation \u201cin such a way as to provide an avenue to escape legitimate prosecution, \u00b0 * People v. Ward (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750, 301 N.E.2d 139, citing People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert, denied, 402 U.S. 972, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 1658.\nDefendant also urges that, by releasing him without his signature on the recognizance, the trial court released him unconditionally. To support his contention, that release on a void recognizance is unconditional, defendant relies on People ex rel. Boenert v. Barrett (1903), 202 Ill. 287, 67 N.E. 23. The defendant there was freed on recognizance after being convicted of a criminal offense. The trial court finally pronounced sentence after a lapse of two years. The supreme court held that defendant was to be unconditionally released because the trial court\u2019s conduct amounted to the institution of \u201canother and different system of parole 008 without uniformity, but wholly dependent 888 upon the discretion of the sitting judge.\u201d (202 Ill. 87, 300.) That case is readily distinguishable because defendant, in the case before us, had not been convicted of the offense charged when he was released. Such a release on recognizance is permissible in Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 110 \u2014 2.) Furthermore, he was tried within the 160-day period as required by statute.\nDefendant contends that the recognizance was void because he did not assent to its terms by signing it. No authority is cited by defendant in support of the theory that signature by a defendant is so indispensable that it may not be eliminated by order of court. We regard this claim as a hypercritical technicality. The trial judge had authority to \u201calter the conditions of the bail bond.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 110 \u2014 6(a).) The trial judge made a note on the face of the recognizance for the express purpose of showing that he waived defendant\u2019s signature thereon. In addition, we find that, despite repeated verbal objections by defendant\u2019s attorney to the court, defendant \u201cconducted himself in such a manner that his assent may fairly be inferred, 8 8 8.\u201d (Miller v. Schloss (1916), 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339.) By appearing before the court on the date fixed for trial \u201cas ordered by the court 8 8 8\u201d and submitting \u201chimself to the orders and process of the court 8 8 8\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 110 \u2014 10(a)(1), (2)) defendant indicated his assent to the waiver by the court of his signature on the recognizance. The enactment of this statute on bail (effective January 1,1964) has served to render obsolete cases such as People ex rel. Boenert v. Barrett (1903), 202 Ill. 287, 67 N.E. 23, cited by defendant.\nThe trial judge acted within his authority by releasing defendant on his own recognizance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 110 \u2014 2) and by altering the condition of defendant\u2019s release by waiving his signature and because defendant by his conduct assented to that release and waiver of signature. We conclude that the recognizance was valid and that the court retained jurisdiction over defendant.\nOne further thought requires expression. This opinion is not intended as an authorization for courts or prosecutors to institute a regular practice of retaining a defendant in custody for virtually the entire period of 120 days and then permitting him freedom on a personal recognizance to effect an additional delay of 40 days before trial. Tactics of this type cannot be reconciled with the requirement of due diligence by the State to insure that there will be no claim of violation of the basic right to a speedy trial. We have not hesitated to enforce this inviolable right in the past and we will continue to be vigilant in this regard in the future. See People v. Shannon (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 185, 340 N.E.2d 129.\nWe will, therefore, point out the unusual circumstances existing in the case at bar which impelled us to affirm the judgment appealed from. The merits of the ruling by the trial court that he \u201cwould deny the motion for the extension of the term\u201d are not before us for decision. We will merely comment by stating that the issue of the lack of due diligence by the prosecution was far from one-sided. We disagree with the argument in defendant\u2019s reply that, \u201cThe state had no colorable claim to \u2018diligence\u2019.\u201d The fact that the complaining witness was actually present in court on October 2,1974, as shown by defendant\u2019s own testimony, might possibly constitute the reason for failure of the investigator to attempt to locate the witness until the following day. Until that time there may have been no need to search for the victim. We do not necessarily infer from this record that the efforts of this investigator, commencing October 3,1974, were the very first attempts made by the State to locate the witness. Furthermore, the serious nature of the charges alleged in the State\u2019s petition for extension of time constitute an important factor and we cannot state categorically that the evidence produced by defendant was sufficient to overcome these charges.\nDuring the pendency of this appeal, defendant made a motion for bail which we denied. Thereafter defendant sought and obtained three extensions of time for the filing of his briefs. With leave of court defendant filed a supplemental brief which the State answered. Defendant then renewed his motion to set bail. The State filed objections to this motion and defendant made a motion to strike these objections. We took these motions for decision with the cause and did our best to expedite the date of oral argument. In view of the result above reached, the motion of defendant to strike the objections of the State is denied and defendant\u2019s renewed motion for bail is denied.\nThe judgment order and conviction appealed from are affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBURKE and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Jack L. Uretsky and Robert P. Isaacson, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Iris E. Sholder, and William F. Ward, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeLOUIS SIBLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 61945\nOpinion filed August 23, 1976.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Jack L. Uretsky and Robert P. Isaacson, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Iris E. Sholder, and William F. Ward, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 644, "last_page_order": 652 }