{ "id": 2642109, "name": "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Department of Insurance", "decision_date": "1976-10-01", "docket_number": "No. 75-345", "first_page": "155", "last_page": "159", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 155" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966749 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2938494 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4947476 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/287/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 F. 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 5391092 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/273/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 U.S. 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3681098 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/251/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 U.S. 345", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 189377 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/253/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2894791 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3384273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/313/0291-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 8583, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.387671992903545e-07, "percentile": 0.797507499471977 }, "sha256": "43988068740b176d8fde07eff8b0e5f3ea57b26a401ee76627913ac013a45dc2", "simhash": "1:004b96a3a0e18cfe", "word_count": 1430 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:00:19.600233+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Board of Trustees of the Policemen\u2019s Pension Fund of the Village of Oak Brook and Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund of the Village of Oak Brook instituted a complaint for declaratory judgments praying that salary increases granted under the Village of Oak Brook\u2019s Pay Plan be declared not to be excluded from withholding deductions by the pension plan provisions of sections 3 \u2014 111, 3 \u2014 125, 4 \u2014 109 and 4 \u2014 124 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108/i, pars. 3 \u2014 111, 3 \u2014 125, 4 \u2014 109 and 4 \u2014 124). The Circuit Court of Du Page County entered judgment granting the prayer of the complaint. The defendant, Illinois Department of Insurance, appeals.\nThe Illinois Department of Insurance made audits of the Police Pension Fund and of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund of the Village of Oak Brook. The audit report of each noted that \u201cthe Fund is receiving erroneous salary deductions based on merit pay of members. Since the governing act calls for salary deductions on base earnings only, the erroneous deductions should be refunded to members.\u201d\nThe Pension Code of 1963 became effective July 1, 1963. The Code is incorporated in chapter 108/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Article 3 of the Code (sections 3 \u2014 101 et seq.) covers Policemen\u2019s Pension Fund for Municipalities 500,000 and under. Article 4 of the Code (sections 4 \u2014 101 et seq.) covers Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund for Municipalities 500,000 and under.\nThe sections of the Code pertinent to this case are 3 \u2014 111, 3 \u2014 125 for police and 4 \u2014 109 and 4 \u2014 124 for firemen.\nSections 3 \u2014 111 and 4 \u2014 109, while not identical, then provided that upon certain conditions being met the pensioner shall have a pension of one-half the \u201csalary attached to the rank.\u201d\nSections 3 \u2014 125 (2) and 4 \u2014 124 provide for partial financing of the pension funds by deductions from salary.\nSection 3 \u2014 125 (2) in pertinent part provides:\n\u201cFor the purposes of this section, the word \u2018salary\u2019 means the annual salary including longevity attached to the rank held by the policeman as established by the municipality\u2019s appropriation ordinance, but does not include \u2018overtime pay\u2019, \u2018holiday pay\u2019, \u2018bonus pay\u2019, \u2018merit pay\u2019, or any. other cash benefit over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance; \u201d \u00b0\n\u25a0 Section 4 \u2014 124 in pertinent part provides for withholding as follows:\n\u201c o o o of salary including longevity attached to the rank held by the fireman as established by the municipality appropriation ordinance, but does not include \u2018overtime pay\u2019, \u2018holiday pay\u2019, \u2018bonus pay\u2019, \u2018merit pay\u2019, or any other cash benefit over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance.\u201d\nThe Village of Oak Brook in 1971 adopted a comprehensive \u201cMerit Pay Plan\u201d for all its employees including the police and fire departments. The basic salary for a patrolman and a fireman was then $10,000; the maximum was $13,500. Merit increases were based on the recommendation of the employee\u2019s department head with review and approval by the village manager. The maximum merit increase was limited to 10% per year but could not exceed the maximum established for the position. When it was determined that an employee be given a pay increase under the plan the pay increase was added to the employee\u2019s former salary and that total was appropriated by ordinance as the annual salary for the employee. It merged into and became the employee\u2019s ordinary salary for the next year, was permanent and vested in the employee. Progression from the entrance minimum rate to the maximum rate was dependent upon the employee\u2019s level of performance, job attitude and other job related factors. Longevity increases were abolished by the plan. Increases were to be considered as merit adjustments, and not longevity increases or cost of living increases.\nThe trial judge found and we agree that the pay of the employee is salary attached to the rank held by that employee as established by the Oak Brook appropriation ordinance. The department, on appeal, contends that any increase under the Oak Brook plan is \u201cmerit pay\u201d within the intent and meaning of the exclusions contained in two statutes involved. The Department refuses to concede that the definition of \u201csalary\u201d for computing deductions is contain\u00e9d only in those sections and is limited thereto. It argues that the pension articles must be construed in their entirety citing Boehne v. Board of Trustees, 313 Ill. App. 291, and Winfield Fire Protection District v. City of Wheaton, 29 Ill. App. 3d 630.\nWe have no quarrel with the statement that the provisions of a pension act (or any other act for that matter) should be examined in their entirety to determine the legislative intent. It should be noted that in section 3 \u2014 125(2) the language used by the legislature was, \u201cFor the purpose of this section\u201d rather than \u201cthis act.\u201d The Boehne case made this distinction on pages 294 and 295 (in reverse).\nThe Winfield case is cited for the proposition that in the absence of statutory definitions indicating a different legislative intent, we must presume that words have their ordinary and popularly understood meaning (page 633). We agree with that proposition of law but must point out that here the words are qualified by the modifying clause \u201c \u00b0 \u00b0 \u201d over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance.\u201d\nWe are aware of the basic canon that qualifying, relative or modifying words, phrases and clauses are ordinarily confined to the last antecedent. (See People v. Thomas, 45 Ill. 2d 68, 72.) Under this canon only \u201cany other cash benefit\u201d would be modified by the phrase \u201cover and above the salary established by the appropriate ordinance.\u201d The canon is not applicable where a further inclusion is clearly required by the intent and meaning of the context. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes \u00a7230 (1974).\nIt is our opinion that \u201cmerit pay\u201d is qualified by, and the exclusion of \u201cmerit pay\u201d is limited to that, \u201cover and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance.\u201d Several rules of construction unite in leading us to that conclusion. The first was enunciated in Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348, 64 L. Ed. 944,946,40 S. Ct. 516 where the omission of a comma between the qualifying clause and the words immediately preceding gave rise to the argument that the clause was applicable only to the nearest group of words and not to those first appearing and separated from those later used by a comma. In answer to the argument the Supreme Court stated, \u201cWhen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.\u201d Also see United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 64 L. Ed. 229, 40 S. Ct. 139; Hillsboro Coal Co. v. Knotts (S. D. Ill. 1920), 273 F. 221; 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7334, at 672 n. 9 and \u00a7332, at 662 (1953).\nSecond, the argument advanced by the Director would require that under Oak Brook\u2019s Plan where the minimum salary provided was *10,000 a year that minimum would be \u201cthe salary attached to the rank\u201d for pension purposes despite the fact that by outstanding ability through the years a pensioner may have merited and received the maximum salary of *13,500 which salary was established by the appropriation ordinance of the Village.\nThe purpose of laws for police and firemen\u2019s pensions is beneficial, and such statutes should be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefited. Colton v. Board of Trustees, 287 Ill. 56; Edwards v. Board of Trustees, 22 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263, affd, 61 Ill. 2d 330.\nWe reiterate, therefore, that the Legislature intended to declare and has declared that to exclude \u201cmerit pay\u201d from the deduction contemplated by the act it must be \u201cmerit pay\u201d over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinances of the Village of Oak Brook.\nJudgment affirmed.\nT. J. MORAN, P. J., and RECHENMACHER, J., concur.\nUnless followed by a comma.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (John D. Whitenack, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Alfred P. Bianucci and Donald W. Forester, both of Maher, Bianucci, Newman & Schlax, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNo. 75-345\nOpinion filed October 1, 1976.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (John D. Whitenack, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nAlfred P. Bianucci and Donald W. Forester, both of Maher, Bianucci, Newman & Schlax, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0155-01", "first_page_order": 185, "last_page_order": 189 }