{ "id": 2815646, "name": "In re J. STIRLING MORTIMER et al., Petitioners-Appellees.-(THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY, Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Mortimer", "decision_date": "1976-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 61230", "first_page": "249", "last_page": "252", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 249" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "328 U. S. 575", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377351 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Mo. App. 1105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1854521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/239/1105-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E. 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 Ill. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5303315 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/350/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2723856 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0533-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 497, "char_count": 8999, "ocr_confidence": 0.879, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.56463479348303e-08, "percentile": 0.4486726832336557 }, "sha256": "819fed0054b4719934e984696625fbaceff2d2f294683662eaac10bf3c31cf55", "simhash": "1:b64f4836616c0a9e", "word_count": 1468 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:08.154218+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re J. STIRLING MORTIMER et al., Petitioners-Appellees.\u2014(THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY, Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State\u2019s Attorney and the Board of Commissioners of Cook County (hereinafter the County of Cook) appeal from an order directing the Board to pay attorneys\u2019 fees to Mr. J. Stirling Mortimer and Mr. Paul Hoffman (hereinafter the petitioners). Petitioners had asked the court for these fees as payment for their services as amici curiae.\nOn February 22, 1973, petitioners sought leave to intervene in the circuit court case which had arisen out of actions of certain policemen during what has become known as the Black Panther raid. The then presiding judge of the criminal division of the circuit court had appointed Mr. Barnabas Sears as special prosecutor in the case. Petitioners sought to intervene alleging that they were concerned taxpayers opposed to any further fees or costs being paid to the special prosecutor or to his associates. Petitioners alleged that the special prosecutor\u2019s conduct in connection with the special grand jury raised \u201cserious questions of misfeasance and nonfeasance\u201d on his part. Their petition, presented to the then presiding judge, contained a series of examples which allegedly illustrated petitioners\u2019 cause for concern. The judge declined to rule on the petition at that time and took it under consideration.\nOn April 18,1973, the judge filed a lengthy order calling for a hearing to secure and consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the special prosecutor\u2019s conduct was contemptuous and tended to interfere with the administration of justice. The judge stated that he had not ruled on the petition to intervene and that it remained pending as part of his order. The judge instead appointed petitioners as amici curiae to make an investigation, conduct a hearing, and to draft a rule to show cause why the special prosecutor and his assistants should not be held in contempt of court for their actions in the case. Motions filed by the special prosecutor and his counsel to vacate the order were denied by the judge. Subsequent motions filed in the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to file original proceedings for writs of mandamus and prohibition subsequently were denied.\nOn March 20, 1974, petitioners filed a motion for fees for their services to the court as amici curiae. The County of Cook opposed this petition and, in support of its position, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for fees.\nIn connection with its motion to dismiss, the County of Cook filed a brief containing a statement of facts outlining the petitioners\u2019 prior involvement in the case. On July 22, 1972, petitioners had filed a taxpayers\u2019 complaint in the law division of the circuit court asking that the Board of County Commissioners be enjoined from making further payments to the special prosecutor. The complaint alleged that the court was statutorily prohibited from paying fees to the special prosecutor in excess of the salary of the State\u2019s Attorney. The special prosecutor moved to dismiss the complaint. On September 19, 1972, Judge Edward Egan dismissed the complaint, directing that no further pleadings be filed without prior leave of court. On October 26, 1972, petitioners sought leave to file an amended complaint alleging that the special prosecutor had \u201cacted illegally\u201d in proceedings before the special grand jury and should therefore not be compensated for any services rendered. Judge Robert Downing, on November 13, 1972, denied leave to file the amended complaint. Judge Downing determined that Judge Egan\u2019s order of September 19 was final. The County of Cook\u2019s brief noted that no notice of appeal was filed from either order.\nOn September 19,1974, the present presiding judge ordered the county commissioners to pay petitioners the sum of *11,475.00 for their services as amici curiae. The amount awarded was that requested by petitioners. The County of Cook appeals that award of public funds. It contends that petitioners are not entitled to compensation for their services in a case of this nature, and that additionally petitioners lacked the requisite impartiality to act as amici curiae.\nNo Illinois case has been brought to our attention which concerns the issue of payment of compensation out of public funds to an amicus curiae for his services. The appointment of an amicus curiae to make an investigation and to conduct a hearing in a contempt case is within the discretion of the trial judge. (People v. Goss (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385; Anderson v. Macek (1932), 350 Ill. 135, 182 N.E. 745.) It is conceded that no statutory basis exists in Illinois either for appointment of amicus curiae or for authorization to pay the amicus out of public funds for services performed. The County of Cook points out that Illinois statute permits a trial court to appoint \u201cSpecial State\u2019s Attorneys\u201d and to compensate such appointees for their services (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 14, par. 6). This statute may be utilized only when the State\u2019s Attorney is unable or unwilling to participate in certain proceedings or is interested in any cause or proceedings. The present record suggests no such incapacity on the part of the present State\u2019s Attorney. And in any event, the court did not utilize that statute in the present proceedings.\nIt has been held in States where the court has the statutory authority to appoint an amicus curiae in a certain situation that it impliedly has the power to award reasonable compensation for services rendered. (In re Phi Fathers Educational Ass\u2019n (1947), 239 Mo. App. 1105, 203 S.W.2d 885; 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae \u00a77 (1962).) As no such statutory basis exists in Illinois, petitioners must demonstrate an alternative reason why public funds are to be paid to them.\nAlthough no Illinois case resolves the issue of compensation to court-appointed amicus curiae, we are in accord with the following enunciated principle of law dealing with the problem:\n\u201cOrdinarily, an amicus curiae who intervenes in a proceeding by leave of court is not entitled to compensation. Thus, it is held that an amicus curiae is not entitled to compensation where he is appointed to aid and assist the court for the purpose of vindicating the court\u2019s honor, as, for instance, where he is called upon to investigate whether fraud has been practiced upon the court. However, where the court appoints an amicus curiae who renders services which prove beneficial to a solution of the questions presented, the court may properly award him compensation and direct it to be paid by the party responsible for the situation that prompted the court to make the appointment.\u201d 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae \u00a77 (1962); see also 3A C.J.S. Amicus Curiae \u00a714 (1973).\nThe petitioners in the present case were attempting to uphold the authority and dignity of the court by assisting in the contempt proceedings and thus under the general rule were not entitled to compensation. Moreover, no private party responsible for the situation requiring the appointment of amicus was directed to compensate the petitioners. Rather the court ordered public funds to be used to compensate petitioners.\nThe Supreme Court case of Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co. (1946), 328 U. S. 575, 90 L. Ed. 1447, 66 S. Ct. 1176, sheds light on the issue of compensation to amicus. Universal is markedly different from the present case in that it was decided on the narrow ground that the amici had already been compensated by one of the private parties involved in the suit and should therefore have received no additional compensation. However, the case is instructional in that it reaffirms the general principle that \u201ccompensation is not the normal reward\u201d of those who offer their services to the court as amici. Justice Frankfurter noted in the opinion that courts are hesitant to grant fees to an amicus curiae since governmental officers generally can be called upon to serve in their stead. We believe that observation to be pertinent in the present case.\nWe conclude that petitioners cannot expect to be compensated from public funds for their efforts to vindicate the honor and dignity of the court through their role as amici curiae. In view of that determination, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether petitioners possessed the requisite impartiality to serve in the position of amici curiae.\nFor the reasons stated, the order of the circuit court of Cook County directing the Board of Commissioners of Cook County to pay attorneys\u2019 fees to petitioners is reversed.\nOrder reversed.\nMEJDA, P. J., and DEMPSEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Sheldon Gardner, Henry A. Hauser, and William E. Kenney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.", "Mortimer & Hoffman, of Chicago (J. Stirling Mortimer, pro se, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re J. STIRLING MORTIMER et al., Petitioners-Appellees.\u2014(THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 61230\nOpinion filed December 3, 1976.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Sheldon Gardner, Henry A. Hauser, and William E. Kenney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.\nMortimer & Hoffman, of Chicago (J. Stirling Mortimer, pro se, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0249-01", "first_page_order": 279, "last_page_order": 282 }