{ "id": 2814931, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERNON JOY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Joy", "decision_date": "1976-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 75-507", "first_page": "349", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 349" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 Ill. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2576853 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/367/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479662 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320487 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5332878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2708862 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0724-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 393, "char_count": 6799, "ocr_confidence": 0.893, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3627974220712758e-07, "percentile": 0.6366560367032982 }, "sha256": "5a2fee082fc64088bb0203ee0dea8b954e03b1fc029c316b15917bceb70927b2", "simhash": "1:be289c603aceca53", "word_count": 1129 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:08.154218+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERNON JOY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was indicted for burglary and theft of property of a value in excess of *150. He waived trial by jury and was found guilty by the court of the lesser includable offense of theft of property of a value of less than *150. His motion for a new trial was denied and he was sentenced to probation for a term of 24 months with the first 90 days of said term to be spent in the Kane County Jail. At defendant\u2019s request the State Appellate Defender\u2019s office was appointed to represent him on appeal.\nDefendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over a diamond ring with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of its use and benefit. In raising this assertion defendant argues, first, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ring introduced at trial was in fact a ring stolen from its owner and, second, that a ring in defendant\u2019s possession was the same ring introduced into evidence at trial. Deeming the first aspect of defendant\u2019s argument determinative we do not reach the second aspect argued.\nAt trial Louise Jones testified that defendant attempted to sell her a diamond ring in early October, 1974. Alluding to an investigation of the \u201cHattie Hoffman burglary,\u201d Detective Wayne Henke of the Elgin Police Department testified that he noted a diamond ring on pawn lists which were routinely scrutinized by the Department. Henke located the ring at Bob\u2019s Trading Post. The owner of the trading post testified that the ring had been pawned for *20 by one Rosella Robinson. Jeweler John Rauschert and Raymond Hoffman identified the diamond ring at trial as one that had been purchased by Raymond\u2019s brother, and given to their mother, Hattie Hoffman, in 1961. Raymond Hoffman indicated that the ring was worn on occasions over the years by his mother. He last saw the ring on his mother\u2019s hand in July, 1974. Louise Jones stated that at the time defendant attempted to sell her a diamond ring in early October, 1974, defendant indicated that he obtained the diamond ring which he sought to sell her from \u201cAnn Street.\u201d Raymond Hoffman testified that Hattie Hoffman lived at 550 Ann Street in Elgin. Hattie Hoffman did not testify at trial.\nThe statute under which defendant was charged and convicted (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(a)(1)) provides:\n\u201cA person commits theft when he knowingly:\n(a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner;\n# # \u00ab\nand\n(1) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property e 6\nIt was incumbent upon the People to establish both that defendant exerted \u201cunauthorized\u201d control over the property and that defendant had the requisite felonious intent in depriving Hattie Hoffman of the use and benefit of the diamond ring. (People v. Shoemaker (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 724.) Defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ring introduced at trial was in fact stolen by defendant from Hattie Hoffman. The only testimony tending to establish the fact of a burglary at Hattie Hoffman\u2019s premises on Ann Street is the allusion of Detective Wayne Henke to the burglary investigation. No testimony in the record indicates that a diamond ring was taken from Hattie Hoffman\u2019s premises. It is apparent, therefore, that no testimony directly establishes that \u201cunauthorized\u201d control over the ring was exercised by defendant or that defendant had the requisite felonious intent in depriving Hattie Hoffman of the use of the property.\nIt has been stated that:\n\u201c \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 [A] conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence, (People v. Russell, 17 Ill. 2d 328,) it being necessary only that the proof of circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion and producing a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the crime. (People v. Magnafichi, 9 Ill. 2d 169; People v. Grizzel, 382 Ill. 11.)\u201d (People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 367.)\nWe do not dispute the people\u2019s assertion that circumstantial evidence may justify a conviction. In this case, however, to sustain conviction it is necessary to pile inference upon inference. First, it must be inferred that a theft occurred at Hattie Hoffman\u2019s premises on Ann Street. Then, inferences must be drawn to permit conclusion that a diamond ring was stolen from the Hoffman premises and that the diamond ring was owned by Hattie Hoffman at the time of the stealing. From the fact of defendant\u2019s possession of a ring similar in appearance to that owned at one time by Hattie Hoffman, and from his statement that he obtained the ring from Ann Street, it must then be inferred that defendant was the thief who took the property from the Hoffman residence on Ann Street. It must also be inferred that the party who pawned the ring, Rosella Robinson, obtained the ring from the defendant and there is nothing in the record to support this inference.\nThe case at hand is similar to People v. Betts (1937), 367 Ill. 499. There defendant was charged with the theft of heifers from a neighbor\u2019s pasture. The court concluded that the fact that the heifers were in defendant\u2019s pasture soon after they disappeared was not in and of itself enough to prove that there had been a theft or that defendant had any connection with it. While noting that unexplained possession of recently stolen property may raise an inference of guilt, the court refused to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction on that basis, finding the rule inapplicable. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the record simply indicated too many hypotheses consistent with innocence. There was no testimony indicating that the heifers could not have reasonably escaped from defendant\u2019s fencing enclosure and there was record evidence that cattle frequently strayed in the vicinity where the alleged theft occurred. Moreover, there was no evidence as to how the heifers got out of the enclosure \u2014 therefore no evidence of a theft. As did the Betts court, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction of theft.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane Count is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERNON JOY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNo. 75-507\nOpinion filed December 6, 1976.\nRalph Ruebner and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0349-01", "first_page_order": 379, "last_page_order": 382 }