{ "id": 2812665, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Edwards", "decision_date": "1976-12-14", "docket_number": "No. 75-259", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "356", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427823 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2882811 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2920873 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2852037 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0291-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 8998, "ocr_confidence": 0.883, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.500188514851265e-08, "percentile": 0.4464304675678003 }, "sha256": "51befee366ff1906f21dfa95a5a32b0ff64377801fe31e9e2a094e6398e5b1ce", "simhash": "1:c16d7079ff4a6d6f", "word_count": 1511 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:08.154218+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals from the sentence of 4 to 12 years imposed upon him by the trial court on his robbery conviction, after his probation was revoked. The principal issue presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant without invoking the provisions of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.1 et seq.).\nDefendant and an accomplice were indicted on 2 counts of armed robbery and 1 count of robbery. (His codefendant pleaded guilty, was sentenced and is not involved in the instant case.) Bail was fixed at *5,000 which defendant posted. Hearing was scheduled for September 24,1973, but defendant failed to appear and a forfeiture of the bond was ordered. Defendant was subsequently indicted for violation of bail bond. On October 29, 1974, he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the robbery count and to bail bond violation. At the hearing when the defendant explained to the court his participation in the robbery, the following was part of the colloquy between the court and the defendant:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Had you been on or had you taken any drugs or anything before that happened?\nTHE WITNESS [Defendant]: No, I hadn\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: And you hadn\u2019t had anything to drink?\nTHE WITNESS [Defendant]: No.\u201d\nThe presentence investigation report which was presented at the sentencing hearing on November 21, 1974, included a report of the statement of this \u201ctwenty year old black youth [defendant]\u201d that he began using drugs (\u201cshooting \u2018speed\u2019 \u2014 amphetamines\u201d) at the age of 13, and that after 2 years he began using heroin periodically. The report concluded that defendant \u201cwould be a poor candidate for probation\u201d and suggested either a \u201cwork release program or a live-in therapeutic community for young drug abusers, in Tinley Park Mental Health Center or Gateway House.\u201d The trial court sentenced defendant to a period of 3 years\u2019 probation with the first 10 months to be served in Lake County Jail under a work release program. This was in accordance with the terms of the plea bargain and was consistent with the suggestion in the probation officer\u2019s report.\nOn January 14, 1975, following a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court ordered that defendant be allowed to leave the county jail on January 15, 16 and 17, for specified four-hour periods each day to seek employment. The defendant failed to return on Friday, January 17, and the State\u2019s Attorney filed a petition to revoke defendant\u2019s probation on that ground. The defendant was returned on January 24.\nTestimony at the probation revocation hearing on January 31 disclosed that on January 17 one of the work release co-ordinators at the county jail received a telephone call from an individual who spoke \u201cincoherently,\u201d but did identify himself by spelling defendant\u2019s name correctly. The Sheriff\u2019s patrolman who \u201cpicked up\u201d defendant at the Evanston Police Department on January 23 testified that at that time defendant\u2019s speech was \u201cslurred\u201d; that the defendant had a \u201cbit of a balance-type of problem\u201d in walking; and that the defendant told him that he was \u201can addict\u201d and \u201ca sick man.\u201d The trial court found that defendant had violated his probation and proceeded to a hearing in aggravation and mitigation.\nThe defendant testified that after looking for employment on January 17 he \u201cshot\u201d some heroin, and during the next several days injected several \u201cbags\u201d of heroin, all given to him by others without payment; that during the days of his absence he stayed either at his sister\u2019s home or at the home of a friend in Evanston; that on January 23 he had made some arrangements to enter a drug rehabilitation program in Chicago but when he arrived there after 10 p.m. it was closed. In response to the judge\u2019s question he testified that he \u201cwas under the influence of drugs\u201d just before he had committed the robbery to which he pleaded guilty. Defendant\u2019s sister testified that she had made arrangements for him to enroll in a drug abuse clinic in Chicago. Rudolph Coleman, the adult probation officer assigned to this case, who was a former drug addict and who had prepared the presentence investigation report in November, 1974, testified that in his opinion defendant\u2019s dependence on drugs was more psychological than physiological, and that, if it were to be eliminated, defendant should be placed in a live-in therapeutic community for drug addicts.\nDefendant\u2019s retained counsel urged the court at that hearing, especially in the light of the court\u2019s awareness of the \u201cRobinson case\u201d (obviously a reference to People v. Robinson (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 291), \u201cwhich really went through all of the drug addiction problems,\u201d and urged that defendant be given \u201cthe structure and backing of some kind of community.\u201d The trial court, in reaching a decision recalled that when at the hearing in November, 1974, the court inquired whether the defendant had been on or taken any drugs before the robbery, the defendant answered that he \u201chadn\u2019t,\u201d while at the probation revocation hearing defendant testified that he was on drugs at that time. The trial court concluded that defendant \u201cis a liar\u201d and that \u201c[njowhere do we get any great comment about his need of drug rehabilitation until he is really in a spot\u201d; and that \u201cthis young man doesn\u2019t want to be helped or at least he has not demonstrated to this court that he wants any help.\u201d The court concluded that the only way to deny defendant access to drugs, \u201csince he can\u2019t do it voluntarily,\u201d is to incarcerate him where he can be \u201cforced to undergo such treatment as the authorities may consider proper.\u201d The court accordingly sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 4 to 12 years in the penitentiary. This appeal followed.\nInsofar as relevant here section 10 of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.10) grants discretion to the trial court, if it has reason to believe that an individual convicted of a crime is an addict or if he states that he is (and if the defendant is eligible under section 8), to \u201cadvise him that he may be placed on probation if he elects to submit 000 and is accepted for treatment\u201d by the Department of Mental Health. The defendant contends that because no specific reference was made to the Act by any of the parties or by the trial judge it does not appear that the requisite discretion was being exercised by the trial judge. The defendant is mistaken.\nBoth the argument of defendant\u2019s retained counsel and her reference to the Robinson case at the combined hearing on the petition to revoke and the sentencing, and the trial court\u2019s remarks referred to above, make it clear that counsel and the trial court were all cognizant of the Act\u2019s provisions even though it was not specifically referred to. From all the evidence the trial court exercised its discretion by declining to offer the defendant the election of submission to treatment under section 10 of the Act because defendant had proven himself unable to \u201cdo it voluntarily.\u201d In view of the circumstances of this case we are unable to say that the trial court abused the discretion reposed in it by the Act. See People v. Williams (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 362.\nFinally, the defendant contends that the sentence imposed is excessive. The trial judge in the course of all of the proceedings before him and at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation had an opportunity to consider all of the relevant factors. The defendant and his accomplice in April, 1973, committed two separate robberies of members of the United States Navy in North Chicago. From one of the sailors a wallet containing $50 was taken, after defendant held a knife at the victim\u2019s back, and from the other $100 was taken. The defendant also committed the crime of bail jumping on September 24, 1973, and was not arrested until April, 1974. To both of these he pleaded guilty. These are serious offenses.\nThe sentence imposed was within the statutorily prescribed limits. The trial court is normally in a better position than a reviewing court to make a sound determination as to the punishment to be imposed. (People v. Taylor (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 417, 424.) We are unable to say that the sentence imposed was at variance with the spirit of the law or is improper.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is therefore affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.\nThe defendant was eligible even though convicted of the offense of robbery. See People v. McCoy (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 40.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Peter B. Nolte, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Jack Hoogasian, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Phyllis J. Perko, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNo. 75-259\nOpinion filed December 14, 1976.\nRalph Ruebner and Peter B. Nolte, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJack Hoogasian, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Phyllis J. Perko, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 383, "last_page_order": 386 }