{ "id": 2814217, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN MEDLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Medley", "decision_date": "1977-01-06", "docket_number": "No. 13662", "first_page": "878", "last_page": "881", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 878" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615417 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2808135 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1498121 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/291/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404559 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 447, "char_count": 6768, "ocr_confidence": 0.881, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08469007266446808 }, "sha256": "099a6b37b08a1656b49ebf45cec190c51228629f6d3484099f94fd1ae7e4a44e", "simhash": "1:b6a0b24a6be8e8b4", "word_count": 1180 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:08.154218+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN MEDLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE REARDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn a jury trial, defendant Allen Medley was found guilty of armed robbery, a violation of section 18\u20142 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142). He was sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment term with the minimum set at 4 years and the maximum set at 7 years. The only issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in hearing and ruling upon defense counsel\u2019s motion in limine outside defendant\u2019s presence.\nDefendant and another person were charged with the May 26, 1975, armed robbery of the D & M Sandwich Shop in Springfield, Illinois. Defendant brandished a gun during the robbery in which approximately *10 to *15 was taken. A waitress, Artmintis Higgins, called the police and gave a description of the escape vehicle. A short time later, the police found a car matching the description, gave chase to the occupants, and captured the defendant.\nAt trial, Ms. Higgins positively identified the defendant and described him as being about five feet, eight inches tall. After the State had rested its case, at the request of counsel for the defendant, the trial judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel met in chambers out of the presence of the jury and the defendant, and the following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The record may show, present in chambers the counsel for the Defendant, Walter Kasten, and counsel for the People, Mr. Don Cadigan, and that this proceeding is out of the presence of the Defendant at the request of counsel for the Defendant.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have talked with the Defendant at some length and also reached the point whether to put the Defendant on the stand. Because of some things the Defendant said to me I don\u2019t want to put him on the stand even though he expressed kind of halfway desire to testify. One of the reasons I can\u2019t \u2014 don\u2019t want to put him on the stand and most important is that he\u2019s just not very smart and you [sic] have a terrible time even when I talk to him upstairs, I\u2019d have a terrible time getting answers out the information I\u2019d ask [sic] such as what color was the jacket he had on and he would take \u2014 and it would take four or five minutes to get an answer out of him. He just really slow and I\u2019m afraid that on cross examination he\u2019d become mincemeat for the State\u2019s Attorney, so I kind of hesitate to have him testify because he\u2019s liable to give some dumb answer in answering a question. He just gets confused easily and I feel if he would tear into him in asking questions, he would get anything out of him. He just answers questions and he gives the wrong answers and even those I know as to some of the answers, why, he\u2019s just lying \u2014 not lying\u2014 not lying, but gets confused. I\u2019m \u2014 I\u2019m going to, I guess, make a motion in limine, I\u2019m going to have the Defendant sworn, I\u2019m going to have him take the stand for the purpose of showing how tall he is because there\u2019s some testimony that Mrs. Higgins thought he was five eight and I think he\u2019s six foot and there\u2019s a difference of four inches and I\u2019m going to spare the Defendant to their cross examining him as to everything else.\nTHE COURT: What\u2019s your position?\n[STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY]: I would object to that, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: All right.\nYou make the motion in limine for that information and ask the Court that if it be allowed and simply have him stand and any cross examination will be limited to his height.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right.\nTHE COURT: Motion will be allowed. That will be for the purpose of direct and cross examination will be limited to the direct. He can ask him if he\u2019s ever been shorter or taller or anything of that kind, but it will be limited to that particular phase.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Reason I made this motion out of his presence, I want to put in the record what I said and didn\u2019t want to destroy the relationship we have and secondly if this goes up on appeal, they sometimes tell the Appellate Court that defense attorney [sic] didn\u2019t want me to testify and he wouldn\u2019t let me or something and I wanted to make a record so the Court \u2014 Appellate Court will know.\u201d\nWhen trial resumed, defendant took the stand, identified himself, and stood in front of the jury. The State then conducted its examination which consisted of having the defendant exhibit himself in various postures in front of the jury. The defense thereupon rested its case.\nAn accused in a criminal case has an absolute right to be present at trial. (People v. Pierce (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 361, 308 N.E.2d 577.) This right cannot be waived by his attorney. (Pierce.) An accused need not be present, however, when counsel advises the court of the defense procedure which he intends to employ and seeks and obtains in advance, assurance of the court\u2019s ruling. In such an instance, defendant\u2019s presence would be useless and, therefore, not necessary. (Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330.) The rationale of a defendant being present during his trial emanates from his right to due process but only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Where no constitutional right is at stake, there is no compelling reason or need for defendant to be present at a proceeding. People v. Breitweiser (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 349 N.E.2d 454.\nWe cannot find any infringement of defendant\u2019s substantial rights. The hearing was not held to determine if defendant should testify but rather it was to ensure that defendant\u2019s testimony and his cross-examination would be limited to simply having defendant stand and testify to his height. This was to serve to protect defendant from the perils of cross-examination. No error is alleged in this appeal as to the correctness of the court\u2019s ruling sustaining defense counsel\u2019s protective motion. Defense counsel was merely explaining his trial tactics to the court and he secured, in advance, assurance of the trial court\u2019s ruling which he believed would be in the defendant\u2019s best interests. We fail, furthermore, to see where the defendant\u2019s presence during this hearing on a motion in limine would enhance his defense (cf. People v. Van Pelt (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 311 N.E.2d 184) or deprive him of any right. Under these circumstances we find no error and affirm the conviction of defendant.\nAffirmed.\nTRAPP, P. J., and GREEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE REARDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Wilson and Barbara A. Chasnoff, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "C. Joseph Cavanagh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (J. William Roberts, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN MEDLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 13662\nOpinion filed January 6, 1977.\nRichard J. Wilson and Barbara A. Chasnoff, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nC. Joseph Cavanagh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (J. William Roberts, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0878-01", "first_page_order": 908, "last_page_order": 911 }