{
  "id": 2892548,
  "name": "THE CITY OF CREVE COEUR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRI H. PELLETIER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Creve Coeur v. Pelletier",
  "decision_date": "1977-01-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 76-125",
  "first_page": "59",
  "last_page": "61",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 59"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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      "cite": "249 N.E.2d 866",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 107",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
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    {
      "cite": "188 Ill. App. 2",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5389786
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      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/188/0002-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:00.202505+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE CITY OF CREVE COEUR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRI H. PELLETIER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Henri H. Pelletier, was convicted of violating a local traffic ordinance and fined following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County. The sole issue on appeal is whether the defendant\u2019s guilt was proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.\nAt about 4:55 p.m. on Sunday, October 19,1975, defendant was driving southbound through the City of Creve Coeur on a rural four-lane public highway. Because of road construction the posted speed limit had been temporarily reduced from 55 m.p.h. to 40 m.p.h., although no construction work was taking place at this time. At 1000 South Main in Creve Coeur, Officer Thatcher clocked defendant\u2019s car on radar at a speed of 54 m.p.h. and proceeded to issue him a speeding citation.\nAt trial defendant testified that the construction zone was of limited size, and the change in the posted speed limit occurred abruptly as he entered the construction area. Defendant conceded his speed in the construction area was between 50 m.p.h. and 55 m.p.h., but stated he was merely keeping up with traffic and that he was afraid if he applied his brakes the sudden reduction in speed would create a traffic hazard. The trial court found defendant guilty of speeding in violation of a local ordinance and fined him $14 plus *5 court costs.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that although he was driving in excess of the posted speed limit, the threat of an accident constituted an extenuating circumstance which entitled him to a verdict of not guilty on the speeding charge. This contention has no merit whatsoever.\nA rule of absolute liability has evolved in cases involving the violation of a municipal speeding ordinance. (People v. Thexton (2d Dist. 1914), 188 Ill. App. 2; 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles And Highway Traffic \u00a7193, n. 17 (1971); see People v. Espenscheid (3d Dist. 1969), 109 Ill. App. 2d 107, 249 N.E.2d 866.) Accordingly, the trial court here properly refused to consider defendant\u2019s reasons for faffing to reduce his speed an adequate defense to the charge.\nSection 11 \u2014 604 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95*2, par. 11 \u2014 604) empowers local authorities to declare by ordinance a reasonable and safe maximum speed limit which is greater or less than that prescribed in the Code when warranted by considerations of public safety. In the instant case we note that the speed limit had been temporarily reduced due to a road construction project. In light of this circumstance, we conclude that the City\u2019s speeding ordinance was a reasonable and proper exercise of its power under section 11 \u2014 604 of the Code.\nHaving thus determined that defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of his arrest for speeding is irrelevant and that the City\u2019s speeding ordinance was lawful, we must finally decide whether defendant was proved guilty by a clear preponderance of the evidence.\nWe note that defendant was not convicted of violating any State law, but rather was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance. Convictions for municipal ordinance violations are to be established by a clear preponderance of the evidence and do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chicago v. Joyce (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 289.) The enforcement of an ordinance by a municipality is not a criminal proceeding which falls under the criminal code and therefore the rule is that a prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance to recover a fine or penalty from a defendant, while quasi-criminal in nature, is civil in form and is tried and reviewed as a civil proceeding and not as a criminal prosecution. Highland Park v. Curtis (2d Dist. 1967), 83 Ill. App. 2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870.\nFurthermore, in a bench trial, the determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters for the trial judge. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we hold defendant\u2019s admission that he was speeding coupled with the fact that he was radar timed at a speed of 54 m.p.h., sufficient to establish his guilt by a clear preponderance of the evidence.\nAccordingly, the judgment of conviction of the Tazewell County Circuit Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Henri H. Pelletier, of Pekin, pro se.",
      "Michael J. Mathis, of Peoria, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE CITY OF CREVE COEUR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRI H. PELLETIER, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 76-125\nOpinion filed January 11, 1977.\nHenri H. Pelletier, of Pekin, pro se.\nMichael J. Mathis, of Peoria, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0059-01",
  "first_page_order": 89,
  "last_page_order": 91
}