{ "id": 2896152, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO LIMAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Limas", "decision_date": "1977-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 76-27", "first_page": "643", "last_page": "652", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 643" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856749 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865469 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2925142 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589-590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2547170 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/377/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 717", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168553, 6168395, 6168787, 6168309, 6168477 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0717-05", "/us/326/0717-03", "/us/326/0717-06", "/us/326/0717-02", "/us/326/0717-04" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2504243 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/389/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857886 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5382518 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2825352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850235 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12123628 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3327057 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/226/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311989 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2581036 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1577217 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/125/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 1009", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526489 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822307 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393764 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5297496 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/63/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708271 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2802161 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2795757 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857193 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0489-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 944, "char_count": 21324, "ocr_confidence": 0.878, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.103966902678998e-07, "percentile": 0.9098115372749531 }, "sha256": "94f1c194d2719cdc0dea9f2ffbabec34ebb54dfd27b75a4eb74603185335e6dd", "simhash": "1:bbc6fc8ba606a06b", "word_count": 3538 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:00.202505+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO LIMAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Lorenzo Limas, was indicted for the offense of murder. The jury rejected his claims of self-defense and insanity and found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The court thereupon sentenced him to a term of not less than 14 nor more than 20 years in the penitentiary. The defendant appeals contending that (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to admit an artificial penis found on the victim\u2019s body, and certain evidence relating to the character and reputation of the victim, into evidence, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding testimony of the defendant regarding his fear for his life and reasons for carrying a weapon, and (3) the court improperly limited defense counsel\u2019s examination of prosecution and defense psychiatrists, and that (4) the trial court violated the one-third rule of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c)(3)) and committed an abuse of discretion when it set defendant\u2019s minimum sentence in excess of the statutory minimum of one year.\nIt is undisputed that the defendant killed Frank Lima by shooting him four times at close range with a .22-caliber revolver. The defendant testified that on the evening of February 21,1972, he, Luna and a number of others had been drinking, talking and dancing at the apartment of a woman named Lourdes McVey. The defendant had never previously met Luna. According to the defendant, Luna asked him to go downstairs and talk. At about 10 p.m., Luna left the apartment, and the defendant followed. The defendant testified that as he began descending the stairs from the apartment, he looked back and saw Lourdes McVey making a gesture to him from the sofa, which he interpreted to be a warning that Luna was armed with a knife. He stated that when he and Luna reached the bottom landing of the stairs, Luna grabbed the defendant\u2019s hand and attempted to pull it toward his own groin; the defendant reacted by pushing Luna away. Luna then attempted to strike him; he fended off the \u2022blow with his arm, but received a glancing blow on his cheek which knocked him against the wall. The defendant testified that he then observed Luna \u201cgoing for something, to pull something,\u201d that he \u201cgot scared\u201d and \u201cjust pulled [his] gun and shot\u201d Luna.\nApart from the defendant, Lourdes McVey was the only eyewitness to testify. She denied making any gesture or signal to the defendant as he left the apartment. She stated that she was at the top of the stairway as Luna and the defendant left, and did not see any pushing or sudden movements prior to the shooting.\nAt trial, the defense called psychiatrist Dr. Marvin Ziporyn. Dr. Ziporyn expressed the opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental condition known as paranoia vera. He explained that a person with this mental condition believes that he is either being persecuted or has delusions of grandeur; however, unlike other mental conditions, in the case of paranoia vera, the individual does not appear to be irrational. Instead, the mental illness is \u201ccircumscribed and well encapsulated\u201d so as to only manifest itself in certain areas of an individual\u2019s life. When these aspects or areas of the individual\u2019s life are not involved, he appears to be quite integrated.\nDefense counsel\u2019s examination of Dr. Ziporyn was limited by certain trial court rulings. After stating that, during his examination of the defendant, the defendant was cooperative \u201cexcept when the material touched on certain areas,\u201d Dr. Ziporyn was asked \u201cwhat those areas were.\u201d Dr. Ziporyn was also asked to recount any statements which the defendant had made, regarding the shooting, and \u201cany comments\u201d of the defendant which enabled him to render his diagnosis. Finally, he was asked whether he felt that the shooting \u201cis connected with\u201d the defendant\u2019s mental disease, and whether the defendant\u2019s \u201cinability to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law is connected to his mental disease.\u201d In each case, prosecution objections on various grounds were sustained. The defendant argues on appeal that these rulings improperly limited the presentation of his insanity defense.\nWe begin by noting that Dr. Ziporyn was concededly an \u201cexamining\u201d psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant for the purpose of giving testimony at trial. In Illinois, a psychiatrist who examines a patient merely for the purpose of qualifying as a witness ordinarily may not testify as to his professional opinions when they are based upon the patient\u2019s description of subjective symptoms; in such a case, it has been held proper to limit the testimony to hypothetical questions (People v. Hester (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 489,510.) It is also held that the trial court \u201cshould be given considerable discretion in the rejection or reception of such evidence.\u201d (People v. Hester, at 510.) Thus, in Hester, the trial court was held not to have abused its discretion when it refused to allow the defense psychiatrist to give his opinion of the defendant\u2019s susceptibility to a dictated confession, since he was an \u201cexamining\u201d physician, and the opinion would have been based on a case history given to him by the defendant. People v. Hester, at 509-10.\nIn the case at bar, the record will not support a finding that the court abused its discretion in limiting the defendant\u2019s examination of his psychiatric witness. In fact, it appears that Dr. Ziporyn was granted a fair degree of latitude in his testimony. He testified that the \u201cparticular delusional world\u201d of the defendant was his \u201cfeeling that he was disliked by a large segment of people\u201d; that the defendant felt that \u201cthere were a number of people who wished him ill for no particular reason\u201d and that \u201cthese people were so threatening to him to make him feel that his life was in jeopardy\u201d; \u201c [c] consequently, he was in the habit of going armed and he felt this was * * * simply a mechanism of self defense * * Dr. Ziporyn further testified, over the State\u2019s objection, that in his opinion, the defendant\u2019s \u201cattitude toward people in general\u201d and his \u201chostility\u201d was \u201cconnected with\u201d his mental illness. Dr. Ziporyn expressed an opinion that the defendant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law under certain circumstances, and that he had this mental disease at the time of the shooting. Thus, the defendant\u2019s examination of Dr. Ziporyn went considerably beyond purely hypothetical questions. We cannot hold that in refusing to allow Dr. Ziporyn to act as a further conduit for narrative declarations by the defendant, or to answer the ultimate question of whether the defendant\u2019s acts on the occasion in question were \u201cconnected with\u201d his mental illness, the trial court abused its discretion.\nA court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Werner Tuteur, was called as a rebuttal witness by the prosecution, and expressed the opinion that the defendant was not suffering from paranoia vera. On cross-examination, the defendant\u2019s counsel attempted to ask Dr. Tuteur whether he would seek another interview with the defendant if he had the benefit of reports which were at variance with his findings; prosecution objections to the question were sustained. The defendant now contends that these rulings were erroneous. However, this contention was not raised in defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. Nor was the point raised by counsel for the defendant in oral argument at the hearing on the post-trial motion. Under these circumstances, the point must be considered to have been waived. People v. Rogers (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 788, 789-90.\nThe defendant asserts that certain evidentiary rulings during the defense counsel\u2019s direct examination of the defendant substantially prejudiced him in the presentment of his insanity defense. Defense counsel asked the defendant if anyone had ever threatened his life, if he was in fear of his life, and a number of related questions. In each case, the prosecution successfully objected. The defendant argues that the excluded answers would have supported defense psychiatrist Ziporyn\u2019s diagnosis of paranoia vera.\nIt appears from the record that the defendant succeeded in eliciting the same evidence during cross-examination of police sergeant Garza, who testified that he knew that the defendant was in fear of his fife, that the defendant\u2019s brother had been shot and killed within a year of the trial, and that the defendant felt that the persons who killed his brother might \u201ccome after him.\u201d The rejection of evidence is not prejudicial where substantially the same evidence is admitted at some subsequent stage of the trial. (People v. Wallenberg (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 350, 352-53; People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 494, 529.) Here the evidence which counsel failed to elicit from the defendant actually reached the jury in the form of uncontroverted testimony from Sergeant Garza.\nThe defendant also argues that the court committed reversible error when it refused to admit certain testimony regarding the character and reputation of the victim, Luna, into evidence. The defense effort to show Luna\u2019s character consisted of questions propounded to a number of witnesses regarding whether the witness \u201chad any knowledge of Luna\u2019s sexual activities,\u201d whether Luna was \u201cknown to [the witness] by reputation,\u201d and whether the witness \u201cknew if Mr. Luna was ever convicted of any crime in this country\u201d; prosecution objections to this line of questioning were sustained. The defendant now urges that this evidence was properly admissible to support his contention that Luna was an \u201caggressive homosexual\u201d who sexually attacked him and forced him to defend himself.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel failed to make any offer of proof after the trial court sustained objections to his various questions regarding Lima\u2019s character. It is not clear what answers the witnesses would have given, or that their testimony would have been relevant or material. It is well established that as a general rule an offer of proof must be made if the exclusion of evidence is to be assigned as error. (E.g., People v. Novak (1965), 63 Ill. App. 2d 433, 438.) On this basis alone, defendant\u2019s contention regarding the admission of evidence of Luna\u2019s character and reputation must be rejected.\nFurther, we are not convinced that Luna\u2019s alleged reputation as a homosexual was relevant to the issues before the court. Where a claim of self-defense is presented, and evidence has been introduced from which the jury could conclude that the deceased was the assailant, evidence of the violent disposition of the deceased, or threats directed at the defendant by the deceased, is admissible to show the circumstances confronting the defendant, the extent of his apparent danger and the motive which influenced him. (People v. Stombaugh (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 130, 138-139; People v. Davis (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 127,129-130.) Here, however, notwithstanding defense counsel\u2019s description of Luna as an \u201caggressive\u201d homosexual, no evidence was tendered to show that Luna had a violent disposition, and no evidence was offered to show that the defendant had any knowledge of Luna\u2019s disposition (violent or otherwise). Certainly the fact, if it was a fact, that Luna had a reputation for homosexuality had no per se relevance. (See People v. Parisie (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009; People v. Herron (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 18.) Under these circumstances there was no error in the court\u2019s refusal to admit this evidence.\nThe defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to admit an artificial penis discovered on Luna\u2019s body at the hospital after the shooting, into evidence. The defendant maintains that the artificial penis serves to corroborate his story that he was the victim of a homosexual attack, and that Luna \u201creached for something\u201d in his belt. At trial, the State successfully contended that the admission of the penis would arouse \u201cprejudicial emotion\u201d among the jurors.\nOn appeal, the State contends that this issue has been waived, since the defendant never made a formal offer of proof regarding the testimony which Scott Leahey, the hospital orderly, would give. Yet the record clearly discloses that the judge and all parties understood that Leahey would testify that he found the artificial penis on Luna\u2019s body after the body was removed to the hospital for examination. An offer of proof is unnecessary where the trial judge understands the objection and the character of the evidence, but will not admit it. (Schuster v. Fletcher (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 249, 253.) Such was clearly the case here.\nIt has been held that evidence having a natural tendency to establish the facts in controversy should be admitted, even though it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the jury. (People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 177; People v. Jenko (1952), 410 Ill. 478.) Where exhibits having little' probative value are tendered for the purpose of arousing prejudicial emotions, they should be excluded. (People v. Speck.) In People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 177, 203, the court, quoting from People v. Jenko (1952), 410 Ill. 478, said:\n\u201c \u2018But questions relating to the character of the evidence offered, and the manner and extent of its presentation, are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse to the prejudice of the defendant.\u2019 \u201d\nIn the instant case, we are not convinced that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit the artificial penis. There was no showing that an individual with such a device on his person was more likely to be an aggressor. There was no showing that the artificial penis was in such a position on Luna\u2019s person as to render it possible that a movement by Luna to grasp the artificial penis could be interpreted by the defendant as an attempt to pull out a knife or weapon, nor was there any evidence that Luna contemplated such a movement. The defendant\u2019s testimony was that he saw Luna \u201cgo for something\u201d after the alleged struggle between the two had already begun, with the defendant pushing Luna away and Luna attempting to strike him. It would be difficult to imagine how the jury could have drawn any inference that Luna was reaching for an artificial penis under these circumstances, and no such argument was presented at trial. Thus, the trial judge could reasonably have concluded that the penis would not assist the jury in reaching its determination, but would merely provide a distraction prejudicial to the real issues in the case.\nFurther, we are persuaded that any error in the rejection of testimony regarding Luna\u2019s character and reputation, or in the court\u2019s refusal to admit the artificial penis, was harmless, in view of the fact that the jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. It was undisputed that the defendant fired four shots into Luna at close range, causing death. In order to have returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, the jury must have found either that the defendant was acting under \u201csudden and intense passion\u201d resulting from \u201cserious provocation,\u201d or that he actually, but unreasonably, believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to preserve him from imminent death or great bodily harm. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2.) Thus, to reach such a verdict, the jury must have substantially accepted the defendant\u2019s testimony regarding the struggle on the stair landing.\nThe defendant argues that, had the rejected evidence been admitted, the jury could have found him not guilty by reason of self-defense. The record does not support this contention. Under section 7 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 1) a person is justified in the use of force intended to cause death or great bodily harm only where the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm; where the actor\u2019s apprehension is reasonable under all of the circumstances, the use of deadly force may be justified even though the danger is only apparent, and not real. Morello v. People (1907), 226 Ill. 388,397; People v. Johnson (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 165, 171-172,\nHere it was conceded that Luna had never threatened the defendant, and indeed, that the defendant had not previously known Luna. The only evidence which was offered or admitted with any bearing on whether or not the defendant believed his life to be at peril, consisted of his testimony that Lourdes McVey made a gesture which he understood to mean that Luna had a knife, and that Luna reached for something in his belt, just before the shooting.\nThe description of the gesture given at trial appears to have been somewhat vague, and defendant\u2019s demonstration of the gesture in the video tape statement which he gave the police, and which was introduced at trial, without objection, gives no clear indication that the gesture could reasonably have been interpreted to mean that Luna had a knife. Lourdes McVey denied making any gesture at all, and also denied seeing any pushing, shoving or striking between Luna and the defendant prior to the shooting. Perhaps she made a movement to bid the defendant farewell. In any event, the record is devoid of anything, other than the defendant\u2019s subjective understanding of the movement, which would provide an objective basis for his belief that it was intended as a warning.\nSimilarly, the only basis for the defendant\u2019s belief that Luna was attempting to \u201cpull a knife\u201d was his own subjective interpretation of a movement by Luna, coupled with his earlier subjective interpretation of Lourdes McVey\u2019s purported gesture. Thus, his belief that his life was in danger was solely supported by products of his own imagination. The weight required to justify the erroneous taking of a human life on the basis of self-defense may not be carried by so slender a thread. See People v. Johnson (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 165; People v. Peeler (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 940.\nThis holding finds further support in the fact that the defendant shot Luna no less than four times. It is clear that the defendant could not have reasonably continued to fear death or great bodily harm after Luna was struck by the first bullet, yet he continued to fire; clearly, \u201c[a] person \u2018is not justified in shooting or employing a deadly weapon against his antagonist after the latter has been disarmed or disabled\u2019 (People v. McBride (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 201, 208, 264 N.E.2d 446).\u201d (People v. Pitchford (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 182,189.) Thus, the defendant failed to offer evidence which would have warranted the jury in finding that his shooting of Luna was justified, and the trial court\u2019s rejection of certain of the evidence which was offered did not, therefore, affect the outcome of the case. Where error has not affected the outcome, a judgment will not be set aside by a court of review. People v. Helm (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 39, 47; People v. Mormon (1944), 389 Ill. 19, 34, cert, denied, 326 U.S. 717; People v. Jersky (1941), 377 Ill. 261, 269.\nFinally, the defendant contends and the State concedes that the sentence imposed by the trial court violated the \u201cone-third rule\u201d of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c)(3)) which provides that:\n\u201c(3) for a Class 2 felony, the minimum term shall be 1 year unless the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of defendant, sets a higher minimum term, which shall not be greater than one-third of the maximum term set in that case by the court; * \u00b0\nThe trial court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the existing law. However, since that time, the legislature has indicated that cases not yet finally adjudicated are to benefit from the new, lower sentences, section 8 \u2014 2\u20144, Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1008 \u2014 2\u20144), and the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that section 8 \u2014 2\u20144 applies to cases pending on appeal. (People v. Harvey (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 585, 589-590.) We therefore hold that the defendant\u2019s minimum sentence must be reduced to 6 years and 8 months. However, we reject the defendant\u2019s contention that the sentence should be further reduced. The imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion, and it does not appear that a sentence of 6 years and 8 months to 20 years constitutes a manifest abuse of that discretion. People v. Bonner (1967) 37 Ill. 2d 553, 563; People v. Caldwell (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 346, 355-56.\nThe judgment of conviction of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for resentencing.\nJudgment affirmed in part; remanded with directions.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Joshua Sachs, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Stephen M. Dietz and Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO LIMAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-27\nOpinion filed February 4, 1977.\nRalph Ruebner and Joshua Sachs, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Stephen M. Dietz and Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0643-01", "first_page_order": 673, "last_page_order": 682 }