{ "id": 2972922, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD CLARK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Clark", "decision_date": "1977-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 76-18", "first_page": "240", "last_page": "246", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 240" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "270 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907396 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 1020", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6459365, 6459497, 6459691, 6460108, 6459852, 6459917, 6460015, 6459608, 6460218, 6459162, 6459261, 6459775 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/1020-03", "/us/404/1020-04", "/us/404/1020-06", "/us/404/1020-11", "/us/404/1020-08", "/us/404/1020-09", "/us/404/1020-10", "/us/404/1020-05", "/us/404/1020-12", "/us/404/1020-01", "/us/404/1020-02", "/us/404/1020-07" ] }, { "cite": "270 N.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905952 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 F.2d 1156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 621363 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/530/1156-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 F.2d 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2216640 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/435/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 294", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336837 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 F.2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3686572, 124284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/165/0105-01", "/f2d/506/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7544.155", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Ann. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "458 F.2d 680", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 728846 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/458/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.W.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10120785 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/522/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Kan. 954", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 61017 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/208/0954-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 N.E.2d 1007", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5622190 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/297/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 821737 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/77/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967601 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0057-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 779, "char_count": 14270, "ocr_confidence": 0.873, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6271686856657227e-07, "percentile": 0.8218774530870333 }, "sha256": "6506f849d2e42cc20cffa078b0c636d73d74d0d4a44cf128f0c8b8056c17e22b", "simhash": "1:a3c4e41992bf5df0", "word_count": 2376 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:39.078190+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD CLARK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Gerald Clark was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery and a lesser included felony theft in the circuit court of Alexander County. The court entered judgment only on the armed robbery and imposed a sentence of 8 to 20 years in the penitentiary. Defendant presents three issues for review: (1) Whether his arrest in Missouri and the subsequent search of Ips truck was lawful under the theory of \u201chot pursuit\u201d; (2) whether the court erred in ordering defendant\u2019s sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated, but as yet unimposed, term of imprisonment in Oklahoma; and (3) whether the sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded because the judgment order is too vague to effect a consecutive term of imprisonment.\nAt approximately 3:06 p.m. on May 23, 1975, the dispatcher of the Cairo Police Department received a telephone call from an employee of Rye\u2019s Jewelry Store in Cairo concerning an armed robbery that had just occurred. Accompanied by two other police officers, Cairo Detective Steve Thomas proceeded downtown toward the store. Detective Thomas radioed Kentucky Police and asked them to seal off the bridge leading from Illinois to Kentucky. While still enroute to the scene, the officers were notified that the robbery suspects had left the area via a one-way street leading to the main highway in a white International pickup truck. The suspects were described as a juvenile, a white male, and a male dressed as a female.\nAfter receiving this later report, Cairo authorities contacted their Missouri counterparts in Poplar Bluff, Missouri, which is over 10 miles from the Illinois border. After being informed that no Missouri trooper was in the immediate area, the Cairo policemen proceeded south over the bridge into Missouri in pursuit of the suspects. Seven miles into Missouri the suspect vehicle was sighted and stopped by the Cairo Police. Defendant and two other men were taken into custody at about 3:23 p.m.\nDuring the arrest of the suspects, Cairo Police seized several items, including a gun identified as the robbery weapon, and a blue metal box taken from the jewelry store. This box contained a $300 diamond ring, a $35 watch and a $350 coin collection. These items were identified as property taken from the jewelry store at gunpoint. Defendant\u2019s motion to quash the arrest and to suppress all evidence seized incidental to the arrest was denied by the trial court on the ground that the arrest and seizure of the evidence was lawful under the doctrine of \u201chot pursuit.\u201d\nThe evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, while dressed in women\u2019s clothing and armed with a gun, robbed the jewelry store.\nDefendant contends that the court erred in refusing to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof. In particular, he asserts that the circumstances of the arrest fail to evidence \u201chot pursuit\u201d as a matter of law.\nIn Illinois the police powers that may be exercised by municipalities are statutorily outlined in the following language:\n\u201cThe territory which is embraced within the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within any county in this State shall be a police district.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 4\u20147.\n\u201cThe police of any municipality in such a police district may go into any part of the district to suppress a riot, to preserve the peace, and to protect the Uves, rights, and property of citizens.\nFor these purposes the mayor of any municipality in the district, and the chiefs of police therein, shall use the police forces under their control anywhere in the district.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 4\u20148.)\nIn addition, section 107 \u2014 5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that \u201c[a]n arrest may be made anywhere within the jurisdiction of this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 5(c).) Furthermore, it has been held that an arrest warrant issued by an Illinois court of proper jurisdiction may be executed by an Illinois police officer anywhere in the State. People v. Carnivale, 61 Ill. 2d 57, 329 N.E.2d 193.\nBut the foregoing statutes and case law do not abrogate the general common law rule that municipal peace officers have no authority to make a warrantless arrest outside the political entity in which they hold office. (See People v. Carnivale.) The sole exception to this rule arises when the officer is engaged in \u201chot\u201d or \u201cfresh pursuit.\u201d (Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 297 Ill. App. 417, 17 N.E.2d 1007.) \u201cFresh pursuit\u201d is defined by statute in Illinois as the \u201cimmediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 4(a)(3).\nSince there is authority for the proposition that the validity of an arrest without a warrant for State offenses is determined by the law of the State in which the arrest occurred, and since the arrest in this case took place in the State of Missouri, we think it is necessary to review the applicable laws of that State to determine if a different rule should apply. (See State v. Tillman, 208 Kan. 954, 494 P.2d 1178 (1972); State v. Morris, 522 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1975); Keeny v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1972).) The doctrine of \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d in Missouri is governed by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law. The applicable Missouri statute gives \u201c[a]ny member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States # * the same authority to arrest * * * [as any law enforcement official of Missouri].\u201d (Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7544.155 (Vernon 1951).) The term \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d as used in the statute \u201cshall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay * * * \u201d and \u201cincludes fresh pursuit as defined by the common law 6 \u2022 \u00b0.\u201d Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7544.155 (Vernon 1951).\nThus, it is apparent that under both Illinois and Missouri law the arrest in this case can be sustained only if it fits within the definition of \u201cfresh pursuit.\u201d Of course, whether defendant\u2019s arrest was valid under the doctrine of fresh pursuit must be determined by the circumstances of this particular case.\nIn this case the Cairo police officers had a description of both the defendant and his companions and of the vehicle in which they were making their getaway. The police had reason to believe that the robbers were heading south out of town. They had knowledge that the bridge into Kentucky was blocked off and that the suspects were still at large when the officers reached the Missouri border. The police officers were also clearly aware that there were only two main roads leading south out of town. They had taken the precaution of setting up a road block on the main exit to the north of Cairo. Only 17 minutes elapsed from the time the police were informed of the crime until they apprehended the defendant and his companions seven miles into Missouri. In light of the foregoing facts, we are persuaded that the pursuit by the Cairo officers possessed the requisite qualities of immediacy. Consequently, we find that the arrest of defendant was within the \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d exception not only to the municipal jurisdiction rule but also to the arrest warrant requirement and was therefore lawful.\nDefendant places a great deal of reliance on the statement in the recent case of United States v. Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that \u201cspeed and continuous knowledge of the 0 * * perpetrator\u2019s whereabouts are the elements which underpin this exception to the warrant requirement.\u201d (506 F.2d 166, 173.) Defendant argues that the Cairo police had no \u201ccontinuous knowledge\u201d of his whereabouts and hence could not have arrested him in fresh pursuit. Detective Thomas, by his own testimony, had no actual knowledge that defendant had crossed the State line into Missouri.\nIn support of its \u201ccontinuous knowledge\u201d requirement the court in Lindsay cited Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967), and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). However, we do not read either Hayden or Dorman as supporting the second element of \u201chot pursuit\u201d set forth in Lindsay. In Hayden, the United States Supreme Court found a warrantless arrest lawful due to the \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d involved in the pursuit of a suspected felon. In so doing, the Court stressed the element of immediacy of pursuit. Dorman provides a test for the circumstances justifying a warrantless entry of a house to make an arrest and creates an exception to the arrest warrant requirement independent of the \u201chot pursuit\u201d exception. Neither of these cases specifically discusses the continuous knowledge of the alleged perpetrator\u2019s whereabouts as essential to a determination of \u201chot pursuit.\u201d\nNor does the case of State v. Tillman, 208 Kan. 954, 494 P.2d 1178 (1972), also cited by defendant, consider this factor crucial. In that case three escaping robbers were observed and followed by a private citizen in his car across the border between Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri. Before undertaking the pursuit, the citizen had directed his wife to notify the police that he was following the getaway car. The robbers abandoned their car in Kansas City, Missouri, and the citizen immediately telephoned both the Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri, police. By the time the Kansas officers had arrived at the place where the car had been abandoned, the Missouri police had already checked out the license number of the getaway car and determined it to be a rented car. The Kansas police officers went first to the address of the individual in whose name the car was rented and \u201cstaked out\u201d his home for 15 to 20 minutes. They were then advised to proceed to the rental agency, where two of the men who had rented the car had just been observed. There, the victim of the robbery, who had accompanied the Kansas officers, identified the men as two of the robbers. The Kansas police took the two defendants into custody and awaited the arrival of the Missouri police, who re-arrested the defendants. The Tillman court had no hesitancy in concluding that the circumstances in that case clearly showed \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d within the meaning of the Missouri statute. The pursuit was said to be continuous, uninterrupted and without unreasonable delay. Thus, the court found the arrest was valid since the police had actual knowledge that the robbery had been committed and since two of the defendants were identified by the victim prior to their arrest at the car rental agency.\nOther recent decisions also fail to support the \u201ccontinuous knowledge\u201d requirement of Lindsay. For example, in United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1976), the court concluded that the warrantless arrest by officers outside their municipal jurisdiction was justified under the Louisiana \u201cclose pursuit\u201d statute. In Bishop, bank robbers in Shreveport had stolen several packets of marked money, one of which was fitted by bank personnel with a small transmitter. A Shreveport police vehicle followed the suspects by reception of the tracking signal. Although the getaway car was lost momentarily, the police were able to follow the vehicle across the bridge into another Louisiana city. A companion Shreveport police car effected the apprehension and arrest of the robbers by responding to radioed directions given by the tracking vehicle.\nFrom our reading of all the above cases, we do not believe that the continuous surveillance of a fleeing suspect or the uninterrupted knowledge of his whereabouts is requisite to a finding of \u201chot\u201d or \u201cfresh pursuit.\u201d The pursuit in this case was continuous, uninterrupted and without unreasonable delay. In many instances the police or others may lose track of the fleeing felon momentarily or for longer times. Whether or not the pursuer can regain the trail and overtake his quarry depends on quick action and knowledge of the probable course of flight. Hence, we cannot say that the doctrine of \u201chot pursuit\u201d demands the element of continuous knowledge urged by the defendant.\nThe remaining issues for our consideration involve the defendant\u2019s sentencing by the trial court. The order of the court in sentencing the defendant stated:\n\u201cThe term of imprisonment ordered herein shall run consecutive to any term of imprisonment ordered by the Circuit or District Court of any sister state.\u201d\nBecause the defendant was on parole from an Oklahoma penitentiary at the time of this offense, he would potentially be subject to a sentence of imprisonment in that State for violation of parole.\nIn its brief the People concede error on this point and we agree. Our supreme court has held that an Illinois circuit court judge has no power to impose a sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated, but as yet unimposed, sentence in another jurisdiction. (People ex rel. Fleming v. Pate, 48 Ill. 2d 426, 270 N.E.2d 4, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020.) Rather, it is the prerogative of the corut which imposes the second sentence to determine the effect of the already imposed Illinois sentence. (People ex rel. Fleming v. Pate.) To do otherwise is violative of an Illinois defendant\u2019s right to due process of law. (People ex rel. O\u2019Connor v. Bensinger, 48 Ill. 2d 440, 270 N.E.2d 1.) The consecutive sentence imposed in this case falls squarely within the proscriptions noted above. For this reason we modify the sentencing order by striking that part which directs the sentence to be served consecutively. Because of this modification, we need not and do not address defendant\u2019s final contention which requests the same relief.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Alexander County is affirmed as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nJONES and EBERSPACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Rosborough and John H. Reid, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon and Peter Stragand, research assistant, for appellant.", "James A. Flummer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cairo (Bruce D. Irish and Roger R. Kasny, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 76-18\nOpinion filed March 4, 1977.\nMichael J. Rosborough and John H. Reid, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon and Peter Stragand, research assistant, for appellant.\nJames A. Flummer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cairo (Bruce D. Irish and Roger R. Kasny, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0240-01", "first_page_order": 270, "last_page_order": 276 }