{ "id": 2970570, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES W. SPANI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Spani", "decision_date": "1977-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 76-211", "first_page": "777", "last_page": "780", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 777" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2780899 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2641253 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0308-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 484, "char_count": 8136, "ocr_confidence": 0.874, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.785198741978647e-07, "percentile": 0.7141032160562256 }, "sha256": "d18582bf7ce52c7aa24aea0d11fc887935e5fd10a22364afbd1d67530f30fc8d", "simhash": "1:c843ebc87201a5b8", "word_count": 1382 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:39.078190+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES W. SPANI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCharles W. Spani, the defendant, after a bench trial was found guilty by the Circuit Court of Tazewell County with having committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more than three years in the penitentiary. The defendant testified that the events which resulted in his conviction commenced during the evening hours of March 9,1975, at which time he was frequenting a place of business known as the Catt-A-Club. While at the club the defendant met a 38-year-old woman known as \u201cLillie Mae\u201d and hereinafter referred to as the victim. The victim was accompanied by her young daughter and as the evening progressed a suggestion was made that all of them would go to the victim\u2019s apartment. This suggestion was agreed to and the defendant drove to the apartment; however, before he left his automobile he removed from the glove compartment of his car a pistol which he placed on his person. The defendant testified that he had borrowed the gun sometime previously since he needed it to obtain the return of a liquor decanter, to-wit, a \u201cJim Beam\u201d bottle which had been taken from him. The defendant further testified that he took the gun into the apartment with him for protection in the event he encountered therein a boyfriend or husband. While at the apartment the defendant and the victim continued to drink and eventually the daughter of the victim, a little girl, was put to bed. It was ultimately decided that the defendant and the victim would go to bed; however, before doing so the defendant started to go to the bathroom, then remembering the pistol, removed it from his waistband and proceeded to lay it on the table when it discharged and the victim was shot in the head. This is the defendant\u2019s version in regard to the fatal shot; however, prior to his trial he stated that he had pointed the gun at the head of the victim, which was lying on the table, and that the gun discharged. Following the shooting the defendant took the little girl, the daughter of the victim, to his girl friend\u2019s house. He also remained there until 4:45 a.m. at which time he bundled up the little girl and returned with her to the apartment of the victim, but being unable to gain entrance because of the door being locked he returned the child to his friend\u2019s house. He then stopped at the Catt-A-Club for a beer, after which he proceeded to the police station and explained to the officers present what had occurred.\nWhen talking to the police personnel the defendant on several occasions referred to the shooting as an accident and on one occasion stated that he was drunk and didn\u2019t mean to shoot the victim. The defendant surrendered the pistol to the police and accompanied by several officers returned to the victim\u2019s apartment. It was necessary to force entry into the apartment and after this was accomplished they found the victim\u2019s body slumped over a table.\nA firearms examiner for the Illinois Bureau of Identification examined the pistol which the defendant had turned over to the police. Among the tests performed was one in which he cocked the gun and banged it on-a table fifteen or twenty times in an attempt to make it fire. In this attempt the examiner was unsuccessful even though he used sufficient force to break the weapon\u2019s handle. Further tests determined that the trigger pull was approximately 10 pounds, which was characterized as a strong pull. It was the expert\u2019s opinion that the bullet found in the victim\u2019s body had been fired by the weapon surrendered by the defendant to the police.\nThere was unrefuted testimony adduced that the weapon had a right hand ejection aperture and counsel for the defense argued that in light of where the shell casing was found in the victim\u2019s apartment the gun would have had to have been on its side when it was discharged.\nDuring the trial it was conceded by all the investigating officers that the defendant was quite cooperative.\nThe first issue presented in this appeal is that the victim met her death by misadventure and that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the offense of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOur initial reaction is that the trial court as a trier of fact in a criminal prosecution is peculiarly suited to determine questions of truthfulness and a reviewing court should not readily substitute its own conclusion unless the proof is so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt. We are also cognizant of the rule that a criminal defendant is not required to testify but if he does his testimony will be judged by its improbabilities. (See People v. Rollins (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 308, 356 N.E.2d 124.) Should we have followed this initial reaction then the judgment of the trial court would have been affirmed; however, we find that the record in this case will not support an affirmance.\nThe defense of the defendant was that the death of the victim was the result of a misadventure, or in other words an accident. A detective of the East Peoria Police Department testified at a coroner\u2019s inquest that the shooting was accidental and reiterated this opinion during the course of the defendant\u2019s trial. We, however, are not disposed to analyze the evidence adduced during the course of the trial since we are far more concerned with the trial judge\u2019s remarks and observations. During the course of the defendant\u2019s trial the court stated:\n\u201c* \u201d # Well, I think this was an accident. Isn\u2019t that what involuntary manslaughter is all about \u2014 it was an accident?\u201d\nAgain during the course of the trial the court made the following remarks:\n\u201cI am not willing to accept, at this time, that calling it an accident answers the question. I think there may have been some sloppy language in the Supreme Court decision \u2014 on calling it an accident doesn\u2019t mean that he is not guilty of involuntary manslaughter because that is what involuntary manslaughter is all about \u2014 is an accident \u2014 something people didn\u2019t intend. e \u201d \u201d\u201d\nDuring the sentencing hearing the court offered the following comments:\n\u201cAt that time [referring to the trial] and at this time, I didn\u2019t find Mr. Spani did anything intentionally. It was an accident, as his attorney argued, it was an accident, but I felt that it was an accident caused by reckless conduct on his part and therefore, that made him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. \u00b0\nWe are confronted with one unchallengeable conclusion and that is that the trial court was of the opinion that the defendant\u2019s shooting and killing the victim was an accident. The trial court, being the sole trier of the facts in a bench trial, having reached this conclusion then a finding by the court that the defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter cannot stand. An act that is committed accidentally does not involve a mental state cognizable to the criminal offenses of murder and involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Carlton (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 995, 326 N.E.2d 100.) A material element of every offense is a voluntary act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 1.) An accident is not a voluntary act nor can accidental conduct be equated with \u201crecklessness\u201d which is an element of the offense of involuntary manslaughter. See People v. Carlton (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 995, 326 N.E.2d 100.\nWe are loath to reverse a conviction on technicalities; however, we are equally loath to sustain a conviction where the requisite elements of a crime are not present. The trial court made it abundantly clear that the tragedy in the instant case was accidental and such being the case the judgment of the Circuit Court of Tazewell County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nSTENGEL, P. J., and BARRY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Bruce Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (James E. Hinterlong, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES W. SPANI, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 76-211\nOpinion filed March 31, 1977.\nRobert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nBruce Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (James E. Hinterlong, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0777-01", "first_page_order": 807, "last_page_order": 810 }