{ "id": 2974902, "name": "In re MICHAEL FIELDS, a Minor.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL FIELDS, Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "Fields v. Fields", "decision_date": "1977-03-11", "docket_number": "No. 63187", "first_page": "1028", "last_page": "1034", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 1028" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2837606 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5308354 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 1999", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L. Ed. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541280, 541092, 541065, 541134, 541711, 541810, 541593, 541279 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0992-05", "/us/421/0992-03", "/us/421/0992-08", "/us/421/0992-02", "/us/421/0992-07", "/us/421/0992-04", "/us/421/0992-01", "/us/421/0992-06" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958038 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226, 227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850874 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2894576 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2715724 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0010-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 629, "char_count": 12580, "ocr_confidence": 0.897, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.807324725727708e-08, "percentile": 0.5329525003195167 }, "sha256": "4970c847b9aa2fb56f91b0d07ab5e81910c04569af35e5ddc27c9882180ec815", "simhash": "1:b4a111b82f58ae53", "word_count": 2041 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:39.078190+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MICHAEL FIELDS, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL FIELDS, Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent appeals from an order revoking his probation and committing him to the Department of Corrections. He contends that the court: (1) lacked jurisdiction to commit him, (2) failed to establish that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea, and (3) abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Corrections.\nOn January 15, 1975, a petition for an adjudication of wardship was filed alleging that respondent \u201c[0]n or about 8 January 1975 knwoingly [sic] obtained unautorized [sic] control over property, 1-ladies wristwatch and 250 pair shoe laces of the value of less *150.00 the property of Leo W. Jones, with the intent to deprive said Leo W. Jones permanently of the use and benefit of said property, in violation of Chapter 38 Section, 16 \u2014 1(a) Illinois Revised Statutes.\u201d At the initial hearing held on January 16, 1975, it was discovered that respondent had been arrested at least four times in the previous year. The hearing was continued to determine if respondent was on probation. On January 20, 1975, the corut established that on December 20, 1974, respondent had been adjudged delinquent on a charge of theft and placed on probation. Realizing that the instant action had been erroneously filed as an original petition the court suggested it be refiled as a supplemental petition. Thereafter, respondent\u2019s probation officer was asked by the court if he could \u201cwork\u201d with respondent. He responded that he was assigned to the case on December 20, 1974, and that:\n\u201cIf I go with just what I see on paper, I\u2019d have to ask for a commitment. I haven\u2019t really been able to work with him.\u201d\nThe court then discussed with the probation officer and respondent\u2019s mother the possibility of respondent residing with two aunts in Maywood. The court directed that this possibility be explored further and ordered respondent held in custody pending a clinical examination.\nOn February 3,1975, the State orally sought leave to amend its petition by striking the words \u201cobtained unlawful control over property.\u201d The report of proceedings does not reflect what was inserted in place of the deletion. Thereafter, respondent, through his counsel, entered an admission to the amended petition. The court again reviewed the dispositional alternatives. The clinical investigation recommended a \u201cresidential treatment center.\u201d However, the respondent\u2019s probation officer felt that this was impractical because of respondent\u2019s age. After the court suggested referral to U.D.I.S., the proceedings were continued in order to determine if U.D.I.S. would accept respondent.\nOn March 31, 1975, after the respondent\u2019s probation officer reported that U.D.I.S. was unable to accept respondent the court reviewed respondent\u2019s situation and ordered that he be held in custody pending a supplemental social investigation to update the original investigation which was incident to the initial probation. The court granted the State\u2019s oral motion to amend the original petition to a supplemental petition.\nAt the dispositional hearing held on April 14, 1975, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: For disposition and UDIS. UDIS won\u2019t take him?\nPROBATION OFFICER: That was in February, Judge.\nTHE COURT: There is no place, is that right?\nPROBATION OFFICER: Right now.\nTHE COURT: Well, I have read the social investigation report, I have seen Michael\u2019s history. Based on the social investigation report and my own contacts with Michael over an extended period of time, I order Michael committed to the Department of Corrections.\u201d\nThe probation officer then stated for the record his \u201cattempts at working with Michael.\u201d He explained that respondent had been living with two aunts in Maywood and had \u201cno problems.\u201d However, against his advice, respondent had returned to his old neighborhood and \u201cgot into trouble again.\u201d He noted that U.D.I.S. had refused to accept respondent because of his previous record.\nOpinion\nRespondent first contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to commit him because he had not previously been adjudged a ward of the court as required by section 4 \u2014 8 of the Juvenile Court Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, pars. 704 \u2014 8.) We agree that an explicit adjudication of wardship is necessary before a court may enter a dispositional order (In re Barr (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 10, 344 N.E.2d 517), but find that an adjudication was made in this case. The record indicates that this petition was amended as a supplemental petition, pursuant to the oral motion made by the State on March 31,1975. Consequently, the adjudication of wardship would have occurred at the hearing on the original petition in December 1974. Because respondent failed to submit a report of these proceedings, a presumption arises that wardship was properly adjudicated. (In re Shannon (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 876, 360 N.E.2d 433.) Nonetheless, respondent argues that the petition was not amended to supplemental status until after he entered his admission. However, because the true nature of the petition was previously brought to his attention on January 20, 1975, we fail to see any prejudice to him in not formally amending the petition until after he entered his admission.\nRespondent next contends that the court erred when it accepted his admission based upon facts which he argues do not constitute a crime. His contention is based on the following colloquy which occurred after the admission was made.\n\u201cTHE COURT: Michael, how old are you?\nTHE RESPONDENT: 15.\nTHE COURT: Do you read and write?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: You have been charged with having stolen some property which you knew was stolen; do you know about that?\nTHE RESPONDENT: No.\nPUBLIC DEFENDER: Did I just talk to you about the ten pairs?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes.\nPUBLIC DEFENDER: Do you remember?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You have the right to a trial and you have the right to have witnesses brought in to testify against you, and you have the right to bring in anyone who could testify on your behalf, and you have the right to testify on your own behalf or to remain silent at your trial. You understand if you admit these charges I could place you on probation or commit you to the Department of Corrections. Is that clear?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Knowing those things, you still want to admit you had those things in your possession?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes, sir.\nPUBLIC DEFENDER: He bought ten pairs of shoeloaces. Well, 250 and he bought ten of them.\nTHE COURT: And you knew they were stolen?\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes, after I bought them.\nPUBLIC DEFENDER: And you kept them anyway.\nTHE RESPONDENT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And I will accept the admission.\u201d\nRespondent argues that his remarks indicate he had no knowledge that the shoelaces had been stolen until after he obtained them. Because the court is required to determine if there is a factual basis for a guilty plea (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 402(c)), he contends that his commitment should be set aside. See People v. Rollins (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 293 N.E.2d 733.\nIn People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 226, 227, 319 N.E.2d 745, 748, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483, 95 S. Ct. 1999, our Supreme Court held \u201cthat Rule 402 is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings.\u201d Although Beard was a criminal proceeding the rule is applicable here. Just as in Beard, the instant proceedings were brought to terminate respondent\u2019s probation.\nMoreover, we think the inquiry here met the standards set forth in Rule 402. In a criminal case a factual basis for a guilty plea is shown when there is reasonable grounds to conclude that defendant, with the requisite mental state, committed acts constituting the offense to which he pleads guilty, and it is not necessary that this be shown beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Maynard (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 468, 321 N.E.2d 378.) Section 16\u2014 1(d)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 makes it illegal to obtain control over property one knows is stolen or \u201cunder such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe the property was stolen \u201d * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(d)(1).) In his remarks to the court respondent admitted that he received 250 pairs of shoelaces, but only paid for 10. From this fact the court could easily conclude that respondent should have known that the items had been stolen when he \u201cbought\u201d them, but only later gained actual knowledge that they had been stolen.\nRespondent also contends that the court erred when it found him delinquent based upon a petition which failed to allege a crime. He argues that the report of proceedings for February 3,1975, shows that the State in amending its petition struck the words \u201cobtained unlawful control over property\u201d without substituting others. He concludes that the petition failed to charge a crime.\nAlthough the February 3, 1975, report of proceedings does not indicate the substitution, the State here without objection by defendant, submitted a supplemental record containing a copy of the January 15, 1975, petition which has the words \u201creceived stolen property\u201d written in the margin. We, therefore, conclude that the petition was properly amended and charges an offense. See People v. Bradley (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 101, 278 N.E.2d 243.\nRespondent further contends that he was denied due process because the court failed to fully consider other dispositional alternatives before committing him to the Department of Corrections. He asserts that commitment is a \u201clast resort\u201d and claims that there were other alternatives which the court failed to consider.\nWe disagree. When respondent was brought before the court on January 16, 1975, he had an extensive arrest record and was already on probation. At various times over the next three months the court ordered a clinical examination, a supplemental social investigation, and proposed referral to U.D.I.S. The court also sought recommendations from respondent\u2019s mother and his probation officer. Based upon these and its contacts with respondent over a three-month period, the court found that the best alternative was commitment.\nAs respondent\u2019s probation officer confirmed on April 14, 1975, there was no place else to send him. Respondent obviously could not return home. Probation had proved an unsatisfactory solution to curbing his unlawful conduct. Although living with relatives in Maywood seemed to keep him out of trouble, he apparently refused to remain there, having returned to his home against the advice of his probation officer. Referral to a \u201cresidential treatment center\u201d was impractical because of his age and U.D.I.S. refused to accept him because of his extensive record. In our opinion the court explored all dispositional alternatives thoroughly before committing respondent to the Department of Corrections.\nFinally, respondent complains that the court failed to adequately state its reasons for committing him as required by section 5 \u2014 1(5) of the Juvenile Court Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 1(5).) We note, however, that no particular type of statement is required. The court is merely required to set forth \u201cthe basis for selecting the particular disposition.\u201d Here, the court stated it based its decision on the social investigation and its own contacts with respondent. Thereafter, the court specifically requested respondent\u2019s probation officer to \u201cstate for the record\u201d his attempts \u201cat working with\u201d respondent, which he did. We believe this statement was sufficient to comply with the dictates of section 5-1(5).\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P. J., and MEJDA, J., concur.\nUniform Delinquency Intervention Service \u2014 nominally under the control of the Department of Corrections, this program diverts minors with prior history of delinquency from commitment to the Department of Corrections to an extensive program of daily non-institutional supervision and simple goal orientation.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John M. Kalnins, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Myra J. Brown, Jerome A. Saxon, and Joel M. Goldstein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MICHAEL FIELDS, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL FIELDS, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 63187\nOpinion filed March 11, 1977.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John M. Kalnins, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Myra J. Brown, Jerome A. Saxon, and Joel M. Goldstein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1028-01", "first_page_order": 1058, "last_page_order": 1064 }