{ "id": 3369640, "name": "SOUTH SIDE MOVE OF GOD CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "South Side Move of God Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals", "decision_date": "1977-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 76-172", "first_page": "723", "last_page": "729", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 723" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352149 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S. Ct. 2019", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 L. Ed. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 946", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772131, 1771812, 1771593, 1771600, 1771889, 1772095 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0946-01", "/us/395/0946-05", "/us/395/0946-03", "/us/395/0946-04", "/us/395/0946-06", "/us/395/0946-02" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821853 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852881 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5394231 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2834271 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585467 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0082-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 13624, "ocr_confidence": 0.882, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3006551255115314e-07, "percentile": 0.6220739124172876 }, "sha256": "cc92215f169b5c78ce6a73674b0c36875a015ea5f8e3ac992ece97285e53f5ad", "simhash": "1:b2e77037b345de19", "word_count": 2184 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:01:05.657790+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SOUTH SIDE MOVE OF GOD CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the South Side Move of God Church, commenced this action for administrative review of a decision of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter \u201cZoning Board\u201d denying plaintiff\u2019s application for a variation in the nature of a special use. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 11\u201413\u201413.) Defendants bring this appeal from the circuit court\u2019s reversal of the Zoning Board\u2019s decision and raise the issue of whether the evidence adduced by plaintiff at the public hearing before the Zoning Board was legally sufficient to entitle plaintiff to a special use permit. More specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to establish that the proposed use is necessary for the public convenience at that location and that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected if the permit is granted.\nBy its application, plaintiff sought approval of the continued use as a church of certain property owned by it and located at 9154 South Ashland Avenue in Chicago. After considering the application, the. Office of the Zoning Administrator for the City of Chicago rendered a decision whereby plaintiff\u2019s application was not approved because the \u201cproposed improvement does not conform with the requirements of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance.\u201d Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Zoning Board, and, pursuant to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, the Department of Development and Planning filed a report with the Zoning Board recommending that the application be denied. On November 15, 1974, a public hearing was conducted before the Zoning Board. After evidence was presented in favor of the application, the Zoning Board entered a resolution wherein the following findings were enumerated:\n\u201c* * * that in this case the proposed use is to be located in a C2-2 General Commercial District; that the proof presented did not indicate that the establishment of a church at this location would not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the neighborhood in which it is located; that the Board takes judicial notice of the establishment of a used car sales lot, two gasoline service stations and a tavern within close proximity to the subject site whose rights could be jeopardized by the establishment of a church at this location * * *.\"\nAccordingly, plaintiff\u2019s application for a special use permit was denied.\nUpon administrative review, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Zoning Board and ordered that a special use permit be issued to plaintiff.\nThe subject premises is located in a district zoned C2-2, General Commercial District. Although a church is not a permitted use in C2-2 districts, it is denominated as a special use which may be allowed in such districts pursuant to the variation provisions of article 11 of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance. (Chicago, Ill., Chicago Municipal Code, ch. 194A, pars. 9.4\u20142, 11.10\u20144 (1974).) Article 11 in pertinent part provides as follows:\n\u201cStandards. No special use shall be granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals unless the special use:\n(1) a. Is necessary for the public convenience at that location;\nb. Is so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected; and\n(2) Will not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the neighborhood in which it is to be located; and\n* * *\n(4) Such special use shall conform to the applicable regulations of the district in which it is to be located.\u201d\nThe evidence introduced at the public hearing disclosed that plaintiff began conducting religious services for its 100 members at the subject site in July of 1974. Prior to that time, the church was located at 6401 South Ashland Avenue, but plaintiff was compelled to relocate when that property was condemned for urban renewal purposes.\nThe pastor of the church testified that plaintiff purchased the subject premises for $55,000 and expended an additional $30,000-$40,000 for renovations. Although the property does not have facilities to provide off-street parking for the members of the congregation, an offer to purchase, conditioned upon the outcome of this litigation, has been made by plaintiff to purchase a vacant lot adjacent to the church which would provide, according to plaintiff\u2019s witnesses, ample parking accommodations.\nPlaintiff\u2019s architect testified that the building is in good condition and that it is well suited for plaintiff\u2019s religious activities. He identified two existing building code violations\u2014a problem in the boiler room and some substandard partitions\u2014which could be easily corrected, but stated that a special use permit is necessary before plaintiff can obtain a building permit. The witness described the vicinity in which the subject premises is located. Most buildings on the 9100 block of South Ashland Avenue are used for commercial proposes, and the neighborhoods extending in both directions from Ashland Avenue are zoned residential. While noting that other churches are located nearby, it was his opinion that the location of plaintiff\u2019s church would not adversely affect the values of surrounding properties.\nUpon questioning by the chairman of the Zoning Board, the architect explained that he had been a licensed real estate broker but that he allowed his license to expire \u201ca few years back\u201d when he phased this type of real estate business out of his business.activities \u201cseveral years ago.\u201d The witness was familiar with provisions of the municipal code prohibiting the establishment and operation of gasoline service stations and automobile sales agencies within 200 feet of a church, but it was his opinion that existing commercial establishments of this nature which are situated within 200 feet of the subject premises would be characterized as nonconforming uses and thus would not be in jeopardy of losing their licenses. Consequently, it was his belief that plaintiff*s church would not have a deleterious effect on these businesses, unless these businesses changed the use of their property and then subsequently desired to revert to their original use as either a service station or an automobile agency.\nPlaintiff\u2019s treasurer testified that he did not believe that any traffic problems developed in the neighborhood when plaintiff conducted religious services at the present site.\nThe Zoning Board also had before it five letters from persons who operated businesses in the vicinity of the subject premises. Two gasoline service stations and an automobile agency, all located within 200 feet of the church, submitted letters in which they expressed no objection to plaintiff\u2019s application. The owner of six lots on the same block as plaintiff\u2019s property submitted a letter indicating that he operates an automobile agency and that parking accessibility on Ashland Avenue is essential for the convenience of his customers and the success of his business. He anticipated traffic congestion problems on Ashland Avenue if plaintiff\u2019s members continue to park their cars on the street. Another property owner who operated a dry cleaning service, a lounge and a restaurant across the street from plaintiff\u2019s church objected to plaintiff\u2019s application since two other churches are located in the neighborhood.\nNo testimonial evidence was adduced in opposition to the application. On administrative review, the findings and conclusions on questions of fact made by an administrative agency shall be held to be prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 274.) The reviewing court\u2019s function is limited to ascertaining whether the findings and decisions of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence; if they are, only then should the agency\u2019s decision be disturbed. Roosevelt Memorial Hospital v. Chaddick (1970), 131 Ill. App. 2d 82, 266 N.E.2d 755.\nAn applicant for a special use permit has the burden of proving that the proposed use satisfies all of the standards required by the controlling zoning ordinance. (Allen v. Board of Appeals (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 376, 254 N.E.2d 840.) However, the failure of the applicant to adduce sufficient evidence to fulfill one or more requirements of the special use ordinance will not necessarily justify the denial of the proposed use if such prohibition does not bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare (Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797) and if there is no adverse affect on adjacent properties (Kraegel v. Village of Wood Dale (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 486, 294 N.E.2d 64). Since a special use zoning ordinance does not allocate any particular zones for the establishment of these unique uses as a matter of right, the local zoning authority is vested with broad powers in determining the suitability of a given site for the proposed special use. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of McHenry (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454.\nAfter reviewing the record, we find that the decision of the Zoning Board is amply supported by the evidence and that plaintiff failed to establish that it was entitled to a special use permit pursuant to the applicable standards of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance.\nPlaintiff offered no evidence tending to show that \u201cthe special use is necessary for the public convenience at that location.\u201d There was no showing that this particular locale was assigned to plaintiff\u2019s ministry, that members of the congregation live within close proximity of the subject premises, or that plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to locate its church in a zoning district where churches are permitted uses. Compare St. James Temple v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525, appeal denied (1969), 40 Ill. 2d 578, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946, 23 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 2019, Columbus Park Congregation v. Board of Appeals (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722.\nPlaintiff also failed to establish that the special use is \u201cso designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected.\u201d One objector expressed concern in his letter to the Zoning Board that the continued use by plaintiff of the subject premises as a church would create a traffic congestion problem to the detriment of his customers and his commercial business. On this point, plaintiff conceded that it did not presently have off-street parking accommodations for its parishioners, but plaintiff introduced evidence of an offer to purchase an adjacent vacant lot containing 5000 square feet. Two witnesses testified that the procurement of this lot would provide ample parking for the congregation. The applicable ordinance requires a church to provide one parking space for every 12 seats in the church. (Chicago, Ill., Chicago Municipal Code, ch. 194A, \u00a7 9.11\u20141 (1974).) No evidence was presented revealing how many seats are in the church and how many parking spaces the vacant lot could provide. Consequently, the Zoning Board could have properly concluded that the special use did not conform to the applicable zoning regulations and that public safety would be decreased.\nPlaintiff also failed to establish that the special use \u201cwill not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the neighborhood in which it is located.\u201d Only one expert witness, an architect and engineer, testified on behalf of plaintiff. It was this witness\u2019 opinion that the special use would not have a deleterious impact on property values in the vicinity of the subject premises. By this witness\u2019 own admission, however, he had allowed his real estate broker\u2019s license to expire a \u201cfew years back,\u201d and he had eliminated this portion of his business activities \u201cseveral years ago.\u201d Consequently, this witness\u2019s expertise for the purpose of offering an opinion concerning property values was not established. In this regard, the chairman of the Zoning Board recommended that plaintiff call another witness to testify on this point, but plaintiff elected not to pursue this topic of examination further. Moreover, the Zoning Board manifested a genuine concern regarding the location of a church within 200 feet of an automobile sales agency and two gasoline service stations and within 100 feet of a tavern and the potential for licensing problems which could arise for any of those businesses. See Chicago, Ill., Chicago Municipal Code, \u00a7\u00a7 127\u20145 and 156\u201412 (1974); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 43, par. 127.\nWe agree that different presumptions become operative when zoning ordinances are applied in situations involving the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. (See Columbus Park Congregation v. Board of Appeals (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722.) But in the instant case, plaintiff failed to meet any one standard of the special use ordinance, let alone all of them. Hence, the Zoning Board\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s application for a special use permit was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court reversing the Zoning Board\u2019s decision is hereby reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nDOWNING, P. J., and PERLIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Robert Retke, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.", "Stone, Pogrund & Korey, of Chicago (Paul J. Cherner and Bertram A. Stone, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTH SIDE MOVE OF GOD CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 76-172\nOpinion filed April 5, 1977.\nWilliam R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Robert Retke, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.\nStone, Pogrund & Korey, of Chicago (Paul J. Cherner and Bertram A. Stone, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0723-01", "first_page_order": 761, "last_page_order": 767 }