{
  "id": 3370944,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL M. DALEY, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Daley",
  "decision_date": "1977-04-29",
  "docket_number": "No. 75-460",
  "first_page": "289",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:36.955471+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL M. DALEY, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted of speeding. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, par. 11 \u2014 601(b), (e).) ****He appeals contending that there was a fatal variance between the complaint and the evidence, and that in addition the judgment of guilty was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe Illinois citation and complaint which was issued charged the defendant with speeding 62 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone at \u201cRt. 71 S. Bnd. at Hughs [sic] Rd.\u201d\nThe bystander\u2019s record states as pertinent:\n\u201cSheriff Alsup testified that on May 26,1975 at approximately 5:15 a.m. he was on regular patrol. He was parked at Pavillion Road and Route 71 observing traffic.\nHE OBSERVED THE Defendant southbound on Highway 71 and the defendant was driving a tractor trailer truck having a gross weight of over 8,000 lbs. when the speed limit was 50 M.P.H. He followed the Defendant for 5-6 miles thereafter. He stated he maintained a distance of between 400-500 feet behind the Defendant. His car was equipped with a caliberated speedometer and that during the 5-6 miles going South from Pavillion Road, he clocked the Defendant going between 62-67 miles per hour on Route 71 depending on whether he was uphill or downhill.\u201d\nDefendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that there was no testimony as to defendant\u2019s speed at Hughes Road whereas the citation had charged defendant with speeding at that location. The motion was denied. Defendant then testified that at Hughes Road he was going only 47 miles per hour.\nThe record does not show the location of Hughes Road. Defendant argues that since the officer did not testify as to defendant\u2019s speed at Hughes Road, the location of the offense specified in the complaint, the charge was either not proved or there was a fatal variance between the charge and the proof which requires reversal.\nThe State has argued that the proof shows that defendant was speeding southbound over a 5- or 6-mile stretch of Route 71 and that there was therefore not a fatal variance between the charge and the proof. Alternatively, the State asks that we take judicial notice of the location of Hughes Road as being an intersection of Route 71 within 5-6 miles from Pavillion Road as the officer testified.\nWe do not decide whether this court may take judicial notice of the location of Hughes Road as the State suggests inasmuch as we have concluded that the evidence in the bystander\u2019s record is sufficient to prove the charge of speeding in the manner set forth in the statute. We also conclude that there is no fatal variance between the charge and the proof.\nThe material elements of the charge of speeding as set forth in section 11 \u2014 601 of the Illinois Vehicle Code as here pertinent are the driving of a vehicle upon any highway of the State at a speed greater than that prescribed for the vehicle of that class.\nUnder the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 111 \u2014 3(a)) the time and place of an offense are generally recognized as separate and distinct from the nature and elements of the offense and considered \u201csubsidiary matters.\u201d (See People v. Patrick, 38 Ill. 2d 255, 259 (1967); People v. Banchett, 33 Ill. 2d 527, 534 (1965); People v. Burch, 19 Ill. App. 3d 360, 362 (1974).) If the offense can only be committed at a particular place, however, the place of its commission may become material and thus be required to be alleged and proved with reasonable definiteness. Cf. People v. Burch, 19 Ill. App. 3d 360, 362; State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766, 26 A.L.R. 894 (1922).\nThe statute before us prohibits the driving of the class of vehicle being operated by the defendant on \u201cany highway of this State\u201d at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. The officer testified that he followed defendant for 5 to 6 miles southbound on highway 71 and that during that distance he clocked defendant between 62-67 miles per hour on Route 71. The complaint charged defendant with speeding southbound on Route 71 and there was no substantial variance between the charge and the proof. The reference in the complaint to Hughes Road, where defendant was apparently stopped at the end of the chase, was not a material element of the charge under the circumstances and was not required to be proved. In fact, defendant\u2019s testimony that he was going only 47 miles per hour \u201cat Hughes Road\u201d would not be a defense to the proof of speeding over a preceding 5- or 6-mile stretch of highway. And, in any event, defendant\u2019s testimony was not required to be given credence by the trier of the facts.\nThe defendant also does not and cannot reasonably claim that he was impaired in preparing his defense. Any possible confusion he might have had could have been cured by a request for a bill of particulars. The request was not made.\nWe conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that there was no substantial variance between the proof and the charge. We therefore affirm the judgment.\nAffirmed.\nGUILD and BOYLE, JJ., concur.\n\u201c(b) No person may drive a vehicle upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than the applicable statutory maximum speed limit established by paragraphs \u00b0 0 * (e) 6 \" e.\"\n\u201c(e) Unless some other speed restriction is established under this Chapter, the maximum speed limit outside an turban district for a vehicle of the second division designed or used for the carrying of a gross weight of 8,000 pounds or more (including the weight of the vehicle and maximum load) is 50 miles per hour.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "George E. Downs, of Palatine, for appellant.",
      "Dallas Ingemunson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Yorkville (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL M. DALEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 75-460\nOpinion filed April 29, 1977.\nGeorge E. Downs, of Palatine, for appellant.\nDallas Ingemunson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Yorkville (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0289-01",
  "first_page_order": 323,
  "last_page_order": 326
}