{ "id": 3372683, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "1977-05-23", "docket_number": "No. 76-120", "first_page": "870", "last_page": "873", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 870" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "50 A.L.R.2d 176", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376950 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5016776 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/301/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2625736 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2786910 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404559 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911163 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305010 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0630-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 492, "char_count": 8353, "ocr_confidence": 0.886, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3284370808938188e-07, "percentile": 0.6284383761369872 }, "sha256": "8ed3ae332f424204243809f361c13d8e4743742223a630e0f80dc3727c996f4c", "simhash": "1:87a05ab2ee5089e7", "word_count": 1441 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:36.955471+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 16\u2014 1(a)(1)) in a jury trial and sentenced to a term of not less than 1 year and not more than 3 years in the penitentiary. He appeals contending that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He also claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the request of the jury and allowed it to hear the complete testimony of one of the State\u2019s witnesses after deliberations had begun.\nThe subject of the theft was a 1969 Chevelle Malibu, black over red in color. Thomas Knapke testified that he owned the car and that it was found missing on January 17,1975, from a parking place near St. Joseph\u2019s College in Rensselaer, Indiana. On January 24, he received a check for $1200 from his insurance carrier (dated January 22), and he assigned the title to the insurance company on January 25.\nOfficer DeDiemar testified that at approximately 3:30 a.m. on January 24 he observed a car proceeding on Interstate 55 with one taillight. He stopped the car which defendant was driving. When defendant failed to produce a driver\u2019s license, stating that it had been suspended, the officer placed him under arrest. In the course of a pat-down search for weapons the officer noted a sharp object in defendant\u2019s pocket. In the pocket he found a vehicle identification number (VIN) plate. In the same pocket he also found an envelope which contained three car titles. One was an Illinois title to a 1969 blue Chevelle assigned by one Jacobs (plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 1). Another was an Illinois title which the officer did not specify but which was later identified as a title to a 1966 Chevrolet assigned by one Pitts (plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 2). The third was an Indiana title (plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 3, later withdrawn).\nDeDiemar also testified that defendant stated at the Woodridge police station that he did not own the car but that it was owned by a friend, Howard Trout, who lived in Cicero. Defendant did not know how to reach Trout nor where he lived. He said that the VIN plate in his pocket had been purchased from a friend of his together with the car title.\nThere was further testimony that the VIN on the 1969 Chevelle and one of the titles found in the possession of the defendant bore the same number (referring to plaintiff\u2019s exhibits 4 and 2 respectively). The engine number of the Chevelle Malibu which defendant was driving, however, did not correspond to the VIN. The confidential number on the vehicle had been removed or replaced with what appeared to be a new part which had no number on it.\nDefendant testified that he was a resident of Lockport, Illinois, and that he was not in Rensselaer, Indiana, on January 16 or 17. He said that he was in a tavern on Roosevelt Road in Du Page County on January 24 until about 2 a.m. He had been driven there from his home. Robert Trout loaned him the car which defendant was intending to buy. While trying it out he was stopped by the police. He said that Trout had handed him an envelope which when opened by the police officer contained another title and a tag for mailing to the secretary of state. He said he told the officer he could not get in touch with Trout at that time of the morning. He was to return the car the next day at the tavern where he had met Trout or bring Trout *1000. However, he was in jail after his arrest. Later, nobody at the tavern knew where Trout was. He said he had looked for Trout without success.\nThe substance of defendant\u2019s argument that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is his claim that the People failed to prove that the ownership of the motor vehicle was in Thomas Knapke as stated in the indictment. He argues that the proof failed because the People did not introduce the check that Knapke received nor the certificate of title showing the date of the transfer. He reasons that the mere fact that Knapke testified that he assigned the title to an insurance company, \u201che thought\u201d on January 25, is not conclusive evidence of Knapke\u2019s ownership at the time defendant was captured. Defendant also argues that the proof was insufficient to show that he knew that the car was stolen.\nDefendant\u2019s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that Knapke owned the car at the time it was found missing. There was also testimony which the jury could weigh that Knapke still owned the car on January 24 when defendant was found in its possession. Defendant\u2019s contention that title passed upon the date of the insurance company check is without authority. Moreover, even if it were to be assumed that title had passed to the insurance company prior to the actual signing of title by Knapke, no fatal variance was created between the indictment which alleged ownership in Knapke since defendant could show no prejudice either in the sense that he was unable to prepare a defense or that he would be subject to a second prosecution for the same offense. People v. Tucker, 35 Ill. App. 3d 630, 632 (1976).\nDefendant was charged with theft \u201cin that he did knowingly exert unauthorized control over property of Thomas Knapke * \u201d Under this charge both possession and knowledge that the property was stolen are essential elements. (People v. Baxa, 50 Ill. 2d 111, 114 (1971).) The evidence, although circumstantial amounted to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had knowledge that the car was stolen or that he himself stole it. His explanation could well be viewed by the jury as incredulous.\nThe next claim of error raised by the defendant involves the jurors\u2019 request for information in the course of their deliberations. Two notes from the jury foreman were delivered to the trial judge. One read \u201cWe would like to see or hear the transcript of the trial of the first officer regarding the testimony which states how Allen explained possession of Exhibits #2 and #4\u201d (court\u2019s exhibit #1) and \u201cMay we have the officer\u2019s whole testimony from the first day\u201d (court\u2019s exhibit #2).\nOver defense counsel\u2019s objections the judge permitted the court reporter to read the testimony of Officer DeDiemar to the jury. Defendant argues that while in exercise of discretion the court could ascertain from the jury specific testimony which it wished to review, it was not proper to read the entire testimony which amounted to a review of the State\u2019s case.\nUnder the circumstances we find no abuse of discretion. After hearing defendant\u2019s explanation of how he came to be in possession of a stolen car, the jury could have reasonably wished to recall the officer\u2019s testimony, particularly with relation to the titles and vehicle identification plate found in defendant\u2019s possession. The cases cited by the defendant (People v. Pierce, 56 Ill. 2d 361, 363-64 (1974); People v. Jackson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 618, 629 (1975); People v. Anthony, 30 Ill. App. 3d 464, 466 (1975)) support the general rule that the trial judge in exercise of his discretion may refuse to give the jury transcripts of trial testimony. People v. Willy, 301 Ill. 307, 327 (1921), also cited by the defendant, stands for the familiar rule that the prosecutor may not be permitted to read from the trial transcript in his argument to the jury. The trial judge may, however, in the exercise of his discretion grant the jurors the opportunity to have read to them testimony that is relevant to their inquiry. (See People v. Pierce, 56 Ill. 2d 361 at 364; cf. People v. Matthews, 21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 252 (1974); see also Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 176 (1956).) Here the trial judge determined that the entire testimony of the officer including his cross-examination should be read so that the jury could fairly compare the officer\u2019s testimony with defendant\u2019s explanation. This was not an abuse of discretion.\nThe judgment is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRECHENMACHER, P. J., and GUILD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas J. Maloney and Richard H. Devine, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "John J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT E. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-120\nOpinion filed May 23, 1977.\nThomas J. Maloney and Richard H. Devine, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0870-01", "first_page_order": 904, "last_page_order": 907 }