{ "id": 3371277, "name": "FRANK MORSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN VIRGIL NELSON, Sheriff, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Morse v. Nelson", "decision_date": "1977-05-09", "docket_number": "No. 76-355", "first_page": "895", "last_page": "899", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 895" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "421 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541758 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2563522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/109/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5221557 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/29/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5655753 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/328/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391926 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406724 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2537980 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/95/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861347 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2654019, 2653102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/128/0356-02", "/ill-app-2d/128/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5312571 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 F.Supp. 111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3606898 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/341/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2762942 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2709042 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 DePaul L. Rev. 264", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "DePaul L. Rev.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a71983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 584, "char_count": 9653, "ocr_confidence": 0.875, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1732159723241193e-07, "percentile": 0.7714581043141897 }, "sha256": "9a624e0cad94bcec13631bea96a6ed41141625e25a7656ad51cba6f740d5221d", "simhash": "1:a75bdd85b75baccf", "word_count": 1601 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:36.955471+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FRANK MORSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN VIRGIL NELSON, Sheriff, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Massac County dismissing plaintiff s complaint with prejudice. The complaint, filed by Frank Morse, is styled designating Frank Morse and the People of the State of Illinois for the use of Frank Morse as plaintiffs. The complaint was brought against John Virgil Nelson, sheriff of Massac County, and his surety, Western Surety Company.\nThe complaint alleges that on March 2, 1975, Morse was arrested in Massac County and was brought to the county jail where he was held in custody by Sheriff Nelson for several days thereafter. Count I of the complaint charges that Nelson as sheriff \u201cdid not faithfully discharge\u201d the office of sheriff because: (1) he \u201cfailed to support Article I, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution\u201d in that he \u201cunduly detained\u201d Morse \u201cwithout any competent authority commitment,\u201d and (2) he \u201cfailed to support the Constitution of the State of Illinois\u201d by detaining Morse \u201cunder the color of a warrant process, the issuance of which he knew had been obtained after, not before the arrest.\u201d Count II of the complaint charges that Nelson had a duty \u201cto obey\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and that he \u201cbreached\u201d that duty as sheriff when he \u201cunduly detained and falsely imprisoned\u201d Morse, under color of Nelson\u2019s official position, depriving Morse of a right \u201cto be free from undue detention\u201d under \u201cArticle I, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution.\u201d Count III of the complaint is substantially the same as count II except that it alternatively alleges that Nelson was the \u201cde facto Sheriff of Massac County.\u201d Each of the three counts prays for a judgment in the amount of *10,000.\nIn response to the complaint, defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting 13 separate grounds thereof, and an affidavit by the Massac County clerk, in support of one of the grounds raised, in which the clerk states, in effect, that plaintiff failed to comply with the one-year notice of injury requirement of section 8 \u2014 102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 102).\nThe record shows that thereafter plaintiff filed a \u201cmotion to reconsider\u201d which states that the trial court had orally ordered a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that notice pursuant to section 8 \u2014 102 had not been given. The motion then appears to request a rehearing on the other grounds stated in defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. The record further shows that on the day after the motion to reconsider was filed, the trial court filed a written order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The order gives no indication of the basis for the dismissal. Plaintiff thereafter filed a notice of appeal and a \u201cnotice of withdrawal of motion to reconsider.\u201d\nIn plaintiff\u2019s brief on appeal, plaintiff appears to be raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing each count of the complaint since each count states a cause of action and \u201cno justification had been affirmatively pleaded\u201d by defendant Nelson. However, we find it difficult to address the argument presented in support thereof by plaintiff since the argument is often confusing, obtuse and sometimes bordering on the undecipherable. An appellant\u2019s counsel has a duty to provide in his brief lucid and persuasive argument. (See Seidenfeld, Professional Responsibility before Reviewing Courts, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 264, 276 (1976).) As we stated in In re Estate of Kunz, 7 El. App. 3d 760, 763, 288 N.E.2d 520, 523:\n\u201cReviewing courts are entitled to have the issues clearly defined, to be cited pertinent authorities and are not a depository in which an appellant is to dump the entire matter of pleadings, court action, argument and research as it were, upon the court.\u201d\nMoreover, a resolution of the issues presented is made no easier where the facts and pleadings in this cause are equally confusing and where the appellee only states in his brief, although perhaps understandably, that he \u201chas been unable to formulate any meaningful response\u201d to his opponent\u2019s argument.\nThis appeal is presented by the same counsel as was the appeal in Coleson v. Spomer, 31 Ill. App. 3d 563, 334 N.E.2d 344, in which an equally confusing brief and record was submitted.\nIn the record, plaintiff s motion to reconsider indicates that the trial court dismissed his complaint because the court found that a section 8 \u2014 102 notice of injury had not been served on the county clerk. On appeal, plaintiff\u2019s only comment on this matter is that:\n\u201c[T]he argument that the County Clerk should have been given notice borders on being an insult to the intelligence of this superior reviewing Court capable of taking judicial notice of actions or inactions of record keeping \u2018persons\u2019 in inferior tribunals.\u201d\nThis statement, of course, does not address the question of whether a notice of injury was required for the type of claims plaintiff attempted to bring in the case at bar. We note that it has been held that the notice requirement of section 8 \u2014 102 is limited to civil actions arising from \u201cinjuries\u201d or \u201caccidents\u201d (Public Litho Service, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 3d 315, 290 N.E.2d 677), and section 8 \u2014 102 has been held inapplicable to civil rights actions brought pursuant to federal civil rights statutes (Luker v. Nelson (N.D. Ill. 1972), 341 F.Supp. 111). In any event the trial court\u2019s written order dismissing the complaint, which was filed after the filing of plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider, does not state which of the 13 grounds raised by defendants was the basis for the order. On appeal an order of the lower court will be affirmed if there exists any ground for such affirmance. (Sears v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association 1 Ill. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300.) Moreover, as we have mentioned, plaintiff\u2019s contentions are directed at the sufficiency of his complaint to state a cause of action. We therefore will direct our attention to this issue.\nInitially, we note that the record does not show that plaintiff sought to amend his pleadings nor does he now contend that he should have been allowed to amend the complaint. We therefore consider plaintiff as having elected to stand on his pleadings.\nPlaintiff contends that count I of the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action based on false imprisonment and that counts II and HI each sufficiently states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. In addition, plaintiff curiously urges the additional point that no \u201cjustification\u201d was pleaded by defendants. This point, however, has no bearing on the sufficiency of the complaint itself.\nIn determining the sufficiency of a complaint a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. (Dear v. Locke, 128 Ill. App. 2d 356, 262 N.E.2d 27.) While pleadings are to be liberally construed, and formal or technical allegations are unnecessary, a complaint must nonetheless contain the substantial averments of fact necessary to state a cause of action. (Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182.) Mere allegations of legal conclusions are insufficient and such conclusions need not be accepted by a court. (Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776.) A complaint is subject to a motion to dismiss where the well-pleaded facts do not entitle one to a recovery. (Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516.) The determination of whether a particular allegation constitutes a fact or conclusion must be made from the context of the pleading with a view to whether the language gives sufficient information to the opponent and to the court of the character of evidence to be introduced or of the issues to be tried. Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin, 51 Ill. 2d 374, 282 N.E.2d 723.\nApplying these principles, we find that stripped of its conclusory language, count I of the complaint merely alleges that plaintiff was arrested and held in custody for several days. False imprisonment consists of an unlawful detention, confinement or restraint. (Shelton v. Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697; McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill. App. 2d 195, 172 N.E.2d 380.) Virtually no facts are alleged showing the unlawfulness of the arrest or subsequent detention. (Watters v. De La Matter, 109 Ill. App. 334.) The allegation to the effect that plaintiff\u2019s commitment to jail was without competent authority is a bare conclusion which, in addition, is also inconsistent with the allegation, without more, the plaintiff was \u201carrested.\u201d The allegation that a \u201cwarrant process\u201d (apparently a five-count criminal charge) was issued after the arrest does not, on its face, vitiate the lawfulness of the original arrest or detention and, if anything, it may suggest an opposite conclusion. So too, we find counts II and III equally vague and conclusory, fully justifying a dismissal thereof. (See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman (1975), 421 U.S. 837, 859, 44 L. Ed. 2d 621, 636, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2064.) In addition, these counts while alleging they state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, in fact, purport to assert rights provided by our State constitution and not the Federal Constitution or laws.\nConsequently, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Massac County dismissing each count of the complaint.\nAffirmed.\nJONES and KARNS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dennis J. Hogan, of Murphysboro, for appellant.", "Stephen L. Spomer, of Metropolis, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANK MORSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN VIRGIL NELSON, Sheriff, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 76-355\nOpinion filed May 9, 1977.\nRehearing denied May 19, 1977.\nDennis J. Hogan, of Murphysboro, for appellant.\nStephen L. Spomer, of Metropolis, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0895-01", "first_page_order": 929, "last_page_order": 933 }