{ "id": 5635530, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPENCER PARKS (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Parks", "decision_date": "1977-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 60503", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "69", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383076 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415030 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2699700 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927490 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2612155 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404955 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2865748 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850461 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435255 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958886 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0180-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 545, "char_count": 9674, "ocr_confidence": 0.877, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2196232015557794e-07, "percentile": 0.5978854365640622 }, "sha256": "a8c9f2470eec291d699c7329eceec3daea3832a6413b7604d0566b8e40a44833", "simhash": "1:5737dc6ad3857a27", "word_count": 1563 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:40.599780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPENCER PARKS (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Spencer Parks, was convicted of armed robbery by a jury and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 7 to 21 years. On direct appeal, the appellate court reversed his conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial based solely on the trial court\u2019s failure to give an instruction, sua sponte, concerning accomplice testimony. (34 Ill. App. 3d 180, 340 N.E.2d 121.) The supreme court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (62 Ill. 2d 591) and reversed the appellate court\u2019s judgment (65 Ill. 2d 132, 357 N.E.2d 487). The cause was remanded for this court\u2019s resolution of the other issues advanced by defendant but not considered in his initial appeal.\nThe evidence relating directly to defendant\u2019s criminal involvement was adequately stated in this court\u2019s previous opinion and in the supreme court\u2019s opinion. It is only necessary to note that defendant, Virgil Hooper and two others accosted the victim in a stairway area and took his coat, at gunpoint. When the victim tried to flee, defendant allegedly fired a fatal shot at the victim. Other facts will be set forth as may be pertinent for discussion of the remaining issues raised by defendant and not considered by this court on the original appeal.\nDefendant argues that prejudicial error occurred when the State asserted in its opening argument to the jury that it would prove defendant sold the victim\u2019s coat. Defendant says the State\u2019s failure to adduce this evidence and the State\u2019s reference to this matter in closing argument were improper.\nIn the State\u2019s opening statement it informed the jury that several witnesses would testify that the day after the incident they observed the defendant sell the victim\u2019s coat in a neighborhood restaurant. No such proof was adduced at trial. It is improper, at least with foreknowledge, to include matters in an opening statement which are not thereafter proved. (People v. Butler (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548, 298 N.E.2d 798.) Here, the State was merely giving a factual background of the case and the matters which it expected to be proved. There is no allegation by the defendant that the State was not acting in good faith when the complained-of remark was made in its opening statement to the jury. Therefore, absent demonstrable prejudice, the comment is not reversible error. 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial \u00a7\u00a7208-09 (1974); People v. Bell (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 171, 326 N.E.2d 507.\nEvidence was produced through the testimony of Hooper that defendant told him he sold the victim\u2019s coat the day after the ihcident. However, the State did not produce any witnesses to the actual sale. The State\u2019s failure to produce witnesses in this regard accrued to the benefit of defendant when defense counsel in his closing argument specifically argued that the State had failed to prove that which it promised to prove in its opening statement.\nAfter defense counsel in closing argument had pointedly commented on the failure of the State to substantiate this claim, the State in rebuttal informed the jury that it could not comment on the alleged sale of the victim\u2019s coat by defendant in a neighborhood restaurant because.no one had testified as to that fact. The State also said that the arresting officer, Charles Boucher, knew defendant\u2019s name prior to the arrest of Hooper or defendant.\nDefense counsel objected to these statements because it appeared the State was attempting to prove defendant had sold the coat by suggesting this was the basis for Officer Boucher\u2019s knowledge of defendant\u2019s identity. The trial court sustained the objection and immediately ordered the jury to disregard the matter. The court further instructed the jury that the opening statements and closing arguments of the attorneys were not to be considered as evidence. IPI Criminal No. 1.03.\nThe State\u2019s reply to the failure to show defendant sold the coat was invited by the defense comment. (People v. Benedik (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 306, 311, 307 N.E.2d 382.) Moreover, Officer Boucher had testified that he obtained arrest warrants for both Hooper and defendant before either was taken into custody.\nWe are of the opinion that the substance of the comments and the trial court\u2019s prompt action in this regard negate a claim of reversible error. (See People v. Stephens (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 971, 980, 310 N.E.2d 824.) The record does not establish that the opening and closing arguments, either individually; or collectively, denied defendant a fair trial.\nWhile defendant relies on People v. Rogers (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 499, 356 N.E.2d 413, to support his position that the State committed reversible error by its response to defense counsel\u2019s comments concerning witnesses to defendant\u2019s sale of the victim\u2019s coat, we find that decision is distinguishable. The defendant in Rogers was convicted of aggravated battery involving an alleged incident of child beating. The State introduced several items of clothing and a sheet which contained bloodstains. No foundation, however, was established that the bloodstained clothing was worn by the child at the time of the incident or that the blood type of stains on these items was that of the child. In the State\u2019s arguments to the jury, it emphasized the relevant nature of these items. The State also commented that the clothing was removed from the victim at the hospital and chemical tests showed the stains on the clothing were of the victim\u2019s blood type. The State informed the jury that this evidence showed defendant was lying when he denied beating the child. However, the appellate court noted that neither statement concerning the physical evidence was supported by the record. The appellate court held such unsworn statements by the State were prejudicial and concluded that the cumulative effect of such errors required a new trial.\nIn the present case the purported impropriety of the State\u2019s comment in its rebuttal argument, which was made in response to defendant\u2019s argument, does not approach the conduct condemned in the Rogers opinion. The State in the present case did not seek to affirmatively use improper matters and ascribe to them evidentiary significance. The State merely responded to defendant\u2019s criticism which was directed to the lack of evidence against him. And, as noted, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection and directed the jury to disregard the matter. Under such circumstances, Rogers is clearly inapplicable.\nDefendant maintains he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain a conviction even when subject to infirmities of promises of leniency. (People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 537, 544-45, 293 N.E.2d 600.) In this case Hooper\u2019s testimony established defendant\u2019s guilt. While defendant denied his participation, the resolution of the conflicting testimony and the witnesses\u2019 credibility was for the jury to decide; and we cannot say a reasonable doubt of guilt is established by the record. People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 456, 343 N.E.2d 489.\nHowever, defendant suggests that testimony introduced by the State in rebuttal was improper because it was offered to impeach him on a collateral matter. Hooper testified on direct examination in the State\u2019s case-in-chief that he knew defendant for several years. During direct and cross-examination defendant denied ; knowing Hooper, although he admitted he may have seen Hooper on two occasions. In rebuttal, Hooper testified he participated with defendant in athletic activities, and a schoolteacher and park employee generally substantiated Hooper\u2019s testimony concerning his prior acquaintance with defendant. We do hot find this testimony was improper. The evidence showed Hooper was asked by defendant and two others to accompany them upstairs after the victim. Hooper\u2019s prior acquaintance with defendant and the other men would tend to explain the reason he did so and acceded to their request. It also established a basis for Hooper to identify defendant as one of the persons with him. Finally, it directly challenged the credibility of defendant\u2019s claim that he was not acquainted with Hooper and had only seen him on two occasions.\nDefendant argues that the jury\u2019s failure to return a verdict on the charge of murder is legally inconsistent with its finding him guilty of armed robbery when the victim was allegedly shot by him. He has relied on People v. Dawson (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 150, 310 N.E.2d 800, to support his position. However, the supreme court reversed that decision (60 Ill. 2d 278, 326 N.E.2d 755) and it quoted extensively from a Federal Court of Appeals decision which approved the historic function of the jury to exercise leniency even though such determination would result in inconsistent verdicts. (See also People v. Ellis (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 766, 769, 350 N.E.2d 265.) The failure of the jury to render a verdict on the murder charge does not necessitate the conclusion that the guilty verdict for armed robbery was improper.\nThe record presents no basis to conclude reversible error was committed. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and BUA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Bradley and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPENCER PARKS (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 60503\nOpinion filed May 2, 1977.\nPaul Bradley and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 87, "last_page_order": 91 }