{ "id": 5636393, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD VAN CURA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Van Cura", "decision_date": "1977-06-08", "docket_number": "No. 76-238", "first_page": "157", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 157" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2941675 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5342287 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594840 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5231684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/32/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 343, "char_count": 4710, "ocr_confidence": 0.884, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1937534806541356e-07, "percentile": 0.5919688754054773 }, "sha256": "3a0be48421d7f60db5203dd7690f92ae3d5aa833eb82bebbbac8a44bbf65e90f", "simhash": "1:969439527a7596a9", "word_count": 768 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:40.599780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD VAN CURA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BOYLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Richard Van Cura, was convicted of the offense of unlawful use of driver\u2019s license (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95/2, par. 6 \u2014 301) by a jury in Ogle County, Illinois. He appeals, asserting that the complaint failed to allege a knowing or intentional act, or any mental state, which, defendant contends, is required for the violation.\nThe facts are that defendant, Van Cura, was notified by the Illinois Secretary of State that a previous revocation of Van Cura\u2019s driver\u2019s license was terminated and that he was eligible to reapply for a driver\u2019s license. Defendant contends he went to Springfield and applied, but was told by letter that he must file proof of financial responsibility, which he did. It then developed that there were outstanding bond forfeitures which precluded a full-purpose driver\u2019s license being issued, but which would not preclude a restricted driver\u2019s license. Defendant contends that he received a restricted driver\u2019s license in the mail some months later and that this is the document which gives rise to the instant case.\nThe State called as a witness the supervisor of the Restricted Driver\u2019s License Section of the Illinois Secretary of State\u2019s Office, who testified that the restricted license was not issued by that office and that the \u201clicense\u201d had several material differences which made it conclusive to him that it could not have been so issued. Among other differences, the nonrepeating sequential serial number was that of another restricted driver\u2019s license issued to an entirely different person, and a copy of that other restricted driver\u2019s license was admitted into evidence.\nThe restricted driver\u2019s license purportedly issued to Van Cura contained restrictions as hours, area and purposes of driving and bore a printed signature of the Secretary of State, but the supervisor-witness testified that it was not typed in the Secretary of State\u2019s Office.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to 364 days in the county jail.\nDefendant\u2019s position that intent or knowledge is an essential element\" in a charge of unlawful use of driver\u2019s license is not well taken. While no cases have interpreted this precise statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 301), it is well settled that one may be guilty of an offense without having knowledge or intent if the statute defining that offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. (People v. Foster (1961), 32 Ill. App. 2d 462, 178 N.E.2d 402.) In cases of driving a motor vehicle while operator\u2019s license is revoked (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 303) there is absolute liability. As such, mental state as defined in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 4 \u2014 3 through 4 \u2014 7) is not part of the offense. In People v. Espenscheid (1969), 109 Ill. App. 2d 107, Ill, 249 N.E.2d 866, 868, the court stated:\n\u201cThe only intention necessary to render a person hable to a penalty for a violation of the automobile law is the doing of the act prohibited.\u201d\nSimilarly, in another case involving driving while operator\u2019s license is suspended, the court said:\n\u201c * * * The defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge, moral turpitude, or motive is immaterial on the question of guilt. The only intention necessary to render a person hable to a penalty for violation of the automobile law is the doing of the act prohibited.\u201d People v. Strode (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 697, 698, 300 N.E.2d 323, 325. See also People v. Witvoet (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 375, 317 N.E.2d 292.\nThere is no merit to defendant\u2019s interposed defense of lack of mental state. Accordingly, his raised objections to two instructions on that subject are without merit, and we, thus, do not reach the procedural question of whether that instructions issue was properly preserved for review.\nDefendant has argued that there was an incumbency on the State to prove exactly how defendant came into possession of the fictitious driver\u2019s license. This position is erroneous, of course, and since the elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, does not warrant discussion.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BOYLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Canfield Law Offices, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Peter Woods, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis Perko, Martin Moltz, James E. Hinterlong, and Robert M. Hansen, all of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD VAN CURA, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-238\nOpinion filed June 8, 1977.\nCanfield Law Offices, of Rockford, for appellant.\nPeter Woods, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis Perko, Martin Moltz, James E. Hinterlong, and Robert M. Hansen, all of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0157-01", "first_page_order": 179, "last_page_order": 182 }