{
  "id": 5636174,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAINDRIVE CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Chaindrive Corp.",
  "decision_date": "1977-06-09",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 76-595, 76-596 cons.",
  "first_page": "564",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:40.599780+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAINDRIVE CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThese consolidated appeals are taken from two bench trials. Defendants, John O\u2019Donnell and Chaindrive Corporation were jointly tried and convicted of two violations of section 14 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act for failing to pay wages to their employees. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 39\u00bd \u2014 14.) Each was assessed fines totalling *460 respectively. Defendants assert that (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant their motions to dismiss at the conclusion of the State\u2019s cases-in-chief; and (2) they were not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe reverse the decision of the trial court.\nIn General Number 76-595, Mrs. Kristen Innocenti testified that she was employed by the corporate defendant to be its restaurant manager in March 1, 1975. Her duties included the hiring of a restaurant staff. She retained this position until her termination on June 21, 1975. She had received her salary except for the final week\u2019s payment of *250. Many of her checks were issued late, and she understood from her conversations with John O\u2019Donnell that the corporate defendant was in financial difficulty.\nJohn O\u2019Donnell, the president of the corporate defendant, confirmed Mrs. Innocenti\u2019s employment but stated that she had been told her employment would cease on June 15, 1975. He claimed the corporation was unable to meet its payroll obligations, and the final paychecks issued to the employees came from personal funds, which had been placed in another corporation\u2019s account upon which the paychecks were made payable. The record also shows the restaurant was closed due to remodeling during the time in question and that it did not commence business thereafter.\nIn General Number 76-596 Melvin Shaw testified that he was employed as a cook by Mrs. Innocenti on June 2, 1975, at a salary of *200 per week. However, until the restaurant opened he was to receive only one-half that amount. Because the restaurant was undergoing construction he worked as a painter until June 21, 1975, when he received his only paycheck which was for an amount *175 less than owed him. The check he received was not drawn upon the corporate defendant\u2019s account. Rather the check stub indicated the money had been loaned to the corporation by an individual. Shaw indicated he had heard O\u2019Donnell inform the court that the corporation\u2019s debt amounted to *140,000.\nJohn O\u2019Donnell reiterated his testimony given at the previous trial, and he again informed the court that the corporation was unable to pay.\nSection 14 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act provides in part:\n\u201cAny employer or any agent of an employer, who, being able to pay wages * * * wilfully refuses to pay 0 0 0 with intent to secure for himself or other person any underpayment of such indebtedness or with intent to annoy, harass, oppress, hinder, delay or defraud the person to whom such indebtedness is due * * * is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 39\u00bd \u2014 14.\nWhile the date which Shaw and Mrs. Innocent! were terminated from employment was disputed, defendants concede evidence was adduced that defendants failed to pay wages during the period of June 15-21,1975. However, they assert the State did not show the corporation was able to pay and wilfully refused to pay with the necessary intent to deprive its employees of their wages.\nWe need not discuss the propriety of the trial court\u2019s denials of defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s cases-in-chief. These motions were predicated upon the lack of evidence presented by the State to sustain its evidentiary burden. Defendants\u2019 subsequent presentations of evidence in each instance waives consideration of this matter. People v. Washington (1962), 23 Ill. 2d 546, 548, 179 N.E.2d 635.\nThe State is under the obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense charged. In accord with the terms of section 14 it must show that the corporate defendant was able to pay and that it wilfully refused to pay. Cf. People v. Harder (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 563, 567, 322 N.E.2d 470.\nThe records in both cases strongly suggest that the corporate defendant was unable to pay. It is undisputed that both Mrs. Innocent! and Melvin Shaw were employed in preparation of the opening of the restaurant to be operated by the corporate defendant. However, the restaurant never opened. Mrs. Innocent! testified that she knew the restaurant was having financial difficulty and John O\u2019Donnell indicated that her last paycheck came from personal funds placed in another corporation\u2019s account upon which the check was payable. Melvin Shaw\u2019s testimony showed that his check was made possible by a loan to the corporation from another individual. Moreover, the record establishes that the corporate defendant was in substantial debt. These factors demonstrate the inability of the corporate defendant to pay which negates the element of wilfullness for nonpayment.\nWe reject the State\u2019s position that the reasonable inference exists that the corporate defendant could pay and wilfully withheld payment because it did not introduce records to disprove this matter. A defendant\u2019s failure to introduce evidence which is within his control is not substantial proof of the offense; but when considered in conjunction with other evidence; it may permit an unfavorable inference against defendant. (See People v. Blakes (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 354, 359, 348 N.E.2d 170.) However, as noted, there was no other evidence upon which to base a conclusion that the disputed wages could be paid.\nAccordingly, the judgments of the circuit court are reversed.\nJudgments reversed.\nDIERINGER, P. J., and ROMITI, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Arthur J. Frank, of Chicago (Frank Associates, Ltd., of counsel), for appellants.",
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mary F. Stafford, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAINDRIVE CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNos. 76-595, 76-596 cons.\nOpinion filed June 9, 1977.\nArthur J. Frank, of Chicago (Frank Associates, Ltd., of counsel), for appellants.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mary F. Stafford, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0564-01",
  "first_page_order": 586,
  "last_page_order": 589
}