{ "id": 5639397, "name": "ROOSEVELT-WABASH CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY J. FORNELLI, Director of the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Roosevelt-Wabash Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Fornelli", "decision_date": "1977-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 62865", "first_page": "896", "last_page": "903", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 896" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 U.S. 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6137873 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/306/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609477 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2802380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314083 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12050959 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2935104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5113410 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/351/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1599851 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/103/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391582 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 F.2d 787", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3692589 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/142/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 N.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 Ill. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2490361 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/384/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 645", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11723248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "405 Ill. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2628809 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/405/0108-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 715, "char_count": 15364, "ocr_confidence": 0.883, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3689579213242296e-07, "percentile": 0.6379028275393662 }, "sha256": "6237656a633d07fe20a614d5db36ed29d25afed61cf396a0afaae70c61ce4220", "simhash": "1:d9a72d7fa647f5c4", "word_count": 2384 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:40.599780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROOSEVELT-WABASH CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY J. FORNELLI, Director of the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Anthony J. Fomelli, Director of the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions (Director), approved the application of defendant, 1015 South State Currency Exchange, for a community currency exchange license pursuant to the Currency Exchange Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 16\u00bd, pars. 30 through 56.3.) Plaintiff, Roosevelt-Wabash Currency Exchange, Inc., filed an amended complaint to review the Director\u2019s action pursuant to the Administrative Review Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) Plaintiff appeals from the order granting the Director\u2019s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.\nPlaintiff contends that it was entitied to a hearing before the Director, that it has standing to seek administrative review under the Administrative Review Act, and that it has a right to judicial review. We affirm.\nPlaintiff in the amended complaint alleged that it received a letter from the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions \u201crequesting its observation and remarks with respect to the introduction of a currency exchange at * * * 1015 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois\u201d; that in response it submitted lengthy objections attached to the complaint, which stated that the proposed location was previously occupied by another currency exchange which ceased operating about mid-1973, that the issuance of a currency exchange license to the applicant at the location would adversely affect the financial stability of plaintiff\u2019s currency exchange, and urged the Director\u2019s serious consideration. The amended complaint further alleged that notwithstanding numerous requests the Director advised that plaintiff was not entitled to any form of hearing before the Department; that plaintiff was advised on March 7, 1975, that the Director had approved the application; that the decision is arbitrary, capricious and a denial of due process of law, equal protection and right of confrontation and cross-examination; that plaintiff will on information and belief lose approximately 25 percent of its business and become financially impaired. The amended complaint prayed that the decision \u201cdenying plaintiff its statutory entitlements to continued stability, be reversed.\u201d The Director\u2019s motion to dismiss the amended complaint alleged that plaintiff lacked standing, the absence of jurisdiction under the Administrative Review Act, and the failure of the amended complaint to state a cause of action.\nOpinion\nPlaintiff initially contends that as an existing licensee it was entitled to a hearing before the Director on the application for a license by a potential competitor. We disagree.\nAs to matters purely statutory in origin, whatever rights the parties may have to a hearing emanates from the statute. (Asche v. Rosenfield (1950), 405 Ill. 108, 89 N.E.2d 885.) Due process does not necessitate a hearing in every case of government impairment of a private interest. (Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208.) As a competitor, plaintiff has no direct interest in the matter which would give rise to a specific right to be heard. American Surety Co. v. Jones (1943), 384 Ill. 222, 51 N.E.2d 122.\nThe Currency Exchange Act in section 4.1 (par. 34.1) in pertinent part provides:\n\u201cUpon receipt of an application for a license \u00b0 * \u00b0, the Director shall investigate the need of the community for the establishment of a community currency exchange at the location specified in the application.\n* * * If the issuance of a license \u201d \u201d \u201d will not promote the convenience and advantage of the community in which the business of the applicant is proposed to be conducted, then the application shall be denied.\u201d\nSection 4 (par. 34) specifies the necessary information to be provided in the application, and section 10 (par. 40) specifies the requisite qualifications of an applicant, and of its officers and directors if a corporation, to be vouched for by two reputable citizens.\nThe above section 4.1 (par. 34.1) clearly imposes no duty on the Director to hold hearings, make findings or to prepare or file a written order or decision in initially passing on the application. It is significant that the Currency Exchange Act expressly provides for hearings before the Director in only two instances relative to licensing: (1) upon written request of an applicant whose application has been denied (par. 40), and (2) where the Director proposes to revoke a license previously issued (par. 45). The requirement of section 4.1 (par. 34.1) to investigate does not mandate a quasijudicial hearing. Instead, the term \u201cinvestigate\u201d is approriate as to a nonjudicial function of an administrative agency for a general one-sided presentation of issues without issues drawn, and \u201chearing\u201d is appropriate to quasijudicial proceedings which include parties, issues of law and fact, and at which parties are entitled to be present, participate, and obtain records of the proceedings. (See Bowles v. Raer (7th Cir. 1944), 142 F.2d 787, and generally, 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law \u00a7\u00a7257 and 414 (1962); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Rodies and Procedure \u00a787 (1951).) Section 4.1 (par. 34.1) in no respect allows anyone or any interested person to intervene or object in the Directors initial investigation and processing of the application. Specifically, nowhere in the Currency Exchange Act is an existing currency exchange operator given the right to object or to demand a hearing thereon.\nThe Director\u2019s solicitation in the instant case of plaintiffs \u201cobservations and remarks with respect to the introduction of a currency exchange at the [proposed] address\u201d was incident to the information-gathering process under the Director\u2019s duty to investigate. Neither the characterization by plaintiff of its response as objections nor the one-sided investigation in which the views were presented elevate the investigation process to a hearing in which plaintiff did or could participate as a party. There was no duty to hold a hearing in initially acting upon the application.\nPlaintiff contends that the approval of the Director in the instant case was a final decision reviewable under section 2 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 265) and, being an objector to the approval, it had standing to file an action for administrative review. Plaintiff is mistaken. Section 22.01 (par. 52.1) of the Currency Exchange Act states:\n\u201cAll final administrative decisions of the Director hereunder shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of the \u2018Administrative Review Act\u2019 * * *. The term \u2018administrative decision\u2019 is defined as in section 1 of the \u2018Administrative Review Act\u2019. The person seeking judicial review shall pay to the Director the cost of preparing and certifying the record of proceedings before the Director.\u201d\nSection 1 of the Administrative Review Act in part by definition states:\n\u201c \u2018Administrative decision\u2019 or \u2018decision\u2019 means any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d\nThe Administrative Review Act governs judicial review of a final decision of an administrative agency where the act created or conferring powers on the agency provides such manner of review by express reference. (Wilkins v. Department of Public Aid (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 88, 280 N.E.2d 706.) The Administrative Review Act does not purport to give an independent remedy or create a new cause of action, but when adopted merely provides a method of review. (Chicago Transit Authority v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1968), 103 Ill. App. 2d 329, 243 N.E.2d 638.) The words in Administrative Review Act \u201cfor review of decisions which terminate proceedings\u201d contemplate an administrative process which presents an issue for hearing and disposition by an impartial trial agency. People ex rel. Vestuto v. O\u2019Connor (1953), 351 Ill. App. 539, 115 N.E.2d 810.\nThe above section 22.01 (par. 52.1) adopted the Administrative Review Act as to administrative decisions of the Director but expressly limited the scope of \u201cadministrative decisions\u201d to the definition set forth in section 1 of the Administrative Review Act. Relative thereto, it also expressly contemplates a \u201crecord of proceedings\u201d for the purposes of such review. The term \u201cproceeding\u201d utilized in section 1 of the Administrative Review Act consistently contemplates an administrative process which presents an issue for hearing and disposition by the Director acting as an impartial agency. In the initial action upon an application, section 4.1 (par. 34.1) of the Currency Exchange Act does not require the Director to prepare and keep on file a written order or decision which contains findings and reasons supporting his action. This is in direct contrast to such requirements imposed by section 10 (par. 40) of the Currency Exchange Act where the Director has denied an application both initially and then following a requested statutory hearing, and by section 15 (par. 45) when the Director is acting to revoke a license. The expression in the latter two sections and the omission to so require under section 4.1 (par. 34.1) indicates a legislative intent not to impose such requirements in the Director\u2019s original execution of an application for license. We conclude that the Director\u2019s approval of the instant application is not a decision, order or determination within the scope of section 22.01 (par. 52.1) of the Currency Exchange Act. Furthermore, under the Administrative Review Act the right to review a final administrative decision is limited to the parties of record to the original proceeding before the agency. (Lake County Contractors Association v. Pollution Control Board (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 16, 294 N.E.2d 259.) It clearly appears that the initial processing of the instant application by the Director was not a \u201cproceeding\u201d nor was plaintiff a party thereto within the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. Neither has the Administrative Review Act been adopted relative to the initial execution of the Director in passing upon applications for license. Where approval is granted and no denial had previously been made by the Director, there is no hearing or proceedings from which administrative review will lie under the Administrative Review Act. Plaintiff has no standing to maintain an action for administrative review.\nPlaintiff further contends that it has a right to judicial review because it is an existing licensee with a statutorily vested competitive interest which is protected from arbitrary interference. It is to be noted that plaintiff in the prior contention claimed a right to administrative review under the Administrative Review Act. To support its right to bring this action, plaintiff cites Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp (1970), 397 U.S. 150, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184, 90 S. Ct. 827, to establish that the tests for standing are (1) whether the challenged action has caused a party injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and (2) whether the interests sought to be protected by a party are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaranty in question. Plaintiff argues that one of the objectives of the Currency Exchange Act is to assure the financial stability of existing currency exchanges by legislating against the very competition adverse to a licensee\u2019s financial stability which plaintiff here seeks to protect, citing Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts (1953), 414 Ill. 89, 110 N.E.2d 234, and Durchslag v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 549, 152 N.E.2d 828. However, plaintiff\u2019s reliance on these two cases is misplaced.\nWhile the Director in his investigation may properly consider the potential effect upon existing facilities (Durchslag v. Smith), the test established under section 4.1 (par. 34.1) of the Currency Exchange Act for the grant or denial of a license to engage in the currency exchange business is the convenience and advantage of the cummunity to be serviced by the proposed exchange; the test is not whether the financial stability of existing exchanges in the area will be impaired. (Thillens, Inc. v. Department of Financial Institutions (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 110, 180 N.E.2d 494.) Section 4.1 (par. 34.1) does not prohibit individuals from establishing and operating currency exchange businesses not detrimental to the public but does provide a means to insure safe financial practices, the limitation of licenses being merely incidental to the regulation of such business; the prime test is the \u201cconvenience and advantage of the community.\u201d (Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts.) The financial impairment or lack of impairment of plaintiffs existing currency exchange business has not been accepted as a criteria. (See Forty-Seventh & Cicero Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Montgomery (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 811, 310 N.E.2d 741 (abstract).) It is well established that freedom from lawful competition is not constitutionally protected. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1939), 306 U.S. 118, 83 L. Ed. 543, 59 S. Ct. 366.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court in Thillens has construed the Currency Exchange Act as having the interests of the public within the purposes or objects which are to be protected and regulated by the statute rather than the rights of any existing licensees. Section 29 (par. 56.2) does declare the operation of an unlicensed exchange, and the unlawful conduct or operation of a licensed exchange, to constitute unfair competition with licensed and legally operated exchanges doing business in the same community for which any licensee legally operating in the same community may obtain an injunction against such unfair competition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 16\u00bd, par. 56.2.) However, plaintiff as an exchange licensee under the Currency Exchange Act does not otherwise have any exclusive franchise, territorial nor other rights, as to any other lawfully operating licensed competitor. In view of the prior determination by the Illinois Supreme Court we reject plaintiffs contention that its interests are arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by CCEA. Freedom from lawful competition is not a vested right entitling plaintiff to judicial review. (American Surety Co. v. Jones.) We need not consider the other test set forth in Data Processing. Plaintiff has not stated a proper cause of action to invoke judicial review of the Director\u2019s approval of the instant application for license.\nFor the above reasons the order of dismissal entered by the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rosenthal & Camow, of Chicago (Donald S. Camow and Joseph D. Palmisano, of counsel), for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (John D. Whitenack, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Department of Financial Institutions." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROOSEVELT-WABASH CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY J. FORNELLI, Director of the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 62865\nOpinion filed May 27, 1977.\nRosenthal & Camow, of Chicago (Donald S. Camow and Joseph D. Palmisano, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (John D. Whitenack, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Department of Financial Institutions." }, "file_name": "0896-01", "first_page_order": 918, "last_page_order": 925 }