{
  "id": 2528576,
  "name": "Richard Wooley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Cohoon, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wooley v. Cohoon",
  "decision_date": "1972-05-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 71-23",
  "first_page": "607",
  "last_page": "609",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 607"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 323,
    "char_count": 4659,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.755,
    "sha256": "d2ed0d4acd9dbfec4acd6abd126ee6f304712d93c4ce9bf934b338d6015f2e61",
    "simhash": "1:a810cee8179711e9",
    "word_count": 761
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:48.814564+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Richard Wooley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Cohoon, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CREBS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case involves an automobile accident and personal injuries on a rainy, foggy November 15, 1968, in East Alton. Defendant Cohoon turned his car left onto Main Street from St. Louis Avenue and Plaintiff Wooley, in his pickup truck, hit the right rear of the Defendant\u2019s car. The Defendant\u2019s car then hit Harold May\u2019s car which was stopped on Main Street pursuant to a yield sign, waiting to turn onto St. Louis Avenue.\nPlaintiff sued Defendant for bodily injury resulting from the accident. Plaintiff had also received injuries in an accident previous to this accident. The jury returned a verdict for the Defendant and Plaintiff has appealed.\nPlaintiff seeks a reversal because the court refused to grant his motion for a continuance. Plaintiff sought a continuance because May, the only independent eye witness to the accident, was in the Armed Forces in Colorado and was not available at the time of trial.\nThe granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the court. Only an abuse of discretion is grounds for a reversal. To justify a continuance, the moving party needs to show not only that there is an absence of some material evidence but also due diligence on his part to obtain it. Here tire Plaintiff knew the trial was originally set for July, 1970. The accident had occurred on November 15, 1968. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated that he told Plaintiff\u2019s attorney in April, 1970 that the witness was no longer in the area and suggested taking his deposition. Five days before the trial began both attorneys announced ready. May had been in the Armed Forces for several months and Plaintiff\u2019s attorney had had no contact with him during that time which immediately preceded his announcing ready for trial. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney did not specifically deny defense counsel\u2019s statement that he advised him of May\u2019s absence in April. He stated he did not remember being so advised. He also stated that someone told him about a month earlier that May was still in the area but he did not recall who this individual was. Plaintiff did not attempt to subpoena the witness until October 13, 1970, the day before the trial. The facts do not show due diligence and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Plaintiff\u2019s motion for a continuance.\nPlaintiff also maintains that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Each party\u2019s testimony disclosed a different version of the circumstances surrounding the accident. The jury is not bound to accept either account of what occurred. From these facts we cannot say that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Also, the Plaintiff\u2019s admission that he was traveling at the maximum allowable speed under adverse conditions and that his vehicle skidded when he applied the brakes would have been sufficient for the jury to have found him contributorily negligent.\nPlaintiff further asserts that the court committed reversible error concerning equally balanced evidence. During the voir dire examination the Judge, when questioning a juror, asked if the juror would find for the Defendant if the evidence was equally balanced. Any incorrect impression that statement may have been made was corrected by Plaintiff\u2019s instruction concerning Plaintiff s burden of proof coupled with the instruction defining burden of proof.\nFinally, the Plaintiff alleges that the trial judge committed reversible error when he asked the attorneys if they wanted to offer the Defendant\u2019s discovery deposition into evidence bcause it is the best evidence. The Plaintiff objected and the Judge then made the following statement: \u201cLadies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I don\u2019t want you to get the impression someone doesn\u2019t want to offer the deposition. I merely asked the question if both of the attorneys wanted to submit the deposition by agreement, I would permit that to be done. Technically, depositions cannot be entered into evidence without agreement. So that is the reason Mr. Shaikewitz objected. He didn\u2019t understand the basis of my question. I think you all understand there is no wish on his part to keep any information from going before the jury.\u201d It would have been better if the remark had not been made, but in view of all the circumstances, we find it was not reversible error.\nJudgment affirmed.\nEBERSPACHER, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CREBS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wiseman, Shaikewitz & McGivern, of Alton, (Richard Shaikewitz, of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "John W. Hoefert, of Alton, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Richard Wooley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Cohoon, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 71-23;\nFifth District\nMay 4, 1972.\nWiseman, Shaikewitz & McGivern, of Alton, (Richard Shaikewitz, of counsel,) for appellant.\nJohn W. Hoefert, of Alton, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0607-01",
  "first_page_order": 629,
  "last_page_order": 631
}