{
  "id": 5640296,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. GREEN, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Green",
  "decision_date": "1977-07-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 77-31",
  "first_page": "980",
  "last_page": "983",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 980"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 392",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2855718
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    {
      "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 177",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2898222
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "181"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:01:05.304449+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. GREEN, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, William A. Green, was charged with unlawful use of weapons in violation of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)). Evidence introduced at the bench trial established that defendant was carrying a concealed pellet gun in his vehicle at the time he was apprehended.\nOfficer Robert Zujewski testified that the gun was a .177-caliber pellet gun, which the officer said the defendant told him was used for hunting rabbits. The gun fired .177-caliber pellets of a \u201cround tubular\u201d configuration, by expulsion of pumped up air. The officer testified that he test fired the gun into a piece of fiberboard at the police station.\nAt the close of this evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the basis of his contention that the weapon in question was not a \u201cfirearm\u201d within the definition of section 1.1(1) of \u201cAn Act relating to the acquisition, possession * * * of firearms * * *\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 1.1(1)). This motion was denied and the defendant found guilty. The court found that since the projectile expelled by the gun was not \u201cglobular,\u201d but was, in fact, \u201ctubular\u201d and flat headed, the gun was a firearm under the meaning of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4). The defendant was fined *100 and a notice of appeal was filed. The pertinent statutory provisions are as follows:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:\n(4) Carries concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver or other firearm.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24-l(a)(4)\nSection 1.1 of \u201cAn Act relating to the acquisition, possession * * * of firearms * * *\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 1.1(1)) states:\n\u201cFor purposes of this Act:\n\u2018Firearm\u2019 means any device, by whatever name known, which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas; excluding, however:\n(1) any pneumatic gun, spring gun, or B-B gun which expels a single globular projectile not exceeding .18 inch in diameter.\u201d\nSection 1 of \u201cAn Act * * * regulating * * * air rifles\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 82 \u2014 1(1)) defines an air rifle as follows:\n\u201cAs used in this Act:\n(1) \u2018Air rifle\u2019 means and includes any air gun, air pistol, spring gun, spring pistol, B-B gun, pellet gun or any implement that is not a firearm which impels a pellet constructed of hard plastic, steel, lead or other hard materials with a force that reasonably is expected to cause bodily harm.\u201d\nWhile it is acknowledged by defendant that the pellet gun involved in this case does not discharge a \u201cglobular\u201d projectile, defendant nonetheless argues that the pellet gun here was not a firearm within the meaning of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)). In support of this contention defendant makes two points: (1) the pellet gun involved in this case is an air rifle as described in section 1 of \u201cAn Act \u00b0 * * regulating * * * air rifles 0 0 \u201d\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 82 \u2014 1(1) and not a firearm as described in section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)); and (2) that the construction urged by the State, that would permit the pellet gun in this case to be a firearm under the unlawful use of weapons statute, would permit many type of air or spring guns which expel projectiles such as darts, corks, and even water which are not \u201cglobular\u201d to be firearms.\nDefendant\u2019s first point is that the pellet gun in question was an air rifle and not a firearm. \u201cFirearm\u201d is defined in section 1.1(1) of \u201cAn Act relating to the acquisition, possession \u00b0 * \u00b0 of firearms \u00b0 # as: \u201c \u00b0 \u201d \u00b0 any device, by whatever name known, which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas; excluding, however: (1) any pneumatic gun, spring gun, or B-B gun which expels a single globular projectile not exceeding .18 inch in diameter.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 1.1(1).) \u201cAir rifle\u201d as defined in section 1(1) of \u201cAn Act 6 6 \u00b0 regulating \u00b0 0 \u00b0 air rifles \u00b0 \u00b0\n\u201c* * \u00b0 includes any air gun, air pistol, spring gun, spring pistol, B-B gun, pellet gun or any implement that is not a firearm which impels a pellet constructed of hard plastic, steel, lead or other hard materials with a force that reasonably is expected to cause bodily harm.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 82 \u2014 1(1).\nIn this court\u2019s opinion, the modifying phrase that is not a firearm is intended to apply to the entire preceding collection of weaponry. Thus, an air rifle under the statute includes any \u201cpellet gun * * * that is not a firearm.\u201d The question, then, is whether defendant\u2019s gun in this case was a firearm. Referring to the definition of a firearm, noted above, it is apparent that defendant\u2019s weapon is a firearm because it does not fall within the excluded language because it does not fire a \u201cglobular\u201d projectile. Defendant\u2019s contention fails.\nThe second point made by defendant is that the interpretation of the statute employed by the State results in absurd consequences. Defendant also argues that if his weapon is a \u201cfirearm\u201d numerous other objects, including certain children\u2019s toys such as cork and dart guns would be \u201cfirearms\u201d under the statute. As noted, by the State, absurd constructions of legislative enactments are not favored. (People v. Hudson (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 177, 181.) The weapon with which defendant was found brings this case within the core meaning of the definition of firearms in section 1.1(1) of \u201cAn Act relating to the acquisition, possession * * * of firearms \u2022 * *\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 1.1(1)). Possible misapplications of statutory language are irrelevant, given the facts before the court in this case. The same principle is in effect acknowledged in the context of due process (vagueness) interpretation of statutes in the conclusion that \u201c constitutionality of a statute \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 is not dependent on its susceptibility of misapplication.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, 397.) Defendant, having clearly fallen within the reach of the statute, may not object, on the basis of absurd applications of the statute, to the reach of statutory proscriptions.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is therefore affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and BOYLE, JJ, concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ralph Ruebner, Peter B. Nolte, and Michael Mulder, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "William J. Cowlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-31\nOpinion filed July 28, 1977.\nRalph Ruebner, Peter B. Nolte, and Michael Mulder, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Cowlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0980-01",
  "first_page_order": 1002,
  "last_page_order": 1005
}