{
  "id": 3385681,
  "name": "THE CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN LAWRENTZ, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Naperville v. Lawrentz",
  "decision_date": "1977-08-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 76-561",
  "first_page": "798",
  "last_page": "800",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 798"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5426498
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      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "133"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:54.645684+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN LAWRENTZ, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was issued an Illinois citation and complaint charging him with speeding in violation of local ordinance 13-322 of the City of Naperville. A notice to appear was specified in the citation pursuant to section 107 \u2014 12(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 12(a)). Upon defendant\u2019s failure to appear on the specified trial date the city moved for an ex parte judgment. The court denied the motion and on its own motion dismissed the case for failure to apply the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 526 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 526). The rule as applicable provides generally that \u201ca person arrested for a traffic offense and personally served by the arresting officer with a traffic ticket\u201d shall post the specified cash bail, his driver\u2019s license, or an approved bond certificate. The city appeals contending that the preset bail provisions of the rule do not apply when an offender has been noticed to appear in lieu of an arrest.\nThe defendant has not appeared in this court. We therefore review the appeal pursuant to the direction outlined in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).\nWe review the issues: (1) Whether the preset bail provisions of Supreme Court Rule 526 are mandatory and thus must be applied to the exclusion of serving the defendant instead with a notice to appear; and (2) whether the failure to apply the bond requirements of Supreme Court Rule 526 when there is no arrest authorizes dismissal of the case. We conclude that each question must be answered in the negative and therefore reverse.\nThe preset bail provisions found in Supreme Court Rule 526 are for the purpose of avoiding delay and freeing certain offenders when in the judgment of the officer who makes an arrest it is not practical because of the hour or the circumstances to bring the offender before a judge. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, pars. 506 to 525, Committee Comments, at 15 (Smith-Hurd 1976).) The Supreme Court Rule does not conflict with section 197 \u2014 12(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states that, \u201cWhenever a peace officer is authorized to arrest a person without a warrant he may instead issue to such person a notice to appear.\u201d The express purpose of the statutory provision is to:\n\u201c\u201c \u201c \u00b0 provide procedures for getting persons into court without the necessity and inconvenience of an immediate arrest. Of course, if the person does not obey the summons or Notice to Appear an arrest warrant may issue. \u00b0 c \u201d Illinois recognizes the Notice to Appear procedure in traffic and municipal ordinance violations e a e \u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 11, Committee Comments, at 210 (Smith-Hurd 1970).)\nSee also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95M, pars. 11 \u2014 610,16\u2014106; cf. People v. Palmer, 62 Ill. 2d 261, 266 (1976); People v. Brausam, 83 Ill. App. 2d 354, 363 (1967).\nThe provision of the supreme court for preset bonds when there is an arrest and the provision of the Criminal Code statute that a notice to appear may issue in lieu of an arrest are not inconsistent. They are alternative procedures for serving the convenience of both the offender and enforcement authorities. The alternative use of the notice to appear is also recognized in Supreme Court Rule 505 which relates to notice to offenders. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 505.) We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because of the city\u2019s nonuse of Supreme Court Rule 526.\nWe note that nothing in Supreme Court Rule 526 as applicable here, or as subsequently amended, however, authorizes the entry of an ex parte judgment for failure of the cited motorist to appear. In the event of nonappearance a summons or warrant of arrest would issue to give the court authority to proceed to judgment. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 12.\nThe case is remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings in accordance with law and not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nNASH and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.\nThe rule has been amended to substitute \u201ccitation and complaint\u201d for \u201ctraffic ticket\u201d and to increase the amount of cash bail. The Note preceding Supreme Court Rule 526 adds: \u201cNothing in these rules is intended to limit a peace officer\u2019s discretion to issue a Notice to Appear in an appropriate case.\u201d Order revising Illinois Supreme Court Rules 501 through 556 entered February 17, 1977 (66 Ill. 2d R. 526).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Francis J. Cuneo, of Naperville, for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN LAWRENTZ, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-561\nOpinion filed August 15, 1977.\nFrancis J. Cuneo, of Naperville, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0798-01",
  "first_page_order": 820,
  "last_page_order": 822
}